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Abstract 
Disruptive Innovation as a theory is often misunderstood and as a term it tacks clear definition. 
Moreover, there is an absence in existing research of a coherent framework to explain the 
qualitative factors that management practitioners face when attempting to pursue disruptive 
innovation as part of a balanced approach to innovation management. 
I 
In response to these problems, this thesis describes a researcher-led collaborative academic- 
industrial exploration of disruptive innovation. The research was conducted in three waves; first to 
generate an holistic appreciation of the organisational effort required in the pursuit of disruptive 
innovation; second to generate focus; third to explore a primary area of management action that 
constrains businesses to the pursuit of incrementalism. New qualitative knowledge was generated, 
based upon the experiences and insights of 127 industrialists from four case study organisations, 
11 experts and the researcher's observations over a 33 month period. 
Findings suggest that the theory of disruptive innovation fails to be translated into practice 
because managers lack an holistic appreciation of th e innovation agenda. When this is the case, 
disruptive opportunities invoke management cognitions that drive disruptive innovation rejection 
strategies. In effect, managers allow their prevailing mental models to dictate an imbalanced focus 
upon steady-state, sustaining innovation. However, it was found that such inhibitors can be 
challenged by the use of adjusted portfolio management approaches. The research is primarily 
exploratory and provides the basis for a new, more grounded understanding of the pursuit of 
disruptive innovation in average performing organisations. 
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1. Introduction 
q ea CS 5 The purpose of this chapter is to provide a back round and context to the res rch pr ented in thi 
thes& The chapter fl'r5t introduces the emergent and growing need for a focus of attention upon the 
topic of disruptive innovation, highlighting the gaps in knowledge that became the focus of the 
investigation, and detailing the resultant research objectives. The methodology chosen to address the 
research objectives is outlinedanda clear distinction is made as to what the thesis aims to achieve. The 
chapter closes with an overview of the thesis structure. 
CHAPTER AIMS ACTIVITIES OUTCOMES 
To provide an overview of this Summarised the background of the SL 5 background of the i Scene Settin 
thesis and an understanding tio t investigation, the research focus, 
of the thesis structure. tt the research design and the 
objectives. Thesis Structure 
1.1 Background 
It is well recogni5ed that periods of evolutionary change get punctuated by revolutionary 
transitions (Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Utterback, 1994; Schumpeter, 1975; Rogers, 1995). 
Technological and business model discontinuities that ignite new industries or change the rules of 
existing markets are not a new phenomenon; history is scattered with examples of major upheaval 
delivered because of technological, scientific or market shifts (Brockman, 2000; Kuhn, 1970; 
Tushman and O'Reilly, 1997). However, the issue at hand is that today's corporate leaders face the 
very factors that trigger these discontinuities at a rapidly increasing pace, and they find themselves 
increasingly threatened by the very real possibility that what they are good at today may be their 
downfall tomorrow (Abernathy and Clark, 1985; Chandy and Tellis, 2000; Christensen, 1997; 
Christensen and Raynor, 2003; Hamel, 2000). Today's successful business models are made 
redundant at a greater pace than ever, replaced by new propositions that were previously 
inconceivable (Hamel, 2000; Foster and Kaplan, 2001). 
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In 1967, Knight reported that "As a result of the rapid advances being made in science and 
technology, innovation has become a key component in today's society... this world of ours is a new 
world, in which the unity of knowledge, the nature of human communities, the order of society, the 
order of ideas, the very notions of society and culture have changed and will not return to what 
they have been in the past" (p136-137). In September 2003, at Stanford, the Institute for the 
Study of Accelerating Change acknowledged the continuation of this trend: "The rate of 
technological change has become dizzying, and it's only getting faster" (Sterling, 2004: 102). In 
these ever more turbulent and competitive environments the importance of innovation has never 
seemed so pertinent. 
Corporate leadership, therefore, faces a paradox (Kaplan 1999). Managers have to respond to 
operational challenges and quarterly or yearly revenue targets, which mandate a stringent focus 
upon short term results. However, our increasingly discontinuous world necessitates the far- 
sighted identification of revolutionary opportunities that might help to ensure long-term survival 
and growth of the enterprise. To survive in this world, executive management teams must ensure 
that they are directing 'ambidextrous organisations' (Tushman and O'Reilly, 1996) a category of 
organisation to which only a handful of enterprises have entered (Tushman and O'Reilly, 1996; 
Christensen and Raynor, 2003). To compound the issue, the world of emerging market 
opportunities and the pursuit of breakthrough innovation is considered to be a large and risky 
place, littered with failure (Kaplan 1999; Ahuja and Lampert, 2001). This puts a premium on better 
understanding the nature of innovation that can punctuate periods of evolutionary change and the 
factors that will enable or inhibit industrialists' attempts to deal with this phenomenon proactively. 
Organisational innovation effort is traditionally focused upon performance improvement in 
attributes most valued by the most demanding customers - those willing to pay higher prices. 
Thus, both incremental and radical innovations offer performance improvements within the 
dimensions and directions that lead-cu5tomers (McDonald et al, 2001) desire and expect (O'Connor 
and Rice, 2001; Rothwell, 1995; Christensen, 1997). Much of the world's research into the 
innovation agenda has focused upon these sustaining innovations - sustaining the traditional 
trajectories of development (Dosi, 1986). Research that has focused upon discontinuities that 
change this 'steady state' (Bessant and Francis, 2004), conventionally focuses upon discontinuities 
that offer revolutionary leaps forward in performance improvement, still in directions that lead- 
customers desire, but to extents that are not yet expected possible (Tushman and Anderson, 1986; 
Christensen, 1997; DeTienne and Koberg, 200i). These innovations are less understood, less 
technologically certain and therefore more financially risky; nonetheless Christensen (1997) argues 
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that these sorts of discontinuities are still sustaining innovations, as they are mostly delivered by 
cash rich industry leaders, thus. maintaining technological trajectories and competitive status quo. 
There is a form of discontinuity known as a disruptive innovation -a term first coined and then 
popularised by Harvard Business School's Clayton Christensen. A disruptive innovation is a 
discontinuity that changes the steady state but unlike the conventionally considered discontinuous 
innovations, it will change the rules of the game, disrupting the status quo and traditional 
trajectories of improvement (Christensen, 1997). 
Disruptive innovations are characterised by processes, customer offerings (prod ucts/services) or 
business models that offer lower performance along traditional trajectories or new performance 
that has previously not been considered. As such, they are undervalued by traditional lead- 
customers, generating either sales or gross margins that are perceived as "low-end" by industry 
incumbents. However, disruptive innovations gain a foothold by introducing new types of 
performance criteria to over-looked or ignored niche markets. Through a period of exploitation, 
reinvestment and improvement, the value proposition offered by the innovation evolves, enabling it 
migrate into the mainstream. In doing so, they bring new propositions to existing markets and 
eventually redefine the paradigms and value propositions on which existing industries are based. 
This process is discussed and explained by Christensen (1997), DeTienne and Koberg (2002), 
Charitou and Markides (2003) and Christensen and Overdorf (2000). For example, Ryanair and 
easyJet pioneered the low-cost-no-frills airline industry in Europe and, by migrating into the 
frequent flyer markets, nearly all European air travel carriers are now trying to adopt or fight the 
low cost approach (Lettice and Smart, 2004). 
The term disruptive innovation, its origins and a critique of Christensen's seminal approach are 
discussed in the literature review presented in the next chapter. The review found that in recent 
years disruptive innovation has become an increasingly prevalent theme within the innovation and 
new product development literature; however, the emergent nature of the topic means that there 
are gaps in both the theory and the knowledge of practice (see Chapter 2). This investigation 
accepts the assumption that the theory of disruptive innovation offers a valuable approach to a 
major form of discontinuous innovation, which could provide the premium of long term 
organisational survival and new wealth creation. However, it is the prevailing gaps in knowledge 
and the fact that this potential remains unexploited by management practitioners that provides the 
motivation underpinning this thesis. 
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The likes of Schumpeter (1976), Tushman and Anderson (1986), and Carroll (1995) illustrate an 
historical academic root to the theory of disruptive innovation, through references to 'creative 
destruction', 'competence-destroying discontinuities' and 'industrial population dynamics' 
respectively. This provides a strong basis for the theory, moreover, academics and industrialists are 
expressing the urgent and growing need for an improved understanding of disruptive innovation 
and how it can be delivered (Danneels, 2004). In sum, the topic, in relation to innovation research 
as a whole, is emergent and the interrelated, qualitative management issues remain under- 
researched and misunderstood. 
1.2 Focus of the research 
Chapter 2 shows that multiple perspectives have been used to describe the process of disruptive 
innovation. And that extant literature also identifies, in discrete locations, a diverse range of 
factors that could enable or disable an industrialists chances of successfully pursuing the 
phenomenon. However, at the onset of the research there were, among others, three important 
gaps in knowledge: (1) a clear definition was unavailable, (2) a coherent unified framework of 
enablers and inhibitors with direct relevance to the ability to foster disruptive innovation was not 
present, and (3) much of the research in the field involved leading edge organisations; discounting 
the experience of average performers and demonstrating a gap in academic knowledge and an even 
wider gulf in practitioner-understanding regarding the application of the theory. 
Therefore, the research was focused upon the exploration of the pursuit of disruptive innovation 
(defined as building the capacity and capability to foster and exploit potentially disruptive 
opportunities), within average performing organisations. The lack of a clear definition of the term 
disruptive' innovation, the quantitative focus within extant literature, and an insufficient 
understanding of the qualitative factors that enable or inhibit the pursuit of such innovations, 
emphasised the requirement for the development of a more grounded understanding (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967). Such understanding could be achieved through the exploration of disruptive 
innovation from the perspective of those charged with its pursuit in industry. Thus, it is from this 
stance that the current research was conducted. The goal was not to create a complete picture or 
model of the pursuit of disruptive innovation, rather it was to expose and explore aspects of most 
relevance to those involved. Therefore, this research aims to generate new in-depth, context 
specific knowledge that can contribute to an enhanced understanding for future theory 
development. 
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It is hoped that this knowledge will enable both academics and industrialists to begin the 
extraction of real possibilities, from a better understanding of the qualitative issues involved in an 
average performing organisation's pursuit of potentially disruptive innovations. 
1.3 Research Questions and Objectives 
To address the three highlighted gaps in knowledge a primary research question was established, 
which also spawned three sub-questions. Following the observation of a gap in qualitative 
methodological research approaches in the field of disruptive innovation, a secondary research 
question was also established (Table 1-1). 
Research What are the key facilitators and inhibitors that today's management practitioners 
Question 1: face, within average performing (or non-best-practice) organisations, when 
attempting to enable a capacity and capability for disruptive innovation? 
Sub- Can the multifaceted and interrelated issues of the pursuit of 
question 1: disruptive innovation be explained in an holistic conceptual 
framework? 
Sub- Can an holistic conceptual framework of disruptive innovation be 
question 2: used to discover important focus areas of management action or 
cognition that ' must be addressed 'today' by management 
practitioners who are initiating the pursuit of disruptive innovation? 
Sub- Can a deeper understanding of important managerial focus areas, 
question 3: which are critical to the pursuit of disruptive innovation, be used to 
develop tools or approaches that can facilitate practitioners to 
tackle the key obstacles to their pursuit of disruptive strategies? 
Research Can a collaborative academic-industrial approach, to exploring and describing the 
Question 2: pursuit of disruptive innovation, facilitate both the development of academically 
rigorous new knowledge and the delivery of useable guidance for management 
practitioners? 
Table 1- 1: Research Ouestions 
In order to answer the first research question, a primary research objective was established with 
three sub-objectives; these were set alongside a secondary research objective established to address 
the second research question (Table 1-2). 
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Research To explore the nature and experience of management practitioners' pursuit of 
Objective 1: potentially disruptive innovations in average performing (or non-best-practice) 
businesses. 
Sub- To deliver an holistic understanding of the key facilitators and 
Objective inhibitors faced by management practitioners wanting to enable the 
1 capacity and capability to pursue potentially disruptive innovations 
within their non-best-in-class organisations. And to convert this 
knowledge into an holistic processual and systemic conceptual 
framework, grounded in both data and theory. 
Sub- To explore the emergent conceptual framework in order to identify 
Objective focus areas of management action and management cognition to 
2: which the delivery of potentially disruptive innovations are highly 
dependent. 
Sub- To specify, design and implement a management intervention. to 
Objective probe a priority focus area of management action and cognition. 
3: The intervention should be able to build new academic knowledge, 
whilst simultaneously improving the ability of the participating 
organisations to pursue potentially disruptive innovations. 
Research To use this investigation as a tool to extend knowledge and practice of 
Objective 2: collaborative academic-practitioner methodological approaches in the field of 
innovation research. 
Table 1-2. Research objectives 
1.4 A summary of the research design 
The methodology designed for this investigation was driven by the research objectives. As the 
research is grounded in the real world, the research design was also grounded in a real world 
context within an academic-industrial research group. It was constructed in a series of three 
waves to provide increasing focus to the investigation. Thus, the researcher does not test existing 
theory, nor does he attempt to establish causal relationships or generate hypotheses; a 
phenomenological perspective is adopted for emergent knowledge development. 
The aim of the first wave was to create a rich understanding of the complex web of conventions, 
rules, actions, behaviours and cognitions that contribute to enabling or inhibiting the pursuit of 
potentially disruptive innovations in today's organisations. This involved complete immersion into 
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the collaborative research group, consisting of industrialists from four case study organisations. In 
the second wave the researcher facilitated the industrialists to identify and explore key focus areas 
of managerial activity. A grounded approach (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) to data collection and 
analysis was deemed appropriate for both waves of the research. Predominantly inductive thinking 
and analysis resulted in the discovery of three key findings - an holistic conceptual framework of 
themes and constructs, four managerial focus areas and a prioritised focus area of management 
action and cognition. 
The final wave of the research adopted an inductive-deductive approach. A management 
intervention was developed to probe the prioritised focus area of management action and 
cognition. A deep analysis and coding exercise (Strauss and Corbin, 1997) was used to appraise the 
data. In doing so the author was enabled to build, analyse and connect emergent themes into 
categories that formed three key findings; these took the form of constraining management actions 
and an understanding of the underpinning management cognitions, in terms of the identification of 
disruptive innovation rejection strategies and the intensity of their use. 
The management intervention process proved in itself to produce significant industrial utility and is 
offered as another key finding. Furthermore, reflecting on the effectiveness of the research design 
enabled the identification of three techniques that enhance the use of the Mode 2, collaborative 
research approaches. 
1.5 What this investigation is and is not designed to achieve: considering 
validity and reliability 
If this investigation shed the phenomenological perspective and adopted the positivist approach, 
using quantitative methods in a search for generalisation to a broader population; then the 
researcher would adopt statistical measures to assess margins of error (Robson, 1993). 
Assessments of research grounded in these scientific traditions demand repeatability, 
generalisability and measures of statistical significance in order to assert rigour and worth. 
The logical parallel with qualitative research is to discuss the issues of validity and reliability in 
order to clarify what the investigation will and will not achieve. An appraisal of this study in terms 
of the traditional positivistic view of these terms (eveals why research from the qualitative domain 
has received unwarranted criticism: 
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0 General isabil ity: 
The aim of this thesis is to generate new insights into the qualitative management issues regarding 
the pursuit of disruptive innovation. This will be achieved through an empirically grounded, context 
specific, collaborative investigation and is, therefore, not aiming for generalisability. Instead, it is 
hoped that it will contribute a meaningful starting point for the continuation of qualitative 
investigations. 
* Validity: 
Silverman (2000) asserts that it is almost impossible to objectively assess the true validity of 
qualitative data due to its deep, rich and complex nature. Along with French and Bell (1990) he 
states that qualitative research is valid and reliable when it is held as credible and valuable by 
people within the contexts that are under consideration. 
This is a brief presentation of an important discussion that enabled the author to assert what the 
investigation will and will not aim to achieve: 
This investigation will not )c 
attempt to validate or qualify the relevance of the theory of disruptive innovation 
consider the managerial reactions to disruptive threats or the impact of regulations that 
predicate the needs for disruptive change 
... explore all the comments of all the participants to the same degree 
... produce findings that are applicable to statistical analysis 
... be able to produce objective facts or truths 
... claim generality to organisations outside the research group 
... provide all the answers to the prevailing gaps in knowledge 
This investigation will 
focus upon profit seeking organisations and their pursuit of disruptive innovation 
enhance understanding of the pursuit of disruptive innovation using a collaborative acadernic- 
industrial approach 
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... iteratively develop focus towards those elements of the pursuit of disruptive innovation that are 
most pertinent to the industrialists involved 
... provide insights that can be tested or probed in additional studies 
... enfold the perspectives of 'experts' external to the research programme and from the extant 
literature to reduce the potential for bias towards any data set 
... focus upon facilitating the emergence of academically robust and industrially relevant 
understanding 
... be a relevant and meaningful starting point for the continuation of qualitative investigations 
into industrialists' pursuit of potentially disruptive innovations 
1.6 Key Deliverables 
It is the belief of the author that the attempts to satisfy the above research objectives, as 
demonstrated in this thesis, has generated a lucid contribution to knowledge on the topic of 
disruptive innovation. The thesis will present four primary deliverables (Table 1-3): 
D 1: An holistic conceptual framework of the facilitators and inhibitors involved in the 
pursuit of potentially disruptive innovations, resulting in a contribution to extant 
theory. 
D 2: The identification and description of a primary area of management action and 
cognition to which the pursuit of potentially disruptive innovations in non-best- 
practice organisations is highly dependent. 
D 3: A methodology for a management intervention that targets the primary area of 
management action and cognition in order to facilitate the pursuit of potentially 
disruptive innovations. 
D 4: A contribution to methodological strategies that pursue a collaborative research 
approach. 
Table 1-3: Research deliverables 
1.7 Thesis Structure 
Figure 1-1 below provides an overview (split across two pages) of the thesis structure. 
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2.1 Introduction and purpose of this 
A literature review was conducted 2t the outset of this investi-, ation; its purpose was to clarify the 
definition Of +the term disruptive innovation and to identify , ýýDs 
in knowledge to provide research 
questions. In doing so, a high-level understanding of field was achieved and research 
objectives were established. As the research methodology was inductive the majoritv of the 
s occurred during the research activities themselves, thus literature will be reading and synthesi 
introduced in chapters 4,5,6, and 7, along with the appropriate resuits and -ýscussion. The 
pF 3. rpose of this literatu re review, therefore, is to introduce the topic of disrupti i. -. - -vý- . ýon and to 
identify the novelty of the work, and to position its contribution by demonstraii-g the gaps in 
knowledge that this thesis will address. Given tLiMe and space limitations, the review cannot 
recreate ail the debates of the past; instead, an overview is provided. The term disruptive 
ta in the is introduced by summarising its historical rools no dernonstrating its posit 
field of innovation literature. The theory of disruptive innovation I's then described from the 
w ngs ol- its main proponent and a critique is offered; this demonstrates the multitude of Possible riti, 
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research areas. Finally, focus is brought to the specific gaps in knowledge that inspired the 
research objectives of this thesis. 
2.2 Defining innovation and innovation management 
There is much debate about the_ definition and boundaries of the term 'innovation' (see Adams 
(2003), Trott (1998) or Tidd et al. (1997) for a full discussion). In its broadest sense, this phrase 
refers to the creation and implementation of a novel idea, relative to a social context, with the 
purpose of delivering benefit. Tidd et al, (1997) offer a definition that summarises this breadth: "... 
innovation is often confused with invention but the latter is only the first step in a long process of 
bringing a good idea to widespread and effective use" (p24). Although the topic of innovation is 
important to almost every sector of life from Government policy, to charities, non-profit 
organisations, schools, and the sciences, the focus in this thesis is the study of a particular kind of 
innovation within profit-seeking organisations. 
A profit-seeking organisation's survival and success is based upon three abilities (1) to identify and 
satisfy some market demands or needs, (2) to develop competitive advantage over other firms 
seeking to offer products/services to these same markets and (3) to establish internal processes to 
ensure that the first two objectives are consistently met (Ansoff, 1965; Porter, 1980; Galbraith, 
2004). It is generally accepted that the term innovation in this context equates to the process of 
theoretical conception, technical invention, and commercial exploitation of new ideas (Trott, 
1998: 12); effectively, all those scientific, technical, commercial and financial steps necessary for 
the successful invention, development and marketing of new or improved products, services or 
processes (OECD, 1981). As such, innovation is critical to organisational survival and success. In 
accordance with this understanding of the term innovation and statements from the European 
Institute of Technology and Innovation Management (EITIM, 2004), this study defines the term 
'innovation management' as: the actions taken to effectively identify, select, acquire, develop, 
exploit and protect the technologies, products, processes business models and infrastructure needed 
to achieve, maintain and grow a market position and business performance in accordance with the 
company's objectives 
2.3 A dualistic typology of innovation 
Discussions stimulated by the dynamics of a Schumpeterian perspective (Schumpeter, 1975) of 
competition have stimulated the accepted proposition of a dualistic typology of organisational 
change, although this has been given many names, for example: 
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0 persistence vs. change (March, 1981); 
" evolutionary vs. revolutionary change (Nelson and Winter, 1982); 
" incremental convergence vs. radical reorientation (Tushman and Romanelli, 1985); 
" frame-bending vs. frame-breaking change (Tushman, Newman and Romanelli, 1986); 
" incremental vs. radical innovation (Dewar and Dutton, 1986); 
" continuous vs. discontinuous change (Tushman and Anderson, 1986); 
" routine vs. non-routine, discontinuous change (Mezias and Glynn, 1993); 
" sustaining vs. disruptive innovation (Christensen, 1997); 
" linear customer offering innovation vs. non-linear business concept innovation (Hamel, 
2000). 
The consensus amongst these authors is that industries undergo long periods of convergence and 
continuous, incremental change or refinement, where organisations build upon existing know-how 
and competences. Conversely, these periods are occasionally punctuated by short bursts of change 
considered to be discontinuous and radical in nature; where frames of reference are broken, and 
underlying skills, technologies or competencies are rendered obsolete with the emergence of a new 
dominant paradigm of customer offering ("offerings constituted by physical goods and/or services" 
(Danneels, 2004: 249)). 
Foster (1985) was a pioneer of the use of technology S-curves to explain the differences between 
incremental and radical technological change; where an S-curve graphically represents technical 
performance change as a function of time (TushM2n and O'Reilly (1997) note that S-curves can be 
plotted for all industries although their shape and size is influenced by scientific knowledge, market 
demand, and levels of investment and commercial isation). S-curves illustrate that inevitable 
technological maturity results in organisations facing diminishing returns on investment into 
incremental innovations, as substantial improvements in performance become increasingly difficult 
due to economic or technical constraints. The result is, technologies whether at a component or 
architectural level, that reach the maturity phase of their S-curves can become vulnerable to 
radically different classes of customer offering (Christensen, 1992a; 1992b), which can be 
represented by the emergence of new S-curves. When such a new class of offering has the 
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potential to compete on performance with existing offerings, and investments into their 
incremental improvement reap higher returns on investment, discontinuous change can occur. 
Thus, the interaction of an S-curve representing a mature technology with one that represents a 
new offering in its growth phase, illustrates the turbulent environment that is experienced within 
existing markets when frames of reference are broken, and underlying skills, technologies or 
competencies are rendered obsolete, as a new form of dominant design emerges (Foster, 1985; 
Tushman and O'Reilly, 1996,1997,2002; Utterback, 1994)1. 
Much of the literature in the field of innovation, new product development and organisational 
change has focused upon how to make organisations innovate more effectively (Mezias and Glynn, 
1993). Given the relative infrequency of discontinuities in most industries, incremental innovations 
that improve and sustain current business paradigms are the most prevalently discussed and better 
understood within both industry and the literature (Mezias and Glynn, 1993; Leifer et al. 2000). 
Moreover, these incremental improvements are essential if management teams are to respond to 
operational challenges and quarterly or yearly revenue targets, which mandate a stringent focus 
upon short term results. 
However,. the subject of discontinuous change is receiving increasing attention because "... 
empirical studies have convincingly demonstrated a consistent, albeit disturbing, pattern of results 
with respect to the management of innovation. In almost every industry studied, a set of leading 
firms faced with a period of discontinuous change fails to maintain its industry's market leadership 
in the new technological era. " (Paap and Katz, 2004: 13). Dosi (1981) stated that it is new, small 
firms that rapidly emerge as key players in a sector when there is a "paradigm shift" in technology, 
which alters radically the rate, direction and skills associated with a technological trajectory. 
Moreover, Tushman and O'Reilly (1997) provide a review of this reoccurring theme and list diverse 
industries in which organisations have failed to manage such non-linear change, including, airlines, 
automobiles, cameras, colour televisions, optical equipment, hand tools, stereo equipment, radial 
tyres and watches. Placing yet more emphasis on this topic, is the Institute for the Study of 
1 While new technologies and business approaches are often central to what makes an innovation discontinuous or 
disruptive, it is acknowledged that forces such as a change in political regime, unthinkable events (such as war, natural 
disaster and terrorism) and Government policy can create spaces for radical change (e. g. Pilkington and Dyerson, (2002) 
discuss the auto industry in California). As stated in Chapter 1, such forces are not considered within the scope of this 
thesis, attention is given to profit seeking organisations and their pursuit of disruptive innovation. 
16 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Accelerating Change which, in September 2003, at Stanford, acknowledged "The rate of 
technological change has become dizzying, and it's only getting faster" (Sterling, 2004: 102). In 
these ever more turbulent and competitive environments, where the life cycles of technologies and 
customer offerings are shortening, business leaders are looking for ways to achieve market 
leadership, and the importance of non-incremental innovation is escalating (Hamel, 2000; Deszca 
et al., 1999). 
Tushman and Anderson (1986) proposed that discontinuous innovations are either 'competence- 
enhancing' or 'competence-destroying'. Competence-enhancing discontinuities "represent an 
order-of-magnitude improvement over prior products, yet build on existing know-how" (Tushman 
and Anderson, 1986: 442), they are initiated by existing firms and are associated with little or even 
decreased environmental turbulence and reduced market uncertainty. However, competence 
destroying discontinuities, according to Tushman and Anderson (1986), are not only less well 
understood in academic literature, but because of factors including resource dependencies 
(Burgelman and Sayles, 1986) and path dependencies (leonard, 1995), these innovations are 
synonymous with new market entrants. Whilst these competence-destroying, 'frame-breaking' 
innovations pose threats to some organisations they present opportunities to others: "Hewlett- 
Packard's inkjet printer platform, for example, represents a discontinuous innovation; this radical 
technology that displaced dot-matrix printing, helped create the desktop printer industry, and 
propelled the company into the leadership position of a multi-billion dollar market" (Kaplan, 
1999: 16). Thus, corporate leadership faces the paradoxical challenge of dualism (Kaplan 1999; 
Paap and Katz, 2004), functioning effectively today whilst innovating effectively for tomorrow, 
management teams must aim to direct 'ambidextrous organisations' (Tushman and O'Reilly, 1996, 
2000). 
In an attempt to address the challenges posed by the pursuit of creating the ambidextrous 
organisation, Christensen (1997) borrows heavily from the work of leading academics in the field of 
technology change, technological innovation and technological discontinuities, (for example 
Abernathy and Clarke, 1985; Dosi, 1982; Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Utterback, 1994). He 
presents a theory that divides all innovation efforts into two categories: 'sustaining innovations' 
and 'disruptive innovations'. Sustaining innovations are said to improve the performance of 
established technologies, processes, products, services or business models in an incremental, radical 
or even discontinuous nature "along the dimensions of performance that mainstream customers in 
major markets have historically valued" (Christensen, 1997: xv). He describes disruptive innovations, 
17 
Exploring and Describing the Pursuit of Disruptive Innovation 
as those that represent a new paradigm of customer offering, which generate new net wealth, 
whilst transforming or displacing some or all of an established market (Christensen and 
Rosenbloom, 1995; Christensen, 1997; Christensen and Overclorf, 2000; Christensen and Raynor, 
2003). 
Unlike other authors who have made similar distinctions, Christensen provides a detailed model to 
both describe and explain the forces that drive the emergence of disruptive innovations to 
punctuate long periods of evolutionary growth (Christensen, 1997,2000; Bower and Christensen, 
1995; Christensen and Bower, 1996). And his recent work continues to "teach companies how to 
use disruptive forces to their advantage" (McGinn, 2003: 7). Another striking difference is that his 
theory has received unprecedented attention; Christensen's 1997 best selling book "The Innovator's 
Dilemma" has sold 500,000 copies in 10 languages (McGinn, 2003) and has provoked an insurgence 
of new high quality academic literature dedicated to the topic (Figure 2-1). 
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Christensen's work is reported to have helped generate breakthroughs in practice', and his work is 
considered to be possibly the most comprehensive explanation available of innovations that are 
able to break the status quo (Businesswire. com, 2000; Charitou and Markides, 2003). However, 
" ... close reading of his book and the articles he has co-authored with his colleagues have left many 
questions unanswered. " (Danneels, 2004: 246). For all these reasons Christensen's theory warrants 
attention; the following sections provide an overview of Christensen's core model of disruptive 
innovation followed by a critique, to identify specific gaps in knowledge. 
2.4 Christensen's theory of disruptive innovation 
Christensen first coined the phrase 'disruptive technologies' with popular appeal in 1997 
(Christensen, 1997; Bower and Christensen, 1997). He claimed that almost all the organisation5 
that have 'died' or been displaced from their industries, because of a new paradigm of customer 
offering, could see the disruption coming but did nothing until it was too late. He states the 
primary reason for this mistake is that managers assess the new approaches or technologies and 
frame them as either deficient or as an unlikely threat. Christensen modified his use of the narrow 
term 'disruptive technologies' and has since also embraced the term 'disruptive innovation' 
(Christensen, et al. 2000; Christensen, et al. 2001; Christensen and Overdorf 2000; Christensen, 
2003a, 2003b, Christensen and Raynor, 2003). 
Christensen (1997) used Dosi's (1982) explanation of how new customer paradigms can be 
represented as discontinuities in trajectories of progress as defined within earlier paradigms - 
where a technological paradigm is a pattern of solutions for selected technological problems. In 
fact, new paradigms redefine the future meaning of progress and a new class of problems becomes 
the target of normal incremental innovation (Dosi, 1982). Therefore, disruptive innovations appear 
to typify a particular type of 'discontinuous innovation' (a term which, as noted earlier, has received 
more academic attention). 
2 Christensen and Anthony (2003) report that Intel Chairman, Andy Grove, attended a seminar at Harvard and went on 
to use disruptive innovation theory to inspire and pursue the creation of the Celeron microprocessor chip. Celeron has 
not only generated new net wealth, but has become their biggest selling product and has protected the business from 
new low-end entrants. 
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When considering examples of disruptive innovation, one should "... graph the trajectories of 
performance improvement demanded in the market versus the performance improvement supplied 
by technology.. Such charts are the best method I know for identifying [and explaining] disruptive 
technologies" (Christensen, 2000: 206). In doing so, it is possible to illustrate the dilemma faced by 
practitioners when their decisions to ignore technologies that do not appear to address their 
customers' needs become fatal when two paradigmatic trajectories of progress interact (Figure 2- 
2). 
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Figure 2-2: Intersecting trajectories of- performance demanded vs. performance supplied 
(adapted from Christensen 1997 and Christensen and Raynor, 2003) 
Christensen's model of disruptive innovation is based on the premise that the performance 
demanded by customers within an existing market can be mapped onto a normal distribution curve, 
from low-demanding to high-demanding, and that average, mainstream customers will always 
demand and be able to absorb more performance over time (line 'A' in Figure 2-2). Moreover, it is 
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this tendency that inspires the drive for performance improvement provided within the 
technological paradigm that serves these customers (line '13' in Figure 2-2). Competitive pressures 
in the market place will often force the performance improvement provided to take a different 
trajectory to that of performance improvement demanded or that can be absorbed by the 
customers (Hill and Jones (1998) refer to this trend in two ways - 'technology myopia' and simply 
the desire to 'keep up with ones neighbour'). When the trajectory slopes differ, and performance 
provided exceeds performance demanded (points '0' and V in Figure 2-2), new technologies and 
customer offerings that were only performance-competitive in remote market niches may migrate 
into other customer networks (note that line 'C' in Figure 2-2 gradually moves into the 'mainstream 
market'). This process provides innovators with a vehicle to new customers, who would have 
previously viewed their offerings as substandard. In fact, Christensen, Raynor and Verlinden (2001) 
state that the feature of performance oversupply literally creates a vacuum into which simpler, 
more convenient customer offerings are draw. This process enables new entrants to offer 
established mainstream markets a new set of performance value attributes that are now more 
relevant than those offered by the current paradigm. 
Clear parallels can be drawn between the term disruptive innovation and Tushman and Anderson's 
(1986) competence-destroying discontinuities; both require new skills, abilities and knowledge, and 
are associated with increased environmental turbulence and increased market uncertainty. 
Furthermore, both have been described as usually delivering a new product class, a significant 
product substitute or a radical new way of making a product that changes the basis of competition 
between firms. Although, both claim new entrants almost always initiate these innovations, there 
is some disagreement between the authors: "We contest the conclusions of scholars such as 
Tushman and Anderson (1986), who have argued that incumbent firms are most threatened by 
attacking entrants when the innovation in question destroys, or does not build upon, the 
competence of the firm. We observe that established firms, though often at great cost, have led 
their industries in developing critical competence-destroying technologies, when the new 
technology was needed to meet existing customers demands" (Christensen and Bower, 1996: 199). 
This clarifies that the difference between these terms can be found in the starting point of the 
technology or customer offering and its relationship with mainstream markets. If a competence- 
destroying discontinuity is applicable and desirable to mainstream customers who are voicing a 
demand, incumbent firms are more likely to pursue the technology or customer offering as an 
extension to their current business - adopting a discontinuous change within a sustaining 
innovation strategy. However, where there is an absence of this demand, and a demand from a 
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small remote customer niche, that is overlooked by the incumbents' prevailing customer offering, 
then there may be scope for a new entrant to adopt a disruptive approach with the introduction of 
this potentially 'game-changing innovation'. 
To further enrich the model presented in Figure 2-2, Christensen uses the concepts of customer 
need and product attributes (Christensen, 2003a; Christensen and Raynor, 2003). The basis of a 
customer's choice between competing customer offerings is directly linked to the benefits they 
desire - their customer need. McDonald et al. (2001) state that customer offerings can be thought 
of as bundles of specific attribute sets offering differing levels of performance on varying 
dimensions - whereby it is the technology or intellectual property that is embedded in the 
customer offering, which is responsible for the said set of attributes. Different customers or market 
niches, will seek different benefits, which in turn drives a desire for different attributes sets 
(McGrath and Macmillan, 1995) and creates markets of companies responding with varied 
customer offerings based on customer need (McDonald et al., 2001). Thus, it is customer needs 
that determine which performance dimensions and attribute sets form the bases of competition. 
The technology and intellectual property of all customer offerings will have performance limits and 
constraints, which in turn limit the prevailing attribute sets to a distinct range of performance 
(Christensen and Raynor, 2003). 
Christensen and Raynor, (2003) use the customer needs and product attribute perspective to 
explain the theory of disruptive innovation. They say that disruptive innovations are customer 
offerings based on technologies or processes that enable different attribute sets to those offered by 
the prevailing dominant offerings. These new offerings initially exhibit lower performance on 
dimensions that are specifically relevant to the mainstream market; however, they introduce higher 
performance on dimensions valued by remote or emerging market segments. It is therefore within 
these smaller, lower-revenue niches where they establish their commercial footing with relatively 
undemanding customers (Christensen, 1997,2002; Bower and Christensen, 1995; businesswire. com, 
2000; Christensen and Rosenbloom, 1995). Through the exploitation of the surrounding niche 
markets, it is possible to raise the investments required for product/service improvement. 
Eventually the performance levels proffered by the new offering meet or exceed the minimum levels 
demanded by the mainstream market. This initiates the process of disruption, allowing the 
previously ignored technologies or approaches to migrate into the mainstream with attribute sets 
that do not over supplýy. 
_customers' 
needs and additional features that the incumbent technological 
paradigm does not and often cannot contain (see Appendix 1 for descriptions of commonly cited 
examples of market/technology disruption, using Christensen's model). 
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Christensen's theory initially focused upon the migration upstream of 'low-end' disruptors; depicted 
in Figure 2-2 and described above as remote market niches. It was only after Gilbert (2002 and 
2003) presented a differing model that Christensen broadened his theory to include emerging 
market niches. Gilbert (2002 and 2003) stated that managers could use 'new-market disruptive 
strategies' as well the low-end approach - where 'non-consumers' are offered a simple, convenient 
product or service that allows them to do things that they would not have other wise been able to 
do. The growth of the new market is ignored by established companies as it is considered too small 
and the technology "not up to snuff on the performance criteria that existing companies focus on" 
(Gilbert, 2003: 8). However, much like the low-end disruptions described above, the incremental 
improvements of the customer offering allows the growth of the niche and eventually the 
attraction of customers from established markets and "... by the time incumbents begin to notice 
the defection, its too late. " (Christensen and Anthony, 2003: 2) the attribute set of the new entrant 
has permanently reshaped the existing market (Figure 2-3). 
, Origin of disruptive 
business outside of 
established market 
with non-consumers 
Figure 2-3: New- market disruption (adapted from Gilbert, 2002) 
The theory of disruptive innovation highlights that the consequences of failing to secure non- 
incremental innovations can be more significant than lost opportunities or lost market share. 
Incumbent firms, that have failed to embrace new disruptive customer offerings before they deliver 
their disruptive effect, have been shown to suffer: financial losses, redundancy of staff, stock write 
off's, stock price reductions and corporate bankruptcy (Utterback, 1996; Barr, et a). 1992; 
Christensen, 1997; Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Hamel, 2000; Charitou and Markidies, 2003). In 
fact, disruptive innovation can signal the end of industries as we know them (Christensen, 1997; 
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Christensen, 2003b; Foster and Kaplan, 2001). The academic and industrial pertinence of this 
theory has inspired a new wealth of research into discontinuous innovation and more specifically, a 
succession of researchers to create disruptive innovation specific frameworks and approaches for 
0 anticipating disruptive innovations (e. g. most recently Paap and Katz, 2004); 
0 assessing the probability that a new entrant poses a disruptive threat (e. g. Raffi and 
Kampas, 2002); 
marketing strategies for disruptive innovation (e. g. Moore, 2000; Christensen and Raynor, 
2003); 
0 identifying market niches for potentially disruptive innovations (Cooper et al 2001; Lynn et 
al., 1996); 
challenging prevailing business models to generate disruptive concepts (Allen et al, 1999; 
Hamel, 2000); 
exploring and communicating the relationships over time between evolving and developing 
markets, products and technologies (e. g. the use of technology ro2dmapping Phaal et al 
2004); 
0 responses to disruptive threats (Gilbert and Bower, 2002 and Charitou and Markides, 2003) 
It is the opinion of the author that the theory of disruptive innovation and the publications of its 
lead proponents offer glimpses into critical technological trends and the challenges that managers 
will face once they have mastered the 'basics' of innovation management. This different approach 
to innovation requires very different ways of dealing with the issues of innovation management 
and despite the comprehensive faqade of Christensen's theory there are gaps and weaknesses that 
must be addressed. 
2.5 A critique of disruptive innovation theory 
Christensen offers a detailed technical description of the forces that facilitate the insurgence of a 
disruptive innovation (of which only a high level summary is provided above). He provides thorough 
case evidence and in his recent co-authored work he generates a deeper understanding of the 
managerial aspects of the theory. 
Traditionally emphasis within the literature on innovation, which could be thought of as 
breakthrough or disruptive, focuses on describing the process or outcomes of discontinuous change. 
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However, this appears to be shifting: today it is increasingly viewed as an important and necessary 
to conduct research into increasing an organisation's innovative capacity' and innovative 
capability' with regards to discontinuous innovations (Leifer et al., 2000). To this regard 
Christensen has aimed to deliver academically insightful and industrially provocative research. 
However, it would appear that the hype surrounding the emergence of the topic disruptive 
innovation may have caused harm, with a plethora of business articles summarising his 
multifaceted insights in just a few sentences. "Christensen offers a really intricate picture of how 
firms react to technological shifts, and I believe that readers do not always do justice to the 
complexity of his argument. One can see from a search for disruptive innovation on the web how 
loosely the term has come to be used and how it has become separated from its theoretical basis" 
(Danneels, 2004: 257). Moreover, Christensen fails to provide a succinct definition of the term 
'disruptive technologies' and then seems to widen his theory to 'disruptive innovation' with little 
statistical or methodological justification. It is the author's opinion that these issues have been 
damaging to the scholarly and industrial understanding and acceptance of his theory, and criticisms 
do not end here. Therefore, it is the purpose of this section to offer a critique of Christensen's 
disruptive innovation theory. Weaknesses that cause confusion in both academia and in practice 
are highlighted, a definition of the term 'disruptive innovation' is offered, closing with a summary 
of the prevailing gaps in knowledge. 
2.5.1 A typology of discontinuous innovations 
Kassicieh et al. (2002) note that all disruptive innovations are discontinuous yet not all 
discontinuities are disruptive. For this reason the consideration of the term discontinuous 
innovation should be made. Veryzer (1998) offers a review of discontinuous new product 
development from the perspective of serial, staged development. Similarly to Christensen, he shows 
that the perceived value attributes of a product or service are critical to innovations with 
discontinuous potential. However, he makes the distinction between "product capability" (the 
benefits of products as perceived by customers and u5ers), and "technological capability" (the 
3 Defined as the potential of a firm to generate innovative outputs (Trott, 1998). 
" Also know as organisational innovativeness and defined by Rogers (1995) as the propensity of the firm to adopt 
innovative output. 
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degree to which the product involves expanding capabilities beyond existing organisational 
boundaries). Using this perspective he showed that organisations can deliver three types of 
discontinuity (Figure 2-4). He suggests that each form of discontinuity requires a different 
management approach, in line with the areas of commercial or technical uncertainty, although he 
does not provide extensive guidance for practitioners. 
Christensen fails to offer such a clear, categorical distinction in his perspective of disruptive 
innovation; although he notes that disruption can be caused by technological changes (Christensen, 
1997), . new commercial approaches 
(Christensen and Raynor, 2003) or the fusion of both 
(Christensen and Raynor, 2003). It is granted that many of the discontinuities to which Veryzer 
(1998) refers may be sustaining in nature, yet the exploration of disruptive innovation with 
Veryzers' framework could lead to a more comprehensive categorisation of non-sustaining 
innovations and an improved understanding of the managerial implications. 
Perceived product capability 
Same Enhanced 
is, Same 
m (Z C2- 
cm 
u 
m L) 
Advanced 
Commercially 
discontinuous 
Continuous 
e. g. Sony 
Walkman 
Technologically 
Technologically Et Commercially 
discontinuous discontinuous 
e. g. Flat screen e. g. Compact disks 
televisions and disk drive 
technology 
Figure 2-4., Types of discontinuous innovation (Veryzer, 1998) 
Moreover, Veryzer (1998) mapped his findings to the traditional conception of staged new product 
development (NPD). He found the primary difference between the pursuit of discontinuous and 
continuous, incremental innovations is the need for extended periods 'dynamic drifting' (where 
technologists and business leaders need longer to explore the various linkages between markets, 
products and technologies) and more extensive efforts in prototyping and testing the specifications 
of new concepts with new niches of lead-users. In doing so, he was able to identify two critical 
areas of the traditional NPD process to which management teams can focus, if they intend to 
pursue discontinuities (Figure 2-5). 
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Figure 2-5. - Anew product development process for discontinuous customer offerings (Petyzer, 1998) 
Although Christensen's work makes reference to these issues, they are not explored at length with 
direct reference to the traditional staged conception of NPD. Such an exploration would naturally 
force a deeper probing of both the management actions and cognitions that prove fruitful during 
these additional NPD functions and the specific changes in resource allocation, training, human 
resources etc. that the executive teams would need to initiate. 
2.5.2 Business concept innovation 
Hamel (2000) takes a business model perspective to the issue of dualism in innovation. He claims 
that management teams will be constrained to 'more of the same' innovation if their whole 
business concept remains unchanged or unchallenged. Alternatively, organisations can attempt to 
disrupt competitive paradigms with new technologies or customer offerings but the real economic 
value is only unlocked when the larger system is factored into the disruption and 'business concept 
innovation' is delivered. To do this, he claims an executive management team should attempt to 
'unpack their existing business model'. By challenging, changing or re-inventing what appear to be 
its critical areas, an organisation can encourage non-linear system wide change and breakthrough 
business concept innovation (for example he credits the challenging of traditional business models 
in the airline industry for the emergence of the low-cost-no-frill approach). 
Christensen's earlier work (e. g. Christensen 1997) attributed much of the process of disruption to 
new technological paradigms, failing to acknowledge at length the changes in the wider 
organisational system that are required to realise disruptive potential. His latter work (e. g. 
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Christensen and Overdorf, 2000; Christensen and Anthony, 2003; Christensen and Raynor, 2003) 
pays more respect to the importance of the required business model changes, although he has yet 
to provide a specific discussion of business concept innovation or the stresses and strains of 
business model change. 
2.5.3 Population dynamics Et resource partitioning 
The 'ecological perspective' (Hannan and Freeman, 1984) is a less immediately pragmatic but 
equally insightful approach that has also been used to explain the dynamics of discontinuous 
change (Mezias and Glynn, 1993). Markets analysed include the US newspaper industry (Carroll, 
1985), early telephone companies in the de-regulated US telephone markets (Barnett and Carroll, 
1987 and Barnett, 1991), digital imaging (Mitchell, 1994), banking co-operatives (Baum and Singh, 
1994) and the microprocessor industry (Wade, 1995,1996). The notion is based upon considering 
changing competitive environments through the population of organisations within industries: the 
concentration of large generalist firms, the prevalence of smaller specialists, and the resource 
partitioning (Carroll, 1985) that occurs as a result. For example, within an industry population, 
large generalists compete with each other to occupy the centre of the market. "As economies of 
scale become important, dominant communities will tend to cater to the center of the market 
because they can reap the greatest cost savings by selling to the niche with the greatest number of 
customers" (Wade 1996: 1241). This competition for similar resources and customers, frees 
peripheral resources to be exploited by new strategically specialised organisations, which sponsor 
new architectures, to which "the center of the market is less important ... because they do not have 
the capacity to take full advantage of economies of scale" (Wade 1996: 1241). As dominant 
technologies mature, the concentration of generalists increases and "... opens up more pockets of 
resources into which specialists, especially those with new approaches, can enter and thrive... 
Paradoxically, then, the emergence of a dominant design may bring with it the seeds of its possible 
destruction. " (Wade 1996: 1241). This process gives rise to organisations with niche producer or 
distributor propositions that can eventually grow from their specialised position and new 
architecture (which the generalists struggle to offer) to enter the mature markets and create 
discontinuous change. 
It could be argued that the extensive, quantitative, empirical base of evidence upon which the 
notions of industry population dynamics (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Wade, 1996) and resource 
partitioning (Carroll, 1985, Wade, 1996) are based, appear to be much more congruent to the 
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concept of generalisability that the case based work of Christensen. This observation reveals 
methodological gaps in Christensen's research approach; these will be discussed later in this 
chapter. Alternatively, it could be argued that the process of disruptive innovation, as described by 
Christensen, adds richness to the perspective of industry population dynamics and the impact of 
resource partitioning. Despite Christensen's failure to discuss either, the amalgamation of these 
insights could surely generate a yet more comprehensive understanding of the dynamics and the 
emergence of disruptive change. 
2.5.4 An holistic conception of disruptive innovation. 
It is the holistic management models in the field of sustaining innovation, especially those that 
offer insights into qualitative management issues, that are often credited with effectively 
addressing the barriers to sustaining innovation and helping management practitioners to know 
where to focus their attention (Cooper, et al. 2001). Deszca et al. (1999) propose that breakthrough 
products can be developed by using the framework presented in Figure 2-6 and contend that focus 
should be given to continuous market assessment throughout. 
------------------------------------- * --------------------------- Scope of Product Development Project 
Product/ 
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Organization 
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t ------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Figure 2-6., The New Product Development framework. For Breakthrough Innovation (Deszca et A 1999) 
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They concede that prevailing methodologies for assessing and incorporating the unarticulated 
needs of future customers into the development process are necessary but remain, as of yet, not 
entirely dependable; nonetheless they understand the power of creating an holistic framework to 
explain their findings. Christensen provides a detailed picture of the process of disruptive 
innovation; yet he has not offered such an holistic conceptual framework to illustrate his theory. 
This inhibits his attempts to provide his academic and industrial readers both an holistic 
appreciation of the topic and of the managerial implications. 
Appendix 1 (1c) compares and contrasts three pertinent holistic approaches to innovation 
management from the field of sustaining innovation (Cooper's (1979,1980,1983,1988,1990) 
Stage Gate approach; Goffin and Pfeiffer's (2000) Pentathlon Model and Adam's (2003) critical 
review of innovation management), the results of this analysis offers strong parallels with Kanters 
(1988) conclusion that: "... the understanding of innovation benefits from examining structural and 
social facilitators as they wax and wane with the innovation development process. This requires a 
dynamic model, a combination of a "variance" model of the factors influencing innovation and a 
"process" model showing how innovation unfolds" (p172). There is an absence in the literature of 
an explicit holistic management model for the pursuit of disruptive innovations, which includes 
variance and process factors. Therefore, it is necessary to qualify a framework by which profit- 
seeking organisations can be understood holistically and then to assess how current literature 
addresses this space. 
There are two dominant schools of thought that seek to explain inter-firm differences: the resource 
based view and the process or routine based view. An organisation's resources are generally 
features that can be bought, sold, depreciated or built; this would include its people and its assets 
(Ansoff, 1965) such as equipment, technology, brands, money, patents, relationships (Johnson and 
Scholes, 1999). Barney (1986,1991, and 2001) is a key proponent of the resource based view of 
the organisation, -noting that competitive advantage is mostly delivered by the ownership of 
superior management, better technologies, stronger brands and more effective relationships. One 
the key reasons he cites for most failed business ventures is that of an inadequate resource - the 
right manager for the job. 
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Alternatively, Nelson and Winter, (1982) explore at length the notion of routines (or processes) as 
the fundamental building blocks of competitive advantage. Johnson and Scholes (1999) note that 
critical organisational routines include: the processes for resource allocation, new product 
development, market research, budgeting, staff development and staff compensation. Routines and 
processes are the means by which value is extracted from resources (Ansoff, 1965); the process or 
routine based view asserts that competitive advantage is built, along with superior organisational 
capability, by developing better routines than competitors (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Moreover, 
supporters of this view state that superior routines can only be developed through a committed to 
the reproduction of effective behaviours. 
As stated, resources and processes are not independent of one another. Therefore, to take a purely 
resource or process based perspective of the firm is to not see the hole picture (Christensen and 
Raynor, 2003). Moreover, Christensen and Raynor (2003) note that it is through the values of an 
organisations and its people that judgements are made regarding the application of processes to 
convert resources into business benefits. They state that values can be ethical or guiding principles 
- the standards by which employees make day-to-day prioritisation decisions. Therefore, whilst 
resources and processes hold an organisation's potential, it is in organisational values where 
constraints can be observed (Leonard, 1995) and an organisation's uniqueness understood. 
Hamel (2000) reports that a product or service will only succeed in the market place with an 
appropriate and supportive business model -a design for the operations of a business which 
focuses on how revenue will be generated. Business models can be configured with the appropriate 
tension between organisational resources, processes and values. Therefore, in seeking to 
understand an organisation and to explain inter-firm differences the perspectives of resources, 
processes, managerial values and business models can be used to generate an holistic 
understanding. Moreover, another method of describing an organisation or explaining inter-firm 
differences is through consideration of the population of organisations within an industry - the 
'ecological perspective' (Carroll, 1985; Hannan and Freeman, 1984). This too can be used to explain 
the differing approaches to managerial and business behaviour. 
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This analysis of the differing theoretical perspectives of the term organisation allows the formation 
of a framework by which the term disruptive innovation and extant literature on the topic can be 
considered (Figure 2-7 and 2-8). 
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When mapping the literature on disruptive and discontinuous innovation onto this framework, it is 
revealed that authors report their findings from each of the major perspectives of an organisation. 
Christensen contributes findings to each of these views, 'but fails to provide an holistic conceptual 
framework that describes the qualitative factors that management practitioners face in the pursuit 
of potentially disruptive innovations. 
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Figure 2-8., Disruptive innovation literature categodsed by the perspectives of organisations 
2.5.5 The function of perspective and location 
Danneels (2004) raises one of the most regularly observed criticisms of Christensen's theory, he 
states that "the most essential question concerns what a disruptive technology [or innovation] 
actually is. If disruptive technologies [and innovations] pose a threat to industry incumbents and 
an opportunity to entrants, managers and scholars need to be able to distinguish disruptive from 
sustaining technology [or innovation]. What makes a technology [or innovation] disruptive? What 
are the exact criteria for identifying a disruptive technology [or innovation]? " (p247). 
This question is frequently asked because of a number of difficulties in translating the theory of 
disruptive innovation and as a result of a number of gaps in understanding. Yet close reading of 
Christensen's work reveals that the terms disruptive technology or disruptive innovation do not 
refer to an attribute of a technology, customer offering or a business model. Rather, they describe 
the effect that some technologies and/or innovations have upon markets affected by the insurgence 
of these new offerings, and the downturn in success of the incumbent organisations that have 
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failed to adopt the new approach in timely fashion (Paap and Katz, 2004; Christensen and Raynor, 
2003). It is the author's observation that those who seek a rigid criteria for identifying a disruptive 
technology or innovation have not understood Christensen's approach to disruptive innovation 
theory. For example, he does not establish clear-cut criteria to determine whether or not a given 
technology or customer offering can be assessed as 'disruptive', as to do so would be to ignore the 
functions of perspective and location: 
Innovation is an example of change which has a duplicitous nature (Van de Ven, 1986). What is 
experienced as an incremental manageable change to one organisation could reap extensive, 
turbulent or even devastating changes to others. Conventionally, it is conceived that disruptive 
innovations transform entire supply chains, value chains and entire industry systems. The original 
case examples used by Christensen to introduce the topic of disruptive innovation, were based upon 
extensive data from a range of industry transformations. It was this large scple disruption, entire 
market transformation and mass potential for new-wealth generation that enticed academics and 
business practitioners alike to the topic. However, disruptive innovations with specific impacts 
upon elements of supply chains have also been identified in the literature (Ulwick et al, 2003; 
Christensen and Raynor, 2003; Gilbert and Bower, 2002; see also Figure 2-7). Thus, disruptive 
innovations hold both the potential to deliver mass societal change (such as the insurgence of 
personal computing (Hamel, 2000) and a range of local market disruptions that can occur in 
different locations throughout a supply or value chain (as implied by Paap and Katz, 2004). 
Consider the example of the lithium battery market. Currently, fuel cell batteries under-perform 
their lithium based counterparts in terms of size, weight and safety, however, their attribute set is 
less restricted in the performance dimension of duration of energy supply. Therefore, it is likely that 
incremental innovations in this low-end fuel cell technology, will soon allow fuel cell manufactures 
to produce rechargeable batteries with a significantly longer 'charged life' than conventional 
lithium batteries (BBC 2004). This incremental innovation could transform the use of, for example, 
laptop personal computers (PC's). To be freed from the need to recharge every few hours would be 
a radical improvement in performance in a direction that the majority of laptop PC users desire. A 
simplistic view would dictate that to deliver this radical innovation for consumers, laptop 
manufacturers could make an incremental change in their supply chain. They would replace the 
current lithium battery manufacturer with a new fuel cell producer. However, such an incremental 
move for laptop producers could generate a destructive market shift for lithium battery 
manufactures that have not invested in fuel cell technologies. Thus, the incremental innovation 
that supplies laptop PC consumers with a radical innovation, and perhaps even a discontinuous 
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change in behaviour, could be experienced by the current lithium battery industry, and its 
distribution channels, as a disruptive innovation. 
This example illustrates how the impact of a disruptive innovation is experienced differently as a 
matter of perspective in different locations of a supply or value chain. This could also explain why 
Chesbrough (2001) found that studies of the impact of technological shifts on incumbent firms 
lacked a common criteria by which to classify different types of technologies - different 
perspectives would generate different interpretations. 
1. Component replaced in supply chain: 
e. g. fuel cells Vs lithium batteries in laptop PCs. 
Disruptive innovation for value network of obsolete component. 
Incremental/radical innovation for system and product. 
2. Innovator makes distributor redundant in supply chain: 
e. g. RyanairleasyJct direct to customer Vs Traditional travel agents. 
- Disruptive innovation impacting value network of "value adding' distributors. 
- Radical innovation for product 
- Discontinuous innovation for low-end new-market consumers 
3. Raw material provider makes move up supply chain: 
e. g. British farmers forced to add value to their produce or close down. 
- Disruptive innovation impacting value network of 'value adding* middlemen. kb-, oý - Incremental innovation for product - Incremental to radical innovation for system. 
4. Innovator integrates roles of 'middlemen' and adds more value, to supply chain: 
e. g. Google. com or Skandia (national to trans-national investment financial services). 
Disruptive innovation impacting major middleman of system's value network. 
Radical for product 
Discontinuous innovation for system. 
5. Innovator re-invents how to add value to raw resources and transforms supply chain: 
e. g. Dell Vs Compaq or Ryanair and easyJct Vs Traditional Air Carriers. 
- Disruptive innovation impacting system's entire value network. 
- Radical Innovation for new-market and low-end consumers. 
Key: 0-0-0-0 = represents supply chain 
ý) 
= entrance of new aspect to supply chain 
Figure 2-9: Examples of differing locations of disruption from a supply chain perspective 
Author analysis of cases described by Christensen and Raynor, 2003; 6ilbert and Bower, 2002 etc. 
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In sum, disruptiveness is a product of perspective (Kaplan, 1999), location (Paap and Katz, 2004) 
and the 'right' marketing skill (Christensen and Raynor, 2003). Where Christensen's work is detailed 
in marketing principles, his theory simply avoids the functions of varying perspectives and locations. 
Instead, each of his case studies is grounded in the immediate location using the immediate 
perspective. This negates the need to consider a more global, industry-wide perspective when 
focusing upon the functions of a discrete component disruption. Alternatively, it negates the 
requirement for him to consider the perspectives and functions of the varying elements of an 
existing value network, when the aim is to disrupt the traditional industrial paradigm. These issues 
confuse the boundaries of the theory and hinder definitions of the term disruptive innovation, and 
once again, this makes it difficult to identify what makes an innovation disruptive at the onset. 
2.5.6 The function of competences and time within the market 
A focus upon the function of an innovation's time within the market reveals a weakness in the term 
disruptive innovation, making it difficult to define and understand. An assessment of the model 
reveals it is not clear at which point in the life cycle of an innovation can it be given the label 
disruptive. Optimistically, the term could be used when data is available to show that the 
innovation has invaded the Market and has transformed elements of a supply chain. A more 
stringent approach might dictate that the incumbents within the core market have to fall prey to 
the innovation before it can be labelled disruptive, where data is available to show that the 
innovation is now the dominant force. Once a decision is made about when it is appropriate to 
state that an innovation has been disruptive, the nature of Christensen's model also dictates that 
the term cannot then be used prior to that event. As such, innovations earmarked for low-end or 
new-market disruption can be referred to, at best, as 'potentially disruptive innovations'. Such 
difficulties of distinction cause confusion when decisions need to be made about resource 
allocation and business priorities (Cooper et al., 2000) 
Compounding these issues further is the notion that disruptiveness could be considered as relative 
to the competences of incumbent organisations. Tushman and Anderson's (1986) findings could be 
used to support this notion; only when competencies of incumbents have been rendered obsolete 
could an innovation be labelled disruptive. This is consistent with elements of Charitou and 
Markides (2003) findings, however, not reflective of other authors. Kaplan (1999) shows that firms 
can follow four strategies to deliver discontinuous innovations (radical cannibalism, competitive 
displacement, market invention, and industry genesis), each could be used to deliver a disruptive 
innovation but only one directly attempts to destroy competencies. Moreover, as noted earlier, the 
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status quo of dominant market players can remain through a period of competence destroying 
activities, if such a change is desired by core lead-customers (Christensen and Bower, 1996). 
Therefore, it remains unclear as to the best way to conceive of an innovation as disruptive via the 
function of competencies. 
2.5.7 Trajectory mapping and understanding product performance dimensions 
Christensen's trajectory mapping approach, as previously described (Figure 2-2), provides a powerful 
analytical tool by which to consider disruptive innovations (Phaal, et al., 2004). When using this 
tool, Christensen assumes that customers' purchasing choices are dominated by the one or two 
performance dimensions on which he focuses. This is a weakness that has not been addressed. 
Evans et al. (2002) demonstrate that the number of performance dimensions which influence a 
customer's choice can almost be counted ad infinitum. They propose support for Kano's (1993) 
model of product quality, a more sophisticated tool that can model different types of performance 
dimensions ('delighters', 'linear qualities' and 'basic qualities') and the dynamic nature of their 
interplay (Figure 2-8) 
Delighters 
Product attributes that surprise, 
delight, and/or excite. Unexpected 
attributes that distinguish the product 
from its competitors. Usually the 
answers to unarticulated needs and 
therefore difficult to identify through 
market research. 
Low 
Linear Qualities 
Product attributes that customers can 
identify they want more or less of. 
Easily identified through market 
research e. g. within auto industry - 
cabin space, fuel consumption, noise 
levels. 
Basic Qualities 
'Must-be" requirements that the 
customer expects in the product. 
Usually only mentioned by customers 
when absent. Identified through 
complaint mechanisms such as 
warranty claims e. g. within auto 
industry - Car starts every time, 
Sunroof keeps water out 
Figure 2-10. Modelling perspectives of performance quality Kano ýF 0993) 
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Kano's model illustrates that the attribute sets of a customer offering Can be considered as 
contributing to one of three types of quality - basic, linear and delighter. This perspective can 
improve investment decisions regarding which attribute sets to improve, in order to increase 
customer satisfaction. Evans et al. (2002) note that over time, attributes rated as delighters (those 
that increase customer satisfaction by an order of magnitude beyond all others) become accepted 
as 'the norm' and transform into liner qualities; likewise linear qualities eventually become 
expected basic features of the product or service offering. 
The use of this tool could allow organisations to more effectively map their current levels of 
performance and to assess the introduction of new customer offerings with differing attributes. For 
example, the likes of British Airways and AirFrance missed the disruptive lead of easyJet (Lettice 
and Smart, 2004). Using Kano's model it could be proposed that the traditional European airline 
carriers were continually improving a multitude of the linear and basic qualities of their customer 
offerings. However, they were unable to understand the significance of the growing customer base 
of the low-cost-no-frills point-to-point air travel operators, as they had no means by which they 
could understand how this overlooked niche of customers, and the low-cost delighter, could be 
mapped to the mainstream. Christensen's trajectory maps are limited by the prerequisite of 
tracking specific key performance measures over time, thus making the onset of a potentially 
disruptive innovation difficult to gauge. However, a model offering a more comprehensive 
assessment of performance dimensions, such as that offered by Kano (1983), could allow a more 
accurate appraisal of the motivation surrounding purchasing choices, whilst improving the ability of 
management practitioners to assess the impact of changing attribute sets of customer offerings. 
2.5.8 The relationship between disruptive innovation and absorptive capacity 
Cohen Et Levinthal (1990) are pioneers of the term 'Absorptive Capacity'; they state that it refers to 
organisational learning, explicitly the commercial application of external information. They argue 
that absorptive capacity is critical to a firm's innovation process - the higher the capacity the more 
effective the process. 
Stock et al. (2001) highlight that the construct has been "studied across a wide spectrum of 
research, including investment in research and development, research productivity in 
pharmaceutical firms, innovation in banking services, information technology use, inward 
technology licensing, strategic 21liances, knowledge transfer, and organizational learning" (p78). 
Moreover, they explored whether greater levels of absorptive capacity are related to the 
development of more technologically advanced products and found that the relationship between 
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absorptive capacity and new product development performance is nonlinear. In fact, they state 
that the relationship could be mapped by an 'inverted-U' shape, and conclude an organisation's 
levels of absorptive capacity can reach a point of diminishing returns, where the adoption of too 
much knowledge confuses the priorities of the innovation effort 
The theory of disruptive innovation, as presented above, indicates that the pursuit of potentially 
disruptive innovations (that is the increasing of an organisations capacity and capability to foster 
and deliver disruptive innovation') is an important, knowledge-intensive, commercial activity. 
Therefore, it could be stated that organisations may require high levels of absorptive capacity to 
positively and effectively pursue these new product and service developments. However, not only is 
there an absence of consideration for this critical construct in the extant literature pertaining to 
disruptive innovation, but Atuahene-Gima (1992) claims there to be an inadequate quantity of 
research that relates absorptive capacity to innovation management. This is an issue that leaves 
gaps in the theory of disruptive innovation and perhaps the base of knowledge upon which it rests. 
2.5.9 Barriers to disruptive innovation 
Some of the most significant gaps in knowledge regarding disruptive innovation revolve around 
barriers to the phenomenon. Paap and Katz (2004) emphasise the difficulty faced by organisations 
when trying to internalise both sustaining and disruptive innovations. They refer to the problems 
faced by the executive board of the world's leading fast moving consumer goods organisation, 
Proctor and Gamble: the stock market made a request that they introduce new wealth creating 
products, only to rescind this request when it was clear that despite the successful launch of new 
products, they had lost focus in core product categories and had suffered losses as a result of new 
market entrants in the form of low-end disruptors. This is just one of many barriers identified in 
the literature that organisations face in the pursuit of potentially disruptive innovations (see Table 
2-1). 
' This is the definition that is referred to when the author states the 'pursuit of potentially disruptive innovations' 
throughout the remainder of this thesis. 
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Examples of Barriers to Disruptive Examples of Authors 
Innovation Described in the 
Literature 
A failure to understand the different 
marketing principles needed for 
disruptive innovation. 
Inability to think out of the box in 
order to create, generate or recognise 
disruptive opportunities. 
Orgpnis ation2l ecologies (culture + 
environment + infrastructure) that 
restrict ideas and are focused on 
incrementalism. 
Inappropriate management of 
potentially disruptive ideas. 
An inability to challenge 
organisational assumptions leads to a 
failure to appropriately scan or 
'futurise' for disruption. 
Inappropriate project funding with 
narrow, focused project selection. 
Trott, 2001; Christensen, 1997; Udall, 2001; Hamel, 
2000; Moore, 1995; Gilbert Et Bower, 2002; 
Christensen Et Overdorf, 2000 
Ahuja Et Lampert, 2001; Amabile, 1997,1998; 
Andriopoulos, 2001; Gilbert and Bower, 2002; 
McFadzean 1998,2000; Rice et al, 2001; Unsworth, 
2001. 
Ahuja Et Lampert, 2001; Rice, et al., 2001; 
Christensen, and Raynor 2003; Amabile, 1998; Allen, 
et al., 1999; Dvir et al., 2002. 
Allen, et al., 1999, Ahuja Et Lampert, 2001; Rice et al., 
2001; Amabile, 1998; Hamel, 2000; Veryzer, 1998. 
Rice, et al, 2001; Hamel, 2000; McFadzean, 1998; 
McFadzean 2000; Stevens, et al., 1999; Leifer et al, 
2000. 
Christensen, 1997; Christensen and Raynor, 2003; 
Cooper et al, 1999 Et 2001; Gilbert and Bower, 2002; 
Hamel, 2000; Ahuja Et Lampert, 2001; Rice et al., 
2001. 
Table 2- 1: Barriers to disruptive innovation as identifled in the first round literature review 
Kuhn (1970) illustrated that prevailing theories often determine what is seen, therefore, explaining 
why many eminent scientists have failed to see the scientific breakthroughs that lay before their 
eyes. This notion introduces psychological issues, as an additional inhibiting factor in relation to 
those highlighted in table 2-1. Senge (1990) summarises this as the impact of mental models - the 
cognitive representations that people hold of the realities in which they partake; he illustrates how 
they impact what we do, in part because they effect what we see: "... two people can observe the 
same event and describe it differently... because their mental models focus their attention upon 
different details" (Senge, 1990: 175). For example, Mitroff (1988) demonstrated that the root of 
General Motor's downfall was linked to its top management team's willingness to hold onto its 
beliefs (i. e. the deep routed mental model that success was linked to cars as status symbols and 
traditional styling). In this case, the mental model was tacit and not explicit, therefore, the 
management team was blind to it and its impact. Similarly, Tripsas and Gavetti (2000) found that 
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it was the rigid behaviours of the executive management team of Polaroid - which was based upon 
narrow beliefs - that resulted in the organisation's demise. They call for more research into the 
effects of management cognitions. Three approaches from psychology and psychology based 
research may provide insights: 
0 Oliver et al. (1997) demonstrate that the stimulus provided by an idea or product evokes 
cognitions, which are either congruent with expectations or disconfirmatory. Such 
cognitions are said to evoke both emotions (also known as 'affects'), such as surprise, 
arousal, pleasure and joy, and behaviours, such as actions to pursue, to purchase or to 
invest. 
0 DeBono (1968,1988) stated that a fixation upon routines or mental models occur as the 
result of psychological inertia - where people become trapped into patterns of thinking 
and behaving. 
0 An area are of cognitive psychology that perhaps contributes the most understanding to 
this issue (White and Bessant, 2004) is theory cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957; 
Harmon-Jones and Mills, 1999). Two cognitions are said to be dissonant if one does not 
follow from the other; for example, an idea that is incongruent with a prevailing mental 
model. The existence of cognitive dissonance is psychologically uncomfortable, and as 
such, those that experience dissonance are motivated to make efforts to reduce it. 
Moreover, the greater the magnitude of the dissonance, the greater the pressure to employ 
dissonance reducing strategies (Harmon-Jones and Mills, 1999) such as ignoring the 
dissonant information and looking for facts that support the prevailing mental models 
(Senge, 1990). 
2.5.10 Methodological gaps in Christensen's approach 
a Data sets: a failure to consider average performing organisations 
Analysis reveals that the literature in the field of disruptive innovation that is not based upon 
conjecture is primarily focused upon leading edge organisations or those that have been disrupted 
from their industries. This has discounted the experience of average performers, demonstrating a 
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gap in academic knowledge and an even wider gulf in practitioner-understanding regarding the 
application of the theory. For the completeness of the theory, organisations from all relevant 
populations should be considered (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1993). Thus average and non-best in class 
organisations should be considered as a viable population from which data can be drawn. 
0 General isabil ity: making generalisations from case data 
Christensen has built much of his theory from extensive quantitative analysis of several case study 
markets. Positivistic approaches usually allow the researcher to adopt statistical measures to 
assess margins of error and to use quantitative methods to search for generalisations to broader 
populations (Silverman, 2000). However, Christensen's case based approach means that he has 
collected and analysed historical data that is empirically grounded in the specific industries or 
technologies under focus. Thus, he has generated new insights regarding the process of disruptive 
change in numerous industries but has failed to note, to some extent, that it is not statistically 
correct to generali5e case based findings to a global theory (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
For example, much emphasis has been placed upon Christensen's (1997) analysis of the hard-disk- 
drive industry in the United States. This work provided the corner stone of evidence regarding the 
process of disruptive innovation: where start-up entrants displace industry incumbents. However, 
Christensen failed to address the national context from within which the process of disruption 
occurred. Alternatively, Chesbrough (1999; 2003) found that the incumbents Of Japan's hard-disk- 
drive industry undertook organisational-level change and transferred to the new technologies, thus 
remaining in place. He concludes that industry wide disruption is contingent upon national 
contexts and that no amount of smart product positioning and marketing will facilitate disruption 
if the national context does not support such fluid change. 
In sum, it is dangerous to make generalisations, which cannot be otherwise supported, from case 
study data. Christensen could, however, build his argument by augmenting it to other patterns of 
technological and industrial change, for example the previously discussed population dynamics and 
resource partitioning perspectives. In doing so, it could be possible to identify markets, industries 
and nation states where the process of disruption is more likely to occur and the theory of 
disruptive innovation is more likely to stand as true. 
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0A lack of longitudinal research: avoiding sampling on the dependent variable 
Truly customer-orientated firms do attempt to understand their customers' needs, even their 
dormant and unexpressed desires (Allen et al. 1999). Yet the businesses portrayed by Christensen 
(1997) and Christensen and Raynor (2003) display an almost superficial understanding of customer 
needs or product selection criteria. It could be argued that Christensen has been 'sampling on the 
dependent variable' (Robson, 1993), falling prey to the temptation of selecting cases to support a 
predetermined thesis. To quash such accusations, theory of disruptive innovation could be assessed 
by conducting longitudinal research. Such research would monitor and analyse, in real time over a 
number of decades, several emergent technologies in several areas of the world, perhaps in 
industries in which technological history is already well documented. By creating transparency in 
data collection and analysis, conclusions drawn from such research would be less open to criticism. 
0A lack of qualitative research: delivering a probing of management action and cognition 
Analysis reveals that the literature in the field of disruptive innovation is primarily positivistic in 
nature. There is a lack of qualitative management research that aims to better understand the 
managerial behaviours and beliefs that support or inhibit the organisational pursuit of disruptive 
innovation. Danneels (2004) observes that "... individual managerial competence does play a 
significant role and should be an explicit focus of research into the determinants of incumbent 
success. Some managers do seem able to lead their firms across technological transitions... " (p254). 
Much of the literature has focused upon better understanding the process of disruptive innovation 
and the global conditions in which it seems to thrive in each case. Research is now needed to 
investigate the qualitative micro factors of the phenomenon, it is proposed that such consideration 
of management issues enhances both academic understanding and industrial thirst for practical 
guidance (Johnson et al., 2003). 
2.6 A definition of the term disruptive innovation 
Despite the issues that frustrate a clear definition and understanding of the terms 'disruptive 
innovation' and 'potentially disruptive innovation', it is believed that the above assessment of 
Christensen's work can be summarised to provide definitions of these terms. Therefore, the 
following were used throughout this research: 
43 
Exploring and Describing the Pursuit of Disruptive Innovation 
A disruptive innovation is: 
a customer offering based upon one or more new technologies and/or processes that have enabled 
the introduction of new attribute sets, which in turn have changed the basis of competition by 
changing the performance dimensions along which organisations compete. 
A potentially disruptive innovation is: 
a customer offering based upon one or more new technologies and/or processes that enable the 
introduction of new attribute sets which, if marketed appropriately, are likely to change the basis of 
competition, by changing the performance dimensions along which organisations compete. 
The five most frequently cited attributes of disruptive innovation appear to be': 
The new attribute sets of potentially disruptive innovations are initially neither expected 
nor desired by lead/high-end customers; customers and suppliers within the mainstream 
initially perceive an unwanted reduction in functionality. 
0 The disruption takes a foothold in an underserved or overlooked customer segment (or with 
those who currently choose non-purchase as an afternative); potentially disruptive 
innovations should never be lunched directly into the mainstream market. 
0 Relationships between customers and suppliers are transformed as customers are enabled 
to do things in a more convenient setting that could have only been achieved with 
specialists in the past. 
Incumbent org2nisations' focus on mainstream customers and historical trajectories of 
performance, result in their lack of ability and desire to identify or recognise potentially 
disruptive opportunities or threats. 
0 The process of disruption is enabled through niche marketing using either a 'low-end' or a 
'new-market' strategy; 'being patient for growth but impatient for profitability' forces 
management teams to stay focused on customer niches with a compelling reason to buy. 
6 This list was generated following a critical appraisal of the literature on the topic disruptive innovation and the broader 
fields of discontinuous and radical innovation. It generated 18 themes or key features of the term disruptive innovation 
as defined above (see Appendix 1b Table B-1). 
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The definition and the features of potentially disruptive innovations, as outlined above, introduce 
the notion "if marketed appropriately"; an essential element of the definition. Christensen's theory 
highlights that the first customers for disruptive offerings will be found in remote or emerging 
market niches, and that it is from these customers that a path to disruption can be carved (Rafii 
and Kampas, 2002) via niche marketing approaches. Similarly, Carroll (1985), Hannen and Freeman 
(1984) and Wade (1996) show that it is through the process of niche market satisfaction that 
resource-partitioning and industry population dynamics can be explained. Furthermore, there exists 
extensive literature on the importance of marketing approaches for emergent technologies and 
customer offerings. For example, proponents and supporters of technology adoption lifecycle 
theory, such as Moore (1995,1998,2000,2002), state that the single most important failure of 
potentially revolutionary concepts is management teams who ignore those small groups with a 
compelling reason to buy, preferring to take their new offerings directly to large mainstream 
markets: 
... this tendency alway5 to take new technologies to mainstream customers reflects 
a rather narrow marketing competence - that although many scholar5 tend to firame 
the issue as one of technological competence, such inability to find new markets for 
new technologies may be a firm ý5 most serious handicap in innovation " (Christensen, 
2000: 58). 
In almost all of Christensen's self authored and co-authored publications there is reference to the 
importance of marketing approaches and he draws from a wealth of literature to describe 
techniques that can help with this process. This thesis aims to address gaps in the theory of 
disruptive innovation, thus this issue will not be critically appraised. Instead it is believed that this 
chapter summarises a deeper understanding of the term disruptive innovation and the prevailing 
problems with the theory. This provides a grounding from which a novel piece of research can be 
conducted, which, as will be explained in the following chapters, will offer a relevant and 
meaningful starting point for the continuation of qualitative investigations in the future. 
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2.7 Summary and focus of the thesis 
2.7.1 The notion of disruptive innovation 
Organisational innovation effort is traditionally focused upon performance improvement in 
attributes most valued by the most demanding customers - those willing to pay higher prices. 
Thus, both incremental and radical innovations offer performance improvements within the 
dimensions and directions that lead-customers (McDonald et al, 2001) desire and expect (O'Connor 
and Rice, 2001; Rothwell, 1995; Christensen, 1997). However, occasionally breakthroughs occur 
with a discontinuous impact upon this steady state (Christensen, 1997, Dosi, 1982; Schumpeter, 
1975). 
Conventionally, discontinuous innovations offer revolutionary leaps forward in performance 
improvement, in directions that lead-customers desire, yet break the steady-state as they are not 
yet expected to be possible (Christensen, 1997; DeTienne and Koberg, 2002). However, there is a 
type of lesser understood discontinuity, known as 'disruptive innovation'. A disruptive innovation is 
a customer offering based upon one or more new technologies and/or processes that have enabled 
the introduction of new attribute sets, which in turn have changed the basis of competition by 
changing the performance dimensions along which organisations compete. Thus, disruptive 
innovations can be considered as potential threats or as 'wellsprings of future sustaining 
innovation' (Kassiecieh et al 2002). 
2.7.2 A critique of disruptive innovation 
The literature on innovation and new product development has evolved to capture a number of 
important understandings and ideas on innovation of a disruptive nature. The rise of Clayton 
Christensen's theory of disruptive innovation has both contributed to and facilitated the growing 
base of research into the topic, yet problems remain regarding definition and clarity. Therefore, this 
chapter has delivered a critical review of the theory of disruptive innovation (SUMM2rised by Table 
2-2). It demonstrates that the phenomenon, with examples, has been described by a number of 
authors, from a number of different perspectives and it offers descriptions of factors that cause 
academics and management practitioners to struggle to understand and capitalise upon these 
important innovations. 
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Issue Author Implications for disruptive innovation 
theory. 
A typology of Veryzer - Less categorised appraisal of the origins 
discontinuous (1998) and management implications of 
innovation. disruptive innovations. 
'Dynamic drifting' Et Veryzer Unclear guidelines with specific 
extensive prototyping (1998) reference to the traditional NPD process. 
Business concept Hamel - Too technology focused not enough 
innovation (2000) attention to wider system changes. 
Population dynamics Et Hannan and - Could be used to provide a quantitative 
resource partitioning Freeman evidence base of industry change. 
0 984); - Casts doubt over the claims of 
Wade (1996) generalisab. ility made by Christensen. 
An holistic conception Deszca et al. - It is difficult to conceive or 
of disruptive innovation 0 999); communicate an holistic understanding. 
Cooper et al. - There is a failure to consider qualitative 
(2001) issues. 
The function of Ulwick et al, - Confuses the boundaries of the theory, 
perspective and location (2003); Paap hindering definitions, making it difficult 
and Katz to identify what makes an innovation 
(2004). disruptive at the onset. 
The function of Cooper et al. - Confuses decision making for resource 
competences and time (2000); allocation and business priorities 
within the market Kaplan - Should not conceive disruptiveness as 
(1999) an impact on organisational competence. 
Trajectory mapping and Evans et al. Could be improved by using more 
understanding product (2002); Kano sophisticated mapping of performance 
performance dimensions (1993) dimensions. 
The relationship Cohen Et - There exists a lack of understanding 
between disruptive Levinthal regarding the role of acquiring and 
innovation and 0 990); commercially applying external 
absorptive capacity information. 
Barriers to disruptive Ahuja Et - Industrial and academic gaps regarding 
innovation Lampert disruptive innovation and: marketing, 
(2001); recognising opportunities, organisational 
Amabile Rice ecologies, ideas management, scanning 
et al. (2001) and 'futurising' and project funding. 
Methodological gaps in Silverman -A failure to consider average 
Christensen's approach (2000); Yin performing organisations. 
0 994); - Making unjustifiable generalisations 
Strauss and from case data. 
Corbin -A lack of qualitative data regarding 
(1990). managerial behaviours and beliefs 
-A lack of objectively verified 
longitudinal research. 
Table 2-2.6aps in knowledge in the theory of disruptive innovation: 
a table to summarise factors that remain unresolved. 
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2.7.3 Addressing gaps in knowledge 
At the outset of the research there were, among others, three important gaps in knowledge to 
which it was decided that this thesis would be dedicated: 
(1) a clear definition of the term disruptive innovation was unavailable, 
(2) a coherent unified framework of enablers and inhibitors with direct relevance to the ability to 
foster disruptive innovation was not present, and 
(3) much of the research in the field was positivistic and involved leading edge organisations; 
loosing the benefits of qualitative understanding and discounting the experience of average 
performers. This demonstrates a gap in academic knowledge and an even wider gulf in 
practitioner-understanding regarding the application of the theory. 
This chapter culminated in a working definition of the term disruptive innovation (Section 2.6), it 
was decide to use it throughout the remainder of an investigation focused upon points 2 and 3 
above. 
2.7.4 Research objectives and next steps 
The following Chapter, the research methodology, will demonstrate that systematic consideration 
has been given to the main issues of research design in order to address the research objectives 
presented in Table 2-3 below. Three waves of research were designed and implemented to tackle 
the three sub-objectives. 
48 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Research To explore the nature and experience of management practitioners' pursuit of 
Objective 1: potentially disruptive innovations in average performing (or non-best-practice) 
businesses. 
Sub- To deliver an holistic understanding of the key facilitators and 
Objective inhibitors faced by Management practitioners wanting to enable the 
1 capacity and capability to pursue potentially disruptive innovations 
within their non-best-in-class organisations. And to convert this 
knowledge into an holistic processual and systemic conceptual 
framework, grounded in both data and theory. 
Sub- To explore the emergent conceptual framework in order to identify 
Objective focus areas of management action and management cognition to 
2: which the delivery of potentially disruptive innovations are highly 
dependent. 
Sub- To specify, design and implement a management intervention to 
Objective probe a priority focus area of management action and cognition. 
3: The intervention should be able to build new academic knowledge, 
whilst simultaneously improving the ability of the participating 
organisations to pursue potentially disruptive innovations. 
Research To use this investigation as a tool to extend knowledge and practice of 
Objective 2: collaborative academic-practitioner methodological approaches in the field of 
innovation research. 
Table 2-3: Research Objectives 
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3. Research Methodology 
This chapter presents the research methodology that was designed in order to sati5fy the research 
objectives presented in Chapters 1 and 2. A phenomenological perspective was adopted with a focus 
on qualitative research. A collaborative academic-industrial research design was developed, adopting 
what has come to be known as the Mode 2 approach (Tranfield and Starky, 1998), with primary use of 
a multiple case study strategy. Data were collected u5ing multiple method5, including workshops, 
interviews and industrial vi5its; they have been analysed using both individual examination and 
collaborative practitioner inspection. The purpose of the research was to explore and describe the 
phenomenon of fostering disruptive innovation. 
CHAPTER AIMS I ACTIVITIES 11 OUTCOMES 
To consider research Systematically considered the issues 
approaches and to design the of research design. Made decisions 
most appropriate research to generate a research strategy in a Research Methodology 
methodology. igorous manner with full 
V- 
awareness of the options available 
I'to 
researchers. 
The function of research is not 
necessarily to map and conquer the world 
but to sophisticate the beholding of it. 
(Stake, 1995) 
3.1 The purpose of the current inquiry and the affect of research perspectives 
The objective of this chapter is to demonstrate that systematic consideration has been given to the 
main issues of research design - that the decisions which led to the research strategy used in this 
study were conducted in a rigorous manner, in full awareness of the options available to 
researchers. 
The preceding chapter illustrated that despite a recent increase in publications upon the topic of 
disruptive innovation, an holistic understanding of these factors is still missing. Furthermore, at the 
outset of this investigation, little was published about the factors of management cognition and 
management action that practitioners, within average performing organisations, should address 
'today' if they want to initiate their pursuit of disruptive innovation. Therefore, disruptive 
innovation, as a subset of the whole innovation agenda, is a relatively new field, as compared to 
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disciplines such as Corporate Strategy or Marketing. Robson (1993) argues that in addition to the 
objective of contributing to knowledge, there are three purposes to undertaking research; these are 
to explore, describe or explain events and/or situations (Table 3-1). Given the novelty and 
immaturity of the topic area, the primary purpose of this study is exploratory; however, the current 
research not only aims to explore the interrelated features of the pursuit of disruptive innovation, it 
also aims to describe how it can be enabled within average performing organisations, focusing in 
particular upon management cognition and management action. 
Purpose Key Characteristics 
Exploratory e To find out what is happening 
To seek new insights 
To ask questions 
To assess phenomena in a new light 
Usually, but not necessarily qualitative 
Descriptive * To portray an accurate profile of persons, events or situations 
Requires extensive previous knowledge *of the situation etc. to be 
researched or described, so that you know appropriate aspects on which 
to gather information. 
o May be qualitative and/ or quantitative 
Explanatory e Seeks an explanation of a situation or problem, usually in the form of 
causal relationships 
* May be qualitative and/or quantitative 
Table 3- 1: 7he purpose of research - to explore, to describe, to explain (Robson, 1993.42) 
Researchers conducting investigations that aim to explore, describe, understand, explain, predict, 
change or evaluate topics in the management world, such as disruptive innovation, are conducting 
inquiries into a social phenomenon (Blaikie, 1993). Authors such as Miles and Huberman (1994), 
Robson (1993), Yin (1994), Gill and Johnson (1991), Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, and Lowe (1991), 
Silverman (1999) and Blaikie (1993) show there are numerous ways in which to approach a social 
inquiry and that these vary according to the perspective that the researcher adopts when looking at 
his or her research questions. Differences in research perspectives are typically characterised as a 
debate between two major and opposing world views or methodological paradigms (Patton, 1990) - 
"in the red-corner is phenomenology, in the blue-corner is positivism" (Zikmund, 1988), although 
there are perspectives that can be adopted between these extremes (Blaikie, 1993). 
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Thus, the choice of investigative methods employed in a social inquiry is influenced by how much 
either of the two schools of thought affects the researcher's perspective. Robson (1993) and Yin 
(1994) state that before undertaking an investigation, researchers must recognise the existence of 
their personal beliefs, biases and assumptions and should consider the suitability of different 
research perspective for the topic in hand. In doing so, researchers will better understand which 
research perspectives to adopt and will be more self aware during the development of an 
appropriately designed research strategy. 
Social scientists who are advocates of the positivist paradigm believe that the social world exists 
externally and can be measured through scientific, objective methodologies. Positivists use careful 
observation and meticulous testing through experiments, quasi-experiments and rigorously defined 
surveys. This enables theory to be deduced to explain causal relationships between variables 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). Thus the positivist perspective uses a deductive research approach. 
Robson (1993) states when beginning such a study researchers first deduce a hypothesis from 
extant theory. They then express the hypothesis in operational terms to propose a relationship 
between specific variables. An experiment or some other form of empirical inquiry will be 
conducted to test the operational hypothesis. An examination of the outcome of the inquiry is 
conducted in order to confirm the theory or reject it. A rejection indicates the need for theory 
modification in the light of the findings. If modification is required, repetition of the cycle is 
conducted in order to verify the revised theory and confirm research hypotheses (Robson, 1993). 
Alternatively, advocates of the phenomenological paradigm state that reality is socially constructed 
rather than objectively determined. Social scientists who hold this perspective focus on 
understanding what is happening and why, by collecting and understanding data from social 
interactions in theirnatural settings. This necessitates the use of more naturalistic methodologies, 
such as case studies, ethnographic observations and interviews. These more qualitative approaches 
are without physical or statistical controls; this enables researchers to inductively generate 
context-bound understanding to underpin theory (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994; Easterby-Smith, 
Thorpe, and Lowe, 1991). 
Patton (1990) illustrates the major difference between the two schools of thought. Whereas the 
experimental design underpinning the positivist-deductive approach requires the specification of 
main variables and the statement of specific research hypotheses before data collection beyins. 
"The strategy of [phenomenological] inductive design is to allow the important analysis dimensions 
to emerge from patterns found in the cases under study, without presupposing in advance what the 
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important dimensions will be" (Patton, 1990: 44). Thus inductive research is mostly linked with 
theory building, whereas deductive research is linked with theory testing (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
It is the author's opinion that these seemingly incompatible approaches can be brought together by 
considering the demands that an inquiry places upon the researcher (Figure 3-1). 
Figure 3-1: Building and testing theofy with the phel7olnenologic. 71,717dpositivistperspectives 
(an illustration derived by considering the publications of BIJWC (1993), Miles and Huberman 
(1994), Patton (1990), Silverman (1999) and Robson (1993)). 
Researchers who want to initiate the building of missing theory, can do so using a 
phenomenological perspective in an exploration of the relevant aspect of the social world. Those 
who want to continue their pursuit of knowledge development can then test the validity of their 
emergent theories by adopting a positivist approach, in more experimental conditions, that may 
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involve manipulating the reality under consideration. As this investigation seeks to address gaps in 
knowledge, Figure 3-1 illustrates that a phenomenological perspective is the more appropriate 
perspective to adopt for this research, this is also more suited to the authors personal research 
approach. 
3.2 Developing a research strategy that delivers both robustness and relevance 
In essence, this thesis aims to provide a better understanding of how management practitioners can 
facilitate the pursuit of disruptive innovation when their organisations have not successfully 
undertaken such a task in recent memory. New and Payne (1995: 75) state that "It is possible to 
have academic research which scores high on rigour and cleverness but low on connection to real 
problems ...... therefore, they claim that in management, more than any other discipline, there is a 
fundamental need to make a "... commitment to an encounter with that which management and 
workers do... " (p75). However, Stewart et al. (2002) observe the complex, challenging and 
sometimes problematic relationship between management practice and the practice of 
management research. According to Tranfield (2002) and Hill et al (1999), the testing relationship 
primarily exists due to the perception that a push for academic rigour in management research has 
negative consequences for industrial relevance and vice versa. Considering the context bound 
nature of the subject matter, it was necessary to give this issue significant attention. 
The major gaps in knowledge on the topic of enabling disruptive innovation are predominantly 
focused around management action and managerne nt cognition; therefore, investigations into 
these areas, by their very nature, must be immersed in context and both academically rigorous and 
industrially relevant. Coghlan and Brannick (2001) state that researchers can adopt an approach 
called Action fle5earch when their research questions relate to describing an unfolding series of 
actions oyer time within a system and understanding how and why action can change or improve 
the working of some aspects of that system. Originating in the 1940's, action research is a generic 
term, which covers many forms of action orientated research. It differs from traditional positivist 
approaches as it "... is an approach that aims both at taking action and creating knowledge or 
theory about that action" (Coughlan and Coghlan, 2002: 220), yet remains genuinely scientific in 
the importance it places upon careful observation and study of the effects of human behaviour on 
human systems (Reason and Bradbury, 2001). Coughlan and Coghlan (2002: 224) and Susman and 
Evered (1978) have compared action research with positivist science, they conclude: 
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The aim of the research is different; positivist science focuses upon universal knowledge, 
theory building and testing, whereas action research is concerned with theory building and 
testing with knowledge in action. 
The researcher's role and relationship to the setting is different; they are an observer in 
positivist science with a detached and neutral role, whereas they are required to be an 
actor or agent of change in action research, immersed in the context that is the field of 
study. 
The type of knowledge acquired is therefore different; positivist science focuses upon 
universal knowledge and covering laws, whereas action research is concerned with the 
particular, context specific knowledge. 
The nature of data validation is also different; positivist science aims to be context free, 
focusing on measurement, building logic and creating consistency of prediction and 
control, whereas action research is experimental, with contextually embedded validation. 
It can be noted that the features of action research are more suited to the objectives of this 
investigation that those of traditional positivistic science. However, Coughlan and Coghlan (2002) 
note that there are certain circumstances that are needed before entering into action research: "... 
what is needed is a real issue of both research an managerial significance upon which a group or 
organisation is embarking, which has an uncertain outcome and which the group or organisation is 
willing to subject to rigorous enquiry, particularly the analysis and implementation of action. " 
Thus, an action research approach in the context of this study would need a willing group or 
organisation(s) to take part in the investigation, not only to explore the pursuit of disruptive 
innovation but also to implement action in order to actually initiate the pursuit. In sum, "The 
grounded, iterative, interventionist nature of action research ensures closeness to the full range of 
variables in settings where those variables may not emerge all at once" (Westbrook, 1995: 18), it is, 
therefore, a suitable and justifiable epistemological and research approach for this investigation. 
Hill et al. (11999) and Huff (2000), along with others from the British Academy of Management (e. g. 
Tranfield and Starkey, 1998) have extended the action research perspective and elevated the 
concept of collaborative 'Mode 2'ruethodological approaches to the fore of management inquiry. 
The Mode 2 approach offers researchers the opportunity to simultaneously seek industrial relevance 
without sacrificing academic rigour. Similarly to action research, this is based on the premise that 
working closely with practitioners and co-creating knowledge and understanding in the context of 
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application will satisfy the aims of both the academic and industrial audiences. There are four 
features that typify the Mode 2 approach to research (Figure 3-2). 
4. Theory-building and 
application should be 
combined In the co- 
production of now 
knowledge. 
3. The group should 
have a socially- 
distributed research 
capability. 
Mode 2 
approach to 
1. The research 
problem must be 
framed In the context 
of application. 
2. A heterogeneous group of 
both academics and 
practitioners should be 
engaged in the Investigation, 
using a trans-disciplinary 
approach. 
Figure 3-2: 777e four features that typify the Mode 2approach to research (adapted from Stewart et al., 2000) 
The Mode 2 action research approach resonates with the author's need to conduct an academically 
robust and industrially relevant investigation, and can fit to the phenomenological perspective. 
Thus it has significantly influenced the research approach developed for this investigation, which 
can be described as a 'researcher driven, collaborative, action research, knowledge-building style' 
(Figure 3-3). 
PhD Research: 
An individual inquiry to 
generate new knowledge 
The Author's Style: 
Researcher driven collaborative 
knowledge building 
L 
Phenomenological 
Perspective 
> 
Collaborative 
"Mode 
=11" 
Approaches 
> 
Figure 3-3: 7he authorýý style of inquiry 
Reason and Bradbury (2001) and Coughlan and Coghlan (2002) are among a growing number or 
authors to propose step by step processes for conducting action research. These can be surnmarised 
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into six key stages (data gathering, data feedback, data. analysis, action planning, intervention, 
evaluation) and one meta-stage (monitoring and feedback throughout the entire process), they also 
propose a host of qualitative and qualitative data collection and analysis techniques. However, 
despite convincing and growing arguments stating the need for more i nd ustri al -academic, Mode 2 
investigations, researchers have few specific guidelines on which research strategies to select or 
why it is important to do so. Furthermore, whilst several authors elude the problems with 
conducting collaborative inquiries, not one proponent of Mode 2 appears to have offered 
researchers an holistic list of issues to consider or how to mitigate for such complications. Thus, 
guideli nes on what constitutes delivering Mode 2 research are available (such as the generic 
processes proposed by advocates of action research); however, there is an absence of literature 
from which researchers can draw standard methodologies. Also missing is advice on good practice 
routines to help researchers with cultivating the necessary joint ownership of an academic- 
industrial collaborative inquiry. 
Thus, the proceeding sections of this chapter present the strategic decisions that have been made 
to design the robust research methodology that was implemented for the investigation in hand. 
Furthermore, to aid future researchers wishing to benefit from the Mode 2 approach, this chapter 
offers a detailed overview of the delivery of the collaborative research methodology that was 
employed for the current inquiry into disruptive innovation. 
3.3 A research strategy to satisfy the objectives of the current investigation 
Full consideration of the available methodological approaches has been made and will be presented 
in the remainder of this chapter (see also Appendix 2). The research strategy benefits from both the 
advantages afforded by collaborative action research, as advocated by Tranfield (2002), and the 
benefits of tried and tested methods underpinning research of a phenomenological nature. 
The researcher driven, collaborative, knowledge-bu il ding style has influenced the design of the 
current investigation. It was anticipated at the outset that this investigation would provide the 
academic audience with improved theory or new knowledge and the industrial audience with 
practical insights to improve their organisation's attempts at fostering disruptive innovation. Yet 
before selecting and designing a detailed research strategy, it is important to consider the type of 
research questions that have been posed, the focus on contemporary events and the control 
required over proceedings (Yin 1994). Thus, the collaborative nature of the research, with the 
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phenomenological perspective - void of traditional experimentation - [ends itself to the 
development of a combined, multiple case study and survey methodology, underpinned by the 
action research, Mode 2 approach. This deliverers a primarily inductive approach for building new 
knowledge on disruptive innovation from the outset, concluding in a deductive and inductive 
approach to deliver management implication5. 
Silverman (1999) suggests that researchers should consider the characteristics that are consistent 
with the requirements of their study in the context of quantitative and qualitative approaches. This 
enables them to better understand the priorities that should be given to the two types of research 
data. Table 3-5 presents the authors high-level consideration of this matter for the current study 
Characteristic of Research Research type required 
Dominantly Dominantly 
Quantitative Qualitative 
1) The action research Mode 2 approach necessitates the relationship 
between researcher and subject matter to be close, using a research VII 
strategy that is systematic but less stfuctured than an experiment. 
3) Surveys and questionnaires can reveal large amounts of objective, 
value free quantitative data that could benefit the understanding of 
disruptive innovation. 
4) Giddens (1987) argues that the phenomenological approach is 
supported by the collection of primarily qualitative data, as social 
reality can only be understood through the eyes of the participants 
involved. This indicates that data collection techniques generating 
quantitative data will provide value; however, qualitative data 
collection techniques should be given more weighting. 
5) Miles and Huberman (1994) and Silverman (1999) state that 
qualitative data provides a better source of richness and holism that V 
has a stronger capability for revealing complexity. This closely fits 
the pursuit of the current research. 
6) The relationship between theory and the current research is one of 
emergence. Such a relationship points to the need for qualitative V 
data (Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
Table 3-2., An analysis of the need for qualitative and quantitative data in the cul-rent study 
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Therefore, both quantitative and qualitative research types are appropriate in the context of the 
current investigation. However, a significant emphasis is placed upon the latter. There are several 
data collection techniques appropriate to a qualitative collaborative inquiry and researchers must 
be cautious when using such strategies as they can negatively impact impartiality and generate a 
prejudice in results. For example, Yin (1994) asserts that a researcher's close involvement with 
cases under consideration can lead to bias in the data collection and the outcomes of data analysis. 
Hence,. three recognised mechanisms have been identified to help overcome this risk (Yin 1994; 
Strauss and Corbin, 1990; Eisenhardt, 1989): 
a) A series of semi-structured surveyslinterviews will be conducted with 'expert industrialists' and 
'expert academics' external to the cases under examination. This data collection and analysis 
will be implemented in parallel to the multiple case study strategy. Triangulation of the 
findings from these interviews with the case study data will reduce risks of researcher bias. 
b) Case study dota will be drawn from the collaborating organisations, which will be primarily 
analy5ed via indjividual researcher examination. However, periodic inspections will be 
conducted by the collaborating practftioner5 and other invited organisations. Once again this 
will ensure that the researcher has accounted for any accidental bias. 
c) Enfolding the literature at key points will help with corroborating internal validity and 
generality For instance comparisons of the emergent concepts/frameworks with a broad range 
of literature, the use of conflicting literature and similar/supporting literature, will force deeper 
investigation and iterations between theory and data. 
In sum, at the onset of the current research a predominantly phenomenological perceptive was 
adopted, with the purpose of exploring and describing the nature of disruptive innovation and how 
it can be enabled by today's management practitioners. A multiple case study and survey strategy 
was selected in line with the Mode 2 approach. Three waves of researcher led collaborative data 
collection and analyses were conducted. The first two waves were focused upon inductive theory 
building and the collection of primarily deep and rich qualitative data. The final wave will also 
include a deductive approach with some quantitative data collection (Figure 3-4). Exactly how this 
strategy was employed, in terms of data collection, data analysis and ensuring research quality, is 
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outlined in the following sections (Appendix 2 provides further details concerning research 
strategies (e. g. experiments, surveys and case studies), how they were selected (e. g. consideration of 
the type of research questions and the control required over events etc. ) and how decisions were 
made regarding research focus in terms of quantitative or qualitative data collection). 
Research 
Purpose Wave 1: Exploratory Wave 11: Exploratory Wave III: Descriptive 
Research RO 1: To explore thý nature and experience of management prktitioners' pursuit of 
Objectives potentially disruptive i1nnovations in average performing (or non-b6t-practice) businesses- 
R01.3: To specify. design and implement a 
management intervention to probe a 
priority focus area of management action 
and cognition. The intervention should be 
able to build new academic knowledge, 
whilst simultaneously improving the 
ability of the participating organisations 
to pursue potentially disruptive 
innovations. 
B02: To use this investigation as a toot to extend knowledge and ractice of collaborative 
academic-practitioder methodological approaches in the field ol innovation research. 
Research 
Strategy Survey Strategy 
- --------- 
1 Research 
I Perspective 
. ... . ..... -I 
3.3.1 Implementing a Mode 2 multiple case study and survey strategy 
Chapter 3 and Appendix 2 have thus far shown how a multiple method research strategy was 
selected; focused upon the use of case studies in a collaborative academic-practitioner approach to 
deliver new knowledge on the topic of disruptive innovation. Decisions have been presented upon 
the qualitative nature of the study; however, the precise details of research activities have thus far 
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Figure 3-4: High-level summary of research strategy 
3.3.1 im. plementing a Mode 2 cý case study and survey strategy 
Chapter 3 and Appendix 2 have thus far shown how a multiple method resear-, ý-i strategy was 
selected; focused upon 'he use of case studies in a collaborative academic-prac-titIoner approach to 
deliver new knowledge on the topic of disruptive innovation. Decisions have been presented upon 
the quaiitati ve nature of the study; however, the precise details of research aclivities have thus far 
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not been offered. What ensues is a high-level summary of how the detailed design of the 
investigation took place, followed by a presentation of the activities - such as data collection and 
analysis techniques, case selection etc. - that have been pursued by the author. 
As previously stated, it was decided that a significant deliverable of the primary use of case studies 
in a collaborative academic-practitioner approach, should be an holistic conceptual framework of 
disruptive innovation. Eisenhardt's (1989) and Yin's (1994) seminal work offers guidelines, for using 
case study based strategies, advice on data collection and analysis, and guidance for knowledge and 
theory building using such methods. They also provide insights for researchers wishing to conduct 
collaborative academic-practitioner investigations. Moreover, Eisenhardt's (1989) work proposes a 
nine stage process (Figure 3-5) that provides a structure on which a case study strategy can be 
employed for conceptual framework construction and theory building. 
The notion of relating specific data collection techniques with particular research strategies is an 
unnecessarily tight linkage; instead, multiple collection techniques can be used to great effect 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994; Silverman, 1999). Therefore Eisenhardt's process, with the utilisation 
of multiple data collection and analysis techniques, was adopted by the author and adapted with 
the insights and advice from eminent qualitative research authors, such as Yin (1994), Strauss and 
Corbin, (1990), Miles and Huberman (1994) and Silverman (1999). 
In order to implement the case study strategy in the context of collaborative research, three actions 
had to be completed before the full design of the research programme could commence 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). (1) Definition of the tentative research questions and constructs. (2) Selection 
of appropriate cases and interviewees. (3) Construction of supporting instruments and protocols. 
These tasks were integrated into the opening steps of the first wave of research activity and once 
they were completed research activities could be designed, data collection tools selected and data 
analysis techniques could be constructed 
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1. Getting Started: 
Defining tentative 
9. Reaching research question 2. Selecting 
Closure Cases 
-Priory specification of 
Know when to stop adding tentative constructs. -Define population fr om 
cases. 
. 
-Be prepared for which the sample is drawn. 
-Know when to stop iterating questions 
to shift. -Sampling for case studies is 
between theory and data. -Must begin as close as theoretical not statistical. 
-Address the strengths and possible 
to no theory -Number of cases selected is 
weaknesses of the case study under consideration and important for generality and 
approach. no hypothesis to test. practicality. 
-Comparison of the 
emergent 
concepts/framework with 
8 Enfolding -Typically multiple 
3. Crafting 
. 
the 
broad range of literature. data collection Instruments 
Literature -Use conflicting 
literature. methods are designed. and 
' 
-Use similar/supporting hL, Building theory ld -Ensure triangulation. 
Protocols 
literature. 
A 
from case -Ensure richness of 
-Corroborating internal t d d t data. 
validity and generality. 
s u y a a 
-Systematic building of an emergent -Understand importance of overlap between frame of constructs ensuring a close fit I. I- -_ 
with data. 
-Refine definition of constructs 
-Building evidence which measures the 
constructs in each case. 
-Establishing construct validity. 
-Verifying the relationships between 
constructs. 
-Avoid leaping to conclusions 7. Shaping the from the data, force going conceptual 
framework beyond first impressions and 
increase probability of novel 
findings. ' 
-Develop dimensions and 
compare cases. 
Select pairs ofcases and look 
for similarities and differences. 
-Divide data by data source. 
6. Searching 
for Cross Case 
Patterns 
.- I-ILL-1 -11 .. 1. 
-Use field notes to capture and to push 
thinking. 
-Use team meetings where possible. 
-Maintain flexible data collection thus 
exploring emergent themes and new 
opportunities. 
Av oid "death by data 
asphyxiation'. 
-Write up detailed case 
study notes from each 
site. 
-Ensure intimacy with the 
data from each case. 
S. Analysing 
VAthIn Case 
Data 
4. Entering 
the Field 
Figure 3-5. - Building theory from case study data (adapted from Eisenhardt. 1989) 
3.4 Wave 1: Delivering research definition and a holistic understanding of 
disruptive innovation. 
The first wave of this research was designed as an exploration to better understand the complex 
and dynamic phenomenon of the pursuit of disruptive innovation. Over a 15 month period, a series 
of workshops, interviews and observations were used in an inductive knowledge development cycle. 
The analyses of the data and the enfolding of literature were extrapolated into a conceptual 
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framework of enablers and inhibitors that management practitioners face in the pursuit of 
potentially disruptive innovations. A full description of the collaborative mode 2 methodology is 
presented in the remainder of this section. 
3.4.1 Getting Started: Defining tentative research constructs 
Objective To develop tentative research constructs to aid case selection and initiation 
of inquiry. 
Eisenhardt (1989) suggests that researchers wishing to build management theory must begin as 
close to no theory under consideration as possible. However, in the context of the collaborative 
research, the author could not approach potential industrial collaborators without what looked like 
a well defined research focus. Thus, early data collection was guided by the development of. initial 
tentative constructs. Authors such as Eisenhardt (1989) and Robson (1993) suggest that initial 
tentative constructs can be generated through a simple review of extant literature and discussions 
of initial concepts with management practitioners from the field. 
When initiating this investigation no overarching theory or model could be found on how 
organisations can foster disruptive innovation. Thus, a research question was established in order 
to define the research focus. The question was posed within an exploratory research design, which 
allowed for it to change in accordance with the emergence of new information. 
"How can senior practitioners understand and foster disruptive 
innovation as part of a major competitive strategy? " 
This initial phase was conducted in parallel with case study selection (Section 3.5.2) and it quickly 
became apparent that very few practitioners in potential case study sites were aware of the term 
disruptive innovation. There was either significant confusion surrounding the meaning or complete 
ignorance of the phrase. Therefore, it was decided necessary to conduct an extensive literature 
survey in order help define disruptive innovation and to generate some simple tentative constructs. 
The tentative constructs were used to guide, but not direct, the author's planning and initial 
discussions (Figure 3-6 illustrates the key words and terms used to search the broad base of 
innovation literature). 
The specific relationships between variables and theories were not considered in depth so as not to 
generate preconceptions on how to answer the broad research question. Instead, the survey led to 
the generation of the research questions and research objectives and enabled the author to frame 
the term disruptive innovation in a language that practitioners could better understand. Thus, 
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constructs were formed to help drive the data collection. The results of this initial stage can be 
seen in Chapter 4. 
Organisational learning 
Research and development 
Disruptive Innovation Plus: 
radical, non-linear, discontinuous, 
breakthrough and revolutionary 
Innovations 
paradigm shifting/breaking 
Intralentreproneurialism 
Innovation and marketingtexploitation 
incremental innovation Plus: 
continuous, evolutionary, linear, 
and sustaining innovations. 
Innovation and teams/team work 
Portfolio management 
Innovation and project selection 
Organisational culture and innovation Organisational form / structure for 
innovation 
Creativity and 
Innovation and business models 
idea generation Venture capitalism and 
corporate venturing 
Figure 3-6., 7he key words1terms used to search literature in the field ofinnovation management technology 
management, marketing, research and development and new product development 
3.4.2 Selecting cases 
Objectives * To develop case and interviewee selection criteria. 
* To select appropriate cases to be involvedin collaborative research. 
* To identify interviewees to be involved in survey strategy. 
0 Why case and interviewee selection is important to the Mode 2 approach 
The decision to conduct a collaborative Mode 2 investigation suits the pragmatic demands of 
industrialists wanting to learn how to improve their chances of fostering disruptive innovation. It 
also suits the author's personal research style and, more importantly, it helps target existing gaps in 
academic knowledge. The collaborative approach requires high levels of commitment from both the 
researcher and the cases involved. Participative firms must be willing to provide appropriate levels 
of access, so that the problem can be framed in the context of application. And individuals from 
the organisation must be willing to actively engage in the investigation. Therefore, organisations 
involved in collaborative research must be carefully selected. 
Innovation strategy Innovation organisational 
ecology 
New product development 
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Van Maanen (1988) warns of the problems of "going native" - where researchers become so close 
to their subjects that they lose their objectivity. Measures must be taken to ensure that the 
collaborative nature of an investigation does not bias a researcher led inquiry. Thus, it was decided 
that expert industrialist and academics from outside the research group were to be interviewed to 
triangulate the findings; both case study organisations and interviewees were judiciously selected. 
0 Selecting the cases for the collaborative Mode 2 inquiry 
The concepts of population and statistical sampling are crucial in quantitative research. However, 
in qualitative studies, sampling (or in the case of this study - case study and interviewee selection) 
is not based upon statistical reasoning. Instead, the type and quantity of participants selected 
depends upon theoretical, strategic and pragmatic factors (Yin, 1994; Robson, 2000; Silverman, 
1999). 
Cases are predominantly chosen for one of two reasons within well designed case study research 
(Yin 1994; Eisenhardt, 1989; Silverman, 1999): 
a) To replicate previous studies in order to extend emergent theory. 
b) To fill theoretical categories to generate new theory. 
The current research does not aim to replicate previous studies; instead it aims to generate new 
understanding and theory. Thus theoretical categories based upon the underpinning notions of the 
topic must be established to focus case study selection. 
The premise that disruptive innovation is "a powerful force that sooner or later threatens the health 
and survival of a# well-managed companies, and constitutes an extraordinary opportunity [for all 
industrialists]" (Christensen, 2003: 1) looks to remain unchallenged. Although some academics are 
calling for tighter definitions and more detailed research (e. g. Daneels, 2004), to date, the academic 
community appears to accept that disruptive innovations can affect any organisation from any 
sector. The current research does not aim to challenge this premise. Instead it aims to better 
understand how organisations can foster disruptive innovations. Therefore, when building a 
framework that attempts to explain how the phenomenon can be fostered it should either have a 
wide ranging generality, based upon data from a wide ranging sample, or be focused upon one 
specific type of industry/organisation. 
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The author was more interested in the wider generality of the topic, which would dictate, within a 
quantitative study, for data to be drawn from a sample of organisations that represent every facet 
of industry. Clearly this is impractical for a case study approach and the time restrictions of the 
current research. Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin (1994) state that when selecting cases it is best to 
choose a sample that matches the criteria of the extremes of the theoretical categories. Therefore, 
using the European Commission's definitions of large, medium and small sized enterprises (The 
European Commission, 2002) and the differentiator of service provider versus manufacturer, aW 
matrix was generated to help with case selection (Figure 3-7). The matrix represents the expansive 
rangeof organisations to which disruptive innovation could be relevant. The embodiment of the 
broad population aids with the generality demanded by the research topic. It was established to 
carefully assess the appropriateness of potential cases once the constraints of further theoretical 
categories, or selection criteria, had been established. 
Large Small 
Manufacturer C M Manufacturer 
Small Org. Large Org. 
Small Service Large Service 
E 
optimum target organisation5. 
Hqure 3-7.7he expansive range of organisations to which disruptive innovation could be relevant 
When implementing a case study strategy, researchers have to decide on which period in time to 
focus. For example, they can focus upon data from present and currently occurring activities or 
they can build an understanding of a past case history, or a balance of both approaches can be 
struck. Furthermore, researchers can choose to look towards better understanding best-in-class- 
organisations, average-to-low-performers, or once again a balance between the two can be struck. 
The author represents these decisions within the context of the current research in Figure 3-8. 
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9 
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cm 
0 
Build case histories 
Build case studies of 
High of firms that have 
firms trying to exploit 
Performing delivered disruptive potentially 
disruptive 
innovation innovations 
Build case studies of 
Build case histories 
firms, with little or no 
Average to Low of firms that have understanding of 
Performing succumbed to 
disruptive innovation, 
disruptive innovation attempting to adopt 
and use the concept 
PAST PRESENT 
Period in time focus 
Rqure3-8. Where to focus research activities -period in time vs. organisational performance 
Case histories of disruptive innovations are riddled with stories of the winners and the losers and 
hind-sight analysis in to what went right or wrong. Much of the published literature on disruptive 
innovation is of this nature. There is a great deal to be learnt about how disruptive innovation can 
be enabled by looking at the cases of past success stories. Much can also be learnt from studying 
those who were disrupted; for example, insights into bad practise can be gleaned from stories of 
practitioners who failed to see disruption coming until it is too late. However, in the judgements 
delivered from the analyses of success and error, hind-sight bias reigns supreme (Kern, 1999; 
Blaikie, 1993). It is common for humans to construct plausible, linear stories of how failure or 
success came about once we know the outcomes (e. g. Starbuck and Milliken, 1998), for example 
making the participants look bad enough to fit the bad outcome they were involved in (Reason, 
1997). It can therefore be argued that these reactions to failure or success make after the fact 
data mining of personal short comings or success factors - real or imagined - not just counter 
productive but actually untrustworthy (for a discussion on accounts of failures see Dekker, 2001 
and for a more detailed commentary upon the weaknesses of assessing historical cases for theory 
building see Glaser and Strauss (1967) and Blaikie (1993)). 
A grounded approach (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss and Corbin, 1990) to data collection was 
deemed appropriate, whereby predominantly inductive thinking and analysis would result in the 
discovery of new theory (see Appendix 2 for further discussion). This approach lends itself to 
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naturalistic methods (for example, interviews and observations within case studies) based on 
current or real time data. This avoids the problems associated with historical case analysis, leaving 
the decision to be made regarding whether 'h ig h -performing' or 'average-to-low-performing' firms 
are selected. It is believed that this choice lends it self to two types of case study procedure, or a 
combination of both, for researching disruptive innovation (Figure 3-9). 
(1) The establishment of a number of 
longitudinal case studies with best 
practice innovators. 
The author could plot the efforts, Vs 
successes and failures of organisations 
who believe they have potentially 
disruptive innovations in their grasp. The 
analysis of this data would generate 
further understanding and theory. 
(2) The introduction of the concept of 
disruptive innovation into a number 
firms of an average or more typical 
innovation performance. 
The author could facilitate the co-creation 
of knowledge and understanding on . disruptive innovation. New theory would 
be generated through assessing 
observations of the practitioner's ability to 
adopt the concept and perhaps utilise it to 
their advantage. 
Figure 3-9: Selecting 'high-performing'Or 'average-to-low-performing'case studies. 
Both these approaches can be used to research disruptive innovation by gathering qualitative data 
using a variety of naturalistic methods (for example, interviews and observations within case 
studies). Both would also generate theory with data analysis that uses interpretative procedures. 
However, due to time and funding issues, the second approach was deemed more appropriate. 
Eisenhardt (1989) suggests that it is difficult to generate and justify theory from less than four 
cases and too difficult for a researcher to cope with the amount of data generated by over 10 
cases. Therefore, it was decided that the case study element of the research would focus upon the 
generation of data from the transfer of the concept disruptive innovation into four disparate non- 
best-in-class organisations. 
The final criterion used in the case selection was access. As the current study aims to better 
understand how disruptive innovation can be fostered by management practitioners, access to 
senior and strategic decision makers was deemed essential. The author's investigation contributes 
to a European Commission co-sponsored project called Disrupt-it. The industrial collaborators 
involved in the project expressed their interest in adopting the investigative approach and 
objectives of the current research presented in this thesis. Therefore, each organisation was 
mapped onto the matrix illustrated above in Figure 3-7 in order to assess their fit to this research 
and its objectives, the result can be seen in Figure 3-10. 
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*- Z! 
A' 
Small Org. Large Or 
IG 
4217' 
organisations wishing to collaborate 
in the current investigation 
Figure 3- 10., Prospective industrial collaborators mapped onto the case selection matrix. 
Four of the six possible sites matched the theoretically ideal sample as set out by the case selection 
criteria above. Although a number of the organisations had either delivered highly radical or 
discontinuous innovations in the past, they now considered themselves to be delivering typical 
innovation performance for their industry (see Appendix 3 for a full description of the cases). Thus 
the following organisations form the sample of case studies used in the current study: 
*Case A-a small French plastic mouldings manufacturer, primarily producing bicycle helmets. 
*Case B- Israel's largest industrial concern, primarily involved in the manufacture of military 
aircraft and associated defence equipment (with increasingly large and in some sites dominant 
non-military commercial 2CtiVitieS). 
*Case C-a Swedish multi-national service organisation operating in the finance sector. 
*Case D-a small to medium sized Spanish service organisation offering product design and 
design consultancy solutions. 
Although cases have not been developed for the outlying organisations (Case Ea global information 
technology service organisation and Case Fa small Israeli management consultancy) they have still 
been involved in the investigation but to a lesser extent. 
Each case organisation granted frequent high-level access to their businesses including regular 
contact with at least one strategic level manager and one other senior member of staff (although in 
practise significantly more people have been involved in the research). Consequently, a 
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. 
heterogeneous group of senior industrialists was formed to be involved in a researcher-d riven 
collaborative investigation into the term disruptive innovation. 
The simultaneous appearance of the four features that typify the Mode 2 approach to research 
(Stewart et al., 2000) had been achieved. Firstly, the initial research problem 'how can senior 
practitioners understand and foster disruptive innovation as part of a major competitive strategy? ' 
was framed in the context of application (as was the later refined research question). Secondly, a 
heterogeneous group of both academics and practitioners were engaged in the investigation of 
disruptive innovation, using a trans-d i. scipl i nary approach. Thirdly, the group had agreed to adopt a 
social ly-d istributed research capability; and finally, theory-building and application were to be 
combined in the co-production of new knowledge. 
0 Selecting the expert interviewees for data collection outside the collaborative inquiry 
The industrialists involved in the collaborative aspect of the research requested, in return for their 
involvement, that they would gain state of the art insights and advice from academia and 'best 
practice' organisations. As part of the collaborative nature of the research this steered the 
selection of interviewees. Therefore, similar selection criteria were adopted when establishing 
contact with prospective interviewees - except for one feature. Interviewees had to be involved 
with organisations that were considered to deliver 'best innovation practice' as perceived by the 
collaborating industrialists. In total seven interviews were completed with industrialists and three 
with leading British academics (Figure 3-11 and Table 3-2). 
Figure 3-11: Interviewees contributing towards the current research by organisational size and customer offering. 
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Interviewee Role and Organisation. 
Identifier 
KF Commercialisation Director - national world leading organisation based 
in the aeronautics and space industry. 
RiM Director of Technology - Europe's leading manufacturer based within 
computer printer industry. 
FF Chief Executive Officer - world leading national semiconductor 
manufacturer. 
TF Director (and Founder) - Leading small UK management and product 
design consultancy and research foundation. 
MB European Head of Human Factors - world leading multinational product 
design consultancy. 
RuM Director of Innovation - fastest growing multinational advertising and 
media company. 
TH Senior Innovation Team Consultant - Europe's leading multinational 
mobile telecoms organisation. 
JB Professor and author on innovation management. 
PT Senior Lecturer and author on new product development. 
SR Professor and author on regional innovation networks. 
Table 3-3: Interviewees contributing towards the current research by role and organisational description. 
3.4.3 Crafting instruments and protocols: building collaborative working practice to deliver 
holistic understanding. 
Obj . ectives To create an environment of openness as an instrument for collaboration and 
knowledge sharing. 
To construct protocols and tools to facilitate the co-develooment of 
construct equivalence and new knowledqe within the team. 
To deliver a research programme owned equally by the practitioners and the 
author. 
Mintzberg (1979) acknowledges that it is possible to uncover all kinds of relationships in hard data; 
however, he states that it is only through the use of soft data that we are able to explain them. 
Thus, theory building requires rich description. Gibbons et al. (1994) support this notion and adds 
that successful collaborative research is "... characterised by a constant flow back and forth between 
... the theoretical and the practical... discovery occurs in contexts where knowledge 
is developed 
and put to use, while results, which would have been traditionally characterised as applied - fuel 
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further theoretical advances" (Gibbons et al., 1994: 9). Therefore, the need for the collection of rich 
data in a collaborative setting inspired the development of a cyclical data collection and inductive 
data analysis process (Figure 3-12). 
Wave 1: Exploration- 
Understanding the 
complex and dynamic 
phenomenon of 
disruption 
UNDERSTAND: 
Improved understanding of the 
enablers and barriers to 
disruptive innovation 
-Define, 
research"aims and objectives 
PLAN ACTION: 
Collaborate with community of practitioners 
seeking improved understanding of 
disruptive innovation 
(Based on instruments and protocols that that support 
collaborative working practices) 
Inductive knowledge COLLECT DATA: 
development cycle Access relevant data, and knowledge from 
industrial practitioners using case study and 
survey strategy. Assess academic 
contribution. 
ANALYSE: 
Assess data patterns and co-create 
constructs with community of practitioners; '. 
leads to co-development of a holistic 
conceptual framework of disruptive 
innovation 
Figure 3-12. The researcher driven, collaborative, inductive-learning approach used in the first wave of the research. 
The problem, however, with exposing and assessing soft data in a collaborative setting involving 
more than one party is that meanings are open to interpretation and emphases can be 
misunderstood (Antaki, 1988). Antaki (1988) shows that there is often incongruence between 
researchers' and respondents' definitions of actions, explanations, resources and competencies, an 
issue that Welkenhuysen-Gybels and Van de Vijver (2001) refer to as the level of construct 
equivalence. Where there is a high level of construct equivalence, different parties have identical 
or at least very similar understandings of the terminology in use. In situations of low equivalence 
the opposite is true; this is often the cause of disagreement and conflict within groups (Arnold et 
al., 1998; Warr, 2002). Thus, every day explanations for everyday events are open to interpretation 
by different people; this issue is often exaggerated when parties are from diverse backgrounds, 
different countries and different cultures (Antaki, 1988). 
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Hence, it was essential that the research team achieved a high level of construct equivalence on 
key terminology as early as possible. Furthermore, an environment had to be fostered in which all 
participants felt comfortable to expose their ignorance of new terminology and where they felt free 
to openly discuss disagreement with definitions or misunderstandings. An environment of trust and 
openness helps to alleviate the problems associated with low construct equivalence and provides an 
environment that facilitates rapid understanding of new concepts (Arnold et al., 1998; Warr, 2002). 
Thus, to conduct effective collaborative research three features were deemed necessary: 
* The creation of an environment of openness as an instrument for knowledge sharing. 
* The construction of protocols and tools to facilitate the co-development of new 
understanding and construct equivalence within the team. 
eA research programme owned equally by the practitioners and the author. 
0 Ensuring trust and openness to facilitate the collaborative approach 
Team walks - before 
during 
and after project 
meetings 
(oraanised by the 
Examples of 
team building 
to assist the 
collaborative 
approach ý-. 
1111h. - --. dd 
Developing Innovation 
cartoons 
(emerged from a group 
exercise) 
Team building -games 
and puzzles 
Figure 3-13: Developing a supportive environment for collaborative research. 
The research design, as will be shown later in this chapter, required the participants to share 
personal thoughts and company practice on innovation in open data collection workshops. Thus, 
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for the researcher driven collaborative approach to be effective, the industrialists were required to 
be trusting and open both with the researcher and the whole team of industrial practitioners. To 
deliver the appropriate supporting environment, a number of team and trust building activities were 
proposed and implemented by each of the different organisations within the group; the essential 
trust that was required quickly formed (Figure 3-13). 
0 Delivering construct equivalence: A common team understanding of important terminology 
Novel insights, such as disruptive innovation, harvested from cutting edge investigations are often 
met with resistance and fear by those unfamiliar with the subject (Guffey and Nienhaus 2002; 
Arnold et al., 1998; Warr, 2002). These reactions can prevent knowledge from being transferred 
and adopted, especially in diverse groups where the participants personally hold different meanings 
for the terminology involved. In fact, at the onset of the research, the author found that the 
transfer of novel insights, from disruptive innovation to the practitioners collaborating in the 
research, was met with further suspicion when: 
* The evidence and insights are radical and counterintuitive. 
e The existing models involve, as they do with the topic of disruptive innovation, 
reasonably new and partially incomplete concepts, which use undefined 'fluffy' 
terminology. 
& Evidence is based upon cases and stories that are potentially tarnished by the bias of 
hindsight. 
9 Evidence has been taken from often obscure unfamiliar industries. 
Therefore, to transfer the meaning of the term disruptive innovation to the research group it was 
found necessary to generate ownership of the phrase. To do this an instrument was employed 
know as _qraphical 
facilitation (Young, 2003). 
The protocol used in graphical facilitation is to drive focused group discussion via the illustrative 
representations of conceptual synthesis and knowledge upon large-scale graphical templates 
(Young, 2003). The graphical templates are also used to encourage and capture the results of 
discussion and feedback from all parties in a workshop setting. If implemented correctly, they 
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generate two-way connections between all workshop participants, including the academic and 
industrial communities. They surface a common language within the research group and prevent 
dominant people from overpowering group exercises. An essential part of closing a graphical 
facilitation process is building a summary of the lessons learnt and the actions to be taken. These 
are also recorded with the graphical method (Figure 3-14). which allows the team to see the details 
in a holistic manner and enables the group to reach consensus and public commitment to moving 
the research forward. 
Graphical facilitation was used in the opening workshop of the research programme. The method 
enabled discussions to involve the entire research group and resulted in the co-creation of a 
working definition of disruptive innovation for the research programme. Once high level construct 
equivalence had been achieved on this term (comprehension of the terms meaning and impact 
agreed), it was easier to initiate the investigation into the topic. 
The graphical facilitation instrument was so effective in the opening workshop of the research 
programme, that it was adopted as the primary instrument by which all data collection exercises 
were conducted or facilitated. 
Figure 3-14: Recording the lessons learnt using the graphical facilitation process. 
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0A research programme owned equally by the practitioners and the author 
The phased strategy was agreed by the practitioners; resources and a 30 month timetable were 
allocated to complete the three waves of investigative action. Table 3-3 summaries the research 
activities and Figure 3-15 illustrates how the programme of research pieces together (note that 
some activities begin in one wave of research and finish in the next) 
Table 3-3: A summaty of the research activities in this study 
Wave Activity Name and Objectives 
Wave 1 1. Getting Started: Defining tentative research questions and constructs 
* To develop tentative research constructs to aid case selection and initiation of inquiry, 
2. Selecting Cases for Waves I Et 11 
To de velop case an d in tervie we e sele ction criteria. 
To select appropriate cases to be involved in collaborative research. 
To identify in terviewees to be involved in survey strategy. 
3. Crafting Instruments and Protocols: Building collaborative working practice to deliver holistic 
understanding 
: To create an environment of openness and trust as an instrument for collaboration and 
no wledqe sharing. 
0 To construct protocols and tools to facilitate the co-development of construct equivalence 
and new knowledge within the team. 
0 To deliver a research programme owned equally by the practitioner5 and the author 
4. Entering the Field: Wave I 
To conduct multi-oryanisational, multi-level, multi-tunctional data collection workshops, 
where best practise academic Jnsiqhts are shared with practitioners to invoke discussion, 
feedback and insights into currentpractice within the cases. 
To conduct case study site visits to observe their innovation environments. 
To conduct interviews with 3 innovation experts, 1 from indusfty and2 from academia. 
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" To maintain extensive field notes throughout the process. 
" To ensure synchronous data collection and data analysis. 
" To maintain flexibility in order to deliver controlled opportunism 
5. Analysing Within Case Data: Wave I 
" To become intimately familiar with each case as a stand alone entity. 
" To allow the unique patterns of each case to emerge before the push to generate theory. 
6. Searching for Cross Case Patterns: Wave I 
0 To use the perspectives of multiple practitioners to analyse data and search for patterns 
across a/I four cases. 
0 To look for similarities and differences, both within and across the cases, using dimensions 
drawn from the literature on disruptive innovation. 
0 To break simplistic frames and generate a deeper understanding byjuxtaposing cases with 
apparently similar elements and forcing a search for differences. 
0 To develop initial framework or theoty, 
7. Building a conceptual framework 
0 To solidify the emerging frame and tentative relationships into a testable and verifiable 
conceptual framework using consolidated bases of evidence. 
8. Enfolding the Literature 
0 To strengthen and enhance or reconfigure and challenge the emerging framework by 
assessing it with a broad range of conflicting and supporting literature. 
9. Reaching Closure of Wave I 
" To ensure enough case data has been collected. 
" To stop iterating between academic theoly andpractitioner data at an appropriate time. 
" To create feedback for instruments andprotoco)s for next wave of activities. 
10. Crafting Instruments and Protocols: Building collaborative working practice to identify focus 
areas from the conceptual framework 
0 To construct protocols and tools that will facilitate the identification of focus areas within 
the emergent framework of disruptive innovation. 
Wave 11 0 To maintain the commitment to the collaborative research and the ethos of openness and 
trUA 
11. Entering the Field: Wave 11 
a To conduct multi-level, multi-functional data collection workshops within single case and 
multi-organisational settings, in order to elicit focus areas from the framework and to discover 
how practitioners envisage overcoming the major challenges of disruptive innovation. 
0 To present to the collaborating industrialist5 the results of an investiqation into 
'innovation enabling tools', in order to provoke discussion, debate and further insights into the 
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focus areas. 
To conduct interviews with 3 innovation experts, 2 from industty and 1 from academia. 
To maintain extensive fleld notes, ensure synchronous data collection and data analysis 
and flexibility to deliver controlled opportunism throughout the process. 
12. Et 13. Analysing Within Case Data and Searching for Cross Case Patterns: Wave 11 
0 To become intimately familiar with the focus areas of the conceptual framework of 
disruptive innovation as identified by each case. 
0 To use the multiple perspectives, dimensions and case pairing to generate a deeper 
understanding, in order to identify one focus area upon which the participants from all four 
case 5 are keen to pribritise in the final wave of the research. 
14. Et 15. Shaping Focused Areas of Framework and EnUding the Literature 
0 To sharpen, refine and define the emergent focus areas by using case data and survey data 
to build a base of evidence for each dimension. 
0 To strengthen and enhance the. emergent focus areas with a broad range of conflicting 
andsupporting literature, paying particular attention to the prioritised focus area. 
16. Reaching Closure of Wave 11 
" To stop data collection at an appropriate time. 
" To create a soeciflc research focus for the third wave of the investigation based upon the 
pribritised focus area. 
17. Crafting Instruments and Protocols: Building collaborative working practice to test theory 
generated about the top priority area of conceptual framework 
0 To develop a schedule of activity, whereby iterative feedback between the author and 
industrialists results in the construction of an intervention to test the research hypotheses. 
Wave 111 0 
To develop a schedule of activIty to implement the intervention and to employ data 
collection tools, such as questionnaires, structured interviews and independent observations. 
0 To consider the authors impact as a participant-observer and to mitigate for negative 
a Me c Is. 
0 To agree mechanisms whereby a contribution to knowledge can be asserted and a 
contribution to industrial practice can be demonstrated 
18. Selecting Cases for Wave III 
To develop case and interviewee selection criteria. 
To select appropriate cases to be involved in the final stage of the collaborative research. 
To identify interviewees to be, involves in surveystrategy. 
19. Entering the Field: Wave III 
0 To conduct two participant-observer intervention workshops in order to probe the 
prioritised focus area. 
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a To employ multiple forms or data collection tools in order to both collect evidence 
regarding the pribritised focus area and the effectiveness of the management intervention. 
0 To conduct interviews with four innovation experts from industry in order to mitigate 
against ýoiqg native' 
a To maintain extensive fleld notes, and to ensure synchronous data collection and data 
analy5is with the flexibility to deliver controlled opportunism throughout the process. 
20. Analysing Within Case Data: Wave III 
0 To become intimately familiar with each case as. a stand alone entity with the use of 
extensive f7eld notes and feedback from other data collection techniques. 
21. Searching for Cross Case Patterns: Wave III 
To conduct cross case analysis and search for pattems. 
22. Et 23. Validating the priority area of framework and enfolding the Literature 
0 To assess and refine the emergent constructs, dimensions and conclusions, regarding the 
pribritised focus area, with supporting and challenging insights, 
0 To strengthen and enhance the emergent dimensions of the pribritised focus area with a 
broad range of conflicting and supporting literature. 
24. Reaching Closure: Wave III 
" To ensure enough case data has been collected. 
" To know when to stop iterating between academic theory andpractitioner data. 
" To develop and employ mechanisms by which the industrial utility of the in vestigation 
findings can be accepted or rejected. 
a To address the strengths and weaknesses ofthe approach. 
Table 3-4: A summary of the research activities in this study. 
It is believed that the resultant strategy and research activities have delivered results that satisfy 
the current research objectives, generating a lucid contribution to knowledge on the topic of 
disruptive innovation. What follows is a description of the three waves of research activity, 
illustrated in Figure 3-15. Each step will be described and justifications for the choice of data 
collection and analysis methods will be presented throughout. 
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3.4.4 Entering the field: Case studies 
Objectives To conduct multi-organisational, multi-level, multi-functional data collection 
workshops, where best practise academic Jnsiqhts are shared with 
ptactitioner5 to invoke discussion, feedback and insights into current practice 
within the cases. 
* To conduct case 5tudy site v&ts to ob5erve their innovation environments. 
To maintain extensive field notes, ensure synchronous data collection and 
analysis and deliver controlled opportuni5m throughout the process. 
The first wave of the current research was conducted over a 15 month period. During this time 
author facilitated a total 3 three-day and 3 two-day cross-functional, multi-level and multi- 
organisational workshops with the four case study organisations (each taking turns to host the 
meetings). The workshop setting provided this investigation with 21 participants from the four 
organisations with a total of 15 days of discussions regarding their innovation and research and 
development activities. In addition, interviews were conducted with one member of the executive 
management team from each organisation and four innovation experts external to the research 
group (two industrialists and two academics). Throughout these 15 months countless informal 
email and telephone conversations were conducted regarding innovation and the pursuit of 
disruptive innovation, this supplied further richness to the data collection. 
Robson (1993); Yin (1994), Silverman (1999) and Eisenhardt (1989) place major importance on the 
researchers approach to 'entering the field'. In accordance with the approaches recommended by 
these authors the current investigation has placed emphasis on the following factors throughout all 
three waves of the research design: 
4, The use of field notes 
4, The essential practice of overlapping data collection and analysis. 
41 Maintaining flexibility in order to deliver controlled opportuni5m. 
During this the first wave of the research, five tentative constructs on disruptive innovation (formed 
following a review of the literature and initial conversations with industrialists) were used to elicit 
information from both the practitioners in all four cases and the expert interviewees. 
0 The use of field notes 
Extensive field notes were made during aH workshops; two methods were employed, these have 
been proposed as suitable and applied in similar contexts by Snowden (2001). The first method, a 
form of graphical facilitation, is that of a 'story-board' or large-scale graphics. This technique 
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allowed either the author or the industrialists themselves to capture, via illustrations, the 
innovation processes, stories and/or concepts that were discussed and presented (Figure 3-16). 
- .1! 
V. - \ 
A 
WOO 
r7=77-, '! 
B 
A= Storyboard capturing Case D's vision of how they would like their innovation process to work. 
B =Case B's complex and busy innovation process drawn by an innovation team ma nag era nd a senior engineer 
Figure 3-16., Examples of Woiy4oard'fflustrations of two innovation processes captured in the workshops 
Along side the graphical technique a diary of field notes was kept using the split-page field note 
technique (Snowden, 2001), which allowed the author to build a "stream-of-conscious 
commentary" (Van Maanen, 1988: 56) about what was happening. Each page of notes was divided 
into two columns; the first column was used for collecting direct observations of occurrences in the 
field. It is vital to react rather than sift as it is difficult to know what may be important in the 
future. The second column is used to push thinking; it captures ideas and thoughts from on-the- 
spot analysis. This is often generated by continually "... asking questions such as 'What am I 
learning? ', 'What is different from the other cases? "' (Eisenhardt, 1989: 539). The separation of 
observation and the on-the-spot analysis helps to prevent researchers from allowing their thoughts 
to bias their observations, whilst not losing the richness of the analysis (Snowden, 2001) (examples 
of field note output from the current investigation can be seen in appendix 2). Photographs of the 
industrialists' working innovation environments were also taken where permitted. This added 
further richness to the field notes, the data analysis and the case understanding that was developed 
(Figure 3-17). 
83 
Exploring and Describing the Pursuit of Disruptive Innovation 
A B 
A=A board in the entrance of Case Ns factory, it displays the very latest priority projects 
(all focused upon delivering incremental innovations to their core product range). 
B= The quality manager of Case A demonstrating how the workers in the factory 
are contributing to incremental process improvements. 
C, D and E= Examples of Case C's creative environment at their Future Centre in Sweden. 
Figure 3-17., Examples of the innovation environments in two of the industrial collaborators 
0 Overlapping data collection and analysis 
Authors such as Glaser and Strauss (1967), Robson (1993) and Silverman (2000) state that whilst in 
the field it is good practice to overlap data collection with data analysis (the employment of after 
the fact data analysis techniques will be discussed in more depth later in this chapter). As stated 
above the use of the split-page field note technique facilitates the overlap of data collection and 
analysis. This overlap is advantageous as it gives the researcher a head start and increases the 
flexibility of data collection (Eisenhardt, 1989). The author also used the collaborative academic- 
industrial approach to take further advantage of overlapping data analysis with data collection in a 
group context; a notion propagated by Yin (1994) and Glaser and Strauss (1967). The cross- 
functional, multi-level and multi-organisational workshops enabled three important activities: 
* Collection of in-depth qualitative data for case study building. 
a Individual researcher data analysis, enabling new insights and knowledge to be generated. 
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9 Academic-industrial joint coding and analysis of the data. 
A typical workshop would involve each of the collaborators presenting to the group a partial or 
holistic view of their innovation process. The academic-practitioner audience would then ask 
questions of the presenter(s) in order to better understand their organisation's innovation efforts. 
This process naturally generated data that could be instantly categorised into the four units of 
analysis that Partington (1998) states are essential for building management theory: 
a) the external organisational context, b) the internal organisational context, 
c) individual and managerial cognition and d) management actions taken. 
0* Maintaining flexibility: Controlled opportunism 
Overlapping data collection and analysis not only allowed the author to gain a richer understanding 
of each case but increased the investigation's flexibility, allowing new or interesting avenues to be 
pursued as they arose. Such "flexibility is not a licence to be unsystematic. Rather this flexibility is 
controlled opportunism in which researchers take advantage of the uniqueness of a specific case 
and the emergence of new themes to improve resultant theory" (Eisenhardt, 1989: 539). The 
utilisation of break-out groups during the workshops became a useful tool for probing emergent 
themes (Figure 3-18). 
Figure 3-18: A breakout group probing an emergent theme - 
"does Case A need a 'nose-like-process'to ý; mell-out'innovative ideas? " 
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Although analysing data is the heart of building theory from case studies, it is both the most 
difficult and least codified part of the process (Miles and Huberman, 1994). There are almost as 
many data analysis methods as there are researchers (Eisenhardt, 1989); however, Yin (1994) and 
Eisenhardt (1989) show that these can be categorised into two overarching data analysis 
approaches - within case analysis and searching for cross case patterns. How these approaches 
were utilised, how extant literature was used, and how validity was tested will be presented in the 
following sections. The detailed results and outputs are presented in the next chapter. 
3.4.5 Entering the field: Expert interviews 
Objectives do To conduct interviews with 3 innovation expert5, one from industry and two 
from academia. 
To maintain exten5ive fieldnotes, ensure synchronous data collection and 
analy5)s and deliver controlled opportumsm throughout the process. 
The five tentative constructs on disruptive innovation (formed following a review of the literature 
and initial conversations with industrialists) were used to shape questions for semi structured 
interviews (Figure 3-19). Three innovation experts were interviewed in the first wave of research 
activities: 
1, The European head of human factors from the world's leading product design 
consultancy. 
e Two British academics from the field of innovation and new product development. 
In order to capture the full richness of the discussion (Robson, 1993), each interview was recorded 
and transcribed. Notes were also taken using the spfit-p3ge field note technique, as previously 
described. The combination of these techniques allowed for on the spot analysis and enabled the 
author to maintaining flexibility, or controlled opportunism, throughout the process. 
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External 
Organisational Environment 
Et consumer behaviour 
Business 
Model 
Eg. newproduct 
development, 
market research, Supporting 
budgeting, staff Processes 
, 
dCVC1O, 0MC17t & Et Routines 
compen-cwtion, 
resource allocation 
Eg. competitive forces, 
marketyrowth, market 
maturity, consumer behaviour, 
degree of market turbulence 
- Are there markets or 
customer niches that are 
more prone to enabling or 
suffering disruptive 
innovations? 
e How can organisations 
scan markets and 'futurize' 
to identify disruptive 
innovations? 
flow can organisations 
thinking out-of-the-box to 
challenge existing business 
models? 
What methods can 
practitioners use to exploit 
emerging technologies? 
What are the best ways 
to 
allocate and protect 
resources 
to pursue disruptive 
innovations? 
Manag 
Valu 
Eg. ethics & safety, 
also basis of value 
judgments such as 
attractiveness of 
markets, customers 
and ideas 
- What value is attached 
to disruptive innovation in 
todays organisations? 
" Are there organisational 
cultures that better 
support disruptive 
innovation? 
" Are there organisational 
environments that better 
support disruptive 
innovation? 
What standards/values 
are needed for employees 
to make pnoritization 
decisions that support 
disruptive innovation? 
Eg people 
equipment, 
technology, - 
brands, money, 
trIationships 
Ey. conrlyptation of resources, 
processes and values to deliver a 
customer offering 
- Is there a right type of 
person to best manage a 
potentially disruptive 
innovation? 
What sort of 
organisation3l 
relationships are best 
suited to the delivery of 
disruptive innovation? 
9 Are there types of 
technologies that are more 
prone to enabling or 
suffering disruptions? 
Figure 3-19. - Ouestions used to guide the researcher in semi-structured interviews 
How can business 
models be used 
to support the delivery 
of disruptive 
innovation? 
Can a holistic 
u nderstanding of a 
business model assist in 
the delivery of 
disruptive innovation 
(e. g. helping to think- 
out-of-the-box. or in 
scanning and 
futurizing)? 
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3.4.6 Analysing the data - within case analysis 
Objectives 9 To become intimately familiar with each case as a stand alone entity. 
* To allow the unique patterns of each case to emerge before the push to 
generate theory. 
Robson (1993) notes that researchers attempting to become familiar with their cases commonly 
face the temptation to jump to conclusions from limited data because they: 
" are over-influenced by specific data vividness, 
" ignore basic statistical properties, 
" are over-influenced by elite respondents, or 
" inadvertently drop disconfirming data. 
Yin (1994) states that to avoid this temptation the researcher should create detailed case study 
write-ups for each site. These are simply pure descriptions yet often prove central to the 
generation of insights (Eisenhardt, 1989). Thus, the premise of within case analysis is for the 
researcher to become intimately familiar with each case as a stand alone entity, this "allows the 
unique patterns of each case to emerge before investigators push to generalise" (Eisenhardt, 
1989: 540). From the outset of the data collection, an open coding approach (Strauss and Corbin, 
1997) enabled the author to categorise field notes, transcripts and other material into patterns, 
themes, concepts and categories. In accordance with Strauss and Corbin (1997) the coding system 
was refined as the data collection proceeded; the use of a database facilitated this process (see 
appendix 4). Thus, the early coding system facilitated the within-case analyses; it was simple and it 
allowed for a uniform capture of information (Table 3-4) and was essential in enabling the author 
to become intimately familiar with each case before seeking similarities and differences. 
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Category Title Category options 
Unit of Analysis - Level 1: Management Action. 
- Level 2: Individual Managerial Cognition. 
- Level 3: Internal Organisational Context. 
- Level 4: External Organisational Context. 
Basic Categorisation - Beginning - e. g. idea generation and capture. 
of innovation pipeline - Middle - e. g. new product/service development. 
- End - e. g. exploitation. 
- Process Support. 
Inhibitor / Enablers - Inhibitor. 
- Enabler. 
- General Comment. 
Table 3-5. - 777e earlyphase data coding system. 
3.4.7 Analysing the data: Searching for cross case patterns 
Objectives To look for similarities and differences, both within and across the cases, 
using dimensions drawn from the literature on disruptive innovation. 
To use the perspectives of multiple practitioners to analyse data and search 
for patterns across all four cases. 
To break 5impli5tic frames and generate a deeper understanding, by 
juxtaposing cases w1th apparently 51mllar element5 and forcing a search for 
differences in order to develop initial framework or theory. 
Social scientists can use a vast range of qualitative data analysis techniques when searching for 
cross case patterns (Table 3-5). 
Case Study Data Analysis Techniques Qualitative Data Analysis Techniques 
Yin (1994) Miles and Huberman (1994) , 
" Pattern-matching Putting data into different arrays. 
A matrix of categories. 
" Explanation-building Data displays (flowcharts). 
Tabulating the frequency of different 
" Time-series events. 
Examining the complexity of such 
" Program-logic. tabulations. 
Categorising information into 
chronological order. 
Table 3-6. Examples of data analysis techniques available to qualitative research 
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After careful consideration, it was decided to employ a number of data analysis approaches in order 
to maximise the benefits of the collaborative Mode 2 approach. This strategy was inspired by the 
Grounded Theory methods developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967). It was established to ensure 
new knowledge emerging from the research activities would bare a close fit with the data and the 
real world. 
Thus, to analyse the data, full advantage was taken of the techniques known as 'multiple 
perspectives' (Yin, 1994) and 'paired cases' (Gibbons et a[, 1994). Workshops were used to bring 
together participants from all four cases and were focused upon both extracting and analysing 
data. It is recognised that findings and patterns are more reliable, stronger and more grounded in 
real life contexts when they are corroborated across multiple participants (Gibbons et al, 1994; Yin, 
1994; Silverman, 2000). The multi-national, multi-functional and multi-level approach employed 
by this research fully exploited the unique insights possible from different perspectives. 
Furthermore, the technique of 'paired cases' (Gibbons et al, 1994) enabled industrialists from the 
case studies and the researcher together to consider and compare each of the case organisations 
and the interview data. Investigating the subtle similarities and differences between the cases and 
the interview data facilitated the emergence of a more appropriate coding system and improved 
constructs for enabling disruptive innovation (constructs with closer fit and more relevance to the 
experiences of the industrialists). This generated the first revised list of constructs for enabling 
disruptive innovation (see Chapter 4). 
An important part of pushing understanding yet further, was the process of juxtaposing apparently 
similar elements of the cases and interview data and the forcing of a search for differences. 
Furthermore, a broad range of conflicting and supporting literature was enfolded into the 
conversations and discussion (in accordance with Robson (1994) and Eisenhardt (1986)). These 
activities broke simplistic frames and generated a deeper understanding. The revised list of 
constructs were combined, restructured and new unexpected concepts emerged to create a fully 
modified conceptual framework of interacting dimensions for enabling disruptive innovation. As 
each emergent construct evolved a base of evidence was built; this enabled further refinement and 
sharpening of the dimensions. These results are presented in Chapter 4. 
The benefits of employing these approaches to data analysis are (Eisenhardt, 1989; Silverman, 
1999; Yin, 1994): 
a They force the researcher to move beyond initial impressions by using diverse lenses. 
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They increase the likelihood of accurate and reliable theory - theory with a close fit to the 
data. 
e They simultaneously increase the probability that novel findings in the data will be 
captured. 
The final step to ensuring the data had been rigorously analysed was a deep analysis and coding 
exercise. This involved procedures for connecting categories developed in the group workshops 
using a process known as axial coding (Strauss and Corbin, 1997). This is described in the next 
section. 
3.4.8 Building a conceptual framework 
Objectives To solidify the emerging frame and tentative relationships into a testable and 
verifiable conceptual framework using consolidated bases of evidence. 
The emerging frame and tentative relationships that arise from such within and across case analysis 
can be solidified into a conceptual framework and eventually a theory by completing the following 
tasks (Eisenhardt, 1989; Partington, 1998): 
4, Systematically comparing the emergent frame of dimensions with the evidence from each 
case and each interviewee. 
* Assessing the closeness of the fit with the data. 
4, Sharpening the constructs through refining, defining and consolidating a base of evidence 
for each dimension. 
Using a version Of 2 process known as 'axial coding' (Strauss and Corbin, 1997), the base of 
evidence underpinning each construct of the newly established conceptual framework was 
systematically and rigorously analysed. The selection and relation process helped to uncover the 
top three inhibitors and enablers of each construct. These were selected by considering the 
frequencies with which they were mentioned and the levels of importance bestowed upon them by 
members of the research group. This generated a grounded, realistic conceptual framework that is 
not burdened by complexity. Throughout the axial coding process a broad range of conflicting and 
supporting literature was cross-referenced (in accordance with Robson (1994) and Eisenhardt 
(1986)); this enabled the author to further strengthen, challenge, reconfigure and enhance the 
emergent framework. The completed framework of enablers and inhibitors was discussed with the 
collaborating industrials, who in turn agreed that it represented the true challenge of fostering 
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disruptive innovation. Further data was collected during this discussion, this helped to strengthen 
and enhance the framework yet further. 
3.4.9 Enfolding the Literature 
Objectives To strengthen and enhance or reconfiqure and challenge the emerging 
framework by assessing it with a broad range of conflicting and supporting 
literature. 
An essential feature of theory building is the comparison of the emergent concepts or theory with 
the extant literature. According to Robson (2000) and Eisenhardt (1986) the key is assessing a 
broad range of conflicting and supporting literature in order to reconfigure and challenge or to 
strengthen and enhance the emerging framework. 
Enfolding the literature proved to be essential to the collaborative methodology employed by the 
current investigation. . 
In return for the collaboration of the industrialists the author was requested 
to iterate between presenting findings from academic publications and gathering and collecting 
data. Both supporting and contrary findings from academic research were presented and assessed 
with the findings as they emerged. It is believed that this has facilitated a more rigorous 
collaborative approach to building and improving the conceptual framework. 
3.4.10 Reaching Closure of Wave I 
Objective5 * To en5ure enough ca5e data ha5 been collected, cea5ing the iteration 
between acadernic theoryand practitioner data at an appropriate time. 
e To create feedback for in5truments andprotoco15 for next wave of activitiC5. 
Tranfield (1998) highlights the perception that collaborative research can be viewed as less rigorous 
due to the industrial partners' demands for practical conclusions. From the outset, the author was 
conscious of this issue, the potential for information processing biases and the temptation to leap 
to premature or false conclusions. Therefore, this research maintained the tension between 
investigating and assimilating for as long as possible by adopting a rigorous yet practical data 
collection and analysis strategy. To maintain credibility and industrial support, it was important to 
preserve transparency of data collection through to conclusions (although Figure 3-15 previously 
illustrated three linear waves of data collection and analysis, in reality the stages were much more 
cyclical, involving constant feedback between all participants of the research group). 
A researcher can ensure academic rigour by completing full investigations, deep impartial analyses 
of the resultant data and finally reaching closure at an appropriate juncture. To do this, Eisenhardt 
(1986) suggests that social scientists, who use inductive case study approaches, have two ways of 
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ensuring that they reach effective closure of their investigations. Essentially, the iterations stop if a 
saturation point is met: 
0 It is time to stop collecting data when the incremental improvements to the theory or 
framework are minimal. 
a It is time to stop iterating between extant theory and. the data when the incremental 
improvements to the theory or framework are minimal. 
Finally, a 'lessons learnt' graphical facilitation exercise was conducted to close the final workshop 
of Wave I of the research. This captured all the positive and negative experiences of the preceding 
15 months and generated a rich source of feedback to begin the second wave of research activity. 
3.5 Wave 11: Understanding of the priority dimensions of the conceptual 
framework. 
The second wave of this research was an exploration to discover the four most critical areas of 
management action and management cognition to which the delivery of potentially disruptive 
innovations are most dependent. The methodology presented in the remainder of this section 
illustrates how this was achieved and how in the closing stages analysis led to the identification of 
the primary inhibitor of management practitioners. who pursue disruptive innovation. This 
discovery led to the emergence of a research hypothesis for the third wave of the investigation. 
3.5.1 Crafting instruments and protocols: Building collaborative working practice to 
identify focus areas from the conceptual framework 
Objectives To construct protocols and tools that will facilitate the identificatiOn of focus 
areas within the emergent framework of di5ruptive innovation. 
To maintain the commitment to the collaborative research and the ethos of 
openness and trust 
When attempting to satisfy the objective of crafting instruments and protocols, to help deliver the 
second wave of the research, significant consideration was paid to the lessons learnt from the first 
wave of research activities. The high levels of trust and openness that had been achieved were 
highlighted as a critical success factor. Furthermore the graphical facilitation approach was seen 
as pivotal in delivering construct equivalence. The need for the collection of rich data in a 
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collaborative setting was again apparent at the onset of the second wave of research activity; this 
inspired the development of another cyclical data collection and inductive data analysis process 
(Figure 3-20). 
Wave Ih 
Exploration- 
Understanding 
priority focus 
areas of the 
(2 i) UNDERSTAND: conceptual 
Improved understanding of the framework 
enablers and barriers to 
disruptive innovation 
Inductive knowledge 
development cycle (1) ANALYSE: 
Assess data patterns and co-create 
constructs with community of practitioners; 
leads to co-development of a holistic 
conceptual framework of disruptive 
innovation 
(2 ii) PRIORITISE FOR ACTION: 
Identify focus areas of conceptual 
framework 
Figure 3-20., 77ye researcher driven, collaborative, inductive- 
learning approach used in the second wave of the research. 
This new re cycle was designed to use the improved understanding of disruptive innovation to 
identify focus areas for management action, which can in turn be used to improve the grounding of 
the conceptual framework. The use of large-scale illustrations of the conceptual framework, to 
facilitate further data collection in the first wave of the research, had been highlighted as a 
success. Thus, instead of inventing new tools to facilitate the identification of priority areas within 
the conceptual framework of disruptive innovation, it was decided to use the framework itself as an 
instrument in the research design. This was important as it further extended the work of the 
collaborative Mode 2 approach and benefited from high-levels of construct equivalence. Thus, the 
conceptual framework that emerged from the first wave of the research was used in three ways: 
* As the basis of a graphical facilitation workshop designed to analyse each case and 
highlight weaknesses, thus identifying the priority areas. 
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* As a method of assessing and recoding the details of existing management tools, which 
are available to practitioners seeking to deliver radical innovation and beyond. 
e As a method of recoding how the collaborating practitioners envisage tackling their 
barriers to disruptive innovation. 
3.5.2 Entering the field: Wave 11 
Objectives To conduct multi-level, multi-functional data collection workshops within 
single case and multi-orqanisational settings, in order to elicit focus areas 
from the framework and to discover how practitioners envisage overcoming 
the major challenges of disruptive innovation. 
To present to the collaborating industrialists the results of an investigation 
into 'innovation enabling tools', in order to provoke discussion, debate and 
further insights into the focus areas. 
To conduct interviews with 3 innovation experts, two from industty and one 
from academia. 
To maintain extensive field notes, ensure synchronous data collection and 
data analysis and flexibility to deliver controlled opportuni5m throughout the 
PrOCe55. 
DATA COLLECTION TECHNIQUE OBJECTIVES 
04x semi-structured interviews; one interview 0 To build agreement of the research process and 
with a member of the senior management team in initial understanding of the major case specific 
each of the four cases. barriers to disruptive innovation. 
13 Email discussions with the research group. 
11 1x three-day multi-organisational workshop Days one and two 
with all 4 cases (plus three additional participants 0 To identify priority focus areas of the from the outlying organisations illustrated earlier in conceptual framework for each case. Figure 3-10). There were 15 participants in total. 
0 To enhance understanding of each case's focus 
areas by conducting cross case comparisons. 
Day three: 
To select one focus area as a management 
priority and to consider acceptable and feasible 
management solutions 
0 Interviews with 3 innovation experts, 2 from To mitigate against the temptations of "going 
industry and 1 from academia. native" (where researchers become so close to 
their subjects that they lose their objectivity) by 
collecting data from outside the research group 
to corroborate or undermine the case study 
output. 
1: 1 2x semi-structured telephone interviews with To conduct in-depth follow-up analysis. 
the manufacturing cases. 
Table 3-7. The method employed in Wave 2 to And the priority focus areas of the conceptual framework 
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Table 3-6 summarises the data collection and data analysis strategy employed in this second wave 
of research. Data were gathered from the practitioners of all four cases in graphically facilitated 
workshops and interviews. In accordance with the approaches recommended by Robson (1993); Yin 
(1994), Silverman (1999) and Eisenhardt (1989) the current investigation once again has placed 
emphasis on the use of field notes, overlapping data collection and analysis and the maintenance of 
flexibility throughout the process in order to advantage from controlled opportunism. Furthermore 
advantage was taken, once again, of the highly collaborative approach, using the multiple 
perspectives of the group for synchronous data collection and analysis - the dominant units of 
analysis under consideration were management cognition and management action. 
The dimensions of the conceptual framework were also used to facilitate semi-structured - 
interviews with individuals outside the collaborative research group. Three innovation experts were 
interviewed during the second wave of research activities: 
* One senior innovation consultant from Europe's largest mobile telecommunications 
organisation. 
* The director of innovation of a leading multinational advertising and media company. 
oA professor and author on regional innovation network5. 
3.5.3 Analysing the data: 
Within case analysis and searching for cross case patterns: Wave 11 
Objectives 0 To become intimately familiar with the focus areas of the conceptual 
framework of disruptive innovation as identirled by each case. 
0 To use the multiple per5pectives, dimensions and case pairing to generate a 
deeper understanding, in order to identify one focus area upon which the 
participants from all four cases are keen to pribritise in the final wave of the 
research. 
13 Within-case analysis: 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with a member of the senior management team from 
each of the four cases; these focused upon identifying and understanding key barriers to the pursuit 
of disruptive innovation. The findings were analysed on a within-case basis, codified and mapped 
onto large-scale graphical illustrations of the emergent conceptual framework. 
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The large-scale graphical illustrations were then used to initiate a three-day multi-organi5ational, 
multi-level, multi-functional data collection workshop. Practitioners were split into subgroups in 
accordance with their organisational affiliation (the three additional participants from the outlying 
organisations were observers during this early process) and each group was given a copy of a 
graphical illustration of the conceptual framework specific to their case. Common to all four 
graphical illustrations were the depicted constructs of the framework, illustrated with listings of 
their major characteristics; specific to each case were samples of data from the interviews 
described above. The large-scale templates were then used to provoke within case dialogue and 
debate on the major inhibitors and enablers of disruptive innovation. The participants captured 
their discussions by recording key points onto post-it notes and transferring them to the relevant 
areas of the conceptual framework. In doing so, four rich pictures emerged from the early 
discussion, one for each case. The practitioners were asked to identify focus areas to which they 
believed the delivery of potentially disruptive innovations were most dependent. The author walked 
from group to group pushing for ideas, and challenging the industrialists not to focus upon 
symptoms but to discover root causes. Ensuring the practitioners constantly asked "why? ", when 
they began to descend upon a potential focus area, assisted in delivering a deeper analysis. By 
continuously moving through the cycle of analyse-understand-prioritise-an, 7ly5e, the four groups 
eventually reduced their lists of focus areas down to four case specific priority focus areas. This 
process delivered a thorough within-case analysis and advantaged from the multiple perspectives 
of practitioners - each subgroup being made up of at least two participants. 
0 Searching for cross case patterns: 
The groups presented and compared their rich pictures of focus areas. In doing so, it was possible 
to identify cross case similarities and differences. As was seen in the first wave of the research the 
juxtaposition of apparently similar elements of the cases and the forcing of a search for differences 
became important part of this process. Chapter 5 illustrates how simplistic assumptions were 
broken, as a deeper, commonly shared understanding emerged regarding primary root-cause- 
barriers to the pursuit of potentially disruptive innovations. The outcome was the identification of 
one focus area that participants from all four cases were keen to prioritise as the focal point for the 
final wave of the research. 
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3.5.4 Shaping the priority focus areas of the conceptual framework and enfolding the 
literature 
Objectives To sharpen, refine and defline the emerqent focus areas by u5ing case data 
and5urvey data to builda base of evidence for each dimen5ion. 
To strengthen and enhance the emergent focus areas with a broad range of 
conflicting and supporting literature, paying particular attention to the 
pribritised focus area. 
0 Shaping the priority focus areas: 
Methods for refining concepts that emerge from data were presented earlier in this chapter. The 
nature of the methodology meant that much of this activity, such as building a bases evidence etc., 
was carried out during the data collection and analysis phase. 
As Chapter 5 shows, an unexpected outcome of the cross case analysis process was the emergence 
of focus areas, represented as significant barriers to disruptive innovation, which were common to 
all four cases. The results chapter shows the practitioners did not initially use the same 
explanations or descriptions for their focus areas. However, cross-case examination and search for 
cross-case patterns revealed that the semantics and root causes underpinning the case specific 
focus areas were the same in each organisation. Furthermore, the enfolding of data from the 
expert interviews only led to the consolidation and enhancement of these four focus areas. This 
suggests that the outcomes (presented in the proceeding chapter) had a strong fit with the data 
and real life experiences. 
0 Enfolding the literature: 
As stated previously, in return for the collaboration of the industrialists the author was requested to 
iterate between presenting findings from academic publications and gathering and collecting data. 
Both supporting and seemingly contrary findings from academic research had been presented, these 
were enfolded to strengthen and enhance the emergent focus areas, with particular attention paid 
to the prioritised construct. 
3.5.5 Reaching closure of Wave 11 
Obj . ectives To stop data collection at an appropriate time. 
To create a specific research focus for the third wave of the investiqation 
based upon the pridtitised focus area. 
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Eisenhardt's (1989) guidelines on reaching closure when conducting theory building research were 
employed in the same fashion as the first wave of the research. Thus, iterative searches between 
data and literature were completed to the point of saturation for each of the four emergent focus 
areas. 
The needs of the industrial collaborators added one final task to the closure of this second wave of 
research. Plans had to be generated on how to establish the industrial utility of the new insights 
and knowledge. Thus, the author had the opportunity to further probe the prioritised focus area 
and to generate a critical academic and industrial contribution. 
Although the author was interested in developing an holistic model regarding the pursuit of 
disruptive innovation, Antaki (1988) notes that often theories and models cannot be tested directly 
or in full. Instead, researchers derive corollaries from theories (e. g. if theory X is sound, we would 
expect to find Y- here Y is the corollary) and it is then possible formulate propositions or 
specifications about that corollary (Gibbons et al., 1994). Concordantly, it was decided that 
corollaries and specifications could be derived from some of the key findings from the data and 
extant theory regarding the prioritised focus area. French and Bell (1990) illustrate that such 
corollaries and specifications can be reconstructed and summarised to form the specifications for 
management interventions. "[I]nterventions are sets of structured activities in which selected 
organizational units (target groups or individuals) engage in a task or a sequence of tasks where the 
task goals are related directly or indirectly to organizational improvement. Interventions ... make 
things happen" (French and Bell, 1990: 113). As su ch, it was decided that if a management 
intervention, which embodies the findings of this investigation, could be implemented with positive 
affect, then the knowledge generated by this investigation could be said to offer significant 
industrial utility. Furthermore, if a researcher is involved in the implementation of a management 
intervention, using knowledge and insights gained from their investigations, then they are 
permitted a unique opportunity to both collect new data and to witness first hand the relevance of 
his or her research. Accordingly, it was decided that a management intervention would be 
developed utilising the knowledge gathered upon the prioritised focus area. The aim was to 
contribute an industrially relevant management tool and to create an academic contribution to 
knowledge regarding the prioritised focus area, via an improved understanding. 
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3.6 Wave III: Probing and testing the prioritised focus area 
The third wave of this research was designed to be more descriptive in nature. The research 
activities were designed to provide a deeper understanding of the prioritised focus area and to 
assist in establishing industrial utility of the findings. Thus, the final wave of this investigation 
aims to reveal implications for the wider conceptual framework, developed in the first wave of 
research activities, along with a series of management implications. A full description of the 
collaborative Mode 2 methodology employed in the final wave of this research is presented in the 
remainder of this section. 
3.6.1 Selecting cases for Wave III 
Objectives 9 To develop case and interviewee selection criteria. 
To select appropriate cases to be involved in the final stage of the 
collaborative research. 
* To identify interviewees to be involves in survey strategy. 
0 Selecting cases for the focused inquiry: 
Innovation literature is extensively focused upon product and process innovation, leaving a 
significantly smaller percentage of publications that report upon service innovation (Wheelwright 
and Clark, 1992). This means that researchers have a much richer base of evidence to draw upon 
when conducting investigations into product orientated organisations. For this reason the focused 
investigation into the funding barrier to disruptive innovation concentrated upon the activities of 
the two disparate manufacturing cases (cases A and B) already under consideration. 
0 Selecting external candidates for interviews during the focused inquiry: 
Once again, to mitigate against the temptations of "going native" (Van Maanen, 1988) - where 
researchers become so close to their subjects that they lose their objectivity - interviews with 
innovation experts were conducted. Four industrial candidates were selected in accordance with 
the interviewee selection criteria stated in section 3.5.2 of this chapter: 
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e The founder and director of one of the UK's leading small management consultancies, 
which focuses upon delivering 'breakthrough business innovation'. 
9 The former head of technology commercialisation of a world leading national 
organisation based in the aeronautics and space industry. 
e The former Director of Technology of a leading national manufacturer from the computer 
printing industry. 
* The Chief Executive Officer of a leading national semiconductor manufacturer. 
3.6.2 Crafting instruments and protocols: Building collaborative working practice to build 
and test theory generated about the chosen priority area of conceptual framework 
Objective5 To develop a schedule of activity, whereby iterative feedback between the 
author and industrialists results in the construction of an intervention to test 
the research hyoothes& 
To develop a schedule of activity to implement the intervention and to 
employ data collection tools, such as questionnaires, structured interviews 
and independent observations. 
To consider the author5 impact as a participant-observer and to mitigate for 
negative affects. 
To agree mechanism5 whereby a contribution to knowledge can be asserted 
and a contribution to industrial practice can be demonstrated 
The instruments and protocols needed to deliver the third wave of this research were developed in 
partnership with the cases under consideration. The group focused upon the development and 
implementation of an intervention that could either confirm or disconfirm the hypothesis. Akin to 
the previous activities, a cyclical approach to data collection and data analysis was developed 
(Figure 3-21). Unlike the previous cycles of research activity, this cycle was designed to be 
completed only twice and also included elements of quantitative data collection and deductive data 
analysis. 
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ANALYSE: 
Assess data patterns and co-create 
constructs with community of practitioners; 
leads to co-development of a holistic 
conceptual framework of disruptive 
innovation 
PRIORITISE FOR ACTION: 
Identify priority areas of 
conceptual framework 
DESIGN INTERVENTION: 
Develop tools that integrate 
knowledge and insights regarding 
the prioritised focus area of 
conceptual framework 
Deductive knowledge 
testing and 
development 
Cycle 
AND Inductive knowledge 
development cycle 
IMPLEMENT: 
Implementation of intervention based upon 
knowledge that is thought to facilitate the 
pursuit of disruptive innovation 
Wave III: Exploration and 
Description - Taking action 
- conducting a management 
Intervention to probe the 
prioritised managerial focus 
area whilst attempting to 
Improve the capacity and 
capability to disrupt 
MEASURE IMPACT: 
Gain feedback from: 
Participant-observer case notes 
independent observer reports / 
immediate participant feedback/ deferred 
participant interviews researcher 
designed questionnaire independent 
designed questionnaire. 
Figure 3-21: The researcher driven, collaborative, inductive-deductive learning 
approach used in the third wave of the research. 
A plan was agreed, which comprised of similar instruments and protocols developed and utilised in 
the previous two waves of research activities: 
A series of workshops, interviews and telephone conferences were to be conducted, 
contributing towards the development of a management intervention. 
e The intervention was to be designed by the author in a process of iteration between academic 
theory and practical recommendations from the senior practitioners involved in the research 
thus far. 
* It was agreed that the intervention would take the form of a workshop that could be 
administered by the author to the senior management teams of both cases A and B. 
e The first complete version of the intervention was to be implemented within Case A- the small 
manufacturer. 
Data from observations made during the first intervention were to be assessed along with 
post-intervention interviews an d questionnaires; this would contribute to a deeper 
understanding of Case A and deliver an impact assessment of the management intervention. 
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Analyses from the first implementation were to be used to make modifications to the design of 
the intervention, and the modified intervention was then to be implemented in Case B- the 
large manufacturer. 
It was agreed that observations and data from this second larger implementation site would be 
collected and analysed using three approaches: 
a) The author would use coding techniques, such as those proposed by Strauss and Corbin 
(1997), to analyse the data from his observations and post-intervention questionnaires and 
interviews 
b) A senior management consultant, independent from the current research and with prior 
experience of working within Case B, was invited to observe the intervention and asked to 
assess the impact of the workshop from her observations and post-intervention interviews. 
c) It was decided that the two cases should provide their own feedback about their 
experiences during and after the intervention. Presentations were scheduled to be made 
by senior managers of both organisations to all the members of the EC co-sponsored 
project "Disrupt-it" and a European Commission selected review panel. 
3.6.3 Entering the field: Wave III 
Objectives To conduct two participant-observer intervention workshops in order to 
probe the pribritised focus area. 
" To employ multiple forms or data collection tools in order to both collect 
evidence regarding the pribritised focus area and the eflectiveness of the 
management intervention. 
" To conduct interviews with four innovation experts from industry in order to 
mitiqate against ýoing native' 
" To maintain extensive field notes, and to ensure synchronous data collection 
and data analysis with the flexibility to deliver controlled opportunism 
throughout the process. 
Once again the dominant units of analysis under consideration when in the field were management 
cognition and management action. These data were gathered from the practitioners within both 
cases via telephone conferences and in graphically facilitated workshops and interviews. Tables 3-7 
3-8 and 3-9 summarise the data collection strategy that was employed in the field. Throughout 
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the three phases of this last wave of research, the existence of open communication and trust, 
between the author and the industrial parties, became the key facilitator of a deeper case study 
investigation into the prioritised focus area. 
PHASE DATA COLLECTION TECHNIQUE OBJECTIVES 
Phase 1: 13 2x semi-structured telephone 0 To gather more data regarding the 
Building deeper interviews with cases A and B, plus prioritised focus area 
understanding informal email and telephone 0 To and present initial findings and 
and designing conversations. discuss with practitioners in order to the iteratively home in on the roots of 
management problems. intervention 
0 CASE A: 1x Two-day workshop with 0 To deliver more detailed understanding 
senior management team (5 participants), of case specific issues regarding the 
including tour of site. prioritised focus area. 
0 CASE B: 2x Telephone conferences 0 To better understand individual 
with senior managers and engineers (4 requirements for solution types. 
participants in total). 0 To use these findings to steer the 
design of the management 
intervention 
Table 3-8. - 777e first phase of the method to deliver a deeper understanding of the pribritised focus area. 
During phase 1, the practitioners were asked to consider the prioritised focus area and to recount 
stories from the past and to explain their prevailing current day situations, they were also 
presented with and discussed summaries of relevant state of the art academic literature. The aim 
was to use the insights gained from this data collection in combination with best practice guidance 
from academic literature in order to steer the design of a management intervention. Inspiration for 
this approach to designing the intervention was taken from French and Bell (1990) and the notions 
presented by Amis, Slack and Hinnings (2004) regarding the integration of trust-building and 
sensitivity when intervening with high-impact elements of an organisation. Consequently, the data 
collection activities were, in a sense, viewed by the management practitioners as a series of 
requirements gathering and understanding exercises for the intervention. This was conducted in 
what was referred to as the 'iterative V approach (Figure 3-22). Accordingly, this led to the 
creation of an intervention that was acceptable to the top management teams of both 
manufacturing cases (Figure 3-23 illustrates the output of one of the latter intervention design 
meetings in which the first high-level intervention process was designed). The intervention that 
emerged was based upon a recognised and well developed management tool, modified to 
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.k 
incorporate a state of the art understanding of 
V (17- 1--k- 
disruptive innovation, and which also incorporated 
S'ý q, the findings from the data collection. The resultant 
management intervention is briefly described in 
Chapter 6 and a more thorough description is 
offered in Appendix 5. 
Disruptive Portfolio 
Management 
Intervention 
-jýL 
To introduce state of the art knowledge from 
academic literature and industrial best practice. 
* To garner feedback regarding the information and to 
expose a deeper understanding of the case specific 
issues regarding prioritised focus area. 
-To iteratively integrate relevant academic knowledge 
and industrial feedback into an intervention that 
attempts to tackle the inhibitors to disruptive 
innovation within the prioritised focus area. 
Figure 3-22: Me 'iterative V approach used to 
design the management intervention. 
Phase 2: 0 CASE A: 1x Two-day workshop with 
Implementing senior management team (5 participants). 
intervention 
0 CASE B: One-day of in-house 
innovation project assessments and 1x 
one-day workshop with senior 
management team and senior engineers 
(16 participants). 
To conduct a two-day implementation 
of the management intervention in 
order to better understand the 
prioritised focus area. 
To conduct a two-day im plementation 
of the management intervention in 
order to better understand the 
prioritised focus a rea. 
Table 3-9., The secondphase of the method to deliver a deeper understanding of the prioritised focus area. 
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In phase 2 the intervention was first implemented over two days with the senior management team 
of case A- there were 5 participants in total. Extensive field notes were taken, immediate 
participant feedback was recorded, significant post-workshop researcher reflection was 
documented and two post-intervention interviews were completed with the CEO and the Head of 
Quality. This provided a detailed within-case analysis that revealed numerous insights into the 
focus area and the management intervention. Moreover, it was planned that feedback would be 
used to deliver process refinements that would improve the management intervention, especially as 
it was to be completed next in Case B-a larger more REW intensive organisation. Once the 
modifications were made the intervention was administered as a one day workshop with the senior 
management team and a group of senior engineers from Case B- there were 16 participants in 
total. During the second implementation extensive data were accumulated using the 
aforementioned techniques. 
Phase 3: 0 Gathering immediate feedback: 
Post CASE A: 
intervention 
- Group discussion. feedback 
-2x post intervention interviews. 
-4x post intervention questionnaires. 
CASE B: 
- Group discussion. 
-3x post intervention interviews. 
-4x post intervention questionnaires. 
11 Gathering feedback after 2 months: 
CASE A: 
-2x post intervention phone interviews. 
-1x presentation from executive manager. 
- Multiple email conversations. 
CASE B: 
-2x post intervention phone interviews. 
-1x presentation from executive manager. 
-1x report from independent 
management consultant. 
- Multiple email conversations. 
0 Gathering feedback after 6 months: 
CASE A: 
- Multiple email conversations. 
CASE B: 
-2x post intervention phone interviews. 
-1x presentation from executive manager. 
- Multiple email conversations. 
" To assess the short term impact of the 
management intervention. 
" To whether or not the management 
intervention had industrial utility. 
" To sharpen and refine the initial 
conclusions, drawn from the 
experience of intervening within cases 
A and B, into a justified contribution 
to knowledge. 
Table 3-10., The final phase of the method to deliver a deeper understanding of the pribritised focus area. 
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As outlined in Table 3-9, the final phase involved collecting data two months and six months after 
the intervention. This continued the deeper probing of the prioritised focus area and enabled the 
industrial utility of the management intervention to be discussed. Throughout this process, the full 
dimensions of the conceptual framework were used to facilitate semi-structured interviews with 
the selected innovation experts from outside the collaborative research group. 
3.6.4 Analysing the data: Wave III 
3.6.4.1 Within case analysis and searching for cross case patterns - Part 1 
Objectives To become intimately familiar with each case as a stand alone entity with 
the use of extensive field notes and feedback from other data collection 
techniques. 
e To conduct cro55 ca5e analy5& and 5earch for joattern5. 
Time and access restrictions prevented a study of the longitudinal impact of the interventions, nor 
were multiple interventions possible. This limited the data collection to the information that could 
be retrieved from the co-development and implementation of a one-off intervention along with 
immediate feedback and feedback over a six month period. In accordance with Yin's (1993) advice, 
purely descriptive case study write-ups were constructed for each case study immediately after the 
interventions. These were developed through a process based upon extensive field notes, 
participant feedback, post workshop reflection, and initial post intervention feedback. The within- 
case analysis process was designed to allow the author to become intimately familiar with the 
issues regarding the prioritised focus area for each intervention site. 
Complex statistical analyses are not feasible with such qualitative studies (Yin, 1994; Silverman, 
1999). Therefore, a system was designed and agreed with the case study participants, which would 
allow the author to use the exercise as a data collection tool whilst also assessing the industrial 
utility of the management intervention. The system was based upon the completion of a checklist 
process (Table 3-10) influenced by French and Bell's (1990) prescriptions. 
Criteria for assessing the industrial utility of the management intervention. Case 
AB 
a) On completing the intervention, at least 75% of the participants state that 
they believe they are in a better position to allocate resources to potentially 
disruptive innovations. 
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b) On completing the intervention, the majority of the participants state that the 
process implemented is one that could fit existing organisational routines and 
could be integrated into regular business practice. 
c) On completing the intervention, the most senior participants state that they 
believe that the intervention could be used in the future to overcome the funding 
barrier and establish new resource allocation routines. 
d) Two months after the intervention, the most senior participants state that 
they believe the intervention will deliver short to medium term benefits. 
e) Two months after the intervention, the most senior participants show that the 
intervention has facilitated the establishment of new approaches to resource 
allocation that support disruptive innovation. 
0 Two months after the intervention, the most senior participants state they 
believe that intervention may have significantly contributed to their ability to 
tackle the funding barrier to disruptive innovation in the long term. 
g) Six months after the intervention, the most senior participants state that they 
believe the intervention will deliver medium to long-term benefits. 
h) Six months after the intervention, the most senior participants show that the 
intervention has facilitated the establishment of new approaches to resource 
allocation that support disruptive innovation. 
i) Six months after the intervention, the most senior participants state they 
believe that intervention may have significantly contributed to their ability to 
tackle the funding barrier to disruptive innovation in the long term. 
Table 3-11: Criteria for assessing the industrial utility of the management intervention. 
A detailed codification of the data from each within-case analysis followed, using the methods 
proposed by Strauss and Corbin (1997) and Miles and Huberman (1994). This activity generated 
cross case patterns, providing a richer analysis of the prioritised focus area under consideration. A 
number of tentative constructs and managerial implications were developed. 
3.6.4.2 Within case analysis and searching for cross case patterns - Part 2: validating the emergent 
dimensions of the prioritised focus area and enfolding literature. 
Objective5 o To asscs5 and refine the emergent constructs, dimensions and conclu5ions, 
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regarding the pribritised focus area, with supporting and challenging insights. 
To strengthen and enhance the emergent dimen5ions of the prioritised focus 
area with a broad range of conflicting and supporting literature. 
To assess and refine the emergent constructs developed during the initial cross-case analysis and to 
build more reliable managerial implications, the author employed a five-fold approach (Figure 3- 
24): 
Generation of tentative 
constructs and managerial 
[ACTIVITY 2i] 
Analysis and integration of 
data from independent 
management consultant's 
observations and conclusions. 
[ACTIVITY 2ii] PPP' 
Analysis and integration of 
data from 2x presentations 
about the intervention from 
enior practitioners of cases 
and B to a wider research 
[ACTIVITY 2iii] 
[ACTIVITY 2iv] 
Analysis and integration of 
Analysis and integration of 
data from expert interviews 
data from post intervention 
II 
feedback (3 months) 
-Analysis and integration of 
data from post intervention 
feedback fG months) 
ng and contrary 
from academic 
ons were enfolded 
Figure 3-24: Refining the emergent dimensions and delivering deeper understanding of the pribritised focus area. 
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(1) Data from a report produced by a management consultant who was acting as an independent 
observer was codified and enfolded into the emergent dimensions. 
(2) Two months after the interventions took place, both cases A and B delivered presentations to a 
wider research group regarding their experiences with the management intervention. These 
data were enfolded into the emergent dimensions of the prioritised focus area. 
(3) Data from the four expert interviews were analysed and enfolded in parallel. 
(4) Data from post intervention feedback, gathered after 2 months, were analysed and enfolded. 
(5) Data from post intervention feedback, gathered after 6 months, were analysed and enfolded. 
Once again an important part of this process was the juxtaposition of apparently similar elements 
of the cases and the forcing of a search for differences. This process broke simplistic frames, 
created new categories and generated a deeper understanding of the dimensions. Throughout the 
whole exercise, academic literature was constantly presented and enfolded into the emergent 
dimensions, as recommended by Eisenhardt (1989). 
3.6.5 Reaching Closure: Wave III 
Obj . ectives * To ensure enough case data has been collected. 
To know when to stop iterating between academic theoty and practitioner 
data. 
To develop and employ mechanisms by which the industrial utility of the 
JnvestiqationýF findings can be accepted or rejected and an academic 
contribution to knowledge can be asserted 
e To address the strengths and weaknesses of the research de5ign. 
As with the previous stages, iterative searches between data and literature were completed to the 
point of saturation - where additional information renders little or no further advantages 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Due to time and resource restrictions the longitudinal impact of the intervention within cases A 
and B could not be assessed, nor could they be implemented again. Therefore, it was not possible 
to develop complex statistical tests to aid in accepting or rejecting the industrial utility of the 
investigations findings. Instead, in collaboration and negotiation with the industrialists involved in 
the research, a checklist was developed to facilitate a valid and justifiable decision regarding the 
short term impact of the management intervention. This is described in Chapter 6. Moreover, 
Chapter 7 will discuss the key findings of this final wave of research, in doing so it will map the 
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conclusions onto the extant literature and will assert a well positioned, clear contribution to 
knowledge. 
In the final multiple case workshop of this research, time was dedicated to generating feedback 
upon the collaborative mode 2 approach. This was analysed alongside the feedback that was 
generated in parallel to the research activities from graphically facilitated 'lessons learnt' sessions. 
These activities enabled a qualitative assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the research 
methodology employed in this study. 
3.7 A summary of the research methodology 
In consideration of the research objectives it was concluded that this investigation would benefit 
from a close relationship between the researcher and the subject. Moreover, the research strategy 
had to be semi-structured, allowing for the collection of rich deep data and the emergence of a 
relationship between theory and the findings. This enabled to the author to deliver a qualitative 
study, a mode of investigation missing from the field of disruptive innovation. 
A truly heterogeneous group of both industrial practitioners and academics were engaged in this 
investigation, using a trans-disciplinary approach. In total, 127 industrialists took part in this 
study. The four different case study sites, from four different countries and four different 
industries, provided a total 17 management practitioners to make up the core members of the 
collaborative research group. In addition, 103 employees from the four case study organisations 
participated in one-off or infrequent data collection workshops and questionnaires. The 
organisational functions that were performed by the participants could be divided into 9 clusters 
and the organisational roles could be divided into 8 clusters (Table 3-11). 
Organisational Function 
0 Finance 0 
0 Marketing 0 
0 Purchasing 0 
0 REW/Design 0 
0 Man ufactu ring/Operations 0 
0 Sales 0 
0 Human resources 0 
0 Legal 0 
0 Cross Functional 
Organisational Role 
CEO 
Director/ Divisional Head 
Senior Manager 
Manager 
Senior Consultant 
Consultant 
General Employee 
Mixed Role 
Table 3-12., The oryanisational functions and roles of the participants involved in this research. 
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Seven expert industrialists were interviewed in parallel to the research process, along with three 
expert academics; moreover, seven members of the EC project 'Disrupt-it' were also consulted 
either once or intermittently throughout the inquiry. 
Four units of analysis were considered, the two primary units were management action and 
management cognition, thus, a focus upon rich qualitative data collection dominates the research 
agenda. 
Thme waves of collaborative research activities were designed (Figure 3-25) in order to fulfil the 
primary research objective established in Chapters 1 and 2: 
To explore the nature and experience of management practitioners' pursuit of potentially disruptive 
innovations in average performing (or non-best-practice) businesses. 
The first wave of research was an exploration to better understand the complex and dynamic 
phenomenon of the pursuit of disruptive innovation; it was designed to tackle the sub-objective 1: 
To deliver an holistic understanding of the key facilitators and inhibitors faced by management 
practitioners wanting to enable potentially disruptive innovations within their non-best-in-class 
organisations. And to convert this knowledge into an holistic processual and systemic conceptual 
framework, grounded in both data and theory. 
Over a fifteen month period, a series of workshops, interviews and observations were used in an 
inductive knowledge development cycle. The analyses of the data and the enfolding of literature 
were extrapolated into a conceptual framework of enablers and inhibitors that management 
practitioners face in the pursuit of disruptive innovation. These results are presented in Chapter 4. 
The second wave of this research was an exploration to uncover focus areas of management 
action and management cognition to which the delivery of potentially disruptive innovations are 
highly dependent; this was designed to satisfy the sub-objective 2: 
To explore the emergent conceptual framework in order to identify focus areas of management 
action and management cognition to which the delivery of potentially disruptive innovations are 
most dependent. 
Data were collected over an eight month period using interviews, telephone conferences, email 
discussions and workshops. The data analysis and the enfolding of literature revealed four focus 
areas, in the form of barriers that management practitioners, of average performing companies, 
face in the pursuit of disruptive innovation. Further analysis led to the prioritisation of one of these 
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focus areas by all four cases and interviewees; this became the focal Point for the third wave of the 
investigation. These results are presented in Chapter 6. 
Define research aims and objectives 
PLAN ACTION: 
Collaborate with community of practitioners, 
UNDERSTAND: 
Improved understanding of the 
enablers and barriers to 
disruptive innovation 
Seeking imprOvCci unacrstanaing or 
disruptive innovation 
(Based an instruments and protocols that that support 
collaborative working practices)_ 
Inductive knowledge 
development cycle 
ANALYSE: 
Inductive C= 
Assess data patterns and co-create 
rnrm? "w constructs with community of practitioners; 
PRIORITISE FOR ACTION: 
Identify priority areas of 
conceptual framework 
DESIGN INTERVENTION: 
Develop tools that integrate 
knowledge and insights regarding 
the prioritised focus area of 
conceptual framework 
MLLECT OATA: 
Access relevant data, and knowledge from 
industrial practitioners using case study and 
survey strategy. Assess academic > 
contribution. 
01"= leads to co-development of a holistic 
conceptual framework of disruptive rl-rTMITRIM 
innovation 
Deductive knowledge 
testing and 
development 
cycle 
AND Inductive knowledge 
development cycle 
IMPLEMENT: 
Implementation of intervention based upon 
knowledge that is thought to facilitate the 
pursuit of disruptive innovation 
MEASURE IMPACT- 
Gain feedback from: 
Participant-observer case notes/ 
independent observer reports 
immediate participant feedback/ deferred 
participant interviews researcher 4) designed questionnaire independent > 
designed questionnaire. 
KEY: Wove III - Wave I- 
Exploration. Understanding Wave If = Exploration - 
Exploration and Description - 
the complex and dynamic 
Understanding priority 
focus areas of the 
Taking action - conducting a 
management Intervention to probe 
phenomenon of the pursuit of 
potentially disruptive conceptual 
framework the prioritised managerial focus 
Innovations area whilst attempting 
to Improve 
capability to disrupt 
Figure 3-25: 7he mode 2 research to action cycle - 
a researcher driven, collaborative, inductive-deductive learning approach. 
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The third wave of this research is more descriptive in nature and was designed to address sub- 
objective 3: 
To specify, design and implement a management intervention to probe a priority focus area of 
management action and cognition. The intervention should be able to build new academic 
knowledge, whilst simultaneously improving the ability of the participating organisations to pursue 
potentially disruptive innovations. 
It focuses upon the development and implementation (within cases A and B) of a management 
intervention that embodied the understanding that had been developed regarding the prioritised 
focus area. Ten months of research activities were designed to provide a deeper understanding of 
the prioritised focus area by investigating the complex and dynamic issues faced by management 
practitioners in this key area of management action and cognition. It was hoped that the analysis 
of the data would reveal implications for the wider conceptual framework, developed in the first 
wave of research activities, and a series of management implications along with a well clear 
contribution to knowledge. The results are presented in Chapter 6 and a full discussion is offered in 
Chapter 7. 
Finally, this chapter was written to offer readers of this thesis a detailed account of the 
collaborative academic-industrial methodology designed and implemented for this investigation. It 
is believed that these pages, along with the discussion presented in Chapter 7 and Appendix 8, 
provide evidence to satisfy the second research objective established at the onset of this research. 
To use this investigation as a tool to extend knowledge and practice of collaborative academic- 
practitioner methodological approaches in the field of innovation research. 
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4. A Conceptual Framework for Enabling 
Potentially Disruptive Innovations 
- The Findings from Wave I of the Investigation 
This chapter is primarily dedicated to presenting the conceptual framework for enabling potentially 
disruptive innovations that emerged from the fir5t wave of this investigation. Preceding this is a brief 
overview of the objectives and the research method employedin the first wave of the investiqation. An 
overview of the tentative constructs used to guide data collection is also provided The chapter is 
concluded with a summary of how the findings relate to the research objectives. 
CHAPTER AIMS 
- -. 1.1 ----... - I-........ .... ..... Wave I Findings 
To develop an holistic 
conceptual framework 0 
representing the pursuit of 
disruptive innovation in non- 
best-practice organisations. 
ACTIVITIES 11 OUTCOMES 
. ............. ....... -....... ...... .... . ........ 15 months of interaction with 4 Conceptual Framework 8 Constructs Et 48 Themes 
case 5Luoy organi5auun5 
including 6 multi-organisational 
workshops and 8 interviews. V- 
I 1--cl-11 
ý & ' 
--C-2-7 
C3 1 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 
ii l i Extensive data analysis and 
enfolding of literature. Synthesis 
ofdata into a conceptual 
n ý 1 
framework. i , 44 44 44 44 444 414 444 44 
4.1 Introduction 
4.1.1 Overview of primary objectives 
The primary objectives of the first wave of the research were: 
e To identify tentative constructs for the research topic, aiding with data collection. 
e To craft instruments and protocols to facilitate a collaborative working practice. 
e To deliver an holistic understanding of the issues faced by management practitioners 
wanting to enable their organisations to deliver potentially disruptive innovations. And to 
convert this knowledge into a testable and verifiable conceptual framework. 
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4.1.2 Overview of research methods 
The above objectives were achieved within the first 15 months of this research. However, to further 
ensure reliability and validity, the data collected and analysed in the final 18 months were also 
integrated in to the emergent conceptual framework. Therefore, the results presented in the 
following sections draw upon data collected and analysed from three main sources: 
* 33 months of regular interaction with cases study organisations A, B, C and D (15 multi- 
case, multi-level, multi-functional workshops, 6 single case, multi-level, multi-functional 
workshops, 10 telephone conferences and 12 interviews plus countless email conversations). 
o An extensive literature survey. 
e Eleven expert interviews (seven experts from industry and three from British academia). 
The triangulation (Lewis and Grimes, 1999) of data from these sources facilitated the development 
of a conceptual framework. The framework identifies the main enablers and inhibitors faced by 
management practitioners wanting to enable their organisations to deliver potentially disruptive 
innovations. These were selected by considering the frequencies with which they were mentioned 
and the levels of importance bestowed upon them by members of the research group. 
4.2 The emergence of tentative constructs 
Five tentative constructs emerged during the case study selection discussions held in parallel to an 
extensive survey and categorisation of extant literature: (1) supporting processes or values, (2) 
resources, (3) management values, (4) business models and (5) the external organisational 
environment (including consumer behaviour). These were configured as shown in Figure 4-1 below. - 
The constructs were tentative and only used to elicit data from the cases and interviewees. This 
ensured that knowledge and new constructs would emerge from the research activities and that 
these new constructs would closely fit the data and, therefore, the real world. 
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Figure 4- 1: Tentative constructs 
Eg. people 
equipment, 
technology, 
brands, cash, 
relationships 
Eg. configuration of resources, 
processes and values to deliver a 
customer oftering 
A list of revised constructs was generated in the early stages of the cross-case analyses, using the 
techniques of 'multiple perspectives' (Yin, 1994), ' paired cases' (Gibbons et al, 1994), the 
juxtaposition of data and the enfolding of supporting and conflicting literature (Eisenhardt, 1986). 
The group identified what they felt to be the top ten most important management decision points 
in the process of disruptive innovation. These could be represented by the linear flow of the 
innovation process illustrated by Table 4-1. 
The remainder of this chapter illustrates the findings from further analysis, in which a deeper 
understanding emerged that broke the simplistic frame represented in table 4-1. Dimensions were 
recombined and restructured, and new unexpected concepts surfaced to create a fully modified 
conceptual framework. 
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The top ten most important management actions and decisions in 
the process of disruptive innovation as reported by the case study 
participants. 
(First Round Construct Revision) 
1) New Concept Reg istration/Recog n ition 
2) Decision to Explore (Major Decision Gate 1) 
3) Preliminary Investigation 
4) Decision to Conduct Detailed Investigation (Major Decision 2) 
5) Detailed Investigation of Potentially Disruptive Innovations 
6) Potentially Disruptive Innovation Business Case Development 
7) Derision to Develop Offering (Major Decision 3) 
8) Execute Development Plan 
9) Decision to Launch Offering on Market (Gate Decision 4) 
10) Marketing for disruptive innovation 
Table 4-1: 7he Arstlist of revised constructs. 
4.3 The disruptive innovation conceptual framework 
The analysis of fifteen months of workshop sessions, interviews and extensive literature, culminated 
in the emergence of a conceptual framework for management practitioners who wish to enable 
their organisations to pursue and deliver potentially disruptive innovations. It was concluded that 
disruptive innovation can be enabled through the management of seven core components, or 
modules, and an understanding of how these interact with one another, the external markets and 
the external environment (Figure 4-2). 
For each construct, the three foremost enablers and inhibitors were identified. The enablers; and 
inhibitors are, in effect, mechanisms of management action and management cognition that can be 
thought of as internal forces or stimuli. Provided the enablers; and inhibitors or their effects are 
attended to, it is believed that a management team will lead its organisation to the purposeful 
pursuit of disruptive innovation. Without such attention, the enabling mechanisms lie dormant and 
the inhibiting mechanisms enact processes in the form of a series of events, whether or not 
explicitly experienced by the organisation's members, which constrain the pursuit of innovation to 
incrementalism. 
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The en2blerS and inhibitors are presented in the remainder of this section. Each one is explained, 
firstly with illustrative evidence, considered to be largely representative of the data set, and 
secondly, a description is provided which draws upon the wider data set and relevant literature. 
Note that the participants involved in the research had differing standards of English (both written 
and spoken). Therefore, a number of the quotes that follow were paraphrased following 
presentations, conversations and emails, they were either observed or recorded, and were either 
immediately or subsequently agreed by the appropriate participants. 
4.3.1 Opportunity Recognition: 
DESCRIPTION: The capability to simultaneously generate and/or 
recognise potentially disruptive opportunities and options for 
sustaining innovation. This involves gathering stimuli and 
converting it into insights or inventions that lead to the 
identification of both new potentially disruptive business 
opportunities and avenues for sustaining innovation. 
ENABLERS: 
4.3.1.1 Gather stimuli from the organisation's wider domain. 
Evidence: 
iCA04FW 
Orr 
Tu 
It 
A 
amo. 
7 aw 
7ý-, 
I-- a) 
ZNT I 
Rqure 4-3: Case DýF collecting broaderstimuli to develop more 
radical ideas 
A senior consultant from Case D used a graphical approach to explain how they have improved 
their ability to generate and identify radical andpotentially disruptive opportunities (Figure 4-3). 
She illustrated how broader scanning, reflecting and 'futurising' with existing and new, personal 
and corporate networks had improved their ability to sense opportunities. Furthermore, by 
exposing their ideas and their ideas pipeline' to stimuli from the wider changing world and 
broader project selection approaches, they have delivered richer more grounded idea5. [9-5enior 
_Con5ultant-OR-1071] 
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The notion that gathering and assessing large arrays of stimuli can fuel the innovation effort is not 
new but it is commonly overlooked and undervalued, especially when attempting to undertake 
radical or disruptive innovation (Morgan, 1993). Stinchecombe (1965) found that entrepreneurial 
insights and activities are difficult to undertake in conventional social arrangements. He claims 
that entrepreneurs thrive where the social and physical variation around them is at a maximum, 
because this allows them to arrange new social order that leads to new innovative opportunities. 
Since Stinchecombe's work, academics and industrialists have evolved improved systematic 
methods by which they can draw stimuli from the external environment - consideration is often 
given to extracting information from 'the wider organisational domain'. A management team's 
organisational domain encompasses companies and their customers positioned upstream and/or 
downstream in their vertical value chain. It also includes companies and their customers that 
supply complementary products or services within the broader value network. And it comprises of 
the companies that form direct or indirect competition, who possess similar core competencies or 
that satisfy comparable customer needs (Hamel, 2000). Morgan (1993) has stated that 
management teams who only consider stimuli from their own industry will be limited to delivering 
'more of the same' innovation. Furthermore, O'Connor and Rice (2001) show it is from a wider 
domain that data and insights are more likely to be gathered to stimulate radical and potentially 
disruptive ideas and the recognition of potentially disruptive opportunities. Both these notions 
were supported by the data set. For example, a car manufacturer should gather stimuli from the 
wider domain of transportation; an oil company would consider the energy domain and a 
microprocessor manufacturer would cover the domain of information and communication 
technologies. The research participants believed, as do Rice et al (2001), that stimuli can come in 
the form of reflections, observations or predictions. 
4.3.1.2 Monitor low-end and adjacent zero-consumption market movements. 
Evidence: "... our technology roadmapping techniques ave allowed us to plan and su fully 
enter the low-end of hiqher-tier markets.. they've also shown us when our incremental 
improvements have begun to overshoot our average customers'needs -letting us know when to 
keep an eye out for new upstarts... there are always new groups of people popping up who don't 
yet buy our technology; we make efforts to watch the wider domain and to spot the places theyýe ii 
likely to cfDp up and make efforts to include them in our technology roadmapping exercises... 
[W-Director of Technology- OR- 19081 
Despite the importance of opportunity recognition, much of the literature on the topic "focuses on 
the nature and importance of the phenomenon rather than on how to encourage the firms' capacity 
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to support it" (O'Connor and Rice, 2001: 98). O'Connor and Rice (2001) find that opportunity 
recognition for highly radical innovation is highly dependent on individual initiative and capacity, 
rather than routine practices and procedures of the firm. Opportunities for changing the basis of 
competition, within an existing industry, mostly appear in the low-end of the existing market 
(Christensen, 1997; Gilbert and Bower, 2002) or within adjacent markets that do not consume that 
industry's produce (Kaplan, 1999, Carrol, 1985). All research participants reported their belief that 
executive management teams who monitor these specific areas will be better prepared to recognise 
disruptive threats and to convert them onto opportunities. 
4.3.1.3 Challenge convention and match potentially disruptive opportunities with market niches 
that offer a disruptive foothold. 
Evidence: ".. not knowing the answer is hugely valuable in the innovation process. So / 
encourage my guys and girls to be brave, to be comfortable when lost.. Iti5notea5yto challenge 
conventions but you have to, and the only way to bring them to life is to match unconventional 
product ideas with unconventional market segments.. These niches of customers have to be 
delighted that you have come up with this idea, ... 
itý only with the base support of 
unconventional markets that you can move unconventional concepts into the mainstream" 
[RuM-Director of Innovation-Ofl- 12461 
7 believe that if you look back at the big breakthroughs in engineering, the genius has been in the 
big picture - seeing the world from a different per5pective, challenging preconceptions, noticing 
the changes - not in the detai& " [B-RRD Director-OR- 1453] 
In a longitudinal study, O'Connor and Rice (2001) found that "the technical discovery or insight [for 
a breakthrough innovation] typically originated with a scientist or engineer, who frequently was not 
prepared - either through training or life experience - to make the cognitive leap from a technical 
idea to an envisioned and articulated business opportunity" (p96). However, in the same study it 
was found that the 'opportunity recogniser' was able to link the breakthrough technical idea with a 
need in the marketplace - one that already existed, but was unfulfilled, or one that could be 
created. Managers involved in the research reported difficulties with pitching potentially 
disruptive opportunities to executive management for resources to conduct further investigations. 
To recognise the disruptive potential of the opportunity as advantageous, these managers stated 
that both they, and their top management teams, need to be prepared to challenge conventions -a 
notion also supported by Morgan (1993). Authors such as Lynn et al (1996) assert that probe and 
learn processes can be used to identify new customer niches for discontinuous innovation. If, 
whilst probing and learning, an opportunity recogniser has found a way to compete against non- 
consumption in an adjacent market or they can target customers who would be delighted by the 
concept because their alternative is to pay for functionality they will not utilise, then they will have 
identified a disruptive foothold market (Rafii and Kampas, 2002). 
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INHIBITORS: 
4.3.1.4 Restrictive assumptions about growth and the basis of competition. 
Evidence: 7 think that innovation at my company [Case A], right now, is stuck within a Vefy 
narrow limited tradition - we have become our product, we all believed that we can just go on 
improving it. But itý bound to break-out 5ooner-or-later because there are people like me 
looking for ways to move it forward, where we secretly explore areas presently off limits to the 
business... if it doesn't, then thi5place willstop existing. " [A-Director 6eneral-08-20121 
Management teams who make the assumption that the basis of competition will not radically 
change, cause problems in the opportunity recognition phase (Ahuja and Lampert, 2001). Evidence 
was gathered from all for cases which showed that such a belief can permeate the business. 
Consequently, stimuli-gathering was seen to be restricted to the collection of trends and 
developments that could only support the advancement of current offerings. Moreover, employees 
rarely allocated time or energies to considering the hypothesis that their organisation may be 
facing obsolescence. It is believed that top managers who want to break these restrictive 
assumptions need to follow Kaplan's (1999) advice; they must infuse "a new common sense" (p2l) 
one that ensures employees realise their company and its core technologies only have limited 
lifecycles - this will inspire urgency for, and commitment to, the pursuit of opportunities of a 
discontinuous nature. 
4.3.1.5 The belief that disruptive innovation necessitates massive organisational change. 
Evidence: At the outset of the r1rst meeting of the research group, thirteen of the fourteen 
participants reported that they believed the pursuit of disruptive innovation would necessitate 
significant change within their oryanisations, especially within the power base of the business. 
Will the pursuit of disruptive innovation necessitate 
significant change within your organisation? 
14, 
12, 
10, 
8- 
6 
4 
2 
OLi 
YFr% NO 
It was apparent that preconceived notions dominated and distracted the practitioners from the 
reality of disruptive strategies -a key restraint in the recognition of disruptive opportunities. 
[Team-Research 6roup-08-49] 
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Arnold, Cooper and Robertson (1998) assert that management practitioners want to safely know 
their actions will deliver positive results; this desire means they mostly prefer stable and predictable 
working conditions. This investigation found most practitioners believe, whether or not explicitly 
stated, that the pursuit of potentially disruptive innovation will necessitate a revolutionary 
organisational change. Kaplan (1999) claims this occurs because most people associate 
discontinuities with "Industry Genesis" (p19) - one of a number of forms of discontinuous 
innovation which "... caries the highest uncertainty and risk" (p20). Therefore, a situation is created 
whereby the beliefs of management associate disruptive innovation with the perception of large- 
scale organisational turbulence, this propagates a resistance to the pursuit of disruptive innovation 
and inhibits the generation and recognition of disruptive opportunities. 
4.3.1.6 Conventional market research techniques. 
Evidence: "Our market research approach takes us to out existing customers and asks them: 'do 
you like this new idea of ours? '.. it seems that we all do this /aH four businesses within the 
research group], its seems that we all have difficulty accepting that we do not know what the 
market will eventually be for a really radical or a potentially disruptive innovation, so we just try 
to squeeze it into something that we already do... " [C-5enior Manager-OR-318] 
The participants reported the purpose of using market research techniques, within their new 
productiservice development process, was to assess the size of market opportunities and to, make 
go/no-go decisions on innovation options. Trott (2001) proposes that this form of market research 
may actually hinder the development of discontinuous new product development. It may be 
undesirable or impossible to conduct too much upfront market research with radical and 
discontinuous opportunities (Veryzer, 1998). It was found that practitioners within all four case 
organisations assessed potentially disruptive market opportunities using the same criteria as their 
sustaining alternatives. They were, in effect, forcing all new concepts into a sustaining model of 
innovation, which led to misunderstanding and the rejection of potentially disruptive options. 
Leifer et al. (2001) state and Trott (2001) predicts this occurs because customers cannot articulate 
their needs when they do not fully understand what is possible. This means it is unfeasible to 
predict how a potentially disruptive technology or offering will eventually be utilised by established 
markets (Linton and Walsh, 2002). However, Cooper, Edgett and Kleinschmidt (2001) are among 
many authors who claim a lack of 'upfront homework', which includes market research, is the 
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foremost reason why most new product development initiatives fail. Thus, investigation found that 
market research is important but its purpose should differ when pursuing innovation of a 
discontinuous nature. The management teams at both 3M (Hippel, Thornke and Sonnack, 1999) and 
Hewlett-Packard (Kalplan, 1999) are reported to have discovered this concept and have as a 
consequence improved their pursuit of discontinuous innovation with refined approaches. Rather 
than tools which approach known customers for golno-go decisions, the practitioners involved in 
this research reported a need for tools to help explore, refine and validate the feasibility of ideas for 
non-consumers or over-looked low-end niche markets. 
4.3.2 Opportunity Development: 
DESCRIPTION: The capability to select newly identified, high-promise 
opportunities and to develop a selection of credible business cases that 
offer the potential for pursuing disruptive and sustaining innovation. 
ENABLERS: 
4.3.2.1 Only select projects with validated 'disruptive foothold' 
Evidence: "VITtal to the development of a business case for a potentially disruptive innovation is 
the definition of the initial target market.. we've found tha t traditional custom er segm en ta tion 
just doesn't work.. you have to consider what the people are trying to get done - not where they 
live, how much they earn, what colour skin they have - you need to match your new technologies 
to the jobs people are trying to do.. only with a real initial target market can you establish a 
foothold for the technology... " [TH-5enior Consultant-OD-21381 
"The consideration of commercialisation issues in the early stages of the product development 
cycle proved to be the critical success factor in the delivery of radical [andpotentially disruptive] 
commercial product offerings [I(F-Commercialisation Director-OD- 103]. ... building a relationship 
with a sample of the potential target population, andmethodically exploring their ýain, helps the 
team to develop empathy for overlooked or ignored people where radical [potentially disruptive] 
technologies can take root. This helps to quickly envision realistic solutions and establishes 
market credibility with [a disruptive foothold of] people who have a 'burning' unresolved need.. 
ltý; often necessary to seek help to do this - we hire a real smart market research team. " [KF- 
Commercialisation Director-OD-1041 
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Interviewee XF [KF-Commercialisation Director-OD- 103] used the above diagram (Figure 4-5) to 
illustrate how his organisation transformed its ability to commercialise what he prefenred to call 
'breakthrough' technologies. As early as po55ible, KF would make stakeholders in the innovation 
process consider the question 'who would be the first niche of customers to need this new 
technology or approach? ' KF; organisation improved its commercialisation rates by over 50001o. j 
Much of the literature that reports examples of disruptive innovations or revolutionary 
breakthroughs (e. g. Adnar, 2002; Afuah, 2000, Chesbrough, 2003; Christensen and Raynor, 2003; 
Dowd and Walsh, 1998; Schumpeter, 1975; Utterback, 1994; Wheelwright and Clark, 1992) does so 
by explaining the original route of the technology, approach or product. All, it would seem, are 
born in small niche markets and grow into their grandiose title of a breakthrough or a disruption. 
Thus rather unsurprisingly, data gathered from the expert interviewees shows that managers who 
send their opportunity recognisers 'back to the drawing board', until they have identified a well 
defined initial niche market, are more likely to develop high-promise potentially disruptive 
innovations. Most of the participants in the research believed that a thorough examination of the 
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unresolved burning issues within their industry's domain would help to identify a target 'disruptive 
foothold' population. This would be a niche of low-end customers or a segment that does not yet 
spend money in this industry who have, to date, not been satisfied by existing offerings. According 
to Christensen and Raynor (2003), and very much in line with the data gathered from the expert 
interviewees, the initial market should be a niche that large competitors will be happy to ignore or 
pleased to walk away from. 
4.3.2.2 Business models that predict early profits with validated niche markets. 
Evidence: "7 once identifled, in my last company, a space in the market thatV been ignored and 
overlooked in the past. / expressed my interest and presented a disruptive opporti 
significant funding. It came as a bit of a surprise that / was met with a wall of scepticism and 
asked 'why can't you accept it? ' The executive team said that 'we don't have a channel or the 
technology to enter that market'. /was so conrident in the potential of the concept that Isaid to 
one of the very senior people 'well it is up to you make sure that W5 company can come up with 
these new channels and technologies' 56, after a little more debate and negotiation, / was given 
a team to investigate the development of a simple but innovative solution for a small group of 
qnored customers... / was told to make money and become self sustainin as quickly these, these ig 
as po55ible - to prove the idea would work. This kept our focus on a narrow market and stopped 
the temptation to over deliver. This company [Case C] needs to learn from these lessons, we tend 
to put too much into our solutions and we tend to want to go straight to biq markets - this 
definitely stops us applying disruptive approaches" [D-Area Manager-OD-20651 
It could be concluded from the data that the pursuit of disruptive innovation will be enabled if 
management teams have the ability, and desire, to support the construction of a specific kind of 
business model that predicts early profits within a validated niche market'. It is believed that 
potentially disruptive technologies or offerings should be based upon the construction of a business 
model that aims to make early profits in one of two ways: (1) With the discount prices required to 
capture customers in low-end markets. (2) With the maximum possible prices that will be endorsed 
by small emerging markets of people willing to migrate from non-consumption. This notion is very 
much in line with Christensen's work (e. g. Christensen, 1997; Christensen and Overdorf, 2000 and 
Christensen and Raynor, 2003) and the findings of Gilbert and Bower (2002). All the expert 
interviewees mentioned or implied the importance of this enabler and all four case study 
organisations note their inability in this area (either through prevailing motivation, culture or 
experience) as a key reason why they fail to develop potentially disruptive business opportunities. 
' The term business model is used in accordance with Hamel's (2000) definition -the unique configuration of resources, 
processes, a product/service strategy, customer interface and the value network that brings a business concept to 
fruition. 
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The data and the findings of Kassicieh et al (2002) also show particular attention must be given to 
distribution channels and processes needed to realise the business model. Many of the participants 
believed if the prevailing organisational system will not provide the necessary support, then options 
such as partnering, outsourcing etc. should be considered -a belief explained in depth by 
Christensen and Overdorf (2000) and Christensen and Raynor (2003). 
4.3.2.3 Plan for emergence. 
Evidence: 'A really important part of the defively of breakthrough innovation, in my experience, 
has been the ability to throw top-down planning out of the window.. you need top-down support 
to conquer the initial market, but then you need to set Up 3 team that can flex and respond to 
emergent opportunities and demands as they come out of the woodwork.. however, there comes 
a time when the breakthrough can become mainstream and looking for new avenues becomes 
ineff7cient, thatý; when you need to bring back top-down planning and deliberate decision 
making" [RM-Director of Technology-OD- 19151 
A key difference between the expert interviewees and the participants from the cases was the 
willingness of senior management to accept emergence as a valid plan. The importance of 
emergent approaches is discussed by Mintzberg and Waters (1985) and Burgleman (2002). And it 
was concluded from the data analysis that a management team will be better placed to enable a 
disruptive innovation if they accept their initial business model and plans for a potentially 
disruptive customer offering will not be the one that delivers long-term success. In accordance 
with Kassicieh et al (2002) and Leifer et al. (2000). it was found that strong business cases are 
needed for initial niche market penetration; however, if the insurgent is going to disrupt existing 
key players they then must remain flexible and facilitate the emergence of a viable strategy to 
deliver the disruptive potential of the concept. Evidence presented by Leifer et al. (2000) 
demonstrates that management teams can plan for emergence by continually monitoring the 
performance of their radical innovation initiatives and continually checking all major assumptions. 
These managers are said to be utilising a multiple opportunity recognition approach (Leifer et al., 
2000; O'Connor and Rice, 2001) by responding to emergent demands. Therefore, it is believed that 
opportunity development teams can plan to embrace emergent approaches thus supporting the 
emergence of viable strategies. 
INHIBITORS: 
4.3.2.4 Selecting opportunities which target satisfied customers. 
Evidence: ".. it costs a lot of money to follow new ideas; it costs even more to follow these 
radical or di5ruptive ideas, because you have to convince your customers to do something 
different.. sometimes, this i5just too much of a gamble. " [B-RRD Director-OD-8901 
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At the onset of the research the above sentiment was echoed across a/I four cases. Management 
practitioners from each business reported failed attempts to develop potentially disruptive 
concepts that could be adopted by a mainstream market. A commonly stated sentenced was. - "if 
only we couldget them [the mainstl-eam customers] to change their behaviour" 
The management teams from all four case studies reported a common behaviour that inhibited the 
initiation of the opportunity development phase. They reported that when selecting opportunities 
for investigation they had, in the past, focused their selection upon incremental innovations and/or 
potentially disruptive opportunities that target customers who already use satisfactory products. 
The main reason they gave was the attractive size of the markets. However, research by McDonald 
et al (2001), Moore (1995) and Leonard and Rayport (1997) has shown that consumers need a 
compelling reason to buy and it is a mammoth task to persuade people to change their purchasing 
habits. Therefore, it would seem that managers who want to challenge existing customer priorities 
increase the potential that they will be setting themselves up for an unwise use of organisational 
resources. This issue is linked to the inhibitor presented in section 4.3.2.6, where the impact of 
narrow opportunity selection is felt during the development of business cases. Furthermore, the 
reasons for top managers focusing upon such projects can be explained by the effect of restrictive 
mental models (Morgan, 1993; Senge, 1990; Swan, 1997; Tripsas and Gavettit, 2000), this issue is 
discussed at length in the proceeding chapter. 
4.3.2.5 Performance guided by traditional processes. 
Evidence: our quality management processes enforces a get it right fitst time policy,.. this is 
good if you know the customer, but bad if you want to test new ideas in new markets, " [A- 
Ouality Manager-OD-6431 
"Our traditional market research techniques take you to existing customers and asks their 
opinions on new ideas.. if itý; an idea thatý a bit 'out-there, they always come back and say we 
don't want that; thatý why we don't use them any more.. we've discovered more empathic 
approaches - these help a lot" [D-Divisional Head-OD- 112] 
7 completely support rigorous engineering approaches in new product development but 1ýn 
concerned that the way we manage our innovation projects may be letting genuinely radical - 
and maybe even disruptive innovations - slip through the net.. you need to think somewhat 
differently to make these things happen, you need to insoire and support different approaches. 
[D-H&D Director-OD- 14541 
It was found that practitioners within the cases contributed to a failure to pursue disruptive 
innovation when they relied upon their traditional practices of project selection, market 
segmentation and quality assurance for all their innovation activity. Managers within all four 
companies rarely selected initiatives outside of their core activities -a tendency observed by Ahuja 
and Lampert (2001) and Chandy and Tellis (2000) that restrains the pursuit of non-linear 
innovation - nor did they display any willingness to self-cannibalise -a tendency considered as 
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essential when organising for truly radical product innovation (Chandy and Tellis, 1998; Grove, 
1996). They failed to segment markets in new ways to "... mirror the jobs that customers are trying 
to get done" (Christensen and Raynor, 2003: 289). And they still applied the prevailing quality 
targets and quality approaches that were embedded within their organisational practice - whether 
or not the products and services needed them. Consequently, business case development was 
limited to the traditional formula of incremental innovation. 
4.3.2.6 The development of high-risk-high-investment business cases. 
Evidence: Case A presented to the research group a new concept in protective helmet design 
(Figure 4-6). ft was heavier than most helmets and it was not as strong, thus it was considered to 
be of lower performance than their conventional product range. However, it offered new 
functionality -a rear view sy5tem. The advice from theory on disruptive innovation would be to 
fl*nd a niche market for the new concept, consisting of a group with a compelling reason to buy 
the product, and to organically grow sales from this disruptive foothold. Instead, Case A had 
developed a business case that would place the new concept on the same shelves as industry 
standard products. This generated two main problems. To compete directly with the existing 
products required high investment, this meant that they needed significant sales from the 
mainstream market. However, they were asking customers to change theirpurchasing behaviour, 
without specifi"cally targeting niches that wouldbenefit from theproductý new offering. 
Figure 4-5.: Case A ýF Rear View Helmet 
Case A was not alone in this approach. A# four cases reported the development of high-risk- 
high-investment business cases in their past attempts at pursuing industry changing innovation 
and all four reported that these business cases were either rejected of failed in the latter stages of 
the innovation process. 
This inhibitor focuses upon the failure to develop appropriate business cases. Four of the seven 
expert interviewees and practitioners from all four cases, reported occasions where their 
organisations had developed business cases, which resulted in failure, for what could be considered 
with hindsight to be potentially disruptive opportunities. In almost all of these reports the business 
case required massive investment and long periods of payback, all of which planned to immediately 
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tackle the incumbent organisations of established markets. The data shows that the participants 
had experienced two significant problems with this approach. Firstly, the placement of a 
potentially disruptive opportunity into a sustaining business model is highly risky, as to make the 
relatively untested innovation look preferable to its established alternative - an alternative that 
consumers are already happy to use - requires massive investment (a finding consistent with one of 
Christensen's (1997) and Christensen and Raynor's (2003) key discoveries). Secondly, it was 
reported that these plans assumed the development teams had identified the definitive strategy for 
the potentially disruptive technology or offering. Burgleman's (2002) insights, into the micro- 
processing giant INTEL, show how this is almost impossible. Instead long periods of payback 
allowed the cases' product managers to pursue the wrong strategy for too long. The consequence 
of the case study organisations' experiences with the failure of high-risk-h ig h -investment business 
cases led to a reinforcement of fears of massive organisational risk when pursuing disruptive 
innovation. This also contributed to the earlier rejection of future potentially disruptive 
opportunities. Alternatively, the expert interviewees reported such experiences contributed to 
refinements of their planning and investment processes. 
4.3.3 Solution Development: 
DESCRIPTION: There are two main phases to solution development. 
Firstly, the capability to select business cases with significant 
promise for delivering both potentially disruptive and sustaining 
innovations. Secondly, the capability to initiate and support new 
product/service development projects, in order to deliver pre 
commercial offerings across the full range of innovation activity - incrementalism to disruption. 
ENABLERS: 
4.3.3.1 Select business cases that have segmented the market by jobs customers are trying to get 
done. 
0 
Evidence: The "Palm Pilot' is often viewed as a disruptive innovation instigated by MBý 
orqanisation, when asked about this he stated., "It was mainly a re packaging of an existing 
technoloyy, notreallymuch ofan innovation in thesense ofa radical invention, wejustdesigned, 
created it and put it together in a better way where people would actually use it,.. we just picked 
up on the real need of a group of people and it grew from there" [MB-Head of Ergonomics-0- 
21401 
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It was found that senior managers who are brave enough to shape and select high-promise 
potentially disruptive business cases are a major enabler in the early phase of solution development. 
It is believed they must select business cases that have segmented the market by the jobs that 
customers are trying to get done and identified overlooked small market niches that can become a 
disruptive foothold. Allen et al (1999), specialist practitioners in break-through product design 
from the UK based consultancy 'Whatlf, highlight managerial bravery and very similar opportunity 
selection criteria. Furthermore as previously stated in Section 4.2.2.1 it would appear that all 
disruptive innovations are born in small market niches, whose members had a compelling reason to 
buy the new technology or offering. 
4.3.3.2 Stick to the target niche and do not compete against existing customer priorities. 
Evidence: ".. we did have some major problems with the software that we now sell, We knew it 
was a great offering, because it had worked in [our parent company] and our first customers in 
the trialphase had been oveoroyed.. but Iguess we got over excited - because before we went for 
the full launch [of the soin-off company] we began to invest a lot of time and money into 
improving the package.. We were introducing functions that we thought our customers would 
eventually like, because they were already trying to do these things with inferior software., and 
found that we had missed what our initial market actually needed -a simple solution... this was a 
major lesson; it took ages to recoup that investment, we should have stayed focused upon 
responding to our fl*r5t custom er5. " [C-5enior Manager-O- 15001 
Development teams who say they need to convince their target customers to change their 
behaviour, rather than targeting a niche of people with a compelling reason to buy, create a 
significant drain on resources and inhibit new growth businesses (Moore, 1995) and disruptive 
innovation (Christensen and Raynor, 2003). Thus, it was concluded by a majority of the participants 
that management practitioners can enhance the pursuit of disruptive innovation by preventing the 
progression of such teams.. The data set contains stories from each of the expert interviewees of 
development teams that had strayed away from the initial well-defined market entry point of a 
potentially disruptive innovation. In each case the team had begun to compete against customers' 
existing and obvious priorities - this led to loss of resources and either serious project set-back or 
concept failure. The author facilitated a discussion regarding these findings with a multi- 
functional group of managers from all four case study organisations. They concluded that keeping 
solution development teams focused on providing more convenient or inexpensive solutions, to the 
problems of an initial niche market, will better enable the delivery of potentially disruptive 
solutions. This was supportive of commentary made by Rinne (2004) and the findings of Allen et a[ 
(1999) and Christensen and Raynor (2003). 
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4.3.3.3 Plan to accelerate the emergence of a viable strategy. 
Evidence. "... when a technology with disruptive potential hadproved itself, either in testing or in 
a small market, we had a process to develop a workable strategy for disruption based on a version 
of technology roadmapping that weV adapted.... rlr5tly, weV say that we want the budding 
initiative to reach a certain financial target, and then we V come up with a few ways the initiative 
could reach this checkpoint and A5t a# the technical, market andproduct assumptions that'd need 
to be true for each to happen. 5econdly, we Vprioriti5e this list - the assumptions most difficult 
to prove or least likely at the top and the ýiven5'at the bottom. Then weV attempt to test or 
investigate the highest-priority assumptions - without actually building very much or investing 
masses of cash. This way, we'd see which assumptions proved to be reasonable, which were crap, 
and a strategy would become clear - we V be able see how we could move upstream or how we 
could enter new markets.. Finally we V create a plan using a technology roadmap and then spend 
money developing the required product.. yeah, it was pretty emergent, /guess; but only in the 
initial tentative phases when we needed to be flexible. " [MM-Director of Technology-0- 18921 
It was concluded by the participants that they need to ensure, at the onset of a potentially 
disruptive innovation, their development teams remain unsure of the eventual viable strategy. They 
believed this would enable them to deliberately focus the pre-commercial offering upon the 
appropriate initial low-end or new-market niche. Equally, this would enable the development team 
to form a base of experience with the new technology or customer offering to create a platform for 
future growth - insights into how the technology or offering could be utilised in the future within 
other larger established markets. The participants felt they need to better understand how they can 
use the experience gathered during this early process to support and plan for accelerated 
emergence of a viable strategy. The findings of McGrath and Macmillan (1995) and Lynn, Monroe 
and Paulson (1996) suggest that discovery driven planning and probe and learn processes are suited 
to this approach. 
INHIBITORS: 
4.3.3.4 Restricting autonomy of development teams. 
Evidence: 7 have heard many colleagues say: 11just wish that my team [a product development 
team] couldjust be given some resources and a profi't target and be told now go andget on with 
it'.. because we are facing hard times right now, our top management are obsessed with controL 
so people in product development have to complete many forms, explain a# their actions and 
focus upon 'core values'[particioant laughs ironically] they have no creative freedom, this Stops 
us doing the things that we used to be good at - making great new products" [C-5enior 
Manager-59-6011 
Moore (1995) shows how the 'early market' - the first group in the technology adoption lifecycle to 
buy a new piece of technology - will purchase a new type of customer offering only if it addresses 
a specific need that is currently either overlooked or over-fulfilled. His research concludes that to 
attack this initial market a company must have deep empathy for the customers' needs -a notion 
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also supported by empathic design specialists Leonard and Rayport (1997)2. Much of this activity 
can be facilitated by providing product development teams with the necessary autonomy. The 
literature indicates that development teams without the autonomy to 'probe and learn' (Lynn et al, 
1996) or to maintain flexibility of leadership of tasks (Dev Amar, 2001) will not prosper during this 
uncertain stage. They will, in effect, be unable to respond to the needs of the early market as they 
will be constrained by their organisations' inertia (Ahuja and Lampert, 2001). A common theme, 
raised by the participants from the cases, when discussing the development of radical or potentially 
disruptive pre-commercial offerings was: the need for more autonomy. Practitioners from all four 
cases reported they felt constrained to focus upon their familiar markets, their mature technologies, 
or their standard approaches to solution development. They believed if they were going to create a 
disruptive innovation to suite the needs of an early market they must have more autonomy to 
explore unfamiliar areas. Many conveyed their belief that new performance measures could be 
introduced to monitor and support such activity. Likewise, psychologists also support autonomy for 
creative acts in the workplace, as long as they are recognised and supported in staff evaluations 
(e. g. Deci and Ryan, 1987). 
4.3.3.5 Failing to match resources, processes and values. 
Evidence: Following a meeting of the entire research group, the author read an observation from 
his case notes to the participants from Case B. The head of the innovation team and one of his 
senior engineers confirmed the observation to be correct., 
"The innovation process at Case ff 
I Progresses painstakingly - through the collective efforts of dedicated research teams. 
a Progresses in tention3fly- deliberately building upon the past to the next generation ofproducts 
to push them into the next phase of their future. 
0 Attempts to screen out 'chancers'and bad ideas by using 'intellectual safety in numbers'- this 
results in support for the established way of doing things and ensures that the traditional 
processes are kept in place. 
However, this leads to major problems when trying to develop business cases for disruptive 
innovations: if an inspired individual comes up with a radically new idea [5uch as a potentially 
disruptive innovation] or a concept that doesn't fit with established norms, he will find it hard to 
get 5UPPort in terms of resources and processes - the values of many managers do not support 
this either" [8-Researcher Observation-0-3241 
2 Moore's (1995) findings also show as sales of the new offering grow, and it is adopted by the early majorities, the 
organisation has to focus less on empathic understanding and more on the efficiency of distribution channels and 
manufacturing - rather like a commodity product. 
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It was reported by almost every participant from the case study organisations that managers 
responsible for allocating resources (human and financial), managing processes and fostering 
organisational values (the basis on which employees make their prioritisation decisions) fail to 
consider the needs of potentially disruptive development projects. Authors such as O'Connor and 
Rice (2001), Lewis Cosier and Hughes (2001) and Brown (1991) show how senior managers either 
fail to assign the most appropriate project manager, or how they allow prevailing org2nisational 
processes and values to inhibit the progression of potentially disruptive concepts (these issues are 
discussed in more length in the proceeding chapter). 
4.3.3.6 The wrong organisational home for the project. 
Evidence: Three common phrases that came from the participants when discussing failed 
attempts to develop potentially disruptive concepts were: 
"we should have allocated our resources differently, so that we didn't burden ourselves with 
massive return on investment expectations"; 
"perhaps we should have sought outside partners"and 
'ýerhqp5 we should have tried to set-up a team outside our normal oay-to-d3y buskess" 
ofcase data- Researcher Observation-SD- 19891 
In early discussions each case displayed major reservations admitting that they may not have the 
skills to develop potentially disruptive solutions or that their day-to-day activities may actually kill 
these concepts. However, for these reasons research has shown that development projects for 
potentially disruptive innovations are not always best delivered in-house. For example, 'spin-outs', 
'partnerships', 'joint ventures', and 'spin-ins' may be better propositions for these initiatives 
(Hellman, 2000; O'Connor, and Rice, 2001; Rothaermel, 2001). After the author presented findings 
from academic papers (on the problems that organisations can face with potentially disruptive 
development projects) all four collaborating cases reported times where they believed their in- 
house pursuit of new product/service development and/or commercialisation may have been 
responsible for killing some potentially disruptive initiatives. Despite major reservations 
surrounding both the generation of autonomous groups and the sharing of intellectual property 
with unknown parties, it was concluded that the wrong organisational home is an inhibitor of 
solution development that can be avoided. 
4.3.4 Exploitation: 
DESCRIPTION: The capability to select the best range of high 
promise pre-commercial offerings and to profitably pursue two Ik 
types of exploitation strategy - top-down strategies, for 
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deliberately driven sustaining innovations, alongside the nurturing of emergent strategies for 
potentially disruptive innovations. 
ENABLERS: 
4.3.4.1 Select solutions that are good enough to win small, win early, and win often. 
Evidence: "One of the most futuristic applications of silicon chips is 'exploding silicon' 
understand this was discovered when some researchers were mucking about.. the discovely of 
chips bouncing around tables with little explosions has led to the idea of retro rockets for steering 
real small MEMs (these devices are basically rockets on a chip) and ideas for a much better air bag 
inflator. The things that were first for fun have taken on surprisingly disruptive market 
applications - which one will work out? / have my ideas. The trick is to not over engineer the 
new concept; you have to try to package new discoveries in places where you can test if theyýe 
anygood without investing millions of dollars... a solution that is good enough to satisfy a group 
of people who were previously unsatisfled, that can then be taken into an adjacent market has a 
much better chance of disrupting the mainstream than a massive investment into a totally new 
infrastructure. Exploding silicon? ft should take on air bags before MEMS, this way the 
manufacture5 are a lot more likely to make money out of concept. [FF-CEO-Exp-21081 
The data shows that management teams, who are happy to select solutions for exploitation which 
embrace a 'minimally accepted features set', will enable the pursuit of disruptive innovation. The 
expert interviewees stated that a critical success factor of disruptive innovation was the prevalence 
of managers who accept that they will not be able to solve every aspect of their niche market's 
burning issues at the first time attempt. Therefore, disruptive innovation enabling organisations 
appear to not compel their development teams to build the 'ideal solution'. As long as the solution 
encompasses the main subset of features that the customers require - and the customers are 
willing to pay for it - the organisation can begin exploitation. Warren East, the CEO of ARM - of 
one of Britain's leading technology companies, states "... it's much better to have some business 
with real customers than lots of plans for a huge business with potential customers. " (Brennan, 
2003b: 4). Hamel calls this: selecting pre-commercial offerings that look set to win small, win early 
and win often - he also states this is essential to building a "revolutionary ready organisation" 
(plo). Brown's (1991) research indicates it is in these initial niche markets that organisations will 
develop invaluable experience and knowledge of the potentially disruptive offering and this will 
open the doors to rapid consumer driven improvement and the path to disruption. 
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4.3.4.2 Be impatient for profitability but patient for growth. 
Evidence: ".. its diff7cuft to actually see what the discontinuities actually are or where they could 
be.. What might be mine or my cfientýF discontinuity might be the market places incremental 
change. ftýF really only when your innovation hits the streets do you understand the true nature 
of the discontinuity.... the key is to make money as quickly as possible but to be patient for the big 
paradigm shift. " [MB-Head of Ergonomics-Exp-2150] 
Christensen (1997) and Hamel (2000) show once a potentially disruptive pre-commercial offering 
has been selected, the product managers must be impatient for profitability within the initial target 
niche market. The data from expert interviewees appears to indicate that their organisations (or 
their clients) have not suffered significant strategic mistakes because using this approach ensures 
that product managers will not patiently tolerate long-term losses. This is unlike cases A, B and C, 
who report many examples of an impatience for growth before profit and the unwitting pursuit of 
strategic error. Thus it is believed that product managers can aim to foster organic growth, and the 
emergence of a viable disruptive strategy to enter existing markets, by remaining patient for 
growth, whilst making money quickly and deliberately from the initial foothold market. O'Connor 
and Rice (2001) have shown how such an approach allows product managers to learn invaluable 
lessons, which can guide responsive actions to emergent demands. 
4.3.4.3 Do not cling to initial success and abandon concurrent development. 
Evidence: ".. we prove the validity of new concepts with prototypes and demonstrators and then 
take on our r1tst stage markets.. Employees are then supported in the process of identifying and 
combining future market needs and the new technologies to breakout of the ritst stage market - 
to create the new disruptive product concepts.. what delivers success in the initial phase is 
almost always guaranteed not to be a key performance driver as the concept matures. " AH- 
5enior Consultant-Exp- 1319] 
... weýe now working on a number of breakthrough technologies and believe that no creative idea can be developed to a 5UCCeSSfUl innovation if it does not have the adequacy to r1t a 
market.. the problem is that evelything has to be completed in a serial way so it takes longer - 
you see, we use parallel development practices for our incremental innowions.. but these do not 
work for the radical stuff.. " [TH-5enior Con5ultant, -Exp- 13181 
All the managers involved in the research accepted that if they cling onto the strategies, skills and 
processes that deliver success in the initial disruptive foothold market, they will fail to develop 
competencies for where money will be made in the future. This belief emerged when discussing 
several examples of disruptive innovation and probing the origins of the case study companies 
themselves. Thus it was concluded that to enable the pursuit of disruptive innovation, management 
teams must accept that the disruptive business they build will not be the one they started with. 
Moore's research (1995,1998,2000,2002) in silicon valley shows when the path to disruption 
opens throughout the exploitation phase, massive shifts in strategies and product lines will emerge. 
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A notion also contended by Tushman and O'Reilly (1997) through their presentation of 
technological 'S-Curves'. Therefore it is believed management teams must have the ability and 
agility to select, validate and then rapidly adapt manufacturing, marketing and distribution 
processes. Further adding to difficulties was the practice of concurrent development preceding and 
during the exploitation phase. The traditional benefits of concurrent development, which include 
cost savings, improved time-to-17112rket, and enhanced manufacturability (Handfield, 1994; 
Krishnan, 1996), appear to not accumulate when the product offering or the underpinning 
technology is unproven and customer requirements are uncertain. The four cases included in this 
study and the organisations of the expert interviewees used concurrent practices to a greater or 
lesser extent, yet in unproven and uncertain environments, a serial, longer development period 
appeared to be necessary to 'iron out' difficulties. The problems of using concurrent development 
for radical or breakthrough product development were predicted by the mathematical models of 
Aitsahlia and Johnson (1995) and also witnessed in United States and Japan, by McDermott and 
Handfield (2000). 
INHIBITORS: ' 
4.3.4.4 A lack of empathy for the disruptive foothold market. 
Evidence: "Having a breakthrough insight is about having a fundamental penetrating 
understanding of a piece of human behaviour - in my business itý5 usually consumer behaviour - 
which nobody else has yet had. ltýý this that will enable you to spot an opportunity or an angle 
that nobody else has found or used yet.. Insights don't come with solutions but building empathy 
for a need or a group of people will deliver the breakthrough idea... no empathy, no 
L-1ýL-. -L M 
An analysis of Britain's fastest growing unquoted technology Companies, from the Sunday Times 
Tech Track lob league table, shows that success has been built upon an ability to deeply 
understand real customer needs (Brennan, 2003a). In spite of a global technology down turn, many 
of these companies are fast growing insurgents, prime to disrupt the mainstream and of those 
thriving the most, success is premised upon a core customer focus (Brennan, 2003b). This 
investigation found that managers struggle to exploit potentially disruptive solutions, when they do 
not have real empathy for the burning issues that they are trying to address. Customers in the 
initial foothold Market will require significant attention and significant understanding, much more 
for instance, than when selling a commodity product to a mass market -a notion propagated by 
Moore (1995,2002). Therefore, selecting pre-commercial solutions that do not contain elements of 
empathic design will inhibit successful exploitation; the findings of Leonard and Rayport (1997) 
also support this conclusion. 
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4.3.4.5 A pre-emptive focus upon legal issues and standards. 
Evidence: Case 8 presented a concept with long-term potential for disrupting the electricity 
energy sector However, their obsession with keeping the proprietafy position closed was 
inhibiting them from overcoming a major technological barrier, which rather that being resolved 
in-house, could have been solved in partnership. This in turn was slowing development of the 
first prototype, adding costs and increasingly making small niche entry markets look less 
attractive. 
When attempting to make progress with potentially disruptive innovations a common behaviour of 
the senior management involved in the research was an eagerness to focus upon seemingly more 
tangible deliverables. Therefore, legal status, standards and protection of intellectual property took 
front stage and overshadowed the more intangible issues of developing relationships with partners 
and building empathy for an initial foothold market with a compelling reason to buy. Thus, it was 
observed that Managers can inhibit their organisations' pursuit of disruption when, at the outset, 
they try to control the market with a focus on legal issues and the development of standards and 
patents. Although more frequently mentioned by the large case organisations, it appears that 
keeping proprietary offerings closed for too long or seeking industry standards when the customer 
offering is not 'good enough', can inhibit product managers in two ways. Firstly, overly restricting 
or not sharing knowledge about an emergent concept, across the supply and value chain can result 
in inaction from a necessary network of partners, suppliers and/or distributors (also noted by 
Rothaermel (2001), Phaal et al (2004) and Rothwell (1995)). Secondly, this focus can distract from 
attending to changes in customer preferences for performance and distribution channels (also 
noted by Christensen and Raynor (2003) and Rogers (1995)). 
4.3.4.6 Improper organisational homes for projects. 
Evidence: With the exception of Case C, traditional approaches to new product development 
constrained managers to develop and exploit a# innovation initiatives from within their existing 
oryanisational framework. Despite Case Cý efforts to use a spin-out incubator approach their 
managers reported that they suffered from an ",. overbearing parentproblem" which "... Creates 
an unspoken demand for fast ramp-up and hiqh-levels of scalability. " [C-Senior Manager-Exp- 
1494] 
The overwhelming traditional approach to innovation constrained the managers involved in this 
research to in-house exploitation of potentially disruptive innovations. It has been recognised for 
some time that sustaining innovations, which also complement core business, should be developed 
and exp loited by central in-house teams (e. g. Knight, 1967; Rothwell, 1995). However, a potentially 
disruptive innovation may or may not fit well with prevailing organisational processes or values 
(Rice et a[, 2002). Christensen and Overdorf (2000) show that in management in these cases could 
consider a spin-out commercialisation team or even a separate spin-out organisation for both 
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development and exploitation. Tushman and O'Rielly (2002) assert that two different organisations 
can be located within one business unit. Regardless of the approach taken it would seem that 
without independence the initiative can suffocate and die. For a detailed discussion of the 
advantages and disadvantages of spin-offs etc. and practises of where to house potentially 
disruptive innovations see Tushman and O'Rielly (2002). 
4.3.5 Innovation Strategy: 
DESCRIPTION: The capability to align strategic intent (the 
organisations vision and plans for the future) and strategic action 
(the output of the resource allocation process) in order to deliver the 
simultaneous pursuit of sustaining and disruptive innovation. 
ENABLERS: 
4.3.5.1 Facilitative resource allocation processes. 
Evidence: ".. iý seems to me that if you want to open new doors to new thinking you have to be 
outside the mainstream with a pot of money; you ha ve to in vite people to join you and you ha ve 
to reassure them that it won't damage their careers. This must be done with a holistic 
understanding of whatýý going in the business and you have to make sure that the conventional 
actlvitle5 of the business cannot steal these resources at any time" [8-Head of Innovation Team- 
15-1488] 
The ability to make investment decisions in a holistic manner was one of the key reasons given by 
six of the seven expert interviewees for their ex ecutive management team's apparent ability to use 
resource allocation procedures to align strategic action with the strategic intent. The literature 
provides support to the importance of holistic decisions making. Cooper (1999) and Cooper, Edgett 
and Kleinschmidt (1999,2000 and 2001) provide compelling evidence to suggest that portfolio 
management tools can reduce project gridlock, maximise return on investments, improve strategic 
alignment of innovation activity and improve the balance of resources across the metrics of risk, 
lead-time, and innovation type. They conclude these benefits are achievable because portfolio tools 
aid holistic decision making. Hellmann (2000) espouses that investments should only be made 
when full consideration of strategic congruence has been taken regarding all investment options in 
relation to core business activity. He provides a model that could assist executive management 
teams, and REW departments alike, to consider the structure of investment activities (e. g. joint 
ventures, sole ownership, and spin-outs) stating that this approach also requires a more holistic 
consideration of the business. Bussey (2002) and Luehrman (1998) both provide methodologies for 
management practitioners to apply real options pricing to investment opportunities. In particular, 
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Luehrman offers evidence to indicate that real options valuations could be the most effective 
method for evaluating innovation opportunities, especially when options are mapped graphically 
onto purpose built matrices to assist with holistic decision making. Thus resource allocation 
approaches that are based upon holistic decision making may be a key facilitator in the pursuit of 
disruptive innovation. A discussion was held with the entire research group regarding the resource 
allocation issue and the pursuit of strategies that include disruptive innovation. The participants 
believed that ideal funding mechanisms would enable a balanced resource allocation approach, 
throughout the innovation pipeline, to a range of sustaining and potentially disruptive innovation 
activities. Yet senior members of each case study organisation believed those with access to their 
organisational 'purse strings' were without the mechanisms to fund the broader activities of both 
sustaining and disruptive innovation. They also reported a lack of an holistic view of innovation 
options. Executive managers interviewed from the case study sites believed their 'hands were tied' 
with stakeholder expectation and ill-fashioned project assessment tools. The case study 
participants concluded that organisations, which have only delivered sustaining innovations in the 
past, must be ready to abandon their project selection methods and adopt more holistic resource 
allocation approaches. Noda and Bower (1996) also support the notion that strategy should be 
delivered through the process of resource allocation. 
4.3.5.2 The support of sustaining and disruptive innovation with flexible cost structures and targets. 
Evidence. "Innovation has been one of our successful features, but could it be done better? YES 
-/ think we could get more 'bang from our buck' with less rigid attitudes. By being a bit more 
adventurous with how we set tar qets for spending and ROI [return on investment], we would be 
more open to ideas that are more maverick than methodicaL but right now we are not 
revolutionary because we are being stifled by practicing ý; ate' innovation and ýale'R&D. " [8- 
5enior Programme Manager-15-96 
Grove (1996) states strategic action is, in effect, the output of the resource allocation process. 
Following his review of successful radical innovators, Bott (2002) supports Grove's statement in his 
declaration that organisations should possess Tractal innovation portfolios'. He states that 
portfolios of innovation activity should be completely representative of the organisations' overall 
strategic intent to pursue business improvement alongside new wealth creation. Early results from 
the innovation effort effect decisions to commit resources, decisions to commit resources are based 
upon positive operational results and as such target setting becomes important (Noda and Bower, 
1996). However, Leonard-Barton (1992) and Ahuja and Lampert (2001) advise that radical and 
breakthrough (and by implication potentially disruptive) innovations are often not pursued due to 
misaligned organisational targets. Noda and Bower's (1996) observations indicate that the 
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perception of early operational results and how resources are allocated is dependent upon the 
targets and the cost structures that are set by the management of the business. "In the case of a 
new business development that involves high degrees of uncertainty, the iterations of the resource 
allocation process generate a pattern of escalation or deescalation of a firm's strategic 
commitment based on early results from operations that confirm or disconfirm the premises of the 
first investment and the credibility of the champions. " (Noda and Bower, 1996: 187). Target setting 
is, therefore, of concern to many authors in the field of disruptive innovation. This importance of 
targets was raised by four of the seven expert interviewees; they explicitly spoke of the need for 
flexible targets for both profit margins and minimum ceilings for opportunity size if pursuing both 
sustaining and disruptive innovations in parallel. They stated flexibility allows attractive profits to 
be made at low price points or in small, emerging new-markets from the very beginning of a 
disruptive venture. Without such flexibility, potentially disruptive innovations are subject to the 
stringent targets of core operations. After discussing these viewpoints with the research group, the 
senior management involved from cases A, B and C, concluded that they must find a way to 
integrate the notion of flexible cost structures and targets into their businesses (case D stated that 
they were more likely to introduce this concept to their clients). Thus the data indicates that an 
innovation strategy underpinned by flexible cost structures and targets is a significant enabler in 
the pursuit of disruptive innovation. It is believed that flexibility in cost structures and targets will 
allow managers to support emergent approaches and opportunities, which Christensen (1997) and 
Christensen and Raynor (2003) claim facilitates the surfacing of viable disruptive strategies during 
product development and early phase expl oitation. Tools such as technology roadmapping can be 
used to communicate support for sustaining and disruptive innovation (Phaal et al., 2004) and can 
therefore be used to also communicate flexible cost structures and targets. 
4.3.5.3 Seed funding capital that can be patient for growth. 
Evidence: ".. the only way, in MY Mind, to deliver a breakthrough innovation without breaking 
the bank is to treat it as good venture capitalists would do: feed it with a little bit of money at 
the beginning and then let it prove itself And this does not mean let it spend without showing 
results -make it self-sustaining as early as possible and gradually increase funds as its ready for a 
wider a udien ce. " [TH-Senior Consultan t-IS-988] 
Leifer et al. (2000) and Rice et al (2002) found as the breakthrough innovation process gathers 
pace, more is understood about the new technologies, customer offerings and the market places to 
which they apply. And the organisations that most effectively deliver these breakthrough projects 
were the ones who typically delivered investment in stages. Rather than committing resources in 
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one block for the entire development path, resources were allocated along the organisation's 
development process and throughout staged exploitation. More resources would be allocated when 
a return on investment could be shown. The benefits and practices of staged funding approaches 
have been published by Cooper (1983), Block and MacMillan (1985), Stevenson and Gumpert 
(1985), and O'Connor and Rice (2001). Likewise, it became the belief of the research group that 
innovation strategy could facilitate the pursuit of disruptive innovation when it supports a 
manager's decision to provide seed funding. They also came to believe that seed funding capital for 
potentially disruptive concepts must meet one condition: concept owners must be patient for 
growth, whilst impatiently seeking profit - although there was serious debate as to whether any of 
the cases could actually embrace such a practice. Thus, it would seem if a concept is innovative, if 
management believe a disruptive position can be found, if it can quickly make money and become 
self sustaining, then the organisation's management team should invest seed funding under the 
premise of 'impatient for profitability - patient for growth'. In a similar vein many authors are 
calling for CEOs and other executives to test or adopt venture capitalist approaches to their 
organisations' investments (Christensen, 1997; Hamel, 2000; Moore, 1995; Gilbert and Bower, 
2002; Hellmann, 2000). This could encourage more emphasis on radical project initiation but has 
not yet translated to practice in industry (Hellmann, 2000) - often with executives worried about 
the performance of their own stock options and personal benefits (Christensen, 1997). 
INHIBITORS: 
() 4.3.5.4 The continuous pursuit of clearly defined, rationalistic planning. 
Evidcnce: "My problem with our R&D is that there are central committees planning out 
innovation strategies and awarding resources to projects that build on past success in a clear and 
measurable way, almost in an atmosphere of fearing real change, fearing the unknown. People 
don't like to step out of line. There: F no way / couldget resources if / didn't know exactly what 
was going to deliver. " [B-Senior Engineer-15- 1201 
".. we a# [the research group] understand success in our main markets is based upon clear we# 
planned strategy and resoonding to our core-customers' needs.. but itýF this approach thatýF 
created a demand in our businesses for all new ideas to quickly contribute to the bottom-line.. so 
weýe all guilty of rejecting these ideas that require these evolving approaches.. we r1nd them 
difficult to justify - they're just not simple, they cannot be rationalised in the same way" [D- 
Divisional Head-Exp-2443] 
The executive management of all four cases exerted pressure for rationalistic long-term strategies - 
it was found this inhibits potentially disruptive innovations. The pursuit of rationalistic or deliberate 
planning constrained innovation stakeholders to exploring familiar territories that could be quickly 
understood. Product management teams were prevented from following emergent demands for 
their potentially disruptive innovations, because at the outset they were sure they had already 
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discovered the 'best' strategies. McGrath and Macmillan (1995) explain that a lack of strategic 
support for discovery-driven approaches, which are difficult to plan in the traditional rationalistic 
sense, can inhibit the pursuit of discontinuous innovations. Other literature also shows that 
management practitioners should not allow their responsiveness to be inhibited as true viable 
strategies materialises (e. g. Kaplan, 1999; Kassicieh et'al, 2002). Inweb and Voxar are examples of 
two of Britain's fastest growing unquoted technology companies, which demonstrate the 
importance of an emergent approach to strategy (Brennan, 2003b). Inweb - initially a web-page 
designer - responded to emergent customer demands and is now a telecommunications software 
provider. Likewise Noxar had planned to sell its imaging software to computer games designers, 
but when this failed the company adapted its software... Today, Voxar's [disruptive] technology 
enables doctors to take output from medical scanners and turn it into three-dimensional images 
displayed on a standard personal computer, rather than an expensive purpose built work station 
(Brennan, 2003b: 4). It is believed by the participants of the research that managers must redress 
the weighting they give to rationalistic strategy and remember the benefits of more emergent 
approaches. 
4.3.5.5 A drive to become big, fast. 
Evidence: 
Figure 4-6., 
Case B'ýý drive to become big, fast. 
Using a large scale graphic of Mooreý (1995) adapted 'technology adoption life cycle', one of 
Case Bý senior engineers is enabled to show the research group how his Ar ... a ft ses M" lways ocu 
attention to target big markets with sophisticate products. We don't like to spend time in small 
markets - they don'tgenetate enough revenue. "(FIgure 4-13) [B-5enior Engineer-15-19501 
Executive level management from cases A, B and D (and strategy advisors from case Q gave 
evidence to show how pressures for growth created a corporate strategy that drives all new 
concepts to become very big, very fast. This compelled managers to force potentially disruptive 
technologies and offerings into sustaining roles in established markets - especially familiar 
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territories. Such strategic pressure was found to be a key motivator behind the decision to compete 
in large markets, against established market players and prevailing customer priorities and 
preferences. Consequently, managers attempting to pursue disruptive innovation within these 
organisations would be driven, consciously or unconsciously, to pursue mass investment and 
ultimately fated to either manage high-risk projects or to oversee concept failure. Hipple, Thornke 
and Sonn2ck (1999) credit 3M's Success to avoiding the temptation of mass markets, instead when 
they discover a breakthrough technology or offering, they conduct a true lead-user analysis to 
identify niches of customers who would benefit from the concept. Moore (1995,1998,2000,2002) 
provides overwhelming evidence to suggest a premature move to the mainstream will change what 
could be a disruptive innovation into a failed invention. His examples include the DVORAK 
keyboard, the Sinclair C5, and Microsoft's and Newton's attempts at replacing the keyboard with 
hand writing recognition devices. 
4.3.5.6 Restrictive models of innovation. 
Evidence: "Ouite often, we've found, the people with the ýutsestrings'are not vety literate with 
new developments or approaches in the wider domain.. they have a picture in their head of what 
innovation should look like; this is why our unusual [radical and potentially disruptive] ideas do 
not get funded " [C-5enior Manager-15-8161 
We spent many years now in this rather con ventional industry and I've always found that there ýF 
a kind of narrowness of vision, a kind of fear of exploring anything that goes beyond these, 
[participant lets out a big siqhj these self imposed limits of what is or isn't permitted" [C- 
5trategy A dvisor-15- 10041 
Even when there is a strategic intent to pursue radical or disruptive innovation, the expert 
interviewees and case study participants spoke of how restrictive 'views' often inhibit strategic 
action. They initially stated that these views consisted of restrictive images of their own 
organisations and constrained acceptance of what innovation is. This notion is supported by 
Morgan (1993, Figure 4-7). Deeper analysis revealed that these restrictive views took a number of 
forms. In one of its worse guises, the executive management team maintains a 'we are our 
products' standpoint - as opposed to the view propagated by Prahalad and Hamel (1990) that 
asserts 'we are our competencies'. This inhibitor was most prevalent in cases A and C; case B was 
making efforts to break away from such a restrictive view point and case D reported nearly all of 
their clients suffered with this disabling assumption. Dougherty and Hardy's (1996) investigations, 
of the organisational tendency to allow prevailing core activities to drain support away from truly 
innovative ideas, illustrates that the access to resources can often be inhibited by the firms 
perception of the importance of innovation. "An organization with both innovation projects and 
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mature businesses ideally will have a resource system that channels 
money, equipment, experience, and information to all these activities 
models of innovation. 
(Morqan 1993.,, xvii) 
simultaneously... Unfortunately, resources do not always flow 
smoothly to innovation, particularly where prevailing practice supports 
established activities. " (Dougherty and Hardy, 1996: 1122). It would 
seem that. average performing organisations constrain innovation to 
exclusively focus upon continued improvement of prevailing, familiar or 
mature business opportunities. Therefore, this investigation provides 
evidence to support Tripsas and Gavetti (2000), Chandy and Tellis 
(2000) and Ahuja and Lampert (2001). It shows that executive 
management teams with a restricted view of innovation can fail to 
allocate and protect resources for potentially disruptive innovations. 
As will be shown in the proceeding chapter, this inhibitor proved to 
underpin the most critical barriers to disruptive innovation. 
4.3.6 Human Research Management: 
DESCRIPTION: The capability to select, hire and/or nurture managers 
for new-growth, potentially disruptive businesses, whilst maintaining 
the selection, hiring and training of managers for sustaining current 
core activities. 
ENABLERS: 
4.3.6.1 Diffuse knowledge on disruptive innovation throughout the organisation. 
Evidence: Ws my opinion that innovation is a key building block of competitive advantage; 
therefore, executive managers must take responsibility for incorporating cutting edge 
understanding of innovation processes into their business. The philosophy of my team was that 
we could facilitate the technology divi5ibn5 in commerciali5ing their breakthrough inventions via 
the delivery of internal educational on the innovation process. This was and still is an essential 
ingredient [KF- Commerclalisation Director-HRM-628] 
Kaplan's (1999) work with Hewlett Packard produced implications for the human resource 
management issues in discontinuous and disruptive innovation. He concludes that to create an 
environment conducive to discontinuous innovation, leadership must first "internalise and then 
communicate the qualitative differences between conventional analytical strategy formulation 
[sustaining innovations] and the search for breakthroughs" (p20). Authors such as Hamel (2000), 
Rice at al (2002) and Wheelwright and Clark (1992) support this notion of communication, as does 
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the evidence gathered during this research. The evidence shows that executive and senior 
management teams, well versed in the theory of disruptive innovation, proclaim they are more 
likely to support the identification and pursuit of potentially disruptive initiatives. The data also 
indicates this pursuit can be further enhanced by diffusing knowledge on disruptive innovation 
throughout the organisation - beyond those responsible for formal resource allocation - and 
embedding the knowledge into every-day prioritisation mechanisms. There was debate amongst 
the practitioners about whether or not terminology was important for such knowledge diffusion 
exercises (e. g. many participants preferred the term 'highly radical' as it felt less destructive than 
the term 'disruptive'). However, there was consensus on the belief in the importance of diffusing 
knowledge on disruptive innovation throughout the organisation. It was said that the provision of 
training and the communication of strategic intent with success stories, could help every mind in 
the organisation to be aligned to the pursuit of both sustaining and disruptive innovations. 
4.3.6.2 Select or hire the right management team. 
Evidence: 'Vetting the right management team together was vital.. we found out the hard way. 
A management team th at has been successfully delivering incremental innovation on a core 
product will not be the one to bring a disruptive new concept to the market - they don't have the 
right experience.. applying the same skills that have delivered past successes will kill the 
disruptive potential of new concepts, stone dead " [W-Director of Technology-HRM-82 1] 
It is commonly stated that the most effective management team for the development and 
exploitation of new products, services or business concepts will be a multi-functional assembly of 
experience personnel (Rothwell, 1995; Trott, 1998; Tidd et al 1997, Utterback 1994). Christensen 
(1997) notes that a team wishing to develop and exploit a potentially disruptive innovation will, 
taken together, have executive expertise and experience of marketing, sales, technology 
management and new product development. The data analysis has uncovered six common ideal 
characteristics for a team pursuing a potentially disruptive innovation: (1) Extensive experience 
and knowledge of the industries wider domain, 2) 'Start-up sear tissue' - those with experience of 
starting new potentially high-growth businesses, (3) Experience of being the small player in highly 
competitive markets, (4) Experience of coping with massive shifts in strategy and product lines. (5) 
Leadership experience of recruiting, training and retaining new employees in growing businesses, 
(6) Finally, the team will need members who have confronted similar problems particular to the 
circumstances of the potentially disruptive innovation. These characteristics are similar to those 
identified as requirements for the ideal 'start-up' team by Adams (2002), the venture capitalist 
expert, and other venture capital organisations (e. g. ET Capital -www. etcapital. com and Mobius 
Venture Capital - www. mobiusvc. com). Furthermore, these characteristics support calls for an 
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overhaul of recruitment techniques, moving from attribute to circumstance based selection - where 
organisations will focus upon the experiences -they need employees to have had in order to deliver 
current goals (McCall's 1998). 
4.3.6.3 Train employees to build a network of influence. 
Evidence: ".. it 5houldn't matter who has generated and built one of these [potentially disruptive] 
opportunities, what should matter is whether it is valid and worth pu/Suing. But in reality it does 
matter. You've got to be able to convince your expert colleagues for a theory or a claim or an 
observation to be taken 5eTiOU51y.... 5o weýe /eft in a diffilcuft position, although we want to 
pursue these [potentially disruptive] opportunities it matters a great deal who puts an idea on the 
table.. People with these [potentially di5ruptivel ideas in the past have built a community of 
interest before they try to access a manager with resoect or weighting at the executive level We 
need to give our engineers space to do this like we used to, this way it becomes hard to stifle 
great opportunities too early. " [9-Senior Programme manager-HRM- 1911 
'Say 'revolutionary innovation'andpeople think of romantic stories of the lone genius who rlqhts 
against the odds. I can tefl you innovation cannot work this way. Innovation is hard work... A 
lone innovator cannot do this - innovation is about collective hard work and action. " [D- 
Divi5ional Head-HRM- 1593] 
O'Connor and Rice (2001) found that the capacity of an organisation to recognise disruptive 
opportunities is directly related to the continuity of informal networks of individuals engaged in the 
conversion of breakthrough insights into new ventures. "Upward networks (access to senior 
managers) provide protection and access to pockets of money, while the broad-based lateral and 
downward networks appear to provide information, confirmation of the recogniser's perception of 
the opportunity, and other resources" (O'Connor and Rice, 2001: 107). Rice et al (2002) hig6light 
that networks are a cost effective and efficient way of supporting innovation; they are often based 
upon personal friendships, histories and favours. These authors also suggest that organisations 
could be missing opportunities to help people think and act creatively if they are not leveraging the 
use of internal and external networks or they are in industries with a high staff turnover. Analysis 
of the expert interview data corroborated the importance of networks of influence. It was found 
that to acquire resources, for a potentially disruptive or highly radical innovation, a manager needs 
influence within their organisation, and to gain influence a manager needs a supporting community 
of interest that contains senior executives. The importance of network effects is discussed at 
length by Dawson (2003) and Rosen (2002). This was observed to be an often overlooked issue 
within the case study organisations. Therefore, following discussion, it was believed by the 
participants that opportunity recognisers, who are trained to acknowledge the importance of a 
community of interest, will cease to overlook the qualitative issues of the people involved in their 
initiative. They will be encouraged to build a network of influence alongside a significant 
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quantitative assessment of market validation information. The worlds leading innovators use these 
approaches. Sakkab (2002) demonstrates that Procter and Gamble have adopted the use of 
communities of interest to develop new business opportunities and that the mobilisation of a 
community of practice is a key means by which to manage the introduction of a discontinuous new 
product offering. Likewise, Swan et al. (2002) demonstrate that new communities of practice are 
an essential factor in the introduction of radical technologies. 
INHIBITORS: 
4.3.6.4 The wrong kind of project manager with the wrong kind of values. 
Evidence: ".. on a number of occasions I've seen people present concepts with, what you might 
call, disruptive potential, only to watch very senior people passionately attack the ideas, and in 
some cases the presenter as well These attacks always get post-rationalised andjustified, but to 
me, theyýe completely irrational, based on an extraordinarily narrow view of what [Case C] R, and 
what it should be doing. We need management with different values... " [C-5trategy Advisor- 
HRM- 10051 
7 can tell you, none of my team would be able to deliver a new type of product in a newly 
established market, they're used to projects that involve helmets [Case Aý core productJ, theyJust 
don't have the have the right experience... ' [A- Director 6eneral-HRM- 163 1] 
The data set and the literature (Christensen and Raynor, 2003; McCall, 1998) demonstrate that the 
most important resource a development project can have is that of experienced management with 
supporting values - when developing or exploiting a potentially disruptive innovation this is no less 
true. However, the data set and the literature (Allen et al, 1999, Christensen, 1997; Christensen 
and Raynor 2003) find that trusted managers with proven track records in delivering sustaining 
innovations are likely to be the wrong kind of managers with the wrong kind of values when 
pursuing disruption. Most participants believed that managers trusted for traditional business 
activities will not have the appropriate pool of experience to draw upon (e. g. starting new-growth 
businesses) and their values will be entrenched in the model of sustaining innovation (e. g. targeting 
existing markets and fighting the prevailing competition). 
4.3.6.5 Performance metrics linked to optimisation and not innovation. 
Evidence. "In new sma# orq3n)s3dons people have freedom inputting forward ideas. Theydon't 
have to deal with all the problems of innovating that we do. In big companies like ours, youjust 
don't get this freedom because of performance measures. Young management trainees are 
dependant on short term success in their projects and want to impress their supervisors. This 
makes them conservative and vely afraid to challenge norms. Then supervisors and senior 
managers, like me, are dependent upon people higher up in the business approving their work and 
saying ýoO-e the right man for thejob'- so we don't make waves either. A# this makes everyone 
frightened of challenging conventions. " [B-5enior frgineer-HRM- 12691 
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Following their investigations of strategy making and strategy implementation, Noda and Bower 
(1996) emphasised the critical importance of the achievement of operational results against set 
targets. They found positive operational results increased middle managers support of initiatives 
and the credibility of those involved, whilst negative results delivered indecisiveness and a loss of 
credibility. Thus, the performance metrics, by which managers are measured, must be supportive of 
the pursuit of disruptive innovation, however it would appear that top management rarely make 
these sorts of considerations. The management development systems within cases A, B and C, like 
many in the world, moved high-potential employees around their businesses using placements - 
aiming to provide a broad experience of the different business areas. Despite its benefits, this 
approach focused intelligent employees on the delivery of short-term business benefits. This is 
believed not to be conducive to the pursuit of disruptive innovation (Charitou and Markides, 2003; 
Ahuja and Lampert, 2001; Amabile, 1998). Performance metrics in cases A, B and C were linked to 
optimisation (cost cutting, lead-time improvement etc); once again focusing managers on the 
delivery of business benefits that are not supportive of disruptive innovation. Furthermore, as 
incentive and compensation schemes were not linked to innovation, employees - especially those of 
the sales force - were prevented from prioritising new customers or new markets. Kaplan (1999) 
concludes that to create an environment conducive to discontinuous innovation a change is needed 
within traditional reward systems. He believes that "... because [disruptive] innovation usually 
represents something new for the organiS2tion, trial and error are almost always necessary... reward 
systems must... include the acceptance of failure. " (p2l). Unsworth (2001) and Amabile (1997, 
1998) demonstrate that intrinsic motivation and implicit rewards can be used to spur the necessary 
creative and even breakthrough problem solving. Whereas McFadzean (1998,2000) introduces 
specific techniques to enhance creative thinking, it is believed that the use of such approaches 
could be linked to reward systems. 
4.3.6.6 Employing managers that fit the mould. 
Evidence: "In my opinion, what makes a true radical innovator is a person who can set aside 
5ocietalnorms. At the vetyleast, theyhave to beready to notaccept the status-quo as theyhave 
to want to change it, if they are going to innovate. This tendency, / think, is often found in 
eccentric people.. these sort of people don't feel bound by the structures of how things usually 
get done but sadly, many of these unconventional types don't speak the same language as our 
executive management. We need to make sure we employ more people like this and then train 
them to have better communication skills because, riý, ht now, we end up ignoring them. " [C-CEO 
of Case C Spinout-HRM- 100 1] 
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concludes that to create an environment conducive to discontinuous innovation a change is needed 
within traditional reward systems. He believes that "... because [disruptive] innovation usually 
represents something new for the organisation, trial and error are almost always necessary... reward 
systems must... include the acceptance of failure. " (p2l). Unsworth (2001) and Amabile (1997, 
1998) demonstrate that intrinsic motivation a nd implicit rewards can be used to spur the necessary 
creative and even breakthrough problem solving. Whereas McFadzean (1998,2000) introduces 
specific techniques to enhance creative thinking, it is believed that the use of such approaches 
could be linked to reward systems. 
4.3.6.6 Employing managers that fit the mould. 
Evidence: "In my opinion, what makes a true radical innovator is a person who can set aside 
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When considering consumers' likeliness to buy a new customer offering, Moore (1995) makes a 
distinction between the early-market technology adopters and the change resistant majority. He 
states that these differences can also be seen between employees who bring disruptive 
breakthroughs to fruition - the visionaries - and those that drive long term profits in established 
markets - the pragmatists (Table 4-2). 
Visionaries 
- Intuitive 
Support revolution 
- Contrarian 
- Break away from the pack 
- Follow own dictates 
- Take risks 
- Motivated by future opportunities 
- Seek what is possible 
Pragmatists 
- Analytic 
Support evolution 
- Conform 
Stay with the herd 
- Consult with colleagues 
- Risk averse - manage risks 
- Motivated by current problems 
- Pursue what is possible 
Table 4-2. The differences between visionaries and pragmatists (Moore, 1995) 
A key difference was observed between the human resource management practices of the cases 
and the expert interviewees' organisations: specifically, how they spoke about their recruitment of 
managers. Organisations need pragmatists to maintain current business activities and visionaries 
to break new ground and must therefore recruit accordingly (Hamel, 2000). However, the cases had 
a track record of employing management in the mould of their existing teams, which consisted 
almost entirely of pragmatists. Instead, the expert interviewees claimed their organisations enjoyed 
a mix of people and personalities - both visionaries and pragmatists - which they claimed 
prevented group-think and increased the chances of bringing novelty to the organisation. The 
benefits of this approach are reported by Amabile (1998). It was also stated by many of the case 
study participants that people who do not ask 'why? ' do not inspire revolutionary thinking, this 
belief is also supported by McFadzean's (1998) data, yet recruitment within the cases did not match 
this insight. 
4.3.7 Organisational Ecology: 
DESCRIPTION: The capability to manage the organisational ecology 
- defined by an expert within the research group (Dvir, Roth, Pasher, 
2001) as the physical infrastructure and the culture of the business - 
to support both continued business improvement and the pursuit of 
disruptive innovation. 
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ENABLERS: 
4.3.7.1 Cultural support for disruptive innovation whilst the organisation is growing. 
Evidence: "A good salesman is closing his next deal whilst serving his current client ltý similar 
at [THý company], we have a culture ingrained into us - whilst we ýe generating revenues from 
our core technologies weýe investing into what we hope will be the next disruptive technologies 
in the ICT [information and communication technologies. ] sector.. You see, you can't leave it too 
late, our innovative culture won't let us; to invest late in these novel concepts will put, how do 
you say, too much pressure on them to make money too quickly - you see, they need to be 
protected from corporate growth targets when they're immature... " ITH-Senior Consultant-OE- 
21131 
7tý5 clear to us now; we needed to invest in disruptive innovation when our business was healthy. 
It would have been a lot easier to grow our ideas and disruptive projects before we hit these hard 
times.. [However] it would not have been easy because our organisation is buried in a culture of 
helmets [Case A ýF core customer offering]. [A-Director 6eneral-OE-723] 
Hamel (2000) notes "Sooner or later, every business model reaches the point of diminishing returns. 
And these days, it is more often sooner than later" (p53). Utterback (1994) and Tushman and 
O'Reilly (1997,2002) shed light onto this dynamic, they demonstrate how technologies and 
products emerge, grow, mature and decline in patterns that are referred to as "S-Curves". These 
authors and many others, including Christensen (1997), Day et al (2000) and Nelson and Winter 
(1982), have studied this phenomenon at great length. One of the conclusions of such work is that 
executive management teams, which have organisational survival as a priority, should invest 
resources into developing in new technological or product S-Curves when their core 
tech nologies/products are in their growth phase. This will allow the new technologies or products 
to emerge whilst their existing alternatives move into their maturity phase. However, Rice et a[ 
(2001) found that if a team has managed to foster a potentially disruptive idea, it often faces 
problems getting internal support. Quite often this was a cultural issue, where employees felt 
attached to core technologies, customers or the past. Thus it is essential that an organisational 
culture - its values, support systems and ethos (Barney, 1986) - encourages the investment of 
resources into potentially disruptive innovations whilst the organisation is growing. All the 
participants of the research believed that such cultural support would allow executive management 
teams to shield disruptive opportunities from the corporate growth demands. This would provide 
them with a nurturing environment before rapid insurgence into mainstream markets. Furthermore, 
they felt that such a culture would dissuade management teams from allocating resources to 
products where there are clearly diminishing returns on investments - freeing resources for other 
152 
Chapter 4: The findings of Wave I of the Investigation 
investment opportunities. Kaplan (1999) summarises "When the organisation views success as 
transient, and long term growth as contingent on creating the next S-Curve, discontinuous [and 
disruptive] innovation becomes a collective imperative. " (p2l). 
4.3.7.2 Maintaining tension between stability and chaos. 
Evidence: ".. you have to add a little spice to the workplace if you want to encourage people to 
create and pursue these [potentially disruptive] ideas. You have to tfy things out, make a fool of 
yourself, / mean, / make a point of making a fool of myself daily, because without making a hool 
of your self, without falling on your arse, you simply do not have successes - you do not have 
success, you can not have success, without failures in the world of innovation.. a little chaos 
is a great source of stimulus - to support all this we have ajoker caro'system... / tell friends that 
itý actually an 'I've f-ked-up system' Everyone has three joker cards that they can play at 
anytime throughout the year. ftý; a way to encourage bravery- you can f*ck-up big-style three 
times in a year and itsimply does not matter. This way people feel protected if they are going to 
follow a crazy idea or try a new radical approach - if it fails, you can play one of thesejoker cards 
to your bosses, and you've had a great learning experience that can be shared with the business. 
... ok it has to be monitored, but / insi5t that everyone uses theirjoker cards, if they don't, / want 
to know why. " [RuM-Director of Innovation-OE-23001 
Authors, such as Ahuja and Lampert (2001) and O'Connor and Rice (2001), state that the 
recognition of breakthrough and discontinuous opportunities is a creative act. They and authors 
such as Kelley and Littman (2001) also show how the innovation process for radical and unusual 
ideas consists of a series of highly creative problem solving steps. Zhou and George (2001) find 
that job dissatisfaction can lead to creativity when employees are encouraged to express their 
opinions. These "expressions of voice" (p682) can be seen as stimulating a little tension in an 
otherwise stable working environment. Likewise, McFadzean's (1998,2000) research shows that 
groups, wishing to generate highly creative or even breakthrough ideas, have to foster an 
environment where they are free to break prevailing paradigms - she finds this is difficult to 
achieve in normal stable working conditions. Amabile and Gryskiewicz (1989) developed an 
inventory of the workplace that could assess capacity for creativity and creative problem solving. 
Their findings suggest that a stable environment is not conducive to the creative output needed for 
breakthrough insights. Yet, Amabile (1998) finds heavily chaotic working conditions to be 
prohibitive of creativity. Thus a tension needs to be found between stability and chaos -a notion 
also promoted by Brown and Duguid (2001). The data contains evidence from the expert 
interviewees that shows how management teams purposely introduce a little organised chaos to 
their working environments. These people appear to take responsibility for delivering an 
organisational ecology that has a high-tolerance for first-time mistakes - exonerating them as 
essential learning opportunities - and for people who challenge entrenched norms. Furthermore, 
practitioners from all four cases recounted stories when tension, turbulence or a little chaos 
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generated radical ideas and, in hindsight, potentially disruptive propositions. It would seem that a 
culture that maintains tension between stability and chaos appears to provide fuel for rule busting 
innovation. 
4.3.7.3 Proactive manipulation of the physical working environment. 
Evidence: ".. ff you ask the top man of our office, Colin, what his mainjob is.. ordinarily he'd say 
that his mainjob is managing the culture andphysical layout of the office and he takes this vely 
seriously.... you can't expect people to do good stuff in a Mitty'place [MB-Head of Ergonomics- 
OE-21491 ... for example, the entire third floor is what / like to call our 'Project Village, ' you can 
put. up a# kinds of visual stuff.. you can have all your information surrounding you all of the 
time.. to get more inspiration or more challenges.. the floor is open for use and accessible by 
evelybody. Other people, not in your project team, can walk past and see the sort of stuff that 
you ýe doing and.... you get a really good kind of cross-tertilisation. " [MB-Head of Ergonomics- 
OE-2151] 
... we've successfully tested co-locating - temporarily and permanently - these groups notorious for poor understanding of each others lead times and roles. This has delivered dramatic effects, 
especially when they were looking at breakthrouqh concept5. Their perception of transaction 
costs is now much more realistic, information flows are stronger and our innovative capacity has 
increased" [KF-Commercialisation Director-OE-791] 
The notion that the physical working environment plays a part in the productivity of employees is 
not new, however, it is less prevalent in the field of innovation. Allen (1977) provides insights into 
how the manipulation of the physical workplace can facilitate the flow of knowledge and 
technology development. Kelley and Littman (2001) are huge advocates of providing working 
environments that are conducive to creating problem solving and radical idea generation. They 
believe very much in allowing people to manipulate their own workplace for the benefit of their 
business objectives. The data analysis also revealed that a management team's active manipulation 
of the physical working environment can enable and support the pursuit of disruptive innovation. 
For example, it was found that the arrangement of the physical environment to encourage cross- 
fertilisation of people, communication and ideas, can reduce functional boundaries to early idea 
generation and project development. It was believed that this is essential to the early phases of 
disruptive innovation. However, such an environment was suggested as unsuitable for project 
delivery - where group members need 'quiet time' to concentrate. Thus, the participants also 
stated their requirement for the provision of quiet, secluded or private spaces, which can be 
appropriately manipulated by individual project teams. Such an environment would increase 
focused attention during delivery phases and assist teams in rapid experimentation or 
implementation. Evidence of these environments was either seen or spoken of with the experts and 
two of the four cases had started experiments with their physical workspaces. It is believed that 
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involvement of the workforce in the manipulation of the physical environment is important and 
preferable; however prevailing fiefdoms should not be allowed to selfishly dictate changes. 
INHIBITORS: 
0 4.3.7.4 Failure to recognise the importance of culture and values. 
Evidence: 'The whole innovation thing in this firm is about me standing up and saying come on 
folk5 we really ought to innovate, and then creating an 'innovation culture' by providing the 
training, the conditions, the support and the motivation. /// keep encouraging and helping, 
encouraging and helping, and encow-aging and heloing, until everyone is capable of delivering 
simple step change and radical breakthroughs.. buts iM; taken serious senior support Before / 
arrived the top chaps didn't really consider the proces5e5 that create a culture of creativity that 
values innovation. People spoke of a system - that kind of existed in the shadows - which made 
everyone conform to familiar territories - scared of pushing the envelope. " [RuM-Director of 
Innovation-OE-20821 
"If we want to generate some urgency aboutputsuing disruptive innovation throughout the whole 
business, we'll have to manage our innovation processes and funding differently, as these are the 
factors that drive our companysý culture.. we need to deliberately put grit into the Oyster 
Perhaps we need to break down the perceived stability of our organisation but this is a messy 
business -perhaps thaLF why we avoid it. " [C-StrategyAdv)sor-OE- 17481 
The data showed that many statements of intended strategy, such as those to pursue radical and 
disruptive innovation, become undermined by the diffused, invisible daily decisions made by 
employees to prioritise one activity over another. This notion is also supported by Mintzberg et al 
(1998) and Stacey (2000). These decisions ultimately underpin the emergence of strategic action 
and it was found by this research that they are more likely to be governed by culture than intended 
vocalised strategy. Cases A, B and C displayed little effort to contend with the anti-disruptive 
innovation 'shadow systems' (McMillan 2004) that were at play within their businesses. 
Consequently, it was found strategic intent is more likely to govern decisions in the upper echelons 
of the organisation, yet organisational culture and values dominate employees' daily prioritisation 
decisions. Thus, the failure to recognise the importance of culture and values and the failure to 
influence these factors, was found to be a major inhibitor to the pursuit of disruptive innovation. 
Barney (1986) provides a more detailed discussion on culture as a source of competitive advantage 
and Stacey (2000) provides a detailed account of the shadow systems that can impact strategy 
execution. 
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N- 
4.3.7.5 An 'accident and emergency' organisational ecology. 
Evidence: "We ýe f9cing hard times; if we come up with an idea we don't have time to waste, we 
have to make up our minds quickly.... Everyone knows to ask Voe5 it add value to our main 
customets? ' 'Is it low cost to u5? ' ff the answers are ýes'then we begin to invest our time. " [A- 
Director 6encral-Of-59] 
"Weýe a global organi5ation thatý feeling the pain of competition, 5ure, weýe motivated to 
pursue innovation but right now its real tough... my concern is that our team5 in the field feel 
that in our current climate there is no place to nurture or grow ideas - right now we too quickly 
ignore or kill suggestions" [C-5enior Manager- OE- 1631 
Allen et al (1999) state that the ecologies of most organisations can be paralleled to front-line 
hospital 'accident and emergency' departments. They reward the ability to conduct 'rapid fire' 
analyses of situations, where judgements need to be made quickly, along with prompt action. Each 
case study involved in this research displayed an organisational ecology which rewarded quick 
decision making, fast formation of assumptions and insistence upon quick action. This was 
contrary to reports from five of the seven expert interviewees'; in their businesses, employees can 
find support for suspending judgement, building empathy for new ideas and nurturing potentially 
disruptive concepts. Oldham and Cummings (1996) suggest that the 'accident and emergency' 
business culture of the case organisations will hamper creativity and contribute to a reduced 
numbers of out-of-the-box ideas. Andriopoulos (2001) also shows that these ecologies either 
quickly kill potentially disruptive ideas or do not even allow them to surface. Furthermore, the 
participants reported they often felt emotionally withdrawn and therefore frustrated because of 
their 'fast to judge' business environments. Despite claims by Zhou and George (2001) that job 
dissatisfaction can lead to creativity, the impact of these sort of emotions is damaging to an 
organisations ability to innovate in general (Lofy, 1998). 
1 
4.3.7.6 Physical working environments dominated by legacies from the past. 
Evidence: ".. we say we want to have radical innovations and we say we want to go into new 
markets but we don't look at our offices or the factoiy and think about how we can change the 
way they look the way theyýe laid out.. / mean, we have photos and posters everywhere of 
cycling and cycling teams; we show our bicycle helmets in the reception and the rooms where we 
have our meetings..... wesit in our off7ces, separated from each other. How are we going to ever 
break away from the past? " [A-Head of Sales-Of- 1822] 
Rqure5 4-8 and 4-9 below illustrate the particioantý grievance with the physical ecology of Case 
A ý5 offices and factory. 
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A 
C 
A ft B= Displays ofjorotective helmets from the past andpresent in the main 
entrance hall and in the reception area of the meeting rooms. There is no showcasing 
of other product categories. 
C= Cycling trophies won by the companyý5 race team behind the reception desk. 
Figure 4-8. - Examples of Case A ýF Office Environment. 
One of three notice boards for 
capturing and displaying process 
innovations for the helmet 
production line. There are no such 
boards for the production lines of 
otherproducts. 
A notice board on the factory 
floor displaying new ideas and top 
priority live innovation projects. 
The board is dedicated to 
incremental product innovations 
ofjorotective helmets despite 
ven tures in to new marke Is. 
Figure 4-9: Examples of Case A ýv Office Environment 
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Leonard (1995) and Ahuja and Lampert (2001) are among many authors who provide compelling 
evidence to show how organisations' core competencies eventually become core rigidities - 
especially in the face of disruptive innovations. Similarly, the expert interviewees stated that it is 
essential to celebrate organisational competencies and past success, whilst simultaneously getting 
ready to both learn and unlearn for the future. Four of the seven expert interviewees linked support 
for this notion to the necessity of keeping the physical working environment fresh. In this sense 
they believed the workplace can be used to ensure the workforce is proud of its history but not tied 
to it. Similarly, senior practitioners from all four cases demonstrated their belief in Leonard's 
(1995) concerns; however, they allowed their physical working environments to be dominated by 
artefacts from past glories and current activities with core markets. It is believed that the 
workforce of the case organisations were, either consciously or subconsciously, being influenced or 
constrained by these environments. Mard (1999), A. Ward (1999) and Salter (2000) all claim that 
an organisation must carefully manage its physical environment to stimulate a future focus and 
Kelley and Littman (2001) provide guidance on how to manage this task. Both the evidence and 
the literature shows that a physical working context will impact the innovation effort, whilst it is 
important to stimulate pride in past achievements, it would appear that artefacts can also inhibit 
the acceptance of an important fact: success is transient and long term growth is contingent on 
finding and exploiting new growth technologies and new customer offerings. 
4.3.8 Interaction with the External Environment: 
DESCRIPTION: The capability to interact with the external 
environment, with the necessary breadth and depth, in order to support 
an innovation process that simultaneously pursues sustaining and 
potentially disruptive innovations. 
ENABLERS: 
4.3.8.1 Look towards unfamiliar markets. 
Evidence: a big part of alt this [the pursuit of disruptive and breakthrough innovations], is 
seeking stimulus, but you are unlikely to come across insiqhts by sitting at your desk,.. / think 
that the internet helps these days but, you know, your desk is actually quite a small place. 
6etting out there in the worldand once again encouraging affyourkeypeople to getout there in 
the world, by saying you do not have to work from this desk, go see at flist hand what other 
markets are doing go and look at those people that the products are missing out.. 6etting people 
to understand the value of getting unfamiliar stimulus into their working lives is enormously 
important. " [RuM-Director of Innovation-Ext-2298] 
158 
Chapter 4: The findings of Wave I of the Investigation 
one of the key ones [facifitatots of di5ruotive innovation] is simply the fact that we go outside 
the norm, we go into context, we talk to people, people we may have never talked to before, so 
we get lots of chaotic rich information from that. Another way of facilitating these 
[breakthrough] ideas is by going to people internally, introducing them to your ideas or to the 
stimulus that you've gathered from outside, as we all react and respond in different ways.. You 
can also look for lchallenger5' or people like that, people - internally or externally - who can 
challenge the way you think and provide different perspectives on the same problem... " JMB- 
Head of Ergonomics-Ext-21741 
At the outset of. the research the practitioners stated their primary sources of stimulus gathering 
for opportunity development were market surveys, information from the press, and internet 
publications. As the relationship of the research group matured and learning was at its peak, it was 
stated by participants from all four cases that an organisation will struggle to deliver disruptive 
innovation if it does not look into unfamiliar places. An especially significant source of rich data 
and information was said to found by speaking to ignored non-consumers, over-looked low-end 
customers and organisations which offer no competitive threat. The practitioners believed 
significant opportunities could be generated if approaching these groups with an open mind. 
Strong support for this insight can be found from Allen et al (1999), Hamel (2000), Kelley and 
Linton (2001) and Unsworth (2001). 
4.3.8.2 Test new relationships with the aim to find new strategic alliances. 
Evidence: ".. itýF a bad analogy but from my experience, an oiganisation thatýý seeking to deliver 
truly radical innovation is rather like a person who needs a breakthrough in an otherwise boring 
personal life.. You've heard the stoty before, you've reached the point where you no longer get 
joy from your marriage or a relationship... and you start to look around.. flirtations lead to secret 
love affairs and maybe short-term experiences, you know, a one-night stand here or there, and 
suddenly, BLAM! You've found your new love interest Who should take responsibility for this sort 
ofstrategic flirting? Top managers. ... we've found that if done properly, the worse case outcome is 
a learning experience for management and practical testing of their communication channels... 
The most likely outcome is that your business has collected some really interesting information 
and contacts, perhaps generated some new insights and even some ideas for the future - at least 
a better understanding of the wider domain.. The best case outcome is the identification of a new 
strategic partner.. the creation of a vehicle, a new marriage if you like, that will help develop and 
bring excitement and new [potentially disruptive] innovations to market" [5R-Protessor-Ext- 
2258] 
Rosenbloom and Christensen (1994) draw attention to the 'value network' in which an organisation 
is embedded. A value network is "the context within which a firm identifies and responds to 
customers' needs, solves problems, procures input, reacts to competitors and strives for profit" 
(Christensen, 1997: 31). These networks can involve innumerate partners, suppliers and distributors 
and play a critical role in how organisations foster or react to disruptive innovation. The data set 
shows that managers, who want to generate competitive advantage from theory on disruptive 
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innovation, will need to establish and test new commercial relationships. It would appear from the 
data that management teams need to move towards strategic dalliances (Phillips et al., 2004) to 
disrupt or to create new market linkages, or to disrupt or to make obsolete existing competencies. 
This was also insinuated by Rothaermel's (2001) references to the need for more and varied "inter- 
firm cooperation to exploit an incumbent's complementary assets" (p687). Data from the case 
study participants and all but two of the expert interviewees indicate that an organisation is more 
likely to identify and exploit potentially disruptive innovations if dallying with new suppliers or 
distributors, with the intended pursuit of radical new wealth creation. The British microchip 
designer, ARM, is an example of an organisation that has created new knowledge and new wealth 
through new collaborations. In 1997, it reported its annual revenues had totalled E16.7m; by 2003, 
its revenues exceeded 1125m. The CEO (Warren East) states "ARM wanted to create a global 
standard and so we had to go international. We soon realised the huge value of new partners and 
the importance of investors who really understood our market" (Brennan, 2003b: 4). Furthermore, 
both the data and authors such as Inkpen (1996) suggest that individual managers' interpersonal 
skills and abilities to initiate and develop new relationships are critical to this activity. 
4.3.8.3 Mechanisms to monitor developments in the wider organisational domain and external 
environment. 
Evidence: 7 use what / call immersive'tools with executive teams, such as Vuest5, Traxie=5, 
and 'Constellations, to help them identify their oryanisationý; uniqueness.. Then it really helps if 
you can help the client to build a rich picture of whatýF going on in the wider context, their realm 
if you like.. Whatý happening across the supply chain of their industry? Who are the newplayers 
in the periphery? Who are the competitors and the 'complementors? And you need to build a 
picture of emerging trends and new government policies that could impact them. From here X5 
much easier to see how they can better exploit their uniqueness to create a breakthrough in the 
wider realm. In my opinion, this is the major key to the breakthrough or disruptive innovation 
process. " [TF-Director-Ext-18991 
Managers from the cases involved in the research came to believe their ability to foster potentially 
disruptive innovations will be directly related to understanding three variables within the wider 
external environment. Firstly, understanding the availability and mobility of suitable personnel. 
Secondly, the exclusivity of their relationships with customers (legally or implicitly) or the potential 
exclusivity of relationships with potential customers. Thirdly, their countries' industrial policies - 
policies which may support or impact business activities (i. e. the UK's tax credit system for research 
and development expenditure (Bell, 2003). These three focus areas are consistent with 
Chesbrough's (2003) findings; his analysis of new entry companies into the worldwide hard-disk- 
drive industry also found the availability and understanding of venture capital funds to be 
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important. The practitioners involved in this investigation also concluded management teams that 
establish mechanisms to monitor movements and developments in the wider organisational domain 
will assist efforts to pursue disruptive innovation. This supports Hamel's (2000) notion that 
monitoring developments of an organisation's industry "... leads to an overly narrow definition of 
company's potential opportunity horizon" (p 286). Hamel (2000) states if a management team has 
an understanding of the wealth creation activities of companies in the vertical 'value chain' and 
those that provide products or services within the broader 'value network' "... there is little chance 
of being surprised by a disruptive technology" (p286). The participants believed that an 
understanding of the wider domain would allow them to apply disruptive innovation theory to look 
for, and possibly advantage from, the next industry sectors that are prime for disruption (those that 
are oversupplying customer needs or overlooking new emergent technologies and approaches). 
Moreover, they stated that such an activity would enable them to collected and distribute stimuli 
throughout their businesses - to inspire key business personnel and stakeholders in the innovation 
process. 
INHIBITORS: 
4.3.8.4 Inappropriate reactions to competitors' actions. 
Evidence: 'To r1ght the Chinese competition, we've spent the last years investing heavily into 
improving our helmet manufacturing processes and the performance of our protective helmet 
range.. we've found efriciencies and cut costs annually by 1001b for the past four years and our 
helmets now outstrip a# others on the market for their safety features and durability. This has 
been diffl-cult, it has taken nearly all our effortand it seems that we will lose the fight anyway.... 
and now.. / can see that our determination to fight the Chinese hasstopped us from testing new 
avenues, or new ways to make new money. " [A-Director 6eneral-Ext-2374] 
"We've learnt that incremental innovations are critical for protecting revenues, however in the 
long-term the only way to deliver substantial growth is through disruptive technologies.. The 
problem companies face in my sector [semiconductors and computing/ is that things change so 
fast - its hard to know how to strike the balance.. we need to stay ahead of the competition, or 
at least keep up with them, but we don't let these people dictate our strategy. We know if we 
react to every move our competitors make then we run the risk of starving new potentially 
disruptive technologies from essential resources. " [FF-CEO-Ext-21091 
"Our company strategy says we want to be a 'world class innovator' we want to be seen as one of 
the most inventive companies in the world Instead, we spend our time and resourcesjumping to 
competitors moves and fearing.. the unknown. To do what you already do better is important 
but, but when it dominates everything itý vety bad" [B-Head of Innovation Team-Ext- 1333] 
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The executive management teams of cases A, B and C (and the clients of case D) reported that 
competitor's actions, in existing markets, stimulate a significant demand for imitative or 
reactionary projects. These unexpected sustaining innovations were mostly launched to the 
detriment of resources for radical and potentially disruptive innovations. This phenomenon is 
discussed by Hamel (2000) and Utterback (1994) and reactionary strategies are said to be good 
practice in immature, developing markets. However, the over-acceptance of reactionary initiatives 
in mature or established markets often ensures that resources for projects considered to be 
peripheral are hauled to the core business. This is made yet worse when the reacting firm is faced 
with diminishing returns from investments into incremental improvements of the core business 
(Grove, 1996). It is believed an organisation will be less inclined to display inappropriate reactions 
to competitors' actions if the executive management team has internalised and diffused the 
concept that technologies and products have limited lifecycles. Unlike the average performing 
cases involved in this research, such organisations will be more inclined to embrace investments 
into new areas rather than face price wars and low returns on investments in declining markets 
(Kaplan 1999). 
4.3.8.5 Failure to build new communities of interest. 
Evidence: ".. someone may spot an interesting development that has new breakthrough business 
potential. 56 we tty and get them to pick up ownership.. we ask them to get a community of 
interest going around that particular area.. if one starts to form then we know that there is this 
strong potential and we ýe not on our own... itý a great way to fiacilitate idea generation and to 
reduce communication barriers. More importantly, this also leads to more cross-tertilisation, 
some great contacts and the rapid maturing of ideas, opinions andpoints of view"[MB-Head of 
Ergonomics-Ext-2158] 
... these communities of interest are really important as breakthrou h nov tion Is nhe ently qair 
risky, no emergence of a community and we let go of the idea - you can't force people to share 
your vision and you can't take a# the risk yourself" [MB-Head of Ergonomics-Ext-21591 
"Disruptive innovation is about hard work, a lot of W5 work is about persuasion. You have to 
work hard to flnd allies - inside and outside. You work hard to show your idea is groundbreaking 
but can still be delivered by the business. You work hard to secure resources. You work hard to 
build a team that will share and improve and deliver the vision. And whilst you ýe doing all this, 
you work hard to build a group of businesses or a community of people who are interested in 
what you are doing.. without these outside people the idea will never take off" [D- Divisional 
Head-Ext- 15921 
Van de Ven and Garud (1989) state that the maintenance of long-term developmental relationships 
with suppliers, purchasers and distributors are essential for the delivery of sustaining innovation. 
However, Van de Ven and Garud (1989) discovered from their investigations into the cochlear 
implant industry, as did the participants of this research, that the emergence of new social systems 
appear to be critical to the emergence of new technologies. Thus, traditional communities of 
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interest can leverage well-known ties for effective sustaining innovation. Yet an over-reliance 
upon these communities contributes to a restricted focus upon familiar customer offerings and 
technologies, and appears to inhibit of the pursuit of new markets and disruptive innovation. 
Critical to new communities of interest are people who are prepared to invest in the potentially 
disruptive innovation - whether the financiers are internal or external the importance of investors 
who really understand the market cannot be overstated (Brennan, 2003b). Expert interviewees and 
workshop participants stated that managers who feel disloyal, when embarking upon new 
relationships with different organisations, will not be able to spearhead the pursuit of disruptive 
innovation. Furthermore, they reported that they need to provide more support for their internal 
entrepreneurs; senior practitioners from all four cases believed that they had employees with 
entrepreneurial spirit but they lacked the resources to build supportive communities of interest. 
Van de Ven's (1993) findings illustrate that executive management must consider a community 
setting if they are to succeed with innovation: "Running in packs means that entrepreneurs 
coordinate with others as they develop and commercialise their innovation. " (p224) 
4.3.8.6 Lead-customers with too much influence. 
Evidence: An email discussion about the influence of the external environment quickly focused 
upon lead-customers, a Divisional Head at Case Dstated that these people have influence because 
theyprovide key revenues orresources. - 
7read5omewhere recently thatscientists like to see themselves as doing a fearless exploration of 
the unknown, but because of how they get their funding, they end up conducting teartul 
explorations of the mostly known. Ha ha hal Thank god itý5 notjust us with this problem then. 
We've lost some really interesting projects in the past, the sort that could have been 
revolutionary, because we've gone for the guaranteed revenue from our main customers- but you 
can't bite the hand that feeds you, can you? " [D-Divisional Head-Ext- 11641 
It was observed that nearly all the participants involved in this research, from all four cases, made 
statements about their organisational commitment to being 'customer or lead-user orientated'. 
However, when assessing their statements using von Hippie's (1986) definition of lead-users, it was 
clear that each organisation was not what they claimed; instead they seemed to be lead-customer 
compelled. These are very different propositions. By observing 3M, von Hippie, Thornke and 
Sonnack (1999) show lead-users are often not current customers. Thus attempts at creating 
breakthroughs at 3M, based upon a true lead-user orientation, necessitates the organisation to look 
beyond current customers into new market segments. Thus, smart executive management teams 
that maintain a dualistic pursuit of sustaining and disruptive innovation can be both efficient in 
their responses to customer's demands and corporately entrepreneurial in new and low-end market 
niches. Alternatively, the Cases involved in this study were all too aware that lead-customers pay 
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their bills. Managers had allowed these customers to exert more influence than they ought to, 
succumbing to focusing too closely on their most profitable customers and businesses. This 
suggests that organisation's that fall into the trap of being lead-customer compelled - 
appropriating lead-customers with too much influence - become disabled in the exploration of new 
territories and constrained in the nurturing of potentially disruptive innovation. 
4.4 Overview of findings in relation to research objectives. 
The primary objective of this thesis is to explore the nature and experience of management 
practitioners'pursuit of potentially disruptive innovations in average performing (or non-best- 
practice) businesses. This first wave of research activities employed a collaborative research 
programme with four industrial cases. To reduce the potential of 'going native' (Van Maanen, 
1988), findings from the data collection and analysis were triangulated with data collected from 
expert interviews and an extensive literature survey. As shown in chapter three (the research 
methodology) this first wave of research contributes greatly to the satisfaction of the primary 
research objective and it also contributes to the first sub-objective (although a contribution was 
made to theory and practice regarding collaborative research designs, this will be discussed in 
Chapter 7): 
Sub-Objective 1: 
To deliver an holistic understanding of the key facilitators and inhibitors faced by management 
practitioners wanting to enable potentially disruptive innovations within their non-best-in- 
class organisations. And to convert this knowledge into an holistic processual and systemic 
conceptual framework, grounded in both data and theory. 
The literature review (chapter 2) concludes there is a requirement for an holistic conceptual 
framework which takes a systems perspective to the pursuit of disruptive innovation in average 
performing companies. For example, Van de Ven and Drazin (1985) illustrate'that innovation 
should be considered in a systemic manner, where multiple contextual and structural 
characteristics have to be examined simultaneously to identify their effect upon performance. The 
literature review also shows that the conceptual framework should be grounded in both a resource- 
based and process-based view of the organisation. Furthermore, it concludes, from methods used 
in the extant literature, that the construction of a framework of enablers and inhibitors is a valid 
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approach to contributing to the understanding Of managerial and organisational behaviour in the 
innovation process (e. g. Penrose's (1959) 'growth inducements' and 'growth restraints', Amabile's 
(1997,1998) 'creativity motivators' and 'creativity killers' and Dougherty and Hardy's (1996) factors 
that induce or overcome the innovation-to-organization problem). 
To ensure a systems approach was adopted, data were collected in four main units of analysis: 
managerial cognition, managerial action, internal organisational context and external 
organisational context (in accordance with Strauss and Corbin (1990) and Partington (1998)). The 
data collection and analysis methods used during the first wave of this investigation allowed the 
author to follow Partinigton's (1998) advice for building grounded theories of managerial 
behaviour, thus the constructs of enablers and inhibitors within the conceptual framework were 
built upon (1) data that were consciously perceived and or presented by the participants involved in 
the research; (2) data from underlying causal mechanisms that were neither perceived by the 
participants nor theoretically preconceived by the researcher, "... which, therefore, act 
independently of thought, and which are only accessible through the creative speculation by the 
researcher of plausible alternatives - whose 'truth' is ultimately dependent on consensual validation 
by informants" (Partington, 1998: 13). And finally, (3) data which were collected from direct and 
indirect observations by the researcher. 
In acknowledgement of Mohr's (1982) concerns of the tendency to present conceptual frameworks 
of innovation as over-simplified stages in a process, the conceptual framework developed in this 
first wave of research (overviewed in section 4.3 and illustrated in Figure 4-10) brings together 
both a processual and systemic view of innovation. It features four 'Stages' and four forces that 
influence each stage. This integration allows for an emphasis to also be made of the values and 
beliefs of management practitioners that underpin the bringing together of resources and 
processes. These factors are considered in the contexts of both the organisational ecology and the 
external environment, thus a systemic model has been developed, which does not only simply 
convey a staged process. Although the conceptual framework has mostly been described as a mix 
of discrete stages and influences (section 4.3 and Figure 4-10), this is somewhat misleading but 
necessary to reduce complexity to a presentable and comprehendible level. The reader is asked to 
note that the conceptual framework aims to adopt a stance similar to that proposed by Jelinek and 
Schoonhoven (1990), from which the constructs are viewed as interwoven, interdependent and 
mutually involved. 
165 
Exploring and Describing the Pursuit of Disruptive Innovation 
Therefore, the conceptual framework delivers an holistic understanding of the key facilitators and 
inhibitors faced by management practitioners wanting to enable potentially disruptive innovations 
within non-best-in-class organisations. The framework presumes that best practice innovation 
procedures will be followed by management practitioners pursuing sustaining innovations. Thus it 
is the contention of the author that the results of the investigation presented thus far demonstrate 
the achievement of the first research objective. 
The next chapter will present the results of the second half this investigation, this builds upon the 
inhibitors and enablers presented above. The chapter will identify the most critical areas of 
management cognition and management action to which the pursuit of potentially disruptive 
innovations are most reliant. It will show how a deeper investigation of the most pertinent area 
has resulted in the development of a management intervention that can be used to support the 
pursuit of disruptive innovation. 
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5. Four Main Barriers to the Pursuit of 
Focus their Attention 
- The Findings from Wave 11 of the Investigation 
This chapter is dedicated to presenting the results of the second wave of research activity. An overview 
of the objectives is provided followed by a description of four managerial hocus areas that emerged 
from the research tasks - they are described as barrier5 to the pursvit of potentially disruptive 
innovations. The chapter will show how one of the focus areas was pribriti5ed as most important by 
the industrial collaborator5, and how this, consequently became the focalpoint for closer investigation 
in the close of this chapter and throughout the remainder of the research. 
CHAPTER AIMS 
To identify focus areas for 
management practitioners 
wishing to pursue disruptive 
innovation and to develop 
focus for the third wave of the 
research. 
5.1 Introduction 
Potentially Disruptive Innovations: 
Where Senior Managers Should 
ACTIVITIES 
During an 8 month period used the 
conceptual framework as a tool v- 
to analyse the four case studies. 
Identified focus areas. Validated 
focus areas with literature and 
expert interviews. Selected one 
focus area for Wave Ill. 
5.1.1 Overview of primary objectives 
Focus Area Rated 
Most Important by! 
Participants 
OUTCOMES 
Focus Focus Focus 
Area Area Area 
Identified research focus for remainder of investigation 
The four primary objectives of the second wave of this research are: 
1) To use the conceptual framework (developed in the first wave of this research) as a tool 
to reveal, within each of the participating cases, areas of management action and 
management cognition to which the delivery of potentially disruptive innovations are 
considered most dependent. 
169 
Exploring and Descfibing the Pursuit of Disruptive Innovation 
2) To use the multiple perspectives, case pairings and juxtapositions available in 
collaborative research, to generate cross case analysis that can identify generic focus 
areas for managers pursuing disruptive innovation. 
3) To build a base of evidence from case data, survey data and the literature that will 
sharpen, refine and define the emergent priority focus areas. 
4) To prioritise one focus area, to investigate it in more depth and to create a specific 
research focus for the final wave of the current inquiry. 
5.1.2 Overview of research methods 
Data were collected over an 8 month period from the following sources: 
*4 semi-structured interviews with senior case study participants. 
3 semi-structured interviews with innovation experts (who were external to the research 
group). 
e1 three-day multi-functional, multi-level workshop with all four case study organisations 
(15 participants in total). 
e Multiple informal email discussions. 
92 telephone conferences with senior management/engineer teams from cases A and B. 
The triangulation of data from these sources and the enfolding of literature revealed four priority 
focus areas, which were in effect barriers that management practitioners face in the pursuit of 
disruptive innovation. The data analysis also led to the prioritisation of one of the focus areas as a 
barrier that seems to inhibit management practitioner's more that the others. This led to the 
emergence of a research focus for the third wave of the investigation. These results are presented 
in sections 5.2 to 5.9 of this chapter. 
5.2 The emergence of managerial focus areas for innovation practitioners 
The results presented below are a summary of the within case and cross case analyses that were 
conducted to reveal the four most critical areas of management action and management cognition 
to which the delivery of potentially disruptive innovations are most dependent. 
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5.2.1 The results of the within-case analysis: case specific priority focus areas 
A focused within case analysis was conducted for each of the four case study organisations. The 
aim was to identify, for each case, management priorities or focus areas for the pursuit disruptive 
innovation. The conceptual framework, developed in the first wave of research activities (Chapter 
4, Figure 4-10), was used to facilitate this process. For. example, Figure 5-1 illustrates how Case C 
utilised a large graphical template of the conceptual framework to focus their conversation and to 
capture their insights and opinions. 
Figure 5-1: 7he output of Case C; graphically facilitated conversations regarding critical focus areas. 
Following the within case analysis (process described in Chapter 3), senior practitioners from each 
case study organisation presented what they perceived to be their organisation's top four 
management priorities. The management priorities were the key areas where it was believed 
management must focus their attention to enable the pursuit of potentially disruptive innovations. 
Figures 5-2,5-3,5-4 and 5-5 illustrate the high-level priority areas identified from the within case 
analyses of cases A, B, C and D respectively. 
"We must accept some 
probe and loam 
approaches; currently 
management culture 
demands quick wins 
from Innovation. " 
CASE A: 
The critical 
f 
(A-MixedGroupMisc-15511 
'We find it hard to think 
out of the box In order 
to create potentially 
disruptive Ideas. " 
"We cannot prioritise "We ilke t got things 
product Ideas that our right first time - you 
most Important cannot do that with 
customers won't vvant. - disruptive Innovation. 
Figure 5-2: Within case analysis reveals Case A ý; four priority focus areas 
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"Employees are change 
resistant - disruptive 
Innovation could create 
confusion. " 
- pp"---"qq 
CASE 0: 
The critical 
T 
"We are not good at 
acknowledging when 
we have Invented or 
found a potentially 
disruptive Innovation. " 
i-Our resource [B-MixedGroup-Misc-1552] 
allocation mechanisms "We need better ways 
make us focus on to exploit our Ideas so 
familiar and mature we can disrupt our 
markets and competitors really 
technologies. " quickly. " 
Figure 5-3: Within case analysis reveals Case 8ýý four priority focus areas 
"Our priority Is to 
protect our mainstream 
business and to grow 
market share. " 
CASE Q 
The critical 
focus areas 
[C-Mixed Group-Misc-1553) 
"Core business 
activities prevent us 
from pursuing 
potentially disruptive 
Innovations. " 
"We generate great 
concepts but don't 
know where to start 
thorn In the market 
place or how. " 
"Managers do not have: 
the right sort of 
experience to deliver 
potentially disruptive 
Innovations. " 
figure 5-4: Within case analysis reveals Case Cs fourpriority forusareas 
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"We cannot prioritise "We have an Inability to 
product Ideas that are generate or to 
only wanted by small recognise potentially 
niche markets. " disruptive Innovations. " 
CASE D. 
The critical 
PMixed Group-Misc-1554) 
"We need to reduce the 
risk of allocating 
resources to potentially, 
disruptive Innovation. " 
"Market research 
restrains us to 
sustaining Innovation. " 
Figure 5-5., Within case analysis reveals Case D ýF four priority focus areas 
5.2.2 The results of the cross-ease analysis: four generic priority focus areas 
Three focused cross-case analysis sessions were conducted, both by the entire research group and 
then independently by the author, to verify the results. The aim was to identify, cross case patterns 
- in terms of similarities and differences - across all of the case specific management focus areas 
identified in the within-case analyses. 
The multi-case, multi-functional, multi-level discussions encouraged the senior practitioners, from 
each case study organisation, to challenge and compare what they perceived to be their 
organisations' top managerial focus areas. For example, Case A reported a "We cannot prioritise 
product ideas that our most important customers won't want". This on the surface appeared to be 
analogous to Case D's statement "We cannot prioritise product ideas that are only wanted by small 
niche markets". However, when comparing the deeper, case specific meaning of these statements, 
it became clear that the management teams of the two businesses meant different things. The 
former was a reference to a lack of strategic understanding regarding the importance of disruptive 
innovation and the latter was more concerned with justifying the allocation of resources. 
Moreover, similarities were not always obvious; the comparison of seemingly different focus areas 
revealed common linkages. For example, Cases B and C reported respectively "We need better ways 
to exploit our ideas so we can disrupt our competitors really quickly" and "Managers do not have 
the right sort of experience to deliver potentially disruptive innovations". During the comparisons 
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of the deeper underlying case specific meanings of these statements, it became clear that both 
businesses had raised very specific elements of a more general issue that was affecting all the 
collaborators - traditional new product/service development routines were constraining and killing 
potentially disruptive opportunities. 
The trusting nature of the group allowed open discussion and surfaced an unexpected realisation 
that the representatives of all four organisations were effectively describing the symptoms of the 
same four root-cause obstacles to the pursuit of disruptive innovation. The participants were in 
fact using different words, from their different perspectives, but the semantics of the deeper ca usal 
issues were the same. Thus, the collaborative approach had surfaced an unexpected breakthrough - 
the emergence of four focus areas that were a common priority to all four cases (Table 5-1). 
Case A's 
Priority Areas 
"We need quick 
wins from our 
innovation 
investment. " 
"We find it hard to 
think out of the bo: 
in order to create 
potentially 
disruptive ideas. " 
"We like to get 
things right first 
time - you cannot 
do that with 
disruptive 
innovation. " 
Case B's 
Priority Areas 
"Employees are 
change resistant - 
disruptive 
innovation could 
create confusion. " 
"We are not good 
at acknowledging 
K when we have 
invented or found a 
potentially 
disruptive 
innovation. " 
"We need better 
ways to exploit our 
ideas so we can 
disrupt our 
competitors really 
quickly. " 
Case C's Case D's 
Priority Areas Priority Areas 
"Our priority is to "We cannot 
protect our prioritise product 
mainstream ideas that are only 
business and to wanted by small 
grow market share. " niche markets. " 
"We generate great 
concepts but don't 
know where to 
start them in the 
market place or 
how. " 
"Managers do not 
have the right sort 
of experience to 
deliver potentially 
disruptive 
innovations. " 
"An inability to 
generate or to 
recognise 
potentially 
disruptive 
innovations. " 
"Market research 
restrains us to 
sustaining 
innovation. " 
"We cannot "Our resource "Core business "We need to reduce 
prioritise product allocation activities prevent us the risk of 
ideas that our most mechanisms make from pursuing allocating resources 
important us focus on familiar potentially to potentially 
customers won't and mature markets disruptive disruptive 
want. " and technologies. " innovations. " innovation. " 
= 
Restructured and 
Refined Priority Areas 
The strategic 
importance of 
disruptive innovation 
is not addressed as it 
is poorly understood. 
An inability to 
identify or to 
generate a disruptive 
foothold market. 
Traditional new 
product/service 
development routines. 
Inappropriate resource 
allocation routines. 
Table 5-1: Illustrating how the cross case analysis facilitated the emergence of four priority focus areas. 
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5.2.3 Selecting a priority focus area 
The first two aims presented in section 5.1.1 had been satisfied with the results presented above. 
The next two aims involved (1) building a base of evidence to sharpen, refine and define the four 
emergent priority focus areas and (2) to identify, from these focus areas, a focus area that the 
industrialists were keen to prioritise and concentrate upon in the final stages of this research. 
Although some debate existed about the ordering of importance of three of the focus areas 
highlighted above, inappropriate resource allocation routines was rated by the industrialists from 
all four case study organisations as the top priority that must be addressed (Table 5-2). 
Furthermore, of the 11 'experts' interviewed throughout this inquiry, 10 highlighted the ability to 
secure resources as a top priority. Therefore, it was this focus area that became the main focal 
point of the remainder of this inquiry5-'. 
Priority focus area of management Case A's Case B's Case C's Case D's 
action/cognition Priority Priority Priority Priority 
Ranking Ranking Ranking Ranking 
Inappropriate resource allocation 1 1 1* 1 
routines. 
The strategic importance of disruptive 4 2 1* 4 innovation is not properly understood. 
An inability to identify or to generate a 3 3 3 26 disruptive foothold market. 
Traditional new product/service 2 4 4 2s development routines. 
*= Rated as joint first priority. § Rated as joint second priority. 
Table 5-2. Inappropriate resource allocation routines are rated as the top barrier to disruptive innovation. 
Sections 5.3 to 5.6 of this thesis present a description of each of the four restructured and refined 
focus areas. Each section presents illustrative evidence from each case that is considered to be 
largely representative of the data set. This is followed by a description of the focus area in terms of 
" The decision not to focus upon the diffusion of knowledge on the strategic importance of disruptive innovation was 
influenced by Noda and Bower's (1996) contention that strategy making is a process of resource allocation routines. 
Thus it is believed that diffusing knowledge on disruptive innovation must be addressed within the context of the 
resource allocation agenda. 
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its interrelation with the pursuit of potentially disruptive innovations and an explanation which 
draws upon the wider data set, including expert interview data, and relevant literature. 
Appropriately, more emphasis is given to the prioritised focus area; hence section 5.6 presents a 
deeper analysis of the data and the relevant literature. Jelinek and Schoonhoven (1990) note that 
constructs or dimensions of an organisations innovation effort are rarely, if at all, independent from 
one another. Likewise, the four managerial focus areas identified by this research are not mutually 
exclusive; they interrelate, interact and, as will be shown, even share dependencies with one 
anothe r. 
5.3 The strategic importance of disruptive innovation is not addressed as it is 
poorly understood 
5.3.1 Evidence from the cases 
The four text boxes below present illustrative evidence from each case; they are considered to be 
largely representative of the data set and portray a feel for the barrier to disruptive innovation 
caused by lack of strategic understanding of the importance of this phenomenon. 
Evidence -Case A: "When we a# started this [began the current research project] I thought that 
disruptive innovation would be a nice thing to do... now I realise that it is the only way weW 
survive in our main market and perhaps the only way we W break into another market with any 
real chance of staying there.. I've now got to get the rest of the business to understand this. " [A - 
Director General-15-2749 &A -Director 6eneral-OE-27501 
Evidence - Case B. "We came to this meeting believing that going for DI [disruptive innovation] 
at [Case BI would mean a5king people to go through big changes.. the real issue is that people 
don't know how important D/ [di5ruptive innovation] is.... ff we can spread this understanding then 
we'll have support from the top and the factory line improving understanding underpins 
everything. " [B- 5ub Divisional Director of R&D-15 2764 8- 5ub Divisional Director of R&D-OE 
27651 
Evidence - Case C "Our executive management say innovation is the most important priority - 
but they don't walk the talk.. all they are interested in is protecting and growing our main 
business. ... thisjust goes to show they don't understand how important DI 
[disruptive innovation] 
is. ff they did, theyV let us get on with improving operations and fighting har market share and 
theyV put some real effort behind shaping a new future for this company. " [C-Senior Manager- 
OE-28231 
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Evidence -Case D: "We will see what we think could be a potential DI [disruptive innovation] for 
one of our clients, but they stop us and prefer to pay for something that is radical but basically 
'more of the same'.. We wanted to introduce mechanisms to stop core businesses fiom stealing 
resources from potential disruptions and focusing us on familiar products and markets. Perhaps, 
this is too complex - whatý really needed is a way to educate these executives about disruptive 
innovation and how important it is. " [D-Divisional Head-15-21261 
5.3.2 A description of the focus area 
Once this focus area was identified, each case study organisation was asked to use the conceptual 
framework (developed in the first wave of this research) to describe the influence of a low 
understanding of the strategic importance of disruptive innovation - in terms of its impact upon 
organisational innovation effort. The data gathered conclusively illustrates that it underpins every 
inhibitor and undermines every enabler of the pursuit of disruptive innovation displayed in the 
conceptual framework. Of particular concern, was the fact that this barrier creates restrictions 
within innovation strategy, influences rewards and recruitment within human resource 
management and underpins an unsupportive organisational ecology. Thus, it is believed efforts 
directed at changing innovation processes to support disruptive innovation will be strangled unless 
the knowledge deficits represented by this barrier are addressed. A low understanding of the 
strategic importance of disruptive innovation was therefore viewed as the root to the remaining 
three priority areas. 
For decades the literature has, time and again, espoused the importance of a strategic commitment 
to radical forms of innovation (Knight, 1967). Cottom, Ensor and Band (2001) studied high 
performing organisations in an attempt to benchmark a strategic commitment to innovation. They 
conclude that organisations with executive level commitment, both in terms of written strategy 
and the embodiment of a responsible director, were more likely to pursue and deliver highly 
innovative output. Power or influence over the delivery of radical innovation has been reported to 
be at its highest within the executive management teams and at its lowest within the general 
workforce (Knight, 1967; Christensen, 1997; Wheelwright and Clarke, 1992). Therefore, it could be 
argued that knowledge regarding disruptive innovation must be diffused across the upper echelons 
of today's organi5ations if the pursuit of disruption is to be realised. The participants, from the case 
study org2nisations, support this notion in their calls for executive management training regarding 
the importance and implications of disruptive innovation. 
However, stories in the business press and academia alike, recount examples of middle managers 
who have garnered informal organisational power and have eventually been able to deliver or 
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thwart the development and exploitation of breakthrough new products or services. For example 
Obeng (2003), Rosen (2002), Stacy (2000), Dalton (1959) Gouldner (1954) and McMillan (2004) all 
show how middle managers, to a greater or lesser degree, create cohort groups, form coalitions, 
undertake bootleg operations and take advantage of unanticipated changes to bring their ideas to 
fruition. Therefore, the strategic importance of disruptive innovation must be diffused more widely 
than the top management team. Data from the expert interviews indicates this knowledge must 
permeate all areas of the business with strategic leverage, both formal and informal. Kaplan's 
observations within Hewlett Packard (1999) similarly conclude that organisations must infuse "a 
new common sense ... one that suggests that technologies and organisations are born, grow, decline 
and are born again ... to understand that a technology - and the company whose future success 
depends upon it - will eventually face the end of its lifecycle, inspires urgency for, and commitment 
to, discontinuous innovation" (p2l). 
5.4 An inability to recognise or to generate a disruptive foothold market 
5.4.1 Evidence from the cases 
The four text boxes below present illustrative evidence from each case. They are considered to be 
largely representative of the data set and portray a feel for the barrier to disruptive innovation 
caused by an inability to recognise or to generate disruptive foothold markets. 
Evidence - Case A: "We r1nd it hard to think out of the box in order to create potentially 
disruptive ideas. " [A-Director General-OR-25731. 
Despite claims of a lack of creativity, further involvement with Case A revealed that their 
engineersand technicians were very good at generating new and unusual ideas. In /act, theyhad 
the capability to buildnewproduct offerings with disruptive potential; what they actually lacked 
was the capacity to position the new concept in a low-end or new-market disruptive foothold 
Evidence - Case B: ".. we've been looking for new ideas and technologies that could instantly 
replace existing products and processes. Now / get it.. we need to find ways to make these 
unusual ideas profitable in smaller markets to see if they can be viable. We thought that we 
faced a lack of disruptive ideas, but we don't; our problem is which markets do you start in? " [9- 
5enior Engineer-OR-25801 
178 
Chapter 5: The Findings from Wave 11 of the Investigatio6 
Evidence - Case C 7Ký clear to me now.. we simply don't know where to start these new 
[potentially disruptive] ideas orhow to do itproperly.... Perhaps thepressure to alway5go straight 
to our main customers is more risky, but at least we know these people. "[C-Senior Manager-OR- 
2589] 
Evidence - Case D., "After this discussion / think / understand our clients'problem better.. people 
can always make new great ideas, they can think out of the box and be wild if theyýe allowed, 
but itý finding customers whoW be willing to pay - thatý the big problem. "[D-Senior Consultant- 
OR-26011 
5.4.2 A description of the focus area 
The analysis of data captured from the cases and expert interviewees reveals this management 
priority is, in effect, an embodiment of the 'Opportunity Recognition' construct (identified and 
described in the conceptual framework that emerged from the first wave of this research). 
Opportunity recognition is a more specific act then pure invention (Leifer et al., 2000). An 
opportunity for a radical (or potentially disruptive) innovation is recognised when a technical 
invention or a concept for a customer offering has been matched with the needs of a market with a 
compelling reason to buy (O'Conner and Rice, 2001; Leifer et al., 2000). It would appear that 
average performing businesses, such as the cases involved in this research, may be initially inclined 
to blame a lack of creative ideas for their lack of potentially disruptive opportunities. However, the 
data indicates organisations are more likely to suffer with the inability to recognise or to generate 
disruptive foothold markets, than they are to suffer a lack of ideas. 
Christensen and Raynor (2003) state that faulty market segmentation schemes help to explain high 
rates of failure in new product development. They continue to state that management teams must 
make it their priority to reconsider how they segment the market place when they are assessing 
new ideas. Expert interviewee TH recognised this management priority, as did all of the experts 
interviewed in the course of this investigation. In an email, he explained how his organi5ation uses 
bi-monthly idea generation and idea development workshops. These are designed to specifically 
overcome the problems with recognising or generating disruptive foothold markets: 
a key approach in these workshops is the combination ofsocietal and technological trends into 
to new product ideas.. with a 'no-doors' architecture /evefyone is welcome to join in] and a 
creative and open culture, the generation of disruptive ideas is supported, as all concepts are 
Armly based on market needs, or at least expected needs. " [TH-Senior Consultant-OR- 102 1] 
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Descriptions of the Main en2blers and inhibitors of opportunity recognition, using case evidence 
and the findings of key academic authors, are provided in section 4.3.1 of chapter four in this 
thesis. Integral contributors to the inability to recognise or to generate a disruptive foothold 
market were witnessed in the data and the literature to be: 
an unwillingness to challenge conventions, 
restrictive assumptions about growth and the basis of competition, 
a lack of consideration for the organisation's wider competitive and market domain, and 
an inability to segment markets in new ways. 
Evidence provided by Evans, Burns and Barrett (2003) adds to this base of understanding. They 
show how getting "inside the head" (p4) of customers and users with empathic design can help to 
break assumptions about early stage ideas, whilst identifying a niche of customers who are most 
likely to be delighted by a new offering. The case study organisations involved in this research may 
well benefit from such an approach. 
Furthermore, the issue of organisational leadership should be mentioned. Notions presented in 
Galbraith's recent work on "the economics of innocent fraud" (Galbraith, 2004) suggest that 
business. leaders are perhaps guilty of losing their grip on a common sense that dictates we should 
pay more credence to our gaps in knowledge. Managers, in all four cases, reported they felt 
restricted by the models of innovation adopted by their (or their clients) executive management 
teams. They reported these inhibiting models simply ignored unfamiliar territories (that could be 
represented by gaps in knowledge) and restricted the search for innovation options, or appropriate 
markets for new technologies and concepts, to familiar arenas. This issue relates significantly to 
the previously described barrier: 'the strategic importance of disruptive innovation is not 
understood'. By overcoming this knowledge deficit, managers will be more inclined to tackle 
unfamiliar territories and will see the importance of challenging conventions (Allen et al., 1999; 
Hamel, 2000), only then will the techniques and strategies, which can be used to identify a 
disruptive foothold market, be adopted successfully. 
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5.5 Traditional new product and/or new service development routines 
5.5.1 Evidence from the cases 
The four text boxes below present illustrative evidence from each case. They are considered to be 
largely representative of the data set and portray a feel for the barrier to disruptive innovation 
caused by the use of traditional new product and new service development routines. 
Evidence - Case A: "Because of competition from China our whole new product development 
process is based upon getting things right first time - from start to end.. We know no other 
way.... we need to learn to accept new approaches. " [A-auality manager-OD-2435 Et A-Ouafity 
manager-SD-2436] 
Evidence - Case B. - "We at [Case B] thought that our major issue was at the end of the process - 
with exploitation and marketing - but itý; not We need to think about these commercialisation 
issues up front and then think about how we adapt our development process to suit more 
experimentation in the market place - you know this probe and learn stuff we've been talking 
about. " [B-5enior Engineer-OD- 1707 & B-5enibr Engineer-0- 1708] 
Evidence - Case C "We initially highlighted that one of our key problems was a lack of 
management experience.. After talking to you all [the research group] itsý clear to us, at least 
that this problem is wider.... [Case C] is great at doing things better, but not supportive of doing 
things differently. " [C-Executive Marketing Manager-0-26501 
Evidence - Case A "We've noticed at our clients and at [Case D] that market research restricts us 
aff to focusing on the familiar.... perhaps this is one of the most critical problems.. but it: F just 
one of many parts of traditional NPD [new product development] that we need to address and 
change when we are aiming for disruption... " [D-Divisional Head-OD-2632 Ct D-Div&ional Head- 
SD-263 11 
5.5.2 A description of the focus area 
There was a tendency for participants from each of the cases to blame either creativity or a singular 
aspect of the new product/service development process for not generating or supporting potentially 
disruptive innovations. Likewise, to address gaps in knowledge, authors in the field of new 
product/service development have also isolated particular elements of the innovation process in 
their investigations. For example: 
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Leifer et al., (2000) provide a comprehensive discussion of early stage activities in the new 
product development process that can prevent or enable organisations from recognising 
and developing radical (and potentially disruptive) opportunities. 
Although concurrent development is a highly effective approach for the delivery of 
sustaining innovations (Lettice, 1996; AitSahlia and Johnson, 1995), McDermott and 
Handfield (2000) provide evidence to illustrate these approaches hinder breakthrough 
innovation. 
Moore (1995,1998,200, and 2002) presents extensive anecdotal evidence to explain that 
a key failure of potentially disruptive innovations can be found in the exploitation phase. 
Cross case examination of the data revealed that management should broaden their focus, to 
consider the impact of the traditional innovation approach, in its entirety as an interdependent 
process. Thus, an examination was made of the barrier caused by the use of traditional approaches 
to innovation in the context of the conceptual framework. The participants of the cases chose to 
focus this analysis primarily upon the constructs of opportunity development, solution development 
and exploitation - the interrelated process that the participants referred to as the 'innovation 
pipeline'. 
The case study participants reported that new 'half-baked' ideas would enter their innovation 
pipeline and make their way through their organisations' development process, past a series of 
decision points where resources would either be allocated or withdrawn. Participants from each 
case believed that the singularity of their pipeline was one of the key reasons why many potentially 
disruptive ideas were lost, killed or ignored. Expert interviewee, TF, agreed: 
as soon as / notice that my client has a single innovation process to develop all their idea5, 
know instantly what will come out of the other end.. simple, small step improvements on what 
they are doing right now.. / tell them: 'what you need is a separate development funnel for 
breakthrouqh projects'.. itsgot to have executive level support.... Jandla more intuitive process is 
needed.. no, intuitive doesn't mean less rigorous.. [for example] there is plenty of tools that can 
help probe and learn, you know, and in a pretty scientilk way"[TF-CEO-OD-2695 Irt TF-CEO-5D- 
2696] 
Thus, the data indicates that disruptive opportunities may require a separate parallel development 
process, as the tools, techniques and approaches, which allow management practitioners to 
approach disruptive innovation differently, appear to be counter-effective for sustaining innovation. 
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For example, the abandonment of concurrent development would cripple lead-times for the 
manufacturing cases involved in this study, but such abandonment could help them when pursuing 
potentially disruptive opportunities. 
The concept of a parallel development process is not new, for example, Veryzer (1998) and 
Christensen (1997) propose that a separate parallel development process is essential for 
discontinuous and potentially disruptive opportunities. They assert that such a separation would 
help management practitioners to 'do better' with sustaining innovation and to 'do differently' for 
innovation that aims to break the steady state. The research presented by Linton and Walsh (2002), 
Rice et al., (2002), Dowd and Walsh (1998) and Kassicieh et al., (2002) suggests that a separate 
parallel process would rely more upon pattern recognition than on data-driven market analysis. 
Furthermore, a parallel process, for the introduction of radical or disruptive technologies, is likely to 
require the establishment of new communities of practice (Swan et al., 2002); for example, Sakkab 
(2002) illustrates how Procter and Gamble use new communities of practice as a means to manage 
the introduction of discontinuous technologies. 
Moreover, the literature and the data, from the case study participants and the expert interviewees, 
demonstrate that executive management support is needed for a successful implementation of a 
new formal innovation processes (e. g. Hamel, 2000; Burgelman and Sayles, 1986). And 
furthermore, it is believed that employee rewa rd-mech an isms must be adapted to implicitly and 
explicitly incentivise the workforce to use new processes (e. g. Amabile (1997) finds psychological 
and financial rewards are both important in induc ing creativity and innovation). Thus, the 
evidence within the data indicates that a low level of understanding regarding the strategic 
importance of disruptive innovation could hamper attempts at developing an all important parallel 
innovation process. 
5.6 Inappropriate resource allocation routines 
5.6.1 Evidence from the cases 
The four text boxes below present illustrative evidence from each case. They are considered to be 
largely representative of the data set and portray a feel for the barrier to disruptive innovation 
caused by inappropriate resource allocation routines. 
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Evidence - Case A: "When / said that we can't pribritise ideas for products that our most 
important customers won't want, / guess we were saying our processes are not right.. our 
resources always revolve around short-term deals that service our main customer.. they say 
"Jump! 'and we ask "How high? " We must break this habit. [A-Director 6eneml-15-21 11] 
Evidence - Case A7 really believe we have some great ideas and some potentially disruptive 
innovations for sure.. But as soon as a large project comes up for one of our main technologies, 
or with a major customer, afl the resources get sucked away from these things on the periphery.... 
how can we stop this happening? " [B-5ub Divisional Director of R&D- 1696] 
Evidence - Case C. "Yeah [in response to the participant from Case 9 above] we experience 
exactly the same problem. The head of my diviSion says letting our core business dominate iS a 
cultural Jssue.. A lot of us are beginning to think differently.... this is absolutely an issue of how 
our executive management routinely allocates resources" [C-5enior A4317ager-15- 16971 
Evidence - Case D. - "We came here saying we need to Ide-risk' going for D/ /oisruptive 
innovation].... thefisk is of course flnancial. We need to learn better financing practice. We need 
better ways of presenting the rigures for these [potentially disruptive] innovations.. if we can 
make them look like a lower rinancial risk, then we will be able tojustify them more. " [D-5enior 
Consultant-15-26571 
5.6.2 A description of the prioritised focus area 
Intel's former chairman, Andrew Grove, states that "To understand companies' strategies, pay 
attention to what they do, rather than what they say" (Grove, 1996: 146). In effect, this means the 
strategy which is actually delivered by a company is what comes out of its resource allocation 
process -a notion supported by Noda and Bower (1996). "To remain successful in today's world, 
managers and organisations must be ambidextrous and able to implement both incremental and 
revolutionary change" (Tushman and O'Reilly, 1996: 8). Thus companies must seek to develop 
strategies that simultaneously pursue and deliver sustaining and disruptive innovations. 
Accordingly, this will necessitate an organisation's managers to allocate resources to both efficient 
responses to core customer demands, and corporately entrepreneurial activities in new and/or low- 
end niche markets (Tushman and O'Reilly, 1996,1997,2002; Bower and Christensen, 1995; Phaal et 
al., 2004, Leifer et al., 2000). 
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This conclusion puts significant pressure upon resource allocation routines, which is further 
enhanced when considering that the multitude of practitioners involved in this investigation 
identified funding routines to be the top barrier to the pursuit of disruptive innovation. Therefore, 
the remainder of this section reviews relevant literature and presents examples of data gathered 
during this investigation '-'. 
5.6.2.1 What is resource allocation? 
Ansoff's (1965) seminal work on corporate strategy, explains that management practitioners 
attempt to achieve their objectives through the "... conversion of resources into goods and or 
services and then obtaining a return on these by selfing" them to customers. There are three types 
of resources: physical (inventory, plant), monetary (money, credit), and human. All three are used 
up in the conversion process... " (Ansoff, 1969: 4). He continues to state that "... entrepreneurially 
orientated managers would view the firm as a pattern of investments [options to which resources 
can be allocated] to be amended and changed when better opportunities arise. " (Ansoff, 1969: 131). 
Ansoffs simple overview defines the term 'resources' and illustrates the purpose of the allocation 
process. And although today's understanding of the resource allocation issue is vast and more 
complex, the same heart still beats at its core. For example, Dougherty and Hardy (1996) stated 
that "An organization with both innovation projects and mature businesses ideally will have a 
resource system that channels money, equipment, expertise, and information to all these activities 
simultaneously. This resource system should also nurture new ideas and continuously raise and 
solve problems [to improve existing customer offerings and existing processes]" (pl 122) 
But what does this mean for today's management practitioners in pursuit of disruptive innovation? 
In what context do they make their decisions? How dynamic is the allocation process? What sort 
5-2 Given time and space limitations, it is not possible to synthesise all the past and prevailing opinions and debates 
concerning the resource allocation issue. Instead, a selective overview of key research is presented to provide a better 
understanding of the nature and complexity of the resource allocation process in today's companies that aim to pursue 
potentially disruptive innovations. 
5-3 The word 'selling' is in italic in the original text. 
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of mechanisms support and prevent resources from being allocated to potentially disruptive 
opportunities? The remainder of this section will attempt to shed light on the answers to these 
questions. 
5.6.2.2 Operation aI ising resource allocation for disruptive innovation: The decision context 
Building upon Ansoff's perspective, Joseph Bower's (1970) seminal work laid the foundation of the 
modern day process models of resource allocation. His book describes how initiatives surface in a 
bottom-up manner and then compete for approval and resources, which are often scarce (especially 
management attention), within the organisation's managerial and administrative systems and its 
strategic context. Bower (1970) focuses his work upon the organisation's managerial and 
administrative systems, which he refers to as the structural context in which resource allocation 
decisions are made. He acknowledges the influence of the situational context, the personal values 
and beliefs of management practitioners, but pays less credence to its importance. 
Burgleman (1983) attempted to extend Bower's work through analyses of corporate venturing 
processes in major diversified businesses. Like Bower, he describes the bottom-up emergence of 
investment options and focuses upon early stage approval and the competition for resources within 
the structural context. He specifically notes the importance of reward and compensation 
mechanisms and performance measurements , such as financial hurdles for project selection; 
however he extends the discussion to include organisational structure in terms of levels of 
centralisation and decentralisation. Burgleman's later work (Burgleman and Sayles, 1986; 
Burgleman et al., 1996; Burgleman, 2002) increasingly evolves the concept of the structural context 
to include Bower's overlooked situational context: "The structural context encompasses 
administrative (e. g. resource allocation rules) and cultural (e. g. rules of expected behaviour) 
mechanisms. " (Burgleman et al., 1996: 494). 
Therefore, the context that will influence a management practitioner's decision to allocate and 
provide resources to a potentially disruptive innovation can be described in a mechanistic structural 
form, or a less tangible situational arrangement. By integrating this knowledge with Leonard- 
Barton's (1992) examination of organisational capabilities, an improved description of the decision 
making context can be achieved (Table 5-3) 
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Burgleman-Bower Leonard-Barton 
Categorisation Categorisation 
Structural Context Management systems 
Human resources 
Physical recourses 
Situational Context Cultural systems 
Examples garnered from all three authors: 
The structure and procedures of the business: 
- 5ystems that determine how the business is structured 
and who has responsibilities. 
- Procedural systems such as resource allocation, human 
resource management, budgeting, training etc. 
The people employed by the business: 
- Knowledge and skill assets. 
- Networks of contacts. 
The tangible non-human assets of the business: 
- Inventory, plant (factoryloffices), monetary (money, 
credit). 
The collective and individual value and beliefs held 
within the business that influence prioritisation 
decisions: 
Table 5-3. Factors that will affect the resource allocation decision making context. 
This analysis provides an insight into the context that will influence a manger's decision to allocate 
resources. However, as previously stated, both Bower's and Burgleman's early work pay attention 
to the approval of resources and the initiation of projects, not the ongoing innovation process. 
Accordingly, resource allocation should also be considered in relation to the ongoing nature of 
innovation management and new product/service development processes. When such a 
consideration has been made, the data collected in this investigation, which pertains to the 
resource allocation process, can be more effectively scrutinised. 
5.6.2.3 Operational ising resource allocation for disruptive innovation: An ongoing process? 
The approach adopted by Bower and Burgleman in their early work overlooked the continuous 
nature of innovation management. Trott (1998) offers a management framework to describe this 
very phenomenon (Figure 5-6). When considering resource allocation and the pursuit of disruptive 
innovation within Trott's framework, it is clear that the decision to allocate resources to an 
innovation initiative is not a one off event but an integral continuous process. Management 
practitioners will continually face resource allocation decisions that will impact the fate of 
innovation projects from their early stages through to exploitation. 
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Figure 5-6. - 7he Innovation Management Framework (adapted from Trott, 1998: 21) 
Likewise, in an attempt to address the gaps in Bower's seminal work, Noda and Bower (1996) 
examined the ongoing nature of decisions to continue or discontinue support for a new corporate 
business. They emphasised that capital investments were made in a serial process and that 
decisions to commit these resources were made through a continual process of proposals, approvals 
and (as was shown in chapter 4) the achievement of milestone operational targets. However, this 
work was limited to the approval of, and commitment to, a series of capital investments. Although 
emphasising the continual nature of resource allocation, it did not consider how practitioners 
approve and commit resources to a single development project with disruptive potential or a 
portfolio of investment options. 
Christensen and Raynor (2003) present a model that places the resource allocation process at the 
heart of strategy actualisation (Figure 5-7). Their model presents both the formal and informal 
influences upon the resource allocation process and the cyclical nature of feedback within the 
ongoing decisions to approve and commit resources. This model further demonstrates that resource 
allocation and strategy delivery can be considered as two sides of the same coin and can, therefore, 
be linked to the findings presented in chapter four - e. g. the need to embrace emergent approaches 
if pursuing potentially disruptive innovations. This model can be used to explain the continuous 
nature of a single development project or a collection of projects and investment options; it also 
cleverly emphasises the importance of both emergent and deliberate strategy for the dualistic 
pursuit of sustaining and disruptive innovations (as do Lynn et al, 1996 and Kaplan, 1999). 
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However, it fails to illustrate Noda and Bower's (1996) notion, presented above, of the serial nature 
of investments. 
Deliberate Strategy "at 
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of and , at 
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Investments in New 
The Resource Organisation's 
Products, Services, 
--0- ACTUAL STRATEGY Allocation Process Values Processes, and 
Acquisitions 
Olt\) 
Emergent Strategy -al\6 
Figure 5-7., The process by which strategy is dertned and implemented (Christensen and Raynor, 2003: 215) 
The common nature and the benefits and practices of staged funding approaches have been 
published by Cooper (1983), Cooper, Edgett and Kleinschmidt (1999) and Block and MacMillan 
(1985). Similarly, Vesper (1980) and Stevenson and Gumpert (1985) propagate the notion of staged 
funding for new entrepreneurial ventures. And the benefits of staged seed funding, specific to the 
pursuit of radical, breakthrough and potentially disruptive innovations, are discussed by Leifer et al. 
(2000) and examples of this in practice are provided by Rice et al (2002) and O'Connor and Rice 
(200 1). It was also found in the first wave of this research that the pursuit of disruptive innovation 
is dependent upon staged seed funding capital that can be patient for growth (chapter four, section 
4.3.5.3). 
Therefore, if the understanding of a management practitioner's context for decision making is well 
advanced and the continual nature of resource allocation is appreciated, with regard to the pursuit 
of disruptive innovation, then an obvious question to ask is: Why are resource allocation routines 
rated as the key barrier to the pursuit of disruptive strategies? 
5.6.2.4 Operational ising resource allocation for disruptive innovation: A breakdown 
between approval and provision? 
It is commonly stated that resources do not always flow smoothly to innovation (e. g. Henderson Et 
Clark, 1990) and even less so to the pursuit of disruptive innovation (e. g. Christensen, 1997). 
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Dougherty and Hardy's (1996) examination of 15 large, mature, organisations, concludes that 
embedded resource allocation routines contribute to the 'innovation-to-organisation' phenomenon 
-a fundamental barrier to radical and discontinuous innovation. They describe a common trend 
within many businesses, whereby operational aspects of the organisation are allowed to 
commandeer scarce resources from the pursuit of highly innovative action. Their evidence shows 
that: 
e Resources were nearly always targeted toward established businesses, and individual 
champions did not have enough power to shift this imbalance. 
e Individuals, that were new to the 'game', were unsuccessful in resource gathering because 
they lacked adequate internal networks or had no networks at all. 
* Processes were to blame, as they failed to support innovation. 
41, Structures were to blame, as they nurtured functional fiefdorns and conservative 
decisions, rather than encouraging cross-functional activity and risk taking. 
Remarkably, many of the businesses in Dougherty and Hardy's study insisted they were committed 
to innovation. There was clearly a breakdown between intended resource approval and resource 
provision. 
The innovation, new product development and technology management literature has been 
summarised into three main themes. These themes reveal three primary reasons for the failure of 
an organisation's resource allocation routines to support the pursuit and the delivery of both 
sustaining and disruptive innovations: 
1) The impact of 'resource dependencies'. 
2) The 'path dependence' of organisational development. 
3) Th e difficulties of simultaneously maintaining different strategy making and 
implementation processes for sustaining and disruptive innovations. 
Burgelman and Sayles (1986) show that an organisation's mainstream customers almost never 
demand highly innovative or disruptive innovations. These are the 'people who pay the bills' and 
although they may want their products and services better, faster or cheaper they only ever voice 
their demand for 'more of the same'. Furthermore, their findings show that investors prefer to 
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garner dividends from safe investments. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) state these phenomena create 
'resource dependencies'; they explain how a company's freedom of action becomes limited to 
satisfying the needs of its main customers and the investors that give it the resources it needs to 
survive. These resource dependencies, therefore, appear to force practitioners to focus upon 
incremental and occasionally radical innovation. 
Most of the practitioners from all four case study organisations reported, whether consciously or 
not, that their resource allocation decisions were bound by a dependence upon their resource 
provid ers; (both customers and investors). For example, despite publicly committing to an intensive 
and broad innovation agenda, it was believed that most senior executive management teams are 
much happier to fund sustaining innovations as they do not want to risk devaluing their stock 
options. Furthermore, four of the seven industrial expert interviewees stated that resource 
dependencies were one of the most difficult problems to overcome when pursuing new lines of 
innovation. 
An organisation's future is often said to be 'path dependent' (Penrose, 1995), "history matters; 
growth is essentially an evolutionary process and based on cumulative growth of collective 
knowledge" (p xiii). Thus an organisation's accumulated knowledge and experience of how it has 
delivered success can often dictate (or at least significantly influence) its future. Leonard-Barton 
(1992) notes, however, that an organisation's core competencies often become its core rigidities 
when pursuing 'new to the world' or 'new to the organisation' product development. Consequently, 
if the organisation cannot unlearn or learn new competencies fast enough, corporate 
entrepreneurial activities become inhibited and are perceived as high-risk options. In seeking to 
avoid risk, therefore, path dependencies compel practitioners to focus on incremental and at best 
mildly radical innovation. 
Most of the practitioners from all four case study organisations and all but three of the expert 
interviewees reported, whether consciously or not, that their resource allocation decisions were 
bound by a dependence upon their organisational history. For example, it was observed that senior 
and middle managers, who want promotion, prioritise their time and resources to innovation 
initiatives acclaimed by their most valued customers and the most powerful executive 
management. 
When a management team aims to deliver a sustaining innovation, it can consciously and 
rigorously analyse data from the current situation and its past experience (Cooper, et al., 2001). 
Typically, they can define a project with a beginning, middle and an end, and drive a 'top-down' 
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deliberate strategy (Ansoff 1965; Obeng, 2003). However, as discussed in chapters two and four 
(the literature review and the results of the first wave of this research), management practitioners, 
faced with delivering a potentially disruptive technology or business model, have to accept that 
nobody can know how this offering will be used at the outset (Brown, 1991). "Disruptive 
technologies [may not suit deliberate strategy approaches as they] present a difficult challenge for 
market forecasting. The one thing that is certain in forecasting the size of these markets is: the 
forecast will be wrong and often by orders of magnitude" (Cooper et al., 2001: 218). As chapter 
four presented, a viable strategy has to emerge, through rapid probe and learn exercises within 
niche markets. Thus, resources have to be allocated to maintain strategic flexibility, in order to 
respond to emergent evidence (Christensen and Raynor, 2003). This is a very different approach to 
allocating resources to deliberate strategy formulation, in which returns on investment can be more 
readily assessed in terms of numerical contribution to the bottom line. These issues of strategic 
approach generate a two-fold problem, which significantly hinders the provision of resources to 
potentially disruptive innovations. Firstly, perceptions of risk increase when return on investments 
are difficult to calculate (Luehrman, 1998; Hellmann, 2002). Secondly, market pressures force 
many organisations to deeply embed the deliberate strategy process, to enable them to better 
respond to lead customers; consequently, they forget how to embrace an emergent approach 
(Mintzberg et al., 1998; Christensen, 1997). 
Once more, these issues were raised by the majority of the senior case study participants. Of 
particular concern, was the observation that sales forces within each case study organisation 
preferred to allocate their time and resources to selling the products and services that they knew 
the best, to the customers they knew would be willing to pay the highest margins. There were few, 
if any, mechanisms to help the teams to probe and learn about new market niches. Furthermore, all 
four organisations presented major reservations regarding opportunities that lacked clear deliberate 
strategy. Doubts were raised both in terms of the difficulties in accepting unclear return on 
investments and in terms of a lack of ability (and motivation) to pursue emergent approaches. 
In summary, an executive management team may state a strategic intent for the pursuit of 
disruptive innovation, and in essence voice a commitment of resources. However, the evidence 
captured by this investigation and the literature shows that embedded, deliberate, strategic 
processes and both path and resource dependencies, will significantly affect the actual strategies 
that can be delivered. 
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It has been shown that how managers and employees allocate their time and resources is a 
complex dynamic, which is diffused throughout all levels of the business. This makes it a difficult 
issue to manage, especially when trying to foster the pursuit of disruptive innovation. Analysis of 
the data captured by this investigation (as represented throughout the conceptual framework in 
chapter four), reveals seven common factors that contribute towards resource allocation processes, 
which are inappropriate for disruptive innovation (Figure 5-8). Each of these can be attributed, to a 
greater or lesser degree, to path dependencies, resource dependencies or issues regarding 
difficulties with strategic approaches. 
Senior executive and 
senior management values 
Competitors' Actions i. e. the standards by which Prevailing cost 
prioritisation decisions are structures 
i. e. a response to an aggressive move from a 
made 
competitor will often attract resources away i. e. profit margin targets 
from non-sustaining investments 
Resource 
Allocation 
L Influencers 
i. e. being responsive to current customer bilk. 
demands blinds many organisations from new i. e. what was attractive when the firm was small, 
market niches will not seem as attracfive when the firm is larger 
Customers Opportunity size 
threshold 
i. e. impacts which customers 
and products sales force 
prioritises 
Incentive and 
compensation schemes 
[Team Conclusion-Aggre, 
i. e. high potential management 
are moved around the business 
this can create short term focus 
Management 
development systems 
gatFon ofdata-IS-3043 to 30491 
Figure 5-8. * Influencers of the resource allocation processes that are inappropriate for disruptive innovation. 
Due to the unexpectedly high content of value based influences (as opposed to mechanistic 
financial techniques), Figure 5-8, was also discussed with the research group from a systems 
thinking (Senge, 1990) and a cognitive mapping perspective (Hodgkinson, 2002; Swan, 1997). This 
approach has been referred to as "meta-triangulation" (Lewis and Grimes, 1999). The senior 
executive teams of each case organisation were observed to possess shared, deeply ingrained, 
assumptions and generalisations and even images of their organisations - what Swan (11997) refers 
to as cognitive maps. These assumptions, values and images appeared to influence how they and 
their management teams understand the world and how they take action. An awareness of these 
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shared images was virtually non-existent and an understanding of their impact was almost entirely 
missing - an observation also made by Hodgkinson (2002). Thus, despite espousing support for 
innovation that goes beyond incrementalism, the management teams were in possession of 
organisational images, which only supported a "more of the same" approach. Argyris (1982) notes 
that people do not always behave congruently with their espoused theories, they do however 
behave congruently with their "theories-in-use", or what Senge (1990) calls 'mental models'. 
Senge's (1990) groundbreaking investigations into 'learning organisations' place significant 
responsibility upon the influence of mental models. He states that a management team's shared 
mental model is built upon the common elements of each individual's mental model, but also 
guided by the dominant top executives' perspectives. These shared views significantly affect the 
support that is given to the allocation of time and resources and the initiation of projects. This, 
consequently, explains why the senior management involved in this research perceived potentially 
disruptive innovations differently to the expert interviewees. Mental models have hugely powerful 
effects upon what we do because they affect what we see (Senge, 1990). "The inescapable 
conclusion is that the way we see our options can colour the decisions we make. [A notion that] 
spin doctors, pollsters and advertisers will not be surprised [to hear]" (Spinney, 2004: 35) 
Kaplan (1999) claims that when the members of an organisation are trained, to understand that 
technologies and processes have limited lifecycles, their personal values change and, by 
consequence, so do the mental models held by individuals and groups. As a consequence, 
organisational members, from the top to the bottom, change their behaviour; and both intended 
and actual support for innovation of a discontinuous nature increases. Figure 5-8 demonstrates the 
impact of personal values and the lack of understanding regarding the strategic importance of 
disruptive innovation. The mental models, upon which these values and knowledge are based, 
clearly contribute to the maintenance of inappropriate resource allocation routines, thus preserving 
the disparity between an organisation's strategic intent to pursue disruptive innovation and its 
actual strategy. 
This subsection has shown when management practitioners attempt to pursue disruptive 
innovation, there is often a breakdown between resource approval and resource provision. 
Explanations for the existence of this breakdown have been offered from a number of perspectives 
but few insights have been provided for overcoming the resource allocation problem. 
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5.6.2.5 Operationalising resource allocation for disruptive innovation: Approaches and 
mechanisms to help management practitioners 
The conceptual framework, developed in the first wave of this research, offers a number of insights 
for management who want to address the barrier of inappropriate resource allocation routines. In 
particular these include: 
The use of facilitative management tools that induce holistic thinking, whilst linking 
business and technology strategies, such as portfolio management (Cooper, Edgett and 
Kleinschmidt, 1999,2000 and 2001; Luehrman, 1998) or technology roadmapping (Phaal 
et al., 2004; Groenveld, 1997; Rinne, 2004). [Chapter 4, Section 4.3.5.1] 
e The simultaneous support of sustaining and disruptive innovation with flexible cost 
structures and targets, which allow attractive profits to be made at low price points or in 
small, emerging new-markets from the very beginning of a disruptive venture. [Chapter 4, 
Section 4.3.5.2] 
The use of staged seed funding capital that can be patient for growth [Chapter 4, Section 
4.3.5.3]. 
* Management practices and resource allocation routines that support emergent strategy. 
[Chapter 4, Section 4.3.5.4] 
Avoiding financial targets that force potentially disruptive innovations to 6ecome too big 
too fast. [Chapter 4, Section 4.3.5.5] 
The abandonment of restrictive mental models with management teams well trained in 
the strategic importance of disruptive innovation. [chapter four, section 4.3.5.6] 
5.6.3 Inappropriate resource allocation routines: A summary 
Resource allocation routines have been identified to be a priority managerial focus area, to which 
the pursuit of potentially disruptive innovations is highly dependent. Section 5.6 provided an 
overview of r elevant literature pertaining to this issue and offers insights into the data collected 
from the case study participants and the expert interviewees. Table 5-4 summarises the key 
themes and influences upon the context of resource allocation and the pursuit of disruptive 
innovation. 
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Literature Theme Influencers Authors 
Structural Context: - Management systems Bower (1970); Burgleman 
- Human resources (1983); Leonard-Barton 
Decision making - Physical resources 0 992); Ansoff 0 965) 
context Situational Context: - Cultural systems Bower (1970); Burgleman et 
- Individual and al. (1996); Leonard-Barton 
(1992) 
Resource allocation, not a one Off event but Trott (1998); Christensen and 
an integral continuous process. Approval and Raynor(2003) 
commitment of resources is ongoing and 
cyclical in nature, based upon formal and 
informal feedback 
Resource allocation and strategy delivery, two Christensen and Raynor 
sides of the same coin, both emergent and (2003); Lynn et al. (1996); 
A continuous 
deliberate management approaches are Kaplan (1999) 
important. 
process New businesses require serial resources Noda and Bower (1996) 
allocation -a continual process of formal 
proposals, approvals and the achievement of 
milestone operational targets 
Breakthrough projects require phased Leifer et al. (2000); Rice et al 
resource allocation - investments delivered in (2002); O'Connor and Rice et 
stages along the development process and al. (2001). 
throughout staged exploitation 
The innovation-to-organisation phenomena Dougherty and Hardy (1996) 
The impact of 'resource dependencies'. Burgelman and Sayles (1986); 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) 
The 'path dependence' of organisational Penrose (1995); Leonard- 
development Barton (1992) 
A breakdown The difficulties of simultaneously maintaining Brown (1991); Cooper et al., 
between resource 
different strategy making and (2001); Christensen and 
approval and implementation processes for sustaining and 
Raynor (2003); Mintzberg et 
resource provision 
disruptive innovations. al. (1998) 
A lack of understanding regarding the Kaplan (1999), Senge (1990); 
strategic importance of disruptive change. Christensen (1997) 
Prevailing mental models or cognitive maps Senge (1996); Hodgkinson, 
may influence what managers do because (2002); Swan, (1997); 
they affect what they see. Festinger (1957); Festinger 
and Carlsmith (1959) 
Staged funding, with flexible cost structures Leifer et al. (2000); Rice et al 
and responsiveness to emergent evidence (2002); O'Connor and Rice et 
al. (2001), Christensen and 
Raynor (2003) 
Primary supportive 
management , 
Holistic decision making. Cooper, Edgett and 
tools/app roaches 
Kleinschmidt, (1999,2000 
. and 
2001), Phaal. et al. (2004) 
The abandonment of restrictive mental Kaplan (1999); Ahuja and 
models with awareness raising approaches, or Lampert (2001); Senge (1990) 
a call to arms 
Table 5-4., A Summary of the resource allocation literature with respect to disruptive innovation 
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5.7 Identifying the needs of management practitioners 
The final aim of this second wave of research activities was to solidify the emergent top priority 
focus area into a testable and verifiable proposition with the development of a research hypothesis. 
Accordingly, it was deemed necessary to investigate the needs of the case studies' management 
practitioners with respect to the resource allocation barrier. 
The core themes of the literature review, pertaining to resource allocation, were presented to the 
participants from the case study organisations. During these presentations, workshop participants 
discussed the theories and constructs in relation to their own businesses and the pursuit of 
disruptive innovation. This section provides the reader with an overview of the analysis of these 
conversations. 
5.7.1 Overcoming the resource allocation barrier: A specification for a management tool? 
Much of the discussion with the case study participants involved addressing gaps in their 
organisation's formal resource allocation procedures. It was impossible to assess informal shadow 
systems (McMillan 2004; Stacey 2000) as they were considered too context specific for such a data 
collection approach. As gaps were identified, needs emerged and were categorised into clusters 
and therned accordingly. Five top management challenges emerged from the data analysis (Table 
5-5): 
The five top management challenges 
. 
1. Senior management need help to "see the whole innovation playing field - not just 
incrementalism", thus facilitating the identification and support of potentially disruptive 
opportunities. ffeamconclusion-AggregationofD,? ta-15-31011 
2. Senior management need help to "legitimise the allocation of resources" to potentially 
disruptive opportunities. [Team conclusion-Aggregation of Data-15-31021 
3. Senior management want "best practice funding guidance" and want help with communicating 
this to the business, i. e. how to provide and protect resources to support the development of niche 
market offerings and how to create return on investment commitments that allow practitioners to 
be patient for growth but ensure their impatience for profitability. [Team conclusion-Aggregation of 
Data-15-3104] 
4. Senior management want to prevent projects with a dominant history or dominant people from 
taking resources away from disruptive opportunities. [Team conclusion-Aggregation of Data-15- 
3105] 
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5. Senior management want help to achieve the above objectives whilst delivering best practice 
innovation management at all points in the new product/service development process (e. g. 
maximising benefits from investment into innovation, preventing project gridlock, delivery of 
strategic aims and a balanced focus between sustaining and potentially disruptive projects). [Team 
conclusion-Aggregation of Data-15-3105] 
Table 5-5. The top five most commonly cited needs of the management practitioners involved in this research with 
respect to overcoming inappropriate resource allocation routines 
It was concluded that if the executive management teams of the four cases had tools or 
approaches, which could overcome these five challenges, then it could be possible to overcome the 
resource allocation barrier. It was thought by the research group, at the onset of investigating 
resource allocation routines, that an organisation's financial mechanisms (such as its cost 
structures, methods for calculating return on investments and probabilities of success etc. ) would 
be the strongest of influencers over the resource allocation process. However, when probing the 
five challenges yet further, it was found that resource allocation routines, which are inappropriate 
for the pursuit of disruptive innovation, are not grounded in managements' ill equipped processes; 
instead, prevailing mental models (Senge, 1990; Hodgkinson, 2002) held the key. 
5.7.2 Inappropriate Resource Allocation Routines: A problem of mind, not one of process 
Spinney (2004) demonstrates that for centuries scientists have been trying to explain how people 
make decisions; she states that much of the focus until the middle of last century was 
concentrated upon rational thinking. However, "... researchers are starting to see how the choices 
we make are swayed by a complex range of factors such as emotions, social context and 
uncertainty, and how we weigh up the potential costs and benefits of alternative options before we 
make up our minds" (Spinney, 2004: 32). This insight was held to be true during the identification 
of the above five challenges. It became clear that the influence of 'management values' had the 
most significant impact upon resource allocation decisions. 
It was found that budgeting committees, production executives and marketing executives were 
reporting that they simply "felt uncomfortable" with allocating resources to concepts which were 
not valued by their traditional lead-customers. This was especially true for concepts which also 
lowered performance along traditional trajectories, whilst potentially offering lower gross margins. 
The consequence of being uncomfortable, in situations where potentially disruptive innovations are 
competing for resources, meant that actual strategies (the outcome of the resource allocation 
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process) become fixated upon the supply of incremental improvement and sustaining innovation in 
core product offerings. The data unequivocally demonstrated that the problem's roots were in the 
minds of the practitioners, within their very own cognitive processes; "... when we weigh up the 
cost and benefits of various courses of action, we do not just consider the material gains but also 
the social and emotional ones" (Spinney, 2004: 33). 
Senior participants from each case recounted times when they had been presented with an 
opportunity with disruptive potential. During these reports, the practitioners stated they had 
recognised and even felt the existence of an inconsistency between their current understanding of 
their organisation and the new opportunity. This inconsistency led to feelings of uneasiness and 
even resentment. They reported that the existence of such conflict created a cognitive driver to 
employ strategies to alleviate the dissonant feeling, which resulted in the rejection of the 
potentially disruptive opportunity (Figure 5-9). It appeared that numerous cognitive strategies 
were being employed to reduce the feelings of uneasiness that accompanied the potentially 
disruptive innovations. Furthermore, the use of these strategies could be linked to one root cause, 
the existence of restrictive 'mental models'. 
Practitioner's cognitive processes 
I Strategies I-J Recognitionof Reported 
employed to ýI 
Feeling of J 
e)dstence of feeling of reduce uneasiness inconsistencies, uneasiness uneasiness alleviated 
Figure 5-9: Potentially disruptive innovations, rejected because of a restrictive mind-set. 
As previously explained, (section 5.6.2.4) people do not always behave congruently with their 
espoused theories, they do however behave congruently with their "theories-in-use" (Argyris, 1982), 
or what Senge (1990) calls prevailing mental models. Senge (1990) states "... that many of the best 
ideas never get put into practice... because they conflict with deeply held internal images of how 
the world works, (mental models are] images that limit us to familiar ways of thinking and acting. " 
(p 174). Swan (1997) notes that cognitive maps (the term he uses for mental models) are the 
psychological tools that people use to construct and utilise knowledge. What makes them critical 
to the pursuit of potentially disruptive innovations is their role in determining and influencing the 
level of importance that is placed upon incoming information. For example, on encountering new 
stimulus and information a manager's prevailing mental models will determine whether this 
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information is registered as a high priority, a low priority, or whether it should be discarded 
(Harmon-Jones and Mills, 1999). 
Using the term 'mental model' enables a better understanding of the management practitioners 
from the cases studies involved in this research, and their perception of inconsistencies between 
investment options. Furthermore, it can be used to explain why the management teams appear to 
employ disruptive innovation rejection strategies. Morgan (1993) notes mental models "... are 
always based on implicit images or metaphors that persuade us to see, understand, and manage 
situations in a particular way. Metaphors [and images) create insight. But they also distort. They 
have strengths. But they also have limitations. In creating ways of seeing, they create ways of not 
seeing. " (p xxi). When presented with a choice between two options, Senge (1990) and Kiesler and 
Sproull (1992) observe that a person may anticipate or experience cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 
1957) if one of the options does not fit with their established mental model(s). If this is the case, 
then he or she should be expected to react to minimise or completely avoid the probable or 
perceived discomfort. Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) called this response cognitive dissonance 
avoidance. 
Thus, it would seem that the feelings of uneasiness that were reported to accompany a potentially 
disruptive innovation may occur because of the emergence of cognitive dissonance. For example, a 
prevailing mental model will skew perception. A management practitioner with a skewed 
perception may fail to see the benefits of a potentially disruptive opportunity because of the 
cognitive dissonance between the opportunity and his/her mental model. The cognitive dissonance 
generates unwanted conflicting emotion and the manager is driven to attach new values to the 
potentially disruptive idea, which differ from the actual values of the concept. The result is the 
rejection of idea because of its incongruence with the prevailing mental model(s), in an attempt to 
alleviate the presence of cognitive conflict. 
Tripsas and Gavetti (2000) present the case of Polaroid; they show how the strong beliefs that were 
deeply diffused across the top management of the company were a primary reason for its failure to 
embrace disruptive digital approaches. Therefore, to tackle inappropriate resource allocation 
routines, and embrace the pursuit of disruptive innovation, it would appear that senior 
management may need tools or interventions that can help them to engage in cognitive change. 
However, attempts to change the cognitions of top managers can be highly dysfunctional for the 
organization. For example, Tushman and Romanelli (1985), Amburgey et al. (1993) and Sastry 
(1997) have provided evidence to demonstrate that strategic re-orientations, involving significant 
changes to strategic beliefs, entail substantial cost and are associated with high mortality rates. 
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Therefore, management tools or interventions must assist practitioners to understand the 
consequences of how their current mental models determine a fixed and narrow view of innovation 
as incrementalism. Managers need to be able to see how their current actions are driven by their 
cognitions and how these cognitions link to the disregarding or mismanagement of potentially 
disruptive innovations. When a person has a deeper understanding Of 2 prevailing mental model 
they become freed to adapt or change it (Griffin, 1997, H2rmon-Jones and Mills, 1999). In fact, 
Senge (1990) predicts that a "major breakthrough in the practice of organisational management in 
the future will be... the discipline of managing mental models - surfacing, testing and improving 
our internal picture of how the world works" (p170). 
In an attempt to ratify the decision to focus upon the effects of prevailing mental models and 
management cognition, the data and insights from the expert interviews were cross examined and 
reassessed. It was found that these people and their teams actively fought against the temptation 
to succumb to disruptive innovation rejection strategies. Furthermore, of those that spoke of 
enabling or delivering breakthrough or disruptive innovations, there was a clear trend to display 
three 'disruptive-innovation-friendly' characteristics. The common link between the characteristics 
was not one of tangible process but one of mind-set: 
i) The ability to see beyond the traditional - to see markets and products differently. 
These practitioners were not constrained by prevailing trajectories of development, by 
tradition or by expectation. Unlike most members of the case study organisations, they 
actively tried to segment or to amalgamate technologies and markets in new ways to 
deliver new wealth creation - even if this involved changing the status quo. They held 
the mind-set that disruptive change was inevitable, so why not drive it instead of 
becoming its victim. 
ii) Doggedness even arrogance. 
Those that had been or were currently involved in the enabling or delivering of disruptive 
innovations, displayed a tenacity and single-mindedness that was not seen in the case 
study organisations. On the surface, this second characteristic could be viewed as 
negative or undesirable in many situations; in fact, it was reported that this was the main 
reason why 'disruptive innovators' were often not liked by change resistant employees. 
However, it seems that this persistence and self belief, which occasionally bordered on 
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arrogance, was a major enabler in the securing, borrowing or even illegitimate 
appropriation of resources for their disruptive ventures. 
iii) Passion: 
Linking the previous two characteristics was personal passion. Sometimes this was seen 
to be related to attempts to improve or maintain an image as an innovator, but mostly 
these people genuinely displayed passion for their change-supportive mind-set and their 
ability to innovate. 
5.7.3 Summarising the need for focus 
In sum, the final stages of the second wave of this research involved case study participants 
discussing resource allocation theories and constructs in relation to their own businesses and the 
pursuit of disruptive- innovation. This has enabled the identification of the needs of management 
practitioners from average performing businesses. Initial focus was given to financial measures and 
tangible resource allocation mechanisms. However, the constraining effect of mental models, often 
referred to by the participants as the 'viewpoint of what innovation is', became the dominant focal 
point. Cross examination of the expert interview data also revealed that mind-set, not 
organisational process, was a key driver for allocating resources to the pursuit of disruptive 
innovation. These findings, therefore, were allowed to steer the remainder of this inquiry. 
5.8 The development of a research focus 
It was not possible to test the validity of the conceptual framework (developed in the first wave of 
the research) in its entirety, due to time and resource restrictions. Therefore, the second wave of 
this investigation used a staged methodology to identify critical focus areas from which corollaries 
can be drawn. The results of the investigation presented thus far, have led to a focus upon resource 
allocation routines that are inappropriate for the pursuit of potentially disruptive innovations. The 
investigation of this focus area (presented throughout Sections 5.6 and 5.7) has provided 
corroborating evidence for the findings presented within the conceptual framework that relate to 
resource allocation. Of particular relevance, is the need for holistic thinking and holistic decision 
making approaches [Chapter 4, Section 4.3.5.1] and the abandonment of restrictive mental models 
[Chapter 4, Section 4.3.1.41 with management teams well trained in the strategic importance of 
disruptive innovation [Chapter 4, Section 4.3.5.6]. 
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It is believed that these finding allow the proposal of a research focus. For example, assuming that 
these findings were correct and generalisable, we would expect that specific circumstances or 
management actions could be proposed as highly important in attempts by senior management 
practitioners to overcome the resource allocation barrier. Table 5-6 highlights some of these such 
factors; although it is recognised that this list does not portray the complete or definitive picture, it 
Can be used to create a focus for the final wave of the research. 
A top management team, of an average performing organisation, could begin to 
overcome the resource allocation barrier if they... 
.. had an understanding of the importance of disruptive innovation. 
... could map their priority innovation activities onto a holistic view of the entire innovation 
playing field (a view that includes areas for both sustaining and disruptive innovation). 
... were facilitated to see how both mechanistic financing routines and a restrictive 
perception of innovation, constrain resources and generate a failure to support disruptive 
opportunities (thus providing a value based view of why innovation projects, with 
disruptive potential, have been killed in the past). 
... were facilitated to see how it is possible to challenge existing restrictive funding 
routines and to allocate resources to potentially disruptive innovations. 
Table 5-6. Factors important in overcoming the resource allocation barrier. 
5.8.1 Creating focus for the final wave of this investigation 
The final task of the second wave of this research was to create a research focus for wave three. It 
was decided to concentrate upon the prioritised focus area and to allow the emergent issues of 
importance to steer the research activities. 
Antaki (1988) notes that often theories and models cannot be tested directly or in full. Instead, 
researchers derive corollaries from theories (e. g. if theory X is sound, we would expect to find Y- 
here Y is the corollary) and it is then possible formulate propositions or specifications about that 
corollary (Gibbons et al., 1994). Concordantly, it was decided that corollaries and specifications 
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could be derived from some of the key findings from the data and extant theory regarding the 
prioritised focus area. French and Bell (1990) illustrate that such corollaries and specifications can 
be reconstructed and summarised to form the specifications for management interventions. Thus 
an intervention was designed to introduce the conditions described in Table 5-5 to the case study 
sites A and B. "[11riterventions are sets ofstructured activities in which selected organizational 
units (target groups or individuals) engage in a task or a sequence of tasks where the task goals are 
related directly or indirectly to organizational improvement. Interventions ... make things happen" 
(French and Bell, 1990: 113). 
Chapter 6 provides an overview of the management intervention that was, in effect, designed to 
further probe the prioritised focus area. The intervention was primarily workshop based, involving 
top management from both cases; it drew upon French and Bell's (1990) guidance on behavioural 
science interventions for organisational improvement. 
5.9 Overview of findings in relation to research objectives: Wave 11 
The primary objective of this thesis is to explore the nature and experience of management 
practitioners'pursuit of potentially disruptive innovations in average performing (or non-best- 
practice) businesses. As shown in chapter three (the research methodology) the second wave of 
this research contributes to this objective by attempting to focus upon the satisfaction of the 
second sub-objective. 
Sub-Objective 2: 
To explore the emergent conceptual framework in order to identify focus areas of management 
action and management cognition to which the delivery of potentially disruptive innovations 
are highly dependent. 
Thus, the second wave of this research was an exploration to uncover managerial focus areas to 
which the delivery of potentially disruptive innovations are highly dependent. Data were collected 
over an 8 month period using interviews, telephone conferences, email discussions and workshops. 
The analysis and the enfolding of literature revealed: 
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Inappropriate resource allocation routines, a failure to address the strategic importance of 
dis ruptive innovation, an inability to identify or to generate disruptive foothold markets and 
traditional new product/service development routines are four highly important areas of 
management action and cognition that can prevent the pursuit of potentially disruptive 
innovations. 
This finding directly supports conclusions that have been drawn in the literature by the likes of 
Dougherty and Hardy (1996), Liefer et al. (2000) and Christensen (1997). Although this cannot be 
asserted as a novel contribution to knowledge, it provides further support for extant literature and 
reassurance that the current research has delivered true-to-life findings. The identification of these 
four focus areas provided the executive managers involved in this study with concrete areas to 
which they could target their attention to initiate the pursuit of disruptive innovations. 
Furthermore, senior practitioners reported that a better understanding of the issues they face when 
pursuing potentially disruptive innovations leaves them feeling more enabled to tackle the 
challenge ahead. 
Authors writing in the field of innovation have mentioned or described the impact of a multitude of 
factors that are important to the pursuit of disruptive innovation. "The real challenge is in building 
the capability within the firm so that it is prepared for, able to pick up on and proactively deal with 
innovation opportunities and threats created by emerging discontinuous conditions. In other 
words, to develop alternative routines for discontinuous innovation ('do different' routines) which 
can sit alongside those for steady state 'do better' innovation" (Bessant and Francis, 2004: 135). 
Despite such a clear call for the development of new, academically robust and industrially relevant 
knowledge, the author is aware of only a few publications that have addressed the issue of "what 
should the management practitioner do differently tomorrow? ". The analysis of data from this 
second wave of research and the enfolding of both expert interview data and literature, revealed 
the prioriti5ation of one of the focus areas as a major inhibitor faced by management practitioners 
who wish to pursue disruptive innovation: 
If a management team wants their average performing business to become an ambidextrous 
organisation - capable of pursuing both sustaining and disruptive innovations - an appraisal of 
their resource allocation routine should be a priority. Both the tangible and intangible processes 
that create inertia of support for sustaining innovation should be considered. 
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Thus, it is the contention of this thesis that managers who are wishing to pursue disruptive 
innovation should address inappropriate resource allocation routines as a matter of urgency. The 
findings of this chapter also demonstrate that in doing so managers should not only consider their 
physical resource allocation process but also the mental models and organisational inertia that 
support it. 
Investigation of this prioritised focus area led to the emergence of a research focus for the third 
wave of the investigation. Accordingly, the remainder of this thesis is mostly dedicated to 
presenting and discussing the findings of the third wave of research, which investigated 
inappropriate resource allocation routines. It is believed that these actions and results satisfy the 
second sub-objective. 
The next chapter will further discuss the prioritised focus area with the view of overcoming the 
barriers caused by inappropriate resource allocation routines. It will then describe a management 
intervention that was designed and implemented to both probe the prioritised focus area further 
and to assist management practitioners to address the resource allocation routines that inhibit the 
pursuit of disruptive innovation. 
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6. Tackling a Significant Barrier to the Pursuit 
of Potentially Disruptive Innovations: 
Exploring and Describing Inappropriate 
Resource Allocation Routines 
- The Findings from Wave III of the Investigation 
This chapter is dedicated to presenting the results of the third wave of this inquiry, where research 
activities were concentrated upon investigating inappropriate resource allocation routines - the 
managerial focus area pribritised by industrial collaborators in the second wave of this research. An 
overview of the objectives is provided, followed by a description of a management intervention that 
was designed to probe the prioriti5ed focus area. The intervention was implemented at two case study 
sites, the impact and results of which are presented in a within case format 
CHAPTER AIMS 
To develop and implement a 
management intervention that 
will provide a critical insight in 
selected focus area. 
6.1 Introduction 
ACTIVITIES 
Developed management 
intervention to probe selected 
focus area. Implemented 
intervention 
in two cases. Collected 
observations from before, during 
and after intervention. 
6.1.1 Overview of primary objectives 
OUTCOMES 
............ Pesig, n, and implement a management intervention 
Observations: Implementation #1 
T 'r Vy 'r V 
Observations- Implementation #2 
vTyyvvTvvyTvTvy 
The second wave of this research prioritised inappropriate resource allocation routines as a major 
focus area for the attention of management practitioners. Consequently, the third wave of this 
research has concentrated upon this focal point and the following four primary objectives were 
established: 
1) To design a management intervention which can probe the management actions and 
cognitions involved inappropriate resource allocation routines. It should enable the 
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researcher to build new academic knowledge, whilst simultaneously aiming to improve 
the ability of the participating organisations to pursue potentially disruptive innovations. 
2) To implement the intervention, in 5itu, with the top management teams of two industrial 
organisations (cases A and B). 
3) To capture data throughout the intervention design and implementation process and 
through feedback sessions, which could be used to provide: 
a. A deeper understanding of case specific issues regarding resource allocation 
routines. 
b. Evidence to establish the industrial utility of the management intervention. 
4) To conduct cross-case analyses of the data to provide further insights and generic 
conclusions regarding the prevailing gaps in knowledge, with respect to the resource 
allocation problem and the pursuit of disruptive innovation. 
6.1.2 Overview of research methods 
Wave III of the investigation was conducted over a 10 month period. Data were collected in three 
phases - 'intervention design', 'intervention implementation' and 'post intervention feedback and 
analysis' - from the following sources: 
*2x pre-intervention semi-structured telephone interviews with cases A and B, plus 
numerous informal email and telephone conversations. 
1x two-day pre-intervention workshop with the senior management team of Case A (5 
participants), including tour of site. 
*2x pre-intervention telephone conferences with senior managers and engineers from 
Case B (4 participants). 
1x two-day intervention workshop, with the executive management team of Case A (5 
participants). 
*1x one-day intervention workshop, with senior divisional management team and senior 
engineers from Case B (16 participants). 
o Instant post-intervention feedback from all participants. 
* Feedback from independent observers of intervention at Case B 
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98x post intervention questionnaires. 
*5x post intervention interviews, with Cases A and B, at two months and six months after 
the intervention. 
4, Two feedback presentations delivered by representatives from the cases two months after 
the intervention. 
* Multiple informal post intervention email and phone conversations. 
The triangulation of data from these sources and the enfolding of literature revealed significant 
insights into the barrier to disruptive innovation that is caused by inappropriate resource allocation 
routines within cases A and B. A within case analysis is presented in this chapter and the results of 
the cross case analysis is presented and discussed in Chapter 7. 
6.2 The development of a management intervention 
6.2.1 Building a design specification 
It was decided that a management intervention must be designed and implemented; the findings 
presented in Chapter 5 established the first specifications of the intervention: 
Spec 1: The management intervention should both probe the prioritised focus area, to 
garner further academic insights, and assist management practitioners to address the 
resource allocation routines that inhibit the pursuit of disruptive innovation. 
Spec 2: The intervention should account for the five management challenges identified in 
Chapter 5 (table 5-5) 
1. Senior management need help to "see the whole innovation playing field - not just 
incremental ism", thus facilitating the identification and support of potentially disruptive 
opportunities. (Team con cl usion-Aggregation of Data-IS-3101] 
2. Senior management need help to "legitimise the allocation of resources" to potentially 
disruptive opportunities. [Team conclusion-Aggregation of Data-IS-3102] 
3. Senior management want "best practice funding guidance" and want help with 
communicating this to the business, i. e. how to provide and protect resources to support the 
ýIevelopment of niche market offerings and how to create " return on 
investment 
commitments that allow practitioners to be patient for growth bot ensure their impatience 
for profitability. [Team conclusion-Aggregation of Data-IS-3104] 
4. Senior management want to prevent projects with a dominant history or dominant 
people from taking resources away from disruptive opportunities. [Team conclusion- 
Aggregation of Data-IS-31051 
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5. Senior management want help to achieve the above objectives whilst delivering best 
practice innovation management at all points in the new product/service development 
process (e. g. maximising benefits from investment into innovation, preventing project 
gridlock, delivery of strategic aims and a balanced focus between sustaining and potentially 
disruptive projects). [Feam conclusion-Aggregation of Data-IS-3105] 
Spec 3: The intervention should account for the circumstances and/or management actions 
proposed as highly important in attempts to overcome the resource allocation barrier as 
identified in Chapter 5 (table 5-6): 
A top management team, of an average performing organisation, could begin to overcome 
the resource allocation barrier if they... 
... had an understanding of the importance of disruptive innovation. 
... could rigorously assess and map their priority innovation activities onto a holistic view of the entire innovation playing field (a view that includes areas for both sustaining and 
disruptive innovation). 
... were facilitated to see how both mechanistic financing routines and a restrictive 
perception of innovation, constrain resources and generate a failure to support disruptive 
opportunities (thus providing a value based view of why innovation projects, with disruptive 
potential, have been killed in the past). 
... were facilitated to see how it is possible to challenge existing restrictive funding routines 
and to allocate resources to potentially disruptive innovations. 
The remainder of this subsection aims to demonstrate how the final details of the specification for 
the management intervention were developed based upon an understanding of the prioritised focus 
area and the aims of this research. 
Ob5ervations of the restrictive impact of top management teams' shared mental models, motivated 
the development of an intervention in the form of a group process directed toward senior 
practitioners. 
Spec 4: The intervention should be in the form of a group process directed towards the most 
senior practitioners of the participating organisations. 
It was believed if senior executives and management could see how and why they inhibit the 
allocation of resources to disruptive innovation, then they would be in a more self aware position 
to tackle the problem. Thus, it was concluded if senior management teams are to fund disruptive 
innovation, they need to be able to see differently - an intervention was required to expose and 
explain the impact of prevailing mental models. 
It is claimed that by seeing wholes we learn to foster health (Senge, 1990); the benefits of tools 
that help us to see information holistically are well documented (e. g. Pavio et al., 1968; Horn, 1998 
and 2001; Maltz, 2000; Young, 2003). Moreover, the use of graphical approaches to the facilitation 
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of the data collection work5hops in this research proved to be highly effective (5ee Young (2003) 
for a discussion of the benefits of graphical facilitation). Therefore, it was decided that a 'visual 
tool', which can deliver 'holistic understanding', should form a large component of an intervention 
to tackle the resource allocation problem. 
Spec 5: The intervention should use an holistic graphical approach to help the participants 
see and understand how their shared mental model(s) impact(s) their allocation of resources 
to innovation. 
In their studies. of radical change, Amis, Slack and Hinnings (2004) found that the propensity for 
radical organisational transition could be increased, if the most value-infused elements of the 
organisation were identified and manipulated. They provide evidence to show that it is these 'high- 
impact' areas that will have "an important functional and symbolic role in the effective functioning 
of an organization... [and] changing high-impact elements early in a change process is compelling 
because their symbolic value helps to convey the importance of the transition. " (p18). Amis, Slack 
and Hinnings (2004) also found that changes to decision-making systems were the most important 
when it came to making radical transitions; however they state that changes to such areas were 
the most difficult to introduce. In fact, their research concludes that rapid, large-scale changes to 
the 'high-impact' elements of a business are ineffective and damaging to business objectives. 
Instead, they suggest that the instigators of change initiatives, which seek to deliver radical 
transitions, must first establish trust with the managers whose support is considered essential. It is 
then important to sensitively target the high-impact elements of the business with small, simple 
interventions that can generate powerful symbolic messages to influential organisational members. 
Thus, it was decided that the intervention that was to be developed for the third wave of this 
research had to encompass the following three issues: 
Spec 6: The intervention should 
sensitively tackle the high-impact decision making routines regarding resource allocation; 
involve the appropriate top management teams in a trusting relationship; and 
be non-invasive and met by little resistance, whilst at the same time maximising a 
symbolic message to the organisation. 
6.2.2 Deciding the upon the structural approach of the management intervention 
Cooper (1999) states that senior executives who manage to optimise their innovation investments 
and define the 'right' new product strategy for their organisations are much like stock market 
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traders with portfolios of investments; they select the winning new product projects, achieve the 
ideal balance of projects, and they consequently will win in the long run. Yet, Arnold (2002) 
illustrates that many companies invest in REtD as an act of faith despite the risks and uncertainty 
(Figure 6-1). 
Great 
Commercial 
(10 Uncertainty "I 
1001. VIIA 
Today's REW 
Activities Trust Us! 
NA, iol-6, 
High Cost 
Figure 6-1: In vesting in RRD as an act of faith (Arnold, 2002) 
Arnold (2002) states that a vital question in product innovation management is: how should the 
corporation most effectively invest its REtD and new product resources? And he claims that 
Portfolio Management approaches aim to answer this question by delivering the allocation of 
resource to achieve corporate new product objectives. Effective portfolio management approaches 
have been shown to yield tremendous leverage for improving innovation productivity (Cooper et al., 
2001) and the benefits from innovation investment (Cooper, 1999; Cooper et al., 2001; Figure 6-2). 
Strategic management of REM 
"Doing the right MD" 
Project management RH 
"Doing REID right" 
Figure 6-2., 'Doing the riqht R&D vs. Doing the NEW riqht'(Amold. 2002) 
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Portfolio management is a recognised and trusted management tool, utilised by senior management 
teams within many of the world's most innovative organisations (Cooper et a], 1999 and 2001). It 
uses graphical and visual techniques to deliver an holistic understanding of innovation activity. 
Luehrman (1998) and Hamel (2000) demonstrate that a portfolio of innovation activity should have 
three levels: (1) ideas/new concepts; (2) development projects or investigations and (3) projects at 
the point of pre-exploitation / new ventures pending launch. It is important to distinguish between 
ideas or investigations and new ventures within the portfolio because the most successful 
organisations will have a lot of small, quick losses whilst on their way to discovering true value 
adding initiatives (Burgelman and Sayles, 1986; Hamel, 2000). Hamel (2000) states that the logic 
of the portfolio management approach is based upon two principles: (1) to minimise risk by 
diversifying investments, and (2) "a business concept that gets killed, rather than scaled up, is not a 
dead loss... [it] produces learning, which, if captured and shared can help a company increase the 
odds that the next idea finds its mark" (p302). Moreover, portfolio management approaches have 
been shown to be relatively simple to initiate and implement, as they generally build upon existing 
processes and available management information (Cooper et al., 2001). 
Discussions were held with the industrialists from the research group regarding seven resource 
allocation tools and approaches, one of which was portfolio management. It became apparent that 
the fact that portfolio management approaches were familiar, are well documented and openly 
trusted by world-class organisations was important. This wide scale endorsement of portfolio 
approaches led the management practitioners to report that they considered Portfolio Management 
to be more trustworthy and reliable than other less popularised approaches such as Technology 
Roadmapping (Phaal et al., 2004) or Real Options Valuations (Luehrman, 1998). Moreover, these 
approaches appeared to fulfil many of the intervention specifications identified thus far: an 
intervention for top management, a graphical holistic approach, and seemingly relatively simple to 
initiate, therefore, non-invasive. 
However, questions remained before these approaches could be adopted and adapted: can they be 
used to enable managers to see differently - to expose restrictive mental models - and do they 
encompass enough of the resource allocation process? 
Figure 6-3 demonstrates how portfolio management approaches can be mapped onto the resource 
allocation routines as described in Chapter 5 (section 5.6). 
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Figure 6-3: 7he scope ofportfolio management tools 
- assisting with resource allocation decisions throughout the innovation effort. 
Cooper et al, (1999 and 2001) provide significant evidence to demonstrate that portfolio 
management approaches improve resource allocation decisions by an order of magnitude and that 
there are typically four goals when using these methods: 
a) Value Maximisation - they can be used to maximise the commercial worth of all an 
organisations innovation investment options. 
b) Balance - they illustrate how management decisions effect the balance of long vs. 
short term projects, low vs. high risk projects and maintenance vs. research projects. 
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C) Strategic Direction - they can help to ensure the portfolio reflects the organisations 
strategy. 
d) Right Number of Projects - they can be used to avoid innovation pipeline gridlock. 
Despite the clear advantages of using portfolio management techniques, there are few references 
to the pursuit of disruptive innovation in the publications of the leading edge portfolio 
management thinkers. Furthermore, Christensen (2003b) claimed in a recent on-line seminar that 
portfolio management methods, in their current form, have not been specifically developed to 
encourage the allocation of resources to potentially disruptive initiatives. Despite his claims to the 
contrary, nearly two-thirds of approximately 300 organisations, participating in this on-line 
conference on disruptive innovation, voted that portfolio approaches are the best way to deal with 
the unpredictability of innovation that moves beyond the steady state (Christensen, 2003). Thus it 
was decided that the characteristics of the portfolio management approach could be used to satisfy 
the specifications of the management intervention. 
In sum, these findings were used to inspire the development of an intervention herein referred to as 
"Disruptive Portfolio Management (DPM)". Like other portfolio approaches, the DPM intervention 
was designed to provide an holistic understanding of innovation activity for improved resource 
allocation decisions. However, unlike other portfolio approaches, the DPM intervention was built 
upon the six specifications outlined above. Therefore, it integrates a state of the art understanding 
of disruptive innovation. It has been designed to enable participants to better understand why 
disruptive opportunities have not been easily financed in the past, and it was designed to help 
justify investment into potentially disruptive opportunities in the future. Furthermore, the use of a 
portfolio management approach enabled the continuation of the collaborative process. For 
example, adapting the portfolio management approach allows the author to gather data, present it 
in a new format and to discuss what the implications are. Alternatively, interventions such as Real 
Options Valuations would require the researcher to adopt a different approach: to gather data and 
then produce 'the answer'; this would have fit neither the researcher's personal beliefs nor the 
ethos of the research programme. 
6.2.3 Intervening in the resource allocation process: An overview of the disruptive portfolio 
management intervention. 
This subsection presents a concise overview of the 'disruptive portfolio management (DPM) 
intervention'; a more full description can be seen in Appendix 5. The DPM methodology was 
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implemented in four phases with a group of senior participants from both cases A and B (Figure 6- 
4). The participants were all executive or senior level management with responsibility for the 
development or implementation of innovation strategy and formal resource allocation. 
1> Prepare 
Dimensions 2> Complete 3> DPM 4> Future < 
Workshop Ranking Checklist "Homework" Actions 
0' 
CASE A 
" Intervention conducted over three 
days. 
" Participants: the full 5 members of 
Case A's executive management 
team. 
" Make-up: This was a multi- 
functional team comprising of the 
Dir6ctor General, the head of quality 
the head of manufacturing, the 
head of logistics and the head of 
sales. 
Figure 6-4: 7he DPM implementation: a process overview. 
CASE B 
" Intervention conducted over three 
days. 
" Participants: 16 members of an 
innovation team of one of Case B's 
key divisions. 
" Make: -up: This was a multi- 
functional team, that consisted of 
top management and senior 
engineers, who was responsible for 
increasing the innovative capability 
and capacity of the division. 
6.2.3.1 Phase One: Prepare Dimensions Ranking Checklists 
The DPM intervention is essentially an assessment and analysis tool, founded upon a series of 
questionnaires called the dimensions ranking checklists (DRCs). The DRCs have two objectives: 
1) To assess the organisation's priority innovation initiatives using a series of standard PM measures 
(e. g. market feasibility, technological feasibility, benefit to the organisations, fit with strategy, etc), 
plus a cluster of qualitative and quantitative measures focused upon disruptive innovation. 
2) To gauge the impact of the initiatives under consideration (e. g. incremental, radical, 
discontinuous or potentially disruptive); whilst providing an analysis of each initiative's current 
stage of maturity, from early stage idea to advanced innovation project. 
The aim of this stage was to ensure that the DRCs were ready for the interventions and that the 
industrialists' requirements had been taken into account. Pre-intervention discussions during day 
one led to some minor customisation of the DRC process before its implementation during day two. 
For example, the senior management team in Case A stated that they did not want to use the DPM 
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intervention to deeply consider financial measures (such as NPV, ROI etc), so the intensity of these 
questions was reduced. 
6.2.3.2 Phase 2: Complete Homework 
Two types of homework must be completed: Firstly the DRC assessments can be completed as 
'homework' by the relevant project managers or REtD team. The assessors should select their 
organisation's top ten high priority innovation initiatives, in any stage of development, and a small 
selection of recently killed initiatives for assessment with the DRCs. Secondly, the author, as 
facilitator of the DPM intervention, gathers this data and plots it onto seven large scale portfolio 
maps or "Bubble Diagrams" (where projects are plotted on a variety of 1M2 maps using different 
parameters on the X and Y axis). Four of the maps are standard portfolio management views and 
three are designed to specifically account for disruptive innovation. The aim is to present to the 
senior management team a holistic graphical representation of their portfolio of priority innovation 
projects (Figure 6-5 illustrates how these appeared in the Case B intervention). 
, 
. 
*I- 
ý ... 
*19xw -I 
Figure 6-5., 7he DPM Intervention: Case BýF keyportfolio maps 
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6.2.3.3 Phase 3: The DPM Workshop 
Figure 6-7., 7he DPM 
intervention: discussing future 
actions and new visions. 
The DPM methodology was designed to be implemented through an 
interactive workshop with senior management teams responsible for 
innovation strategy. The management team can choose a one or two 
day DPM workshop, which follows the agenda shown Appendix 5. The 
plotted portfolio'maps are attached to the wall of the meeting room; 
the purpose of the workshop is two-fold: 
(1) To allow the author, as facilitator, to introduce or re-emphasise the 
concept of disruptive innovation to the participants using a knowledge 
safari approach (a graphically based knowledge diffusion tool - see 
appendix 5). 
(2) To allow the participants to be facilitated through an holistic 
analysis of the data from their portfolio maps. (Figure 6-6), in order 
assess how the prevailing approaches to innovation of innovation have 
influenced their resource allocation decisions. 
6.2.3.4 Phase 4: Future Actions - New Visions 
The final phase was designed to be driven very much by the 
participants of the intervention (Figure 6-7). Only when requested was 
guidance provided by the facilitator. The objective of this process is to 
use the richness of the preceding conversations in order to construct 
new visions to guide future resource allocation choices. 
6.2.3.5 Closure of the DPM intervention: 
Detailed case notes, of both formal and informal activities, were 
recorded throughout each intervention. Photographs were taken 
throughout the day to aid with documenting the events along with the 
graphically facilitated output from each group. Formal and informal 
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verbal feedback were recorded and questionnaires were completed by each participant (see 
Appendix 5). Finally, the author created a document that would, in effect, represent the minutes of 
the intervention process. These were distributed to the most senior manager present in each case. 
Daneels (2004) states "I call for research to observe directly the processes within firms, particularly 
using field methods. Such research could track resource allocation to sustaining and disruptive 
technologies... and could detail decision making processes" (p252). It is hoped that the results 
presented in the preceding section and the discussion chapter that follows go some way to 
answering Daneels' call. 
6.3 An overview of the management intervention's impact 
The facilitated analysis of the holistic views created through the DPM interventions generated a 
number of interesting insights and decisions for both cases, which go beyond an assessment of 
innovation projects. It is believed that the outcome of the DPM process has contributed to an 
improved understanding of the pursuit of potentially disruptive innovations and the barrier of 
inappropriate resource allocation routines. The remainder of this subsection will present and 
discuss the results of the within case analyses. It will present for each case: 
0 an integrated overview of the observations made during the interventions, 
the main aggregated results of the initial feedback questionnaires (a full version of the 
questionnaire and its aggregated results can be seen in Appendix 6), and 
0 the results of the post intervention feedback after both two and six months 
The findings from the cross-case analysis will be presented and discussed in the proceeding chapter. 
6.3.1 Case A: the impact of the intervention 
6.3.1.1 Key intervention observations, and the results of immediate post intervention feedback 
Case A's priority innovation activities were plotted onto the portfolio maps following completion 
and analysis of the project dimensions ranking checklists (DCRs). Figures 6-8 and 6-9 are examples 
of the maps that were created; they suitably represent how Case A was allocating its time and 
resources to the 'innovation playing field'. These two maps proved to be the most influential in the 
generation of decisions and insights from the four that were used during the intervention. 
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A number of early observations were made upon unveiling the portfolio maps containing Case A's 
top priority innovation initiatives: 
9 The diversity of Cases A's ideas and investigations, at first glance, looked promising. The 
maps show a spread of initiatives across familiar markets, current business activities and 
unfamiliar markets with new technologies. 
The promising diversity was quashed when recent project terminations, which had been 
made in response to competition, were factored into the holistic portfolio views. The 
terminations had enabled the management team to reallocate resources to accelerate the 
completion of projects contributing towards familiar core market products. 
9 The participants reported that they foresaw much of the project closure as they were 
experiencing serious issues regarding the integration of commercial information from 
unfamiliar markets. This was believed to be a major contributor to past project 
termination. 
It quickly became obvious that the participants preferred to work on highly controllable, 
predictable projects in familiar territories. In fact, the two initiatives that were rated to 
be potentially disruptive innovations were simply the Director General's pet projects. 
There was no process for gathering or attracting potentially disruptive ideas, neither was 
there an explicit or designated resource for experimenting with new concepts. 
The most senior people involved in the intervention expected every idea, development 
project and venture in their portfolio of top propriety initiatives to deliver significant 
returns. It was this expectation that appeared to maintain the organisation's focus upon 
conservative projects. 
During the workshop process, which aimed to explore many of these initial observations, extensive 
field notes were taken, capturing the conversations, debates and analysis. A multitude of issues 
were raised; the remainder of this subsection presents the key insights generated and the key 
immediate effects of the intervention. 
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0 The impact of facing organisational decline: 
Case A's senior management team reported they believed that during a period of growth they could 
protect potentially disruptive innovations from the pressures of regular targets and stakeholders' 
demands. This would clearly provide potentially disruptive ventures with the space and time that 
they need to be nurtured from niche markets into disruptive, new-wealth -generating positions. 
However, at the onset of the intervention, Case A was facing significant organisational decline. 
The early stages of the DPM process unveiled that organisational decline was keeping the team 
focused upon large scale market opportunities. In effect, they had unconsciously recognised that 
potentially disruptive innovations start in initially small niche markets, but the prevailing pressures 
had made these markets unattractive. Potentially disruptive innovations appeared to be 
inappropriate for contributing towards their immediate demands for growth. Thus, perhaps the 
most difficult issue for the senior management team of Case A to embrace was the suggestion, 
from the extant literature, that when trying to exploit a potentially disruptive innovation, 
practitioners should be patient for growth whilst being impatient for profitability". 
Nevertheless, the DPM discussions enabled the team to understand that it must not forget about 
the potential of disruptive innovation, especially in the face of diminishing returns on investments 
into established core products (and even more so when these products are nearing the end of their 
lifecycles). For this reason, the senior management team quickly concluded that it must pursue a 
careful balance between delivering sustaining innovation and enabling disruptive innovation. It 
was hoped that the diminishing returns on incremental improvements to current offerings, could be 
abated, whilst knowledge about disruptive innovation could be adopted and exploited for future 
success. 
11 The importance of contextualising the term disruptive innovation: 
The Director General of Case A stated during one of the pre-workshop interviews, that he alone was 
responsible for pushing new innovation boundaries and that the rest of the top management team 
failed to share both his enthusiasm and his motivation. In this regard, resistance was expected to 
the DPM intervention. However, a distinct tipping point was observed in the group's attentiveness 
and willingness to contribute to the workshop, this occurred following the completion of the 
Disruptive Innovation Knowledge Safari and the introduction of the organisation's portfolio maps of 
innovation activity. The participants embraced the notion and importance of disruptive innovation 
when they contextualised the term to their current situation. They used the terminology to refer to 
their current circumstances and realised that their business was, in fact, under attack by new 
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disruptive products from China. Furthermore, they could see they had neither a radical way of 
responding to the Chinese threat nor new revenue streams to pursue. The Director General also 
made the same observation: 
felt that 5ome people ýaw the light, when they 5aw, for the f1r5t time, all their different 
project idea5 vi5uali5ed on 5tructured meaningful maps, and it was clear WE are NOT being 
disruptive... "[A-Director General-15-DPM-3244]. 
It was this collective insight that appeared to generate commitment to the intervention and to the 
embracing of the pursuit of disruptive innovation. 
11 Disruptive innovation rejection strategies - the impact of restrictive mental models: 
As stated earlier, in an attempt to refocus their innovation resources, in the face of competitive 
pressure, the top management team of Case A had made a decision to kill a number of initiatives, 
prior to the intervention. The results of this cull would appear to highlight a significant resource 
allocation bias -a desire to avoid allocating resources to projects situated within unfamiliar 
markets, especially those which involved technologies novel to the organisation. However, at the 
outset of the intervention, Case A's participants spoke of the decision to kill their projects in 
mechanistic terms regarding inability to meet financial targets, lack of technical feasibility and lack 
of commercial attractiveness. 
Nonetheless, once a deeper understanding of disruptive innovation was delivered, conversation re- 
emerged regarding some of the previously terminated initiatives. This conversation, however, 
changed in nature and a deeper truth began to surface. The participants stated that termination 
decisions sometimes seemed to be based upon feelings and dogma, especially when the initiative 
was reported to be 'out-of-the-box'. The participants acknowledged their ownership of a narrow 
view of what constitutes valid innovation activity. It was also recognised that this view, and the 
beliefs and routines that held it in place, was largely responsible for killing many initiatives with 
new wealth and disruptive potential. A distinct change of language was noticed, in particular with 
the Director General. Once the team had acknowledged its narrow view of innovation, he stopped 
talking about projects "that didn't meet targets" and changed to speak of the "excuses we've made 
to kill projects". He became aware that he and his team had employed several disruptive 
innovation rejection strategies because of fear of the unknown, rather than objectively defined 
reasoning. 
For example, analysis shows that the practitioners at Case A had become fixated onto a resource 
allocation habit (as illustrated by Figure 6-10) that had proved to be successful during the growth 
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of the business. All efforts were focused upon their main customers and new innovative ideas were 
assessed by two criteria: (1) "How much does it benefit our main customers? " and (2) "How much 
will it cost us? " 
Cost 
High Low 
Vu . 21 Analyse 
Invest 
-2 E 0 
-0 :3 
co 
uý IgnorelCut Ignore 93- --1 
Figure 6- 10., A resource allocation habit at Case A 
High cost initiatives with a high perception of value to main customers were analysed for technical 
feasibility. If investments were made and benefits for key Customers were later determined to be 
low, the project would be cut, as these initiatives were normally ignored. Likewise initiatives with 
low cost and low value to main customers were ignored in favour of projects with 2 low cost to the 
business but with a high benefit to main customers. For Case A, circumstances had changed but 
their resource allocation habits had not. Intense competition meant that price had become the 
benchmark for competition in their core market. Consequently, there were now few low cost 
innovations that could deliver high benefits. Furthermore, this narrow customer focus had excluded 
both the gathering of low-end disruptive propositions that might have been found in the bottom 
right corner of figure 6-10, and new customers for Case A competencies. The decisions not to 
pursue these avenues could be linked to the affects of disruptive innovation rejection strategies, 
which are discussed in greater depth in Chapter 7. 
0A decision to reposition a major innovation initiative - the first adoption of a disruptive 
strategy: 
From the insights garnered from the portfolio views, the senior management team decided they 
needed to invest resources differently into one of their major on-going initiatives. Prior to the 
intervention, this initiative (represented by the acronym LIC in Figures 6-8 and 6-9) was considered 
to be a radical sustaining innovation. However, the team would now reposition the concept in an 
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emerging niche market and attempt to reconsider cost structures to allow the organisation to be 
patient for growth but impatient for profitability. Case A was about to embark on its first 
disruptive strategy. 
0A lack of early commercial consideration: 
The intervention unveiled that a lack of commercial confidence in unfamiliar markets was 
restricting Case A's innovation effort. The participants, in particular the Director General, decided 
that they must immediately address their lack of commercial thinking in early innovation activities; 
discussions commenced regarding training issues and a follow-up meeting was arranged. 
0A decision to kill a sustaining innovation project to provide resources to potentially 
disruptive innovations: 
The workshop allowed the participants to discuss their innovation activity holistically and in the 
context of the prevailing competitive environment. This facilitated a number of deep organisational 
insights. For example, during the workshop, the participants scheduled a follow-up meeting to 
discuss how one of their current high priority initiatives (a sustaining innovation in a core market 
with diminishing returns on investment), could be killed to make way for re-opening investigations 
into two previously closed potentially disruptive projects, which resided in peripheral markets. Case 
A had previously struggled to free resources from their fight with insurgent Chinese competition in 
their core market. The ability to open such a discussion, without it being quashed, was recognised 
by the participants to be a major breakthrough for Case A's management team. Furthermore, the 
indication that they were going to do this whil5t attempting to enable potentially disruptive 
innovations in other markets was an unexpected and well received outcome of the DPM process. 
0 The emergence of multi-stakeholder portfolio mapping: 
The Director General of Case A was surprised to see the low impact positioning of a key priority 
initiative, which he had assumed to be delivering high impact business benefits (represented by the 
acronym MTP in Figures 6-8 and 6-9). Consequently, he decided that he was going to take the 
"Reward Vs Probability of Technical Success" portfolio map to the major stakeholder in this 
initiative - an external materials advisor and supplier. He wanted to use the portfolio map as a too[ 
to communicate his concerns and to drive a discussion to see if it was possible to improve the 
feasibility of plans and increase the benefits of the project. 
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0 The impact of subjectively selected innovation effort that purely responds to competitive 
threat. - 
It became apparent that Case A had struggled to engage in rigorous, planned innovation effort. It 
was believed this was due to the restrictions that many SMEs face (e. g. their 'deal making' nature 
and limited management time and training) and was a major contributor to blockages in the 
resource allocation process. The head of quality and manufacturing believed they must adopt more 
rigorous project assessment and refrain from unplanned responses to their competitors' actions. He 
stated: 
"Many of our decisions have been mainly based on 'feefing'thisjust isn't good enough any more. 
Today we have seen that it is not difficult to be objective, we must use these more analytical 
qpproache5"[A-Ouafity Manager-SD-DPM-31981. 
El Emotional responses to challenging conventional behaviour. 
The consequence of challenging organisational routines, even when they were shown to limit 
organisations to incremental innovation, evoked significant emotional responses - particularly from 
Case A's Director General. The experience of emotional highs and lows were not explicitly stated by 
the participants in a formal context, either during or after the DPM intervention. However, their 
emergence was plainly evident and even 'joked' about during informal conversation following the 
workshop process. For example, there were emotive personal outbursts following the recognition 
that prevailing routines, which had delivered past success, had also killed potentially disruptive 
opportunities. There was a gradual but significant emergence of tension between the participants 
and the author, in his role as the facilitator, who was seen as responsible for surfacing these 
emotions. The Director General of Case A at one point suddenly shouted 'Are you telling me, Pete, 
" which almost led to the rejection of the process. However, that 1ýn running this busines5 badly? I 
when the participants acknowledged that it was their data which had produced the portfolio maps, 
and their insights which were challenging their current resource allocation approach, the tension 
was relieved, and the energy was refocused onto creating new visions of strategic intent for the 
future. 
0 Overaff impact assessment of the DPM intervention: 
Immediately following the workshop, the Case A participants unanimously voted the DPM 
intervention to be of significant benefit to their organisation (Figure 6-11). Particularly 
contributing to the feeling of success was the unanimous belief that that the objective of 
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'suggesting improvements to Case A's innovation strategy' had been 'mostly met' and that the 
following workshop objectives had been 'completely met': 
e To introduce and familiarise the group with Case A's "innovation landscape". 
a To allow the participants to understand the implications of their narrow project selection 
and the team's current resource allocation approach. 
9 To develop an understanding of how the senior management team's actions influence the 
innovation efforts of Case A. 
How beneficial has the DPM intervention been to your organisation? 
(immediate feedback) 
No 
-., 
1, 
High 
Benefit ' Medium Benefit ' Benefit 
Figure 6-11: Case A ýF scalar rating assessment of the overall benefits delivered by the DPM methodology 
- completed immediately after the intervention, 
0 The intervention delivered a clear, common and shared understanding of innovation activI4, ý 
The overwhelming initial feedback from the top management team of Case A was that the DPM 
intervention had significantly enhanced their ability to articulate a clear, common and shared 
understanding of their innovation activity. It was reported that this understanding included a view 
of where the company is today and how it could seek to simultaneously pursue both sustaining and 
disruptive innovations in the future. It was this belief that contributed significantly to the 
perception of success. 
6.3.1.2 Key feedback two months after intervention 
0 Holistic tools help to deliver strategic action aligned to both sustaining and disruptive 
innovation: 
In a presentation, two months after the DPM intervention, the head of quality and manufacturing 
reported that the Case A participants had learned that strategic action is what comes out of the 
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resource allocation process. He stated that the DPM had helped them to realise a new strategic 
intent for the business, which they understood must be matched by resource provision. 
Furthermore, it was reported that they believed approaches that deliver an holistic understanding 
of innovation activity, such as the DPM methodology, could become the focal integrating device to 
achieve this aim and to carry forward their business strategy and planning process in the future. 
0 OveraH impact assessment of the DFM intervention. 
Despite the positive feedback above, Case A's participants unanimously voted that the DPM 
methodology had actually only delivered medium business benefits - this was not as high as they 
had previously stated (figure 6-12). 
How beneficial has the DPM intervention been to your organisation? 
(feedback after two months) 
No High 
Benefit Medium Benefit Benefit 
A simpler, more 
accessible and 
repeatable version 
Figure 6-12: Case A ýF scalar rating assessment of the overafl benerits delivered by the DPM methodology 
completed two months after the intervention. 
It was reported that intensifying competition in their core market had forced the management 
team to invest resources into sustaining innovations in order to protect jobs. Furthermore, when 
they tried to replicate part of the DPM process, without the support of the author, the methodology 
was deemed too complex and the benefits that were foreseen were not as easy to deliver as they 
had hoped. 
I 
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0 Ca5e A declares the need for an on-going DPM tool., 
The learning gained during the initial application of the DPM methodology, in Case A, had provided 
confidence in the benefits of the general approach - even two months after the intervention. The 
head of quality and manufacturing noted the key reason for this high level of confidence: 
"The DPM work5hop gave us a coherent view of our current innovation activity and helped us to 
justify resource allocation decisions... "[A-Ouafity Manager-15-DPM-34001 
They stated their desire to generate on-going benefits from the intervention and made clear their 
wish for a simplified process, to be customised to better suit their direct needs (Figure 5-23). 
"ffhe DPM] helped to create a consensus of understanding and priorities that would have other 
wise been impossible to deliver within our management team - we need to keep this momentum, 
we need to tailor this process for us" [A-Director 6eneral-15-DPM-33621. 
It was reported that such an on-going process would need to be integrated into Case A's review 
and planning cycles and enhance current information management systems. 
0 The emergence of multi-stakeholder portfolio mapping: 
As reported in section 6.3.1.1, the Director General of Case A had planned to use the "Reward Vs 
Probability of Technical Success" portfolio map to initiate a conversation with a major external 
stakeholder. His aim was to improve the feasibility and the benefits of a major project. He 
reported two months later that this major technical programme had been cancelled following a 
number of conversations with the stakeholder, all of which had been kick-started by the use of the 
portfolio map. 
13 A decision to reposition a major innovation initiative - the r1rst adoption of a disruptive 
strategy., 
As reported in section 6.3.1.1, the top management team of Case A had planned to reposition one 
of their major on-going initiatives into a disruptive strategy. However, intensified competition in 
their core market led to a loss of a major contract, from their main customer, and despite the 
success of initial groundwork, it was reported that this forced the team to seek a sustaining role for 
their potentially disruptive initiative. Consequently, they were rushing the product to the 
mainstream core market in a hope that it would be well received and that they would not have to 
undergo majorjob losses. It was too early to see the results of this responsive strategy. 
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6.3.1.3 Key feedback six months after intervention 
At the onset of this research in October 2001, the management team of Case A was aware of their 
over-reliance upon a large dominant customer. They had spent much of their time since then 
trying to address this situation in their core market, and the DPM intervention appeared to be 
responsible for re-establishing a focus on opening new revenue streams in unfamiliar markets. 
However, as mentioned in section 6.3.1.2, during the course of this investigation Case A suffered 
the loss of a major contract, from their main customer, in their core market. With no other major 
revenue streams, the loss of this contract meant that Case A could no-longer sustain a business and 
workforce of the size to which it had grown. Attempts to replace the lost revenues with a 
potentially disruptive innovation were in vain; not only was it too little too late but it would seem 
that customers in the mainstream market were not ready to take on this unusual offering. In 
February 2004, one month before the planned six month post intervention feedback, Case A 
terminated its involvement in this research and steps were taken to terminate prevailing operations. 
0A focus upon disruptive innovation rejection strategies: 
During this difficult time, the director general had remained in monthly contact. The main focus of 
the email and telephone conversations was disruptive innovation rejection strategies. He was 
clearly concerned about the effect of unseen influences upon the resource allocation process, to 
which both he and his team had become the victim. These conversations enhanced the data 
collected during the DPM intervention design and implementation and will be presented as a 
discussion in the next chapter. 
6.3.2 Case B: the impact of the intervention 
6.3.2.1 Key intervention observations, and the results of immediate post intervention feedback 
Case B's priority innovation activities could be plotted onto the portfolio maps following 
completion and analysis of the project dimensions ranking checklists (DCRs), Figures 6-13 and 6- 
14 are examples of the maps that were created; they suitably represent how Case B was allocating 
its time and resources to the 'innovation playing field'. These two maps were two of four which 
proved to be the most influential in the generation of decisions and insights during the 
intervention. 
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A number of early observations were made upon unveiling the portfolio maps containing Case B's 
top priority innovation initiatives: 
* On seeing the portfolio map represented by Figure 6-13 for the first time, the first 
statement made by the head of the innovation team was: 
"Do you use the saying ýou shouldn't keep all your eggs in one basket? This picture looks rather 
worrying"[8-Head of Innovation 7eam-15-DPM-3452J. 
Prior to the workshop, he had reported that he believed the team's priority innovation 
initiatives were "a diverse group of future options" 
The most senior participants of the DPM workshop raised the immediate concern that the 
innovation team's priority focus had been given completely to opportunities that lie 
outside the core of existing activities. There was concern that the increased competition, 
faced by Case B's core business propositions, was not being alleviated by the introduction 
of radical or potentially disruptive opportunities. 
The projects represented by the acronyms 'SE' and 'RA' in Figures 6-13 and 6-14 were 
rated by the project managers to be potentially disruptive innovations. However, as 
English was not their mother tongue, language issues has led to confusion and meant that 
these initiatives were quickly repositioned by the senior management team to their 
positions shown in Figure 6-13. 
Despite the focus upon developing new business in unfamiliar markets, Case B was 
exhibiting major problems with commercial isation issues within unfamiliar territories. 'It 
was initially reported that there was perhaps not enough commercial consideration in the 
early stages of the innovation process. 
It was apparent that executive management were expecting every priority initiative to 
yield significant returns for Case B. This expectation was quickly noticed to have a 
draining effect upon the portfolio. Stakeholders in the innovation process only liked to 
present opportunities with a high certainty over the outcome, and were reluctant to 
reveal ideas for potentially disruptive innovations. 
It was reported almost instantly that Case B had no explicit or designated resource for 
experimenting with new 'out-of-the-box' ideas. Thus it was difficult to attract or gather 
potentially disruptive opportunities. 
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During the workshop process, which aimed to explore many of these initial observations, extensive 
field notes were taken, capturing the conversations, debates and analysis. A multitude of issues 
were raised; the remainder of this subsection presents the key insights generated and the key 
immediate effects of the intervention. 
D Building consensus: 
It was observed that the participants were almost overjoyed by the fact that they did not have to 
engage in long discussions regarding the impact or importance of the individual projects. The use 
of a standard checklist that assessed and ranked the various critical dimensions of each initiative, 
which was supported by the head of the innovation team, had given the participants confidence in 
the data that was represented by the portfolio maps. The holistic views allowed some initial project 
movement but consensus was reported to be delivered more quickly than ever before. 
0A bias against small experiments and the credibility of internal entrepreneurs: 
It became clear that Case B's executive management team, and the management team of the 
division with which this research was conducted, maintained a bias against small experiments. To 
get noticed or to be considered as delivering a true contribution, it appeared that employees had to 
be seen working on large prominent projects. This does not support the facilitators of disruptive 
innovation discussed in the previous chapters, such as win small, win early and win often. During a 
coffee break in the intervention, two senior engineers reported that the credibility of those in the 
innovation process was linked more to the size and budget of the project, rather than the results 
that it was delivering. Later, and again in an informal context, these same two engineers explained 
that they were working on small private projects, which they had not reported to the top 
management team. Following a discussion, it was clear that both initiatives had significant 
disruptive potential, yet worryingly, from Case B's perspective, neither engineer wanted to 
announce their discoveries to the corporate powers. They believed that their credibility would be at 
stake. Instead, they were both considering establishing their own businesses to pursue their 
initiatives in their own time. Clearly, Case B's bias towar d large experiments not only flies in the 
face of theory on disruptive innovation, but it was forcing the innovation process to haemorrhage 
its potentially disruptive innovations. 
0 An arrogance that "business as usual" will protect core markets. 
After initial probing it became clear that past success, with world beating technologies, 
underpinned many of the participants' belief that Case B could not be disrupted in their current 
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mainstream markets. Therefore, despite preliminary evidence of 'technology over-supply' in several 
core product categories, Case B's top priority innovation initiatives were focused upon new business 
creation. 
0 Disruptive innovation rejection strategies - the impact of restrictive mental models: 
Similarly to Case A, Case B's participants spoke of the decision to kill projects in mechanistic terms 
regarding inability to meet financial targets, lack of technical feasibility and lack of commercial 
attractiveness. However, the conversation changed in nature and a deeper truth began to surface 
once a deeper understanding of disruptive innovation was delivered. For example, the bias against 
small experiments, as presented above, was discussed in the context of the pursuit of disruptive 
innovation. Consequently, many of the participants stated that termination decisions were clearly 
based upon prevailing dogma, especially when the initiative was considered to be 'out-of-the-box'. 
Despite intended strategic commitment to being a world class innovator, the participants slowly 
acknowledged their ownership of a narrow view of what constitutes valid innovation activity. Once 
it was recognised that this view was restricting the pursuit innovation, the participants began to 
admit (in retrospect and in trust) to many circumstances where they rejected potentially disruptive 
opportunities, in favour of sustaining innovation. It was clear that a number of disruptive 
innovation rejection strategies were being employed both at a conscious and unconscious level. 
The divisional Director of REtD summarised this finding: 
"These holistic portfolio maps presented us with information that was previously unseen" [B- 
Director of R&D-OE-DPM-3487j. 
Decisions to reject or kill projects became the focus of a great deal of discussion and debate; an 
analysis of this debate is presented in Chapter 7. 
0 Crea ting news tra tegic in ten L 
When Case B's most senior participants recognised that they had been unintentionally employing 
disruptive innovation rejection strategies a new priority objective emerged: 'to build a new vision 
and focus for the future of innovation activity which includes disruptive innovation'. Significant 
time was spent discussing how they could avoid falling into the trap of rejecting potentially 
disruptive innovations again in the future. These discussions led the head of the innovation team 
to facilitate and literally create a new intended strategy. He listened to the group's commentary, 
pushed for deeper insights and then, using a marker pen, he physically circled areas of the portfolio 
maps, which he believed must become Case B's targets for the future. It was from these areas 
which the team and the author believed potentially disruptive innovation were more likely to 
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emerge. This was considered to be one of the most powerful moments in the DPM workshop, as it 
led to the development of new future focus areas and generated consensus and support, from the 
entire group, regarding how resources should be allocated. When asked for feedback at the close of 
the intervention the head of the innovation team stated: 
i the DPA4 methodology] enabled us to touch the vefy basic tý; [ assumptions of our bu5iness.. 
now lets get disruptive"[8-Head of Innovation Team-15-DPM-361 11. 
0 The effect of facinq 'unusual orpnisational objectives". 
The DPM intervention helped to unveil Case B's commitment to an unwritten, implicit company 
objective - the desire to create more jobs for Israeli citizens. The management team could clearly 
see that an investment into a large-scale project was more likely to rapidly deliver higher-levels of 
new job creation. Thus, this unanticipated and unusual organisational objective became difficult to 
reconcile with the initially low levels of job creation in small or emergent niche markets in which 
potentially disruptive innovations tend to begin their existence. Eventually, the participants' 
attention was focused upon the key feature of disruptive innovation that related to their implicit 
organisational objective: disruptive innovation is a source of new-growth markets and new-wealth 
creation. Thus the potential for long-term benefits allowed the participants to reconcile their 
unusual organisational objective with investments into small or emergent niche markets. 
0 The importance of an holistic view of innovation activity - improving the quality of 
discussion: 
The participants reported that they believed the holistic view of innovation activity had allowed the 
management team to broaden the discussion of innovation activity to include disruptive innovation. 
Furthermore, they believed that the dialogue in general had improved in quality because discussions 
were less rambling than most previous 1341) meetings, and actions were easier to agree and 
communicate. The holistic views prevented the most organ isationa Ily well know project from 
overshadowing the discussion Moreover, the main contribution that the holistic views and the 
DPM process gave to improving the quality of discussion was reported to be the prevention of the 
most senior person from dominating the whole meeting. 
0 The importance of an holistic view of innovation activity - tackling mental models: 
The participants reported that they believed the DPM intervention had provided them with a 
holistic view of the entire innovation playing field and how they were performing in relation to all 
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the differing approaches to innovation. They continued to announce that when armed with an 
holistic understanding of innovation activity they found it easier to challenge prevailing mental 
models and to legitimise the pursuit of disruptive innovation. It was also reported that the use of 
the holistic portfolio maps would allow them to ring-fence resources for potentially disruptive 
opportunities. 
13 A reduced perception of risk facilitates the pursuit of disruptive innovation: 
At the onset of the intervention, it was reported that potentially disruptive opportunities were 
perceiv ed to be high risk ventures. However, it was clear that a major reason for this perception 
was the focus upon large scale projects that dominated the REtD activities of Case B. Wheelwright 
and Clark (1992) note it is quite right for management practitioners to consider mass investment 
into an unproven technology or unproven business concept as a high risk strategy. However, the 
participants reported that they believed the DPM intervention had provided them with a better 
understanding of the issues relating to the phenomenon of disruptive innovation (in particular, the 
need for probe and learn approaches and seed and staged funding processes). Armed With this 
information and the holistic views of innovation activity, the most senior participants reported their 
perception of risk in relation to potentially disruptive innovation had been reduced. It appears that 
it was this reduced perception of risk that enabled the group to address the preclusion of 
potentially disruptive opportunities from their innovation activity. 
0 Overall impact assessment of the DPM intervention: 
Immediately following the workshop, the majority of Case B's participants voted that the DPM 
intervention had been of high benefit to their organisation and had contributed to their 
professional development (Figure 6-15). 
Particularly contributing to the feeling of success was the unanimous belief that that the objective 
of suggesting improvements to Case B's innovation strategy had been 'completely met', as had the 
following additional workshop objectives: 
e To probe each of the important portfolio views for the deeper implications of Case B's 
current resource allocation approach. 
To develop an understanding of how the senior management team's actions influence the 
innovation efforts of Case B (particularly the surfacing of restrictive mental models). 
* To understand how an holistic view of innovation activity can be used to develop a new 
vision of strategic intent for the future. 
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How beneficial has the DPM intervention been to your organisation? 
(immediate feedback) 
100% 
-j 
igh No 
11 
Q 
Benefit Medium Benefit Benefit 
To what extent did the DPM workshop contribute to you professionally? 
(Immediate feedback) 
10010 90010 
1 
-1- 
No High 
Benefit Medium Benefit Benefit 
Figure 6-15., Case Bý; scalar rating assessment of the overall benefits delivered by the DPM methodology 
- completed immediately after the intervention. 
Thus, the DPM intervention was viewed as a success and the Case B participants believed the 
process to have clear strategic relevance: 
"The DPM enriches exi5ting innovation management processes used in [Case 81 today" [B-Head of 
Innovation Team-OE-DPM-3608J 
"ffhe DPM intervention] enabled a more thorough examination process then ever before" [8- 
5enior Engineer-15-DPM-36091 
0 The intervention delivered a clear, common and shared understanding of innovation activitjlý 
The overwhelming initial feedback from the management team from Case B was that the DPM 
intervention had significantly enhanced their ability to articulate a clear, common and shared 
understanding of their innovation activity. It was reported that this understanding included a view 
of where the company is today and how it could seek to pursue disruptive innovations in the future. 
It was this belief that also contributed significantly to the perception of a successful intervention. 
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6.3.2.2 Key feedback two months after intervention 
0 Overall impact assessment of the DPM intervention: 
Two months after the intervention, the popularity of the DPM approach had diminished (Figure 6- 
16). Only 60% of the participants stated that they believed the approach had delivered high 
benefits to the organisation (compared to the original 10001o) and the same 60% reported that the 
intervention had contributed to them professionally (compared to the original 90%). Despite this 
reduction, the DPM intervention was still viewed by the majority of the participants as a success. It 
is worthy of note that the group of participants who voted "high benefits", in both questions in 
Figure 6-16, comprised of the most senior members of the workshop - the DPM process appeared 
to be a strategically relevant tool. 
How beneficial has the DPM intervention been to your organisation? 
(feedback after two months) 
40% 60% 
-1 -t- 
No 
--*I. 
High 
Benefit Medium Benefit Benefit 
To what extent did the DPM workshop contribute to you professionally? 
(feedback after two months) 
20% 20% 60% 
No 
Itw. 
ý 
-woll. 
High 
Benefit Medium Benefit Benefit 
Figure 6-16. Case Bý; scalar rating assessment of overall benerit of the DPM methodology 
two months after intervention. 
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El The holistic view of the innovation playiW field keeps people thinking about disruptive 
innovation. 
As previously stated, when deciding how to implement the DPM intervention, executive 
management within Case B had allowed the innovation team of one of its key divisions to take part 
in the process. This was a multi-functional team, that consisted of top management and senior 
engineers, who were responsible for increasing the innovative capability and capacity of the 
division. One month after the intervention, an executive management decision resulted in the 
disbandment of the team and its members were absorbed throughout numerous areas of the 
organisation. It was clear that impact of the DPM intervention could be significantly reduced or 
even terminated by such actions. However, all but one of the most senior members of the 
participating group reported that they were still "flying the flag for disruptive innovation". The 
former head of the innovation team reported that he was working with a group to consider how the 
learning from the DPM intervention could be integrated throughout his division. Moreover, it was 
reported that the use of the holistic view of the innovation playing field was the main reason as to 
why managers and engineers were still focusing time and energy on the topic of disruptive 
innovation. 
0 Portfolio maps as a communication device. 
Two months after the DPM intervention, a senior engineer reported that a divisional director of 
REtD had been using the portfolio mapping approach (introduced to him by the DPM intervention). 
He was using the portfolio maps to communicate the strategic intent of the division's RU strategy 
and to announce that resources were available to convert intent into action. This was not only a 
high level exercise; the use of the portfolio maps was being tested as a visual tool to encourage the 
day-to-day resource allocation decisions within a broader test bed of the workforce. 
11 Case B declares the need for an on-going DPM tool., 
A senior engineer announced, in a presentation, that a Case B Programme Manager had recently 
stated in a meeting: 
"The DPM increases the ability to more effectively organise and filter ideas.. we need to make this 
part of our on-going process"[B-frogramme Manager-15-DPM-35431. 
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He also reported that a senior systems engineer claimed 
"It [the DMapproach]deflnitelygave us professional added value" [B-Senior Systems Engineer- 
HRM-DPM-35451 
His presentation went on to conclude that his division, within Case B, was now seeking a way to 
adopt the core elements of the DPM methodology as part of a trial to improve decision making in 
planning and budgeting cycles. However he noted two problems, the first with the trial and the 
second with any potential roll out of the approach. 
(1) The DPM approach that was used in the intervention was not 100% suitable: 
... the coexistence of other project a5sessment traditions in the company could make people 
contused.... we have to be careful to make it appear like we ýe not really changing much... but we 
know that we will actually change a lot in terms of outout"[8-5enior Engineer-15-DPM-35521 
(2) Significant top management support would be needed for a role out of the DPM approach: 
"There could be a lack of support from divisional management to role out this sort of tool across 
their businesses; since W5 i5 a pilot and it is not in the main focu5 of the corporate management 
team, it does not drive the divisional heads to use it. "[B-Senior Engineer-15-DPM-35531 
6.3.2.3 Key feedback six months after intervention 
13 An on-going DPM tool - the human management i5sues: 
Following a series of meetings with the external consultants that observed the DPM intervention at 
Case B, and the subsequent process trials mentioned above, the senior management team expressed 
their interest in the full adoption of a DPM approach. It was reported that six months after the 
intervention a project team was now considering the establishment of a "Chief DPM Expert". This 
person would have two key responsibilities: 
(1) coordinating portfolio management roll out, and 
(2) training a group of "portfolio managers" to become experts in the delivery of the DPM workshop 
process and who would grow to be the foundation of a DPM community of practice. 
El An on-going DPM tool - the information management issues: 
The project team, responsible for considering the roll out of a DPM approach, were also looking at 
technical systems issues. They were investigating how the information that is required for the 
construction of valid and reliable portfolio maps could be best gathered and stored with minimal 
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disruption to current systems and processes. With over 1000 live 'ideas' the portfolio process was 
more complex but the principles were the same. 
0 Disruptive innov3tion rejection strategies: 
The conscious and unconscious disruptive innovation rejection strategies, which were employed by 
the senior managers and engineers of Case B, received significant attention during the DPM 
intervention. However, this subject almost appeared off bounds after six months. Case B was 
notoriously difficult to penetrate; the top management neither like to share their organisation's 
intellectual property nor their weaknesses with anyone. Thus, it is not known whether the 
organisation was dealing with this issue or whether it was hoping that its new DPM processes 
would tackle these root causes of the resource allocation barrier. 
6.3.3 Assessing the impact of the management intervention: a cross case analysis 
This sub-section summarises a high-level cross case analysis of the impact of the management 
intervention. The next chapter presents and discusses the findings of the cross-ease analysis of 
data from the two firm's resource allocation routines - this will offer a deeper understanding of 
their inhibiting affects. 
4, It was shown that management practitioners can obtain a holistic understanding of their 
priority innovation activity with large-scale graphics, which represent a holistic view of the 
innovation playing field, using the process and portfolio maps created by the DPM intervention. 
When the management teams were provided with a holistic understanding of their priority 
innovation activity, they reported that they found it easier to understand and to challenge or 
extend their prevailing mental model(s) (often referred to during the workshops as their 
'viewpoint of what innovation W). Consequently, they felt more freedom to legitimise 
investments into potentially disruptive innovation. 
* It was reported that the use of large-scale graphics that represent a holistic view of the 
innovation playing field, can be used to improve the quality of management meetings arranged 
to discuss innovation activity. These improvements were reported to take three main forms: 
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(1) Improved quality of dialogue (in particular, it was more directed and broad), 
(2) Enhanced communication of action and intent (in particular, it appeared easier 
to build consensus); 
(3) The prevention of one person, group or project from dominating the resource 
allocation discussion. 
It was found that the desirability of pursuing disruptive innovation increases if the top 
management team sought to actively reduce the perception of risk surrounding the 
phenomenon. Reducing the perception of risk appeared to be achieved primarily through the 
combination of three actions: 
(1) The adoption of knowledge on the theory of disruptive innovation and staged 
financing approaches. 
(2) The recognition of prevailing mental models and an understanding of how they 
encourage the use of disruptive innovation rejection strategies. 
(3) An holistic view of innovation activity, which can be used to legitimise 'ring- 
fencing' resources for potentially disruptive initiatives. 
The adoption of knowledge on seed and staged funding approaches appears to be essential. It 
was believed if these approaches could be adopted into the resource allocation process it might 
help to ring-fence seed resources. Such a step could assist management practitioners to 
develop and deliver new potentially disruptive ventures whilst being impatient for profit yet 
patient for growth. 
It was found that employees were quite often involved in new potentially disruptive ideas, yet 
remained unaware of the concepts' potential for disruption and/or the difficulties in proceeding 
with such initiatives. Thus, it was reported by all the participants that their organisations 
require a team of 'disruptive-innovation-friendly executives' who can work with innovative 
employees to mould potentially disruptive ideas into disruptive business propositions. For 
example, they may help secure resources and training for the pursuit of more experimental, 
emergent approaches. 
It was found that the portfolio map output from the DPM process could be used as part of an 
organisational wide communication exercise. For example, it was shown that the portfolio 
maps could be used to create a call to arms. Furthermore, the maps were used to communicate 
a new vision of strategic intent to the participants, and it was reported that this could be 
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extended to other stakeholders. Moreover, it was reported that the maps could be used to 
display current innovation activity in relation to strategic intent and available resources. This 
allowed real time decisions to be taken with real immediate affect upon resource allocation in 
both case study sites. The most senior members of both intervention groups claimed that the 
visual aspects of the DPM approach could be developed to enhance visible support for 
organisational wide day-to-day resource allocation decisions; it could be used to encourage the 
sorts of actions that enable potentially disruptive innovations to be pursued. 
In sum, it was found that management practitioners could use the DPM intervention as a way to 
acknowledge the source of problematic resource allocation routines. Participants in both cases, 
quickly realised that routines, deemed inappropriate to the support of disruptive innovation, were 
more linked to psychological and organisational inertial than to process and actual value 
measurements. With this realisation in hand, the DPM intervention allowed the participants to 
openly discuss how past and present behaviours and decisions were constraining the pursuit of 
disruptive innovation. It is these insights, and their explanations, that are missing from extant 
literature. Thus, it is these that are the focus of discussion in the following chapter in which a 
deeper understanding of the resource allocation barrier is provided. 
6.4 Assessing the design and validity of the DPM management intervention 
It is the belief of the author that the evidence gathered during the third wave of this research has 
contributed to the following key finding; this will be the focus of discussion in the remainder of this 
subsection. 
An holistic understanding of the innovation playing field (which includes sustaining, radical and 
disruptive innovations at a process, sub-system, product/service and business model level, with 
respect to current and new business opportunities) and how current priority innovation activity 
maps onto this area of opportunity, can be used to facilitate discussion to enable the surfacing and 
challenging of mental models that restrict innovation to incrementalism. These activities can be 
achieved by using a portfolio management approach that has been tailored to introduce and 
include the pursuit of disruptive innovation. 
The DPM intervention was establish upon evidence and findings from data collection and data 
analysis protocols delivered by the first and second waves of this research. It is believed that 
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Chapter 3 demonstrated that the entire research methodology was rigorously developed will stand 
up to scrutiny, as a valid approach to the investigation in hand. Thus, to further assure the validity 
and reliability of the DPM intervention and the resultant observations, French and Bell (1990) 
contend the following two issues must also be considered (Figure 6-17): 
Was a rigorous design 
approach used for the 
development of a rigorous 
intervention process? 
What are the shortcomings 
of the Intervention and do 
these Impair the desired 
output? 
Figure 6-17., Assessing the validity of management interventions (French and Bell. 1990) 
6.4.1 Assessing the rigour of the design process and industrial utility of the intervention 
methodology 
" 
Consideration of the advice from French and Bell (1990), Silverman (2000) and Gibbons et al. 
(1994), led to the development of three assessment questions, the answers to which can be used to 
evaluate the rigour of the design process and the intervention: 
a) Did the design process deliver an intervention methodology that met the objectives of the 
research? 
b) What were the limitations of the conducting the interventions at the chosen sites? 
c) Has the intervention worked (i. e. did it deliver what it was designed to deliver)? 
A rigorous design process: 
It is the belief of the author that a rigorous design process was utilised for the development of the 
DPM intervention. This conclusion was drawn because of the following key reasons: 
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1) The benefits afforded by close collaboration were: increased trust between the 
industrialists and the author during the design phase and increased acceptance of the 
resultant intervention process. Van Maanen (1988) warns of the dangers of 'going native' 
when working closely with participants or cases. This issue was mitigated against during 
the design phase, by ensuring that the intervention was both needs and theory led and by 
collecting data from experts outside the research group. 
2) The needs of management practitioners from the top echelons of average to low 
performing organisations were carefully identified. Vocalised needs were often not taken 
on face value; deeper needs were elicited through deep probing of the issues and by cross 
referencing findings with the literature and the data from the expert interviews. 
3) A research focus was developed from the activity above; this was believed to be valid as 
the executive teams of the four case study organisations subsequently volunteered to test 
it without hesitation. 
4) A collaborative method to the intervention design, using the iterative V approach, 
generated a specification for the intervention that was grounded in both data and theory. 
5) The output of the design process - the DPIVI methodology - was an intervention that 
managers from all four case study organisations wanted to test within their organisations. 
On paper, it had met the design specification and could be used to probe the prioritised 
research focus area, whilst also delivering business benefits. 
6) This research contributes to a larger research programme (as outlined in Chapter 3). The 
entire research programme was assessed on a yearly basis by a panel appointed by the 
European Commission's "Information Society Technologies Directorate", under their 5th 
framework research program. The DPM intervention was presented as part of this review 
process, first in its conceptual form, then later as a fully designed process and finally after 
it had been implemented. The review panel assessed the development and implementation 
of the intervention and concluded that it was a valid and valuable approach to the task in 
hand. 
7) The fact that two manufacturing organisations committed and provided the time of their 
top management teams to be involved in implementing the intervention was a testament 
to its rigorous needs-and-theory-led design, and the rigorous methodology that was 
proposed. 
245 
Exploring and Describing the Pursuit of Disruptive Innovation 
0 The limitations of focusing the intervention upon cases A and B., 
The design process resulted in the creation of the DPM intervention methodology; it is believed that 
this methodology could be adapted to be implemented in almost any organisation. The choice to 
focus upon only two cases during implementation was explained in Chapter 3. As the chosen sites 
were willing to provide open access to their top management teams with open, honest and frank 
conversation, it is believed that the author faced few, if any, limitations during the 
implementations of the intervention process. However, the use of only two cases raises two key 
issues, (1) regarding the limitations of the generality of the conclusions and (2) in assessing the 
effectiveness of the intervention process. The issue of generality is discussed later in this chapter. 
The issue of whether or not the intervention was effective can be assessed on a case by case basis, 
as described in the following section. 
6 Did the DPM intervention deliver what it was designed to deliver? 
In essence this subsection attempts to establish the industrial utility of the management 
intervention. The within case and cross case findings were used to complete a checklist developed 
to help assess whether the DPM intervention delivered what it was designed to deliver (Table 6-1). 
These conclusions were 21SO subsequently approved by senior practitioners from both cases A and B. 
Criteria for assessing the industrial utility of the management intervention. Case 
AB 
a) On completing the intervention, at least 75% of the participants state that YES YES 
they believe they are in a better position to allocate resources to potentially 
disruptive innovations. (100010) 
(80%) 
b) On completing the intervention, the majority of the participants state that the NO YES 
process implemented is one that could fit existing organisational routines and 
(40%) (100%) 
could be integrated into regular business practice. 
c) On completing the intervention, the most senior participants state that they YES YES 
believe that the intervention could be used in the future to overcome the funding 
(80010) (100%) 
barrier and establish new resource allocation routines. 
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d) Two months after the intervention, the most senior participants state that 
NO 
YES (40%) 
they believe the intervention will deliver short to medium term benefits. With 
modifications (100%) 
YES (100%) 
e) Two months after the intervention, the most senior participants show that the 
intervention has facilitated the establishment of new approaches to resource YES YES 
allocation that support disruptive innovation. 
0 Two months after the intervention, the most senior participants state they YES YES / NO 
believe that intervention may have significantly contributed to their ability to 
tackle the funding barrier to disruptive innovation in the long term. 
(60%) (50010) 
g) Six months after the intervention, the most senior participants state that they N/A YES 
believe the intervention will deliver medium to long-term benefits. company 
(1000/0) 
ceased trading 
h) Six months after the intervention, the most senior participants show that the N/A 
intervention has facilitated the establishment of new approaches to resource company YES 
allocation that support disruptive innovation. ceased trading 
i) Six months after the intervention, the most senior participants state they 
believe that intervention may have significantly contributed to their ability to 
tackle the funding barrier to disruptive innovation in the long term. 
Table 6- 1: Criteria for assessing the industrial utility of the manageme 
and the responses from Cases A and B. 
N/A YES 
DPM 
company processes 
adapted and ceased trading internalised. 
! nt intervention 
If it was possible to generalise from the experiences and findings presented in this chapter, then it 
would be possible to say that the management intervention holds significant industrial utility for 
today's average performing businesses wishing to pursue initiate the disruptive innovation. 
At the time of writing this thesis, the REtD director from Case B reported that his team had 
completed further internal trials of the DPM methodology and he had taken the decision to adapt 
and incorporate the major elements of the process into the planning cycle of one of the main 
divisions. Furthermore, during May 2004, the author trained a senior consultant from Case D to use 
the DPM methodology; the process was later tailored to suit Case D's house style. In July 2004, 
Case D sold a three day DPM intervention process for El 1,000 to one of its new major global 
clients. As a result of this intervention process Case D has was able to secure further consultancy 
work in assisting this client to delve into the previously unexplored area of disruptive innovation. 
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It would also appear that the DPM intervention can deliver significant additional benefits for 
average-to-low-performing business, beyond the aim of encouraging support for potentially 
disruptive innovations. For example, intervening with the DPM approach appears to: 
0 bring together people from different disciplines and better support functional boundary 
spanning communication. 
0 generate holistic consideration of the organisation's innovation effort by creating an 
opportunity to reflect upon and integrate technical, product and commercial 
perspectives. 
improve communication by creating a common framework for conversing and thinking 
strategically, which generates a better understanding of the firm's current position and 
enables the sharing of knowledge, ideas and opportunities for the future. 
0 bring together, either in recorded graphical form or through facilitated discussion, 
commercial, product and technological knowledge from inside and outside the 
organisation in a form that enables improved decision making. 
0 distinguish between process and product/service innovation, thus allowing the 
participants to regard component innovation to be a separate innovation stream (this 
means that component innovation is not restricted to the product in which it is a 
subsystem). 
It would appear from the apparent success of the DPM intervention during this investigation, and 
since, that it has significant potential to support innovation strategy, planning and the pursuit of 
disruptive innovation. However, when considering the criteria upon which the intervention was 
developed it is clear that there are other approaches that such an intervention could have taken 
(for example, technology roadmapping, Phaal et al., 2004). Therefore, this intervention cannot be 
considered to be a 'black box solution'. The DPM methodology alone cannot deliver useful portfolio 
maps nor can it dispense intelligent decisions. To do this, it needs to be integrated with the soft or 
more human aspects of the portfolio management process and it requires a supply of accurate 
information. For example, a key benefit of the DPM process was the sharing of knowledge and the 
development of a common vision of where the organisation's innovation effort is focused today and 
where it could be focused in the future. This was only delivered during the interventions by 
peoples' willingness to share knowledge and make connections in the face-to-face workshop 
setting. Thus, many of the benefits of the DPM intervention were derived from the process rather 
than the output of the project assessments or the portfolio Maps. Each application was a learning 
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experience and as such, a flexible approach was employed, this created an adaptable process that 
could suit the particular circumstances under consideration. 
It was concluded that that a portfolio management approach, which is tailored to introduce and 
include disruptive innovation, can enable the surfacing and challenging of mental models that 
restrict resources to sustaining innovation. In sum, it was decided that the DPM intervention did 
deliver what it was designed to deliver, 
6.4.1.1 Assessing the shortfalls of the DPM intervention 
a 
General discussion points and notes of caution regarding the intervention as a whole are presented 
in this subsection. A deeper discussion regarding the shortfalls of the intervention, with respect to 
weaknesses of the individual elements of the DPM process and issues that the DPM intervention 
overlooked or neglected, is offered in Appendix 7. 
General observations and notes of caution regarding the intervention as a whole 
Despite the apparent benefits of the DPM intervention, the methodology must come with the 
following observations and notes of caution for consideration, of which any future iterations of the 
intervention must address: 
A business would probably need to invest in a number of iterations before the DPM 
intervention could be completely trusted as an effective management tool to facilitate 
improved strategic planning - this would require serious senior commitment and 
dedicated resources. 
The portfolio maps are powerful communication tools but the information within them is 
highly synthesised, revealing none of the finer understanding that is required to make 
effective decisions. Therefore, the users of the portfolio maps should have access to the 
completed dimensions raking checklists for each initiative, along with any other 
supporting information. 
9 The portfolio maps in their present guise do not show the dimension of time. They present 
a snap-shot of a world that is dynamic and changing in nature. Methods will probably 
need to be generated to chart the migration of initiatives as they mature. 
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It was clearly apparent that the long-term value of the DPM intervention can only be 
realised if the process is kept alive and integrated into the business. This would mean 
that information must be kept up-to-date as events unfold, that information quality is 
ensured and that the output is reviewed as a major part of any budgeting or planning 
cycle. With this regard, the participants from both cases raised two main issues: 
1) Rolling out the process: It is believed that there are two routes for rolling-out the 
DPM process into planning cycles. Firstly, a top-down approach can be pursued, 
whereby the requirements and format of the portfolio management approach are 
prescribed by the top management team. Secondly, an organic approach can be 
pursued, whereby the benefits are communicated to business units or senior managers 
and the executive team provides support for an emergent roll-out. How the process is 
rolled out would be determined by the business culture and competitive demands; 
furthermore, an organisation wishing to maintain a DPM approach must consider how 
it can be integrated into planning cycles with the least amount of upheaval to the 
business. 
0 2) Information management: Simple spreadsheets, graphics packages and graphical 
facilitation approaches were used to implement the DPM intervention for this study. 
These approaches could be used to maintain further implementations of the DPM 
approach; however, information management complications could soon arise. This is 
not likely to occur in a small Organisation such as Case A, however, if the tool was 
deemed an essential part of the on-going decision making process in Case B, then 
there could be a strong need for the Organisation to adopt a dedicated information 
management system. This could be linked to prevailing project 
management/assessment and management information systems. Alternatively, a 
dedicated software solution could be made available to support the development, 
storage, dissemination and upkeep of the information that sits behind the portfolio 
maps. 
6.5 Overview of findings in relation to research objectives: Wave III 
The primary objective of this thesis is to explore the nature and experience of management 
practitioners'pursuit of potentially disruptive innovations in average pErAorming (or non-best- 
practice) businesses. As shown in Chapter 3 (the research methodology), the third wave of this 
research contributes to this objective by focusing upon the satisfaction of the third sub-objective: 
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Sub-Objective 3: 
To specify, design and implement a management intervention to probe a priority focus area of 
management action and cognition in order to build new academic knowledge, whilst 
simultaneously improving the ability of the participating organisations to pursue potentially 
disruptive innovations. 
Thus, the third wave of this investigation was both an exploration and description of the barrier to 
potentially disruptive innovations caused by inappropriate resource allocation routines. Using the 
results of the first and second waves of this research as a springboard, data were collected over a 
10 month period using interviews, telephone conferences, email discussions and workshops along 
with an iterative literature review in response to emergent demands. The analyses of the data 
along with the enfolding of literature revealed the need for a management intervention to tackle 
the case study organisation's inappropriate resource allocation routines. Concordantly, using an 
'iterative V approach a reliable and robustly designed management intervention was developed - 
the 'Disruptive Portfolio Management (DPM) Intervention'. This intervention was implemented in 
cases A and B- two manufacturing sites. Data were collected prior to and during the DPM 
workshops; furthermore, post-workshop data collection and analyses were conducted. The results 
of the DPM intervention have generated insights that address gaps in knowledge with respect to 
the resource allocation barrier - particularly focusing upon two units of analysis: management 
action and management cognition. Moreover, the results have led the author to believe that a 
pragmatic industrially relevant contribution has been made, alongside the development of 
significant academic understanding. The next chapter will discuss the key findings in an attempt to 
demonstrate new knowledge regarding the barriers caused by inappropriate resource allocation 
routines that inhibit the pursuit of disruptive innovation. 
In sum, the conceptual framework, developed in the first wave of this research, has helped to 
ground the development of a management intervention that appears to have assisted two 
organisations to begin tackling their restrictive resource allocation routines. Moreover, the 
intervention has simultaneously addressed the academic need for new qualitative knowledge 
regarding this barrier to disruptive innovation. Accordingly, it is believed that these actions and 
results satisfy the third sub-objective. 
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Discussion 
. 
ýghls the four main findings of the first and second waves of the research; it This chapter first highli, 
then focuses upon explaining and discussing the findings of the third and final wave. This third wave 
concentrated upon exploring and describing resource allocation routines, a criticalarea of management 
action and management cognition to which the pur5uit of potentially di5ruptive innovations is highly 
dependent Four key findings were generated in this final wave, each will be discussed in relation to 
theoty and practice. The chapter will end with a summary and brief recommendations forpractitioners. 
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7.1 Introduction 
This thesis has been constructed in a series of steps that provide increasing focus to the research. 
The first step Was to undertake a review of the literature, helping to construct the definition of the 
term 'disruptive innovation' used throughout the investigation and to identify gaps in knowledge. 
This review generated two research objectives and three sub objectives. The first wave of this 
investigation culminated in the development of a conceptual framework containing an holistic 
understanding of the tasks and difficulties that management practitioners face in the pursuit of 
disruptive innovation. The second wave of the research used this new framework to elicit 
managerial focus areas to which the pursuit of potentially disruptive innovations is highly 
dependent. The focus area referred to as 'inappropriate resource allocation routines' was prioritised 
and became the focal point for the remainder of the research. Consequently, the third and final 
wave of this research concentrated upon exploring and describing how and why resource allocation 
appears to be a critical barrier to the pursuit of disruptive innovation. A management intervention 
was designed and conducted; this generated a series of observations regarding the management 
actions and management cognitions that play a part in the resource allocation process. This 
chapter will show that analysis of these findings provides both a contribution to knowledge and to 
industrial practice. 
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Figure 7-1 provides a holistic view of the research process and in doing so it highlights the 
relationship between the initial research objectives and the findings presented and discussed in this 
in this thesis. 
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The first four key findings of this research have been presented and discussed in Chapters 4,5 and 6 
(i) the emergent conceptual framework of disruptive innovation; 
(ii) the identification and description of four managerial focus areas; 
(iii) the prioritisation of inappropriate resource allocation routines as an essential management 
focus; and 
(iv) the finding that is possible to surface and challenge mental models that restrict innovation to 
the pursuit of incrementalism, by using a portfolio management approach that has been adjusted 
and tailored to introduce and include the importance of disruptive innovation. 
This chapter is primarily dedicated to making sense of the third wave of results and discusses the 
key findings from this final phase with reference to extant theory and the context of application. 
Four key findings are presented and their novelty and relevance will be discussed; the chapter will 
end with a summary, followed by brief recommendations for practitioners. 
7.2 The key findings from the third wave of research activity: A deeper 
understanding of inappropriate resource allocation routines 
To investigate the barrier to the pursuit of disruptive innovation caused by resource allocation 
routines, the third wave of this research employed the implementation of a management 
intervention within two manufacturing organisations. This investigation has enabled the 
generation of new understanding regarding the pursuit of potentially disruptive innovations and 
the nature and root-cause of the barrier that is caused by inappropriate resource allocation 
routines. Thus, the issues raised in this section contribute to a deeper understanding of how and 
why resource allocation routines can inhibit the pursuit of potentially disruptive innovations; to this 
respect, three key findings are presented: 
1. The identification of six regularly occurring management actions, which restrict resources 
to sustaining innovation. 
2. The identification of five common disruptive innovation rejection strategies, which are the 
cognitive drivers of inappropriate resource allocation routines. 
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3. The observation that the higher the perceived intensity of disruption (e. g. a need for a 
change in strategic belief), the faster and more intense the disruptive innovation rejection 
strategies emerge. 
These findings contribute to both extant theory and to the practice of innovation management - to 
industrialists involved in the tasks associated the pursuit of potentially disruptive innovations. 
Therefore, each of these key findings will be discussed within this section in terms of their 
relationship with existing literature and in the context of its meaning in application. 
The push to assimilate these finding forced the author to reflect upon the use of the collaborative 
Mode 2 approach and the experiences of the three waves of this 33 month study. During this 
process three features have been identified as a novel contribution to the practice of collaborative 
research; these are offered as an additional and final key finding in section 7.3. 
7.2.1 Common management actions that restrict resources to sustaining innovation 
There are six most commonly occurring management actions that constrain resources to sustaining 
innovation within average performing businesses, and six 'idealised' management actions to which 
managers should aspire (Table 7-1 at the end of this subsection). 
The analysis of current practice and anecdotal stories' that were told through the research, led to 
the identification of 21 common trends of management action that inhibit the allocation of 
resources to potentially disruptive innovations. These could be directly mapped to themes, 
combinations of themes or elements of themes within the conceptual framework (Chapter 4). The 
1 Throughout the third wave of research activities, anecdotal stories were told by the research participants on how their 
organisations had rejected or failed to capitalise upon projects that may have delivered disruptive innovations. Thirty- 
two anecdotes were recorded in total, nearly all of which were told on an informal basis; a further 11 such stories were 
also reported or discussed with the expert interviewees. 
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six most frequently recorded inhibiting management actions are presented here 7-2 (see also 
Thomond, Lettice and Herzberg, 2004): 
Management Action 1: Managers deliver a narrow selection of innovation projects 
based on restricted 'views' of innovation 
The DPM intervention stimulated an holistic understanding of how the senior management teams 
in both cases A and B were allocating resources to their innovation effort; and it was instantly 
obvious that the participants had a narrow view of what innovation is. The intervention process 
enabled the participants to understand and question, for the first time, how their actions were 
restricting their organisations to a path of incrementalism, and that these actions were reactions to 
their personal and group view of what constitutes valid innovation. The head of the innovation 
team in Case B stated: 
/ feel like we've seen the light, now we know its time to get disruptive... and the only thing that 
will stop us, is us" [B-Head of Innovation Team-OE-DPM-3596] 
The literature (as presented in sections 5.7.2 and 5.6.2.5) allows us to understand that these narrow 
views can be described as the consequence of the cognitive dissonance experienced between 
disruptive opportunities and prevailing mental models of innovation. 
Management Action 2: Managers increase the perception of risk regarding 
disruptive innovation and prevent the adoption of risk reduction strategies 
7-2 These inhibiting management actions were also presented and discussed with the senior management practitioners 
from the collaborative research group and five other organisations that were involved in the wider research programme 
to which this investigation contributed. These senior practitioners reported they believed that the management 
behaviours were commonly prevalent within their organisations. The analysis and publication of these discussions are 
not included in this thesis for the sake of brevity and confidentiality. 
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Senior management practitioners, from each case, recounted times when they had been presented 
with an opportunity that had disruptive potential. During these reports, the practitioners stated 
they had recognised, and even felt, the existence of an inconsistency between their current 
understanding of their organisation and the new opportunity. These inconsistencies appeared to 
generate emotional conflict, which in turn induced an increased perception of risk. Once again, the 
literature (as presented in sections 5.7.2 and 5.6.2.5) allows us to understand that this conflict can 
be described as the result of cognitive dissonance experienced when prevailing restrictive mental 
models of innovation are challenged. Thus this second trend is linked to the first. Furthermore, it 
emerged that the effect of cognitive dissonance prevented the practitioners from seeking strategies 
for reducing risk (e. g. probe and learn t actics, staged funding, partnering etc. ). Instead, the inverse 
was occurring, management practitioners at both cases were employing disruptive innovation 
rejection strategies. 
0 Management Action 3: Managers prefer to handle tangible technical risk and avoid 
opportunities that appear to contain high commercial risk 
This third common management action was an extension of the second. Participants in both 
interventions asserted their confidence in their experiences and competences with their core groups 
of technologies. The result of this confidence was that they were more likely to favour projects 
with technical difficulties rather than those facing market uncertainties. It became clear that the 
practitioners associated disruptive innovations with the perception of increased commercial risk 
and, therefore, both cases showed time and again that potentially disruptive initiatives are not 
likely to be funded if risk is perceived to be high. 
The introduction of notions such as empathic design (Leonard and Rayport, 1997) and probe and 
learn techniques (Lynn et al., 1996), which are reported to tackle commercial risks, helped to give 
both cases confidence in unfamiliar commercial niches. However, more work was needed in order 
for the management teams to truly embrace such concepts. 
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0 Management Action 4: Managements' pursuit of project-by-project planning 
reinforces a focus upon sustaining innovation and kills potentially disruptive 
opportunities 
Much of the new product planning processes within both cases appeared to be "done blind" - 
project-by-project planning dominated the innovation process. Evidence showed that the lack of 
an holistic view of innovation activity was increasing the reluctance of the management 
practitioners to allocate resources to potentially disruptive opportunities. In fact, the holistic views 
delivered by the DPM intervention revealed to the participants that their project-by-project 
approach had delivered imbalanced activity. The facilitation of holistic deci5ion-making in both 
cases allowed the managers, for the first time, to consider the reasons and consequences of narrow 
project selection. 
a Management Action 5: Managers are tempted by "big money" mass market 
strategies and are reluctant to experiment 
A lack of knowledge regarding disruptive strategies underpinned the mind-set that potentially 
disruptive innovations should be directly focused upon existing mainstream customers. Even when 
evidence was provided to show that most disruptive innovations begin their lives in small target 
markets, consisting of low-end or emerging niche customers, managers still preferred the notion of 
targeting the 'big money' mass markets. It appeared that the executive management of all four 
cases were exerting pressure on their innovators to adopt mass market strategies (perhaps this 
could be explained in cases A and B as a result of both organisations facing difficult times). 
Consequently, product managers, and others responsible for allocating resources, assumed that 
projects for potentially disruptive innovations should be complicated, technically sophisticated and 
require mass investment. Small experiments were deemed inappropriate. 
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0 Management Action 6: Managers assess and measure all new product and service 
opportunities with preset, inflexible cost structures and targets 
As presented in the literature review (Chapter 2), disruptive innovations tend to start out as niche 
market propositions within an emerging market or the over-looked low-end customers of an 
existing market. By their very nature they require the acceptance of either, or both, low revenue 
thresh old targets or low-margin price points. The managers of the case study organisations 
involved in this research were witnessed employing preset targets and cost structures in the 
assessment of new investment opportunities. As presented in the findings of the first wave of this 
research (Chapter 4), such over application of measures, which are effective for sustaining 
innovations to core customer offerings, leads to the unnecessary rejection of potentially disruptive 
innovations. To compound this further, the managers were unwilling to introduce flexible cost 
structures and targets for fear of investing in innovations that do not help to improve the bottom 
line of their businesses. 
7.2.1.1 Identifying idealised management actions 
The analysis of the outcomes from the third wave of research activity revealed the six most 
frequently observed common Management actions to inhibit the allocation of resources to 
potentially disruptive innovations (described above). In effect, these could be considered as 
important characteristics of the 'disruptive innovation disabling organisation'. By reflecting upon 
these inhibiting actions, in the context of the conceptual framework of disruptive innovation 
(developed in Chapter 4), inverse, disruptive innovation enabling management actions could be 
proposed. In effect, a list could be presented illustrating important characteristics of the 'idealised 
disruptive-innovation-supporting-organisation' (Table 7-1). 
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The Disruptive Innovation Disabling 
Organisation: 
Inhibiting Management Actions 
The Disruptive Innovation Enabling 
Organisation: 
Idealised Management Actions 
1) Managers deliver a narrow selection 
of innovation projects based on 
restricted 'views' of innovation. 
2) Managers increase the perception of 
risk regarding disruptive innovation and 
prevent the adoption of risk reduction 
strategies. 
3) Managers prefer to handle tangible 
technical risk and avoid opportunities 
that appear to contain high commercial 
risk. 
1) Managers' project selection reflects their 
Vs 'view' that valid innovation activity includes 
sustaining and disruptive innovations. 
2) Managers do not see potentially 
Vs disruptive opportunities as 'more risky'; they 
seek to address the issue of risk with equity 
across all innovation types. 
3) All risk is assessed in terms of the 
vs probability and scale of impact, and 
mitigated against accordingly. 
4) Managements' pursuit of project-by- 4) Managers have a holistic understanding 
project planning reinforces a focus upon Vs of their innovation activity and make 
sustaining innovation and kills decisions accordingly. 
potentially disruptive opportunities. 
5) Managers are tempted by "big money" 5) Managers actively pursue a broad 
mass market strategies and are reluctant portfolio of small experiments/investigations 
to experiment Vs and are willing to test and grow new 
concepts in small emerging or low-end 
markets 
6) Managers assess and measure all new 6) Managers actively distinguish between 
product and service opportunities with Vs sustaining and potentially disruptive 
preset inflexible cost structures and innovations and accordingly apply 
targets. differential cost structures and targets. 
Table 7- 1: Key Finding 4- 7he critical differences in management actions within the resource allocation process 
between the average performing the 'idealised'oryanisa tion. 
7.2.1.2 Summarising the contribution made by the probing of restrictive management 
actions 
Each of the common disabling and idealised management- actions (outlined in table 7-1) have been 
described to a greater of lesser extent by past authors, in particular, Christensen (1997), 
Christensen and Raynor (2003), Dougherty and Hardy (1996), Noda and Bower (1996), Hamel (200), 
Leifer et al. (2000) and Burgleman et al. (1996). Therefore, this research contributes support to the 
salience of these management actions. In fact, their industrial relevance was also observed when 
the findings presented in Table 7-1 were extended and used by management practitioners involved 
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in this research as a checklist by which to assess their management team's likeliness or capacity to 
allocate resources to potentially disruptive opportunities. However, Senge (1990) has noted that 
linear descriptions of management actions do not 'get to the core of the issues at hand'. Such a 
statement in the context of the findings above, leads to the requirement for a deeper 
understanding of whythe inhibiting management actions occur in the first place, only then can 
prevailing knowledge be extended and an effective contribution established. Thus, although 'key 
finding 4' is a valid finding from this research, it has limitations that prevent it from being asserted 
as a contribution to the better understanding of inappropriate resource allocation routines and the 
pursuit of disruptive innovation. 
The literature review, which was conducted throughout all three waves of this investigation, 
demonstrated a general lack of attention to management practitioners' cognitive processes in 
relation to discontinuous innovation. This was consistent with the findings of Kaplan et al. (2003), 
Tripsas and Gavetti (2000) and White and Bessant (2004). Consequently, the current investigation 
has attempted to address this gap and to answer the calls of these authors, by providing insights 
into the cognitive processes that underpin managerial actions and reactions, with respect to 
disruptive innovation. This discussion has therefore adopted 2 stance, also taken by White and 
Bessant (2004), of considering theories and literature written and inspired by the seminal author in 
cognitive psychology, Festinger (1957). Thus, there has been a focus upon management action and 
management cognition as the primary units of analysis, and the analyses has been conducted as a 
"metatriangulation" (Lewis and Grimes, 1999) - where understanding is developed via the 
assessment of multiple perspectives and paradigms. The following subsection will present a 
contribution to knowledge, by discussing the management actions that delivered inappropriate 
resource allocation routines, through the often overlooked perspective of managerial cognition - in 
particular cognitive dissonance. 
7.2.2 Disruptive innovation rejection strategies: cognitive drivers of inappropriate resource 
allocation routines 
The commonly occurring management actions that restrict resources to sustaining innovation are 
driven by management cognitions that promote and maintain the use of five disruptive innovation 
rejection strategies (Figure 7-3). 
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The Six Most frequent Trends 
of Management Action: 
mtdckd Mevwsý Qf innovation, 
Managers increase the perception of 
risk tegar4ing. disruptive innovation 
anctiprevent the adoption of risk 
reduction strategies. 
------ ------------- 
Managers prefer to handle tangible 
technical risk and: 
avoid 
opportunities that appear to contain 
high commercial risL 
Mafiigem-ifitý! fursuit- of project- 
by-prqJect planning reinforces a 
focus upon sustaining innovation j, 
and kills potentially disrul) ve 
, -. -----opportunities-.. ---j 
Mpna gers are tmpted by "big 
moner, massmayket strategies and 
are reluctant to experiment 
Managers assess and measure all 
new product and service 
opportunities with preset inflexible 
cost structures and targets. i 
Fiqure 7-2. - Trends of management action and cognition that 
inhibit the allocation of resources to potentially disruptive innovation. 
The data sets of the six common inhibiting management actions were further analysed, alongside 
the anecdotal stories of failed or rejected potentially disruptive innovations. This led to the 
discovery that each of these management actions and stories was underpinned, to a greater of 
lesser extent, by five, discrete, disruptive innovation rejection strategies. Further analysis revealed 
that each rejection strategy was driven by the management practitioners' experience of a 
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phenomenon that Harmon-Jones and Mills (1999), Beauvois and Joule (1996) and Festinger (1957) 
-7-3 call 'cognitive dissonance 
It is therefore these findings that become the focal point of the discussion presented in the 
remainder of this section. 
7.2.2.1 Rejection Strategy 1: Rewarding incrementalism 
When presented with a potentially disruptive opportunity, managerial psychology, particularly the 
experience of cognitive dissonance, focuses managements' attention upon prevailing explicit and 
implicit incentives as a way to reward sustaining change and to reject potentially disruptive 
alternatives. 
One strategy used by management to avoid funding potentially disruptive ideas was to focus upon 
prevailing organisational rewards. It was found in both cases that the prevailing explicit and 
implicit rewards had a negative effect upon practitioners' decisions to fund potentially disruptive 
opportunities (where explicit rewards include financial incentives and promotions, and implicit 
rewards include a sense of belonging and respect from peers (Unsworth, 2001; Amabile, 1997). The 
rewards reduced creativity and caused management to disregard evidence that suggested their 
organisation's current resourcesý-technologies or business models may be put to better use in 
opportunities differing to current practice. 
For example, in Case B, it emerged that job creation was an important implicit performance 
measure that was rewarded by top management. Thus, the initiation of new product development 
projects for small niche markets, as characterised by disruptive innovations, gained little support in 
comparison to investment opportunities with familiar technologies that could generate immediate 
large scale job creation. In fact, in the 1990's, this implicit reward had driven Case B to 
incrementally increase the scope and quality of the specification of a contract with the US 
government. Consequently, when the customer cancelled the order, because of policy change and 
7-3 Two cognitions are said to be dissonant if one does not follow from the other; the existence of cognitive dissonance is 
psychologically uncomfortable. Such discomfort motivates efforts to reduce the experience of dissonance and various 
strategies can be used. The greater the magnitude of the dissonance, the greater the pressure to employ dissonance 
reducing strategies (Harmon-Jones and Mills, 1999). 
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major technological over-supply, Case B suffered a significant setback. In Case A, explicit rewards 
were focused upon current production line enhancements - once again steering management's 
attention to incrementalism. Moreover, both cases A and B appeared to display an "Emergency 
Room" culture (Allen et al., 1999), especially case A. This was characterised by the existence of 
implicit rewards for the ability to conduct 'rapid fire' analyses of situations, where judgements need 
to be made quickly, along with prompt action. When implicit rewards exist for reacting quickly, 
making fast assumptions and insisting upon quick action, there appears to be little support for 
suspending judgement, building empathy for new ideas and nurturing potentially disruptive 
concepts. When such a culture dominates and is rewarded, creativity would seem to be reduced 
and new ideas are quickly killed. This prevents ideas for potentially disruptive innovations from 
being developed or shared between individuals or across organisational boundaries. 
Thus, how an organisation's key innovation stakeholders are incentivised, appears to have a 
significant impact upon the pursuit of innovations that are characterised as counter-intuitive or 
counter to historic trajectories of development, such as potentially disruptive opportunities. This 
finding has important implications for executive management teams. As such, a proposition can be 
immediately drawn from the discovery of this disruptive innovation rejection strategy: executive 
teams should intervene with the reward systems within their organisations in order to ensure the 
simultaneous pursuit of sustaining and disruptive innovations. Particular attention must be given 
to uncovering and changing both implicit and explicit incentives and rewards that undermine the 
pursuit of innovation that moves beyond the steady state. 
Discussing the validity of this finding: 
To investigate the validity of this finding, both the participants of the wider collaborative research 
group and literature from the fields of cognitive dissonance and innovation were consulted. 
The strategy of rewarding incrementalism was presented and discussed in a workshop setting with 
senior management practitioners from Cases C and D and five other organisations that were 
involved in the wider research programme to which this investigation contributed. Despite some 
initial hesitancy, the participants began to 'admit' that they, or other members of their 
organisations, had resorted to only rewarding incrementalism when afflicted with cognitive 
dissonance. Thus the existence of this disruptive innovation rejection strategy has been ratified by 
a wider group of industrialists. 
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Writing in the field of organisational creativity, Amabile (1997) suggests that the negative effects 
of rewards upon creativity and innovation are common for many businesses. Moreover, it would 
appear that the discovery of this disruptive innovation rejection strategy contributes a new context 
of application to two domains of knowledge: the theory base of knowledge management (in 
particular the topics of knowledge transfer and intellectual capital) and social psychology (in 
particular the construct of cognitive dissonance). 
Literature from the academic domains of knowledge transfer and intellectual capital appear to 
provide further evidence as to why managers may find it implicitly easier to reward incrementalism 
- it is easier to absorb knowledge from people with whom it is easy to communicate. Stewart 
(1998) has stated that management practitioners are implicitly rewarded for the fast transfer of 
company codified information. However, information regarding potentially disruptive opportunities 
is more likely to be tacit than codified because of its emergent nature (Burgleman et aL, 1996). 
This means there are difficulties, and an implicit lack of incentive, attached to the management and 
transfer of tacit knowledge - especially between organisational silos (Stewart, 1998). Reagans and 
McEvily (2003) found that the transferral of tacit knowledge requires strong ties to be in place 
between the relevant actors within the organisation; however, without incentives and support, 
strong ties may fail to materialise. Consequently, tacit knowledge transfer continues to, struggle 
against a natural preference for the transfer of easily codifiable knowledge. This provides an 
insight into why knowledge regarding potentially disruptive innovations often fails to permeate 
organisational boundaries because of the implicit reward for the easily transferred knowledge 
embodied by incremental innovation. 
Probing more deeply into the emergence and impact of cognitive dissonance, research has been 
conducted, for decades, into the uptake of counter-attitudinal behaviours and induced-compliance. 
For example, Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) proposed the existence of a negative-incentive effect. 
The participants in their experiments would display more positive attitudes towards engaging in a 
counter-attitudinal behaviour when smaller rewards were received. Thus, there appears to be a 
negative relationship between the amount of incentive and the amount of attitude change in 
support of the counter-attitudinal behaviour; however when no incentive was present, there was 
no support. Linder, Cooper, and Jones (1967) replicated and extended these findings. They showed 
that the negative-incentive effect occurs when people feel free to decide about engaging in the 
counter-attitudinal behaviour. However, they found where attempts were made to induce 
compliance, when there was no perceived freedom of choice to engage in a counter-attitudinal 
behaviour, there was a positive relationship between the amount of incentive and the amount of 
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attitude change. Thus, in a paradigm of induced compliance, the more an incentive is provided, the 
more positive the attitude towards desired counter-attitudinal change will be. 
Beauvois and Joule (1996) state that today's psychologists continue to successfully utilise the 
negative-incentive and induced-compliance paradigms when considering the impact of cognitive 
dissonance and the uptake of counter-attitudinal behaviours. They also note that these theories 
have failed to significantly permeate domains outside that of psychology. Despite this, these 
findings from social psychology appear to clarify a major observation of this thesis: rewards and 
incentives, both explicit and implicit, influence the perception of counter-attitudinal behaviours by 
subjectively increasing or decreasing the amount of cognitive dissonance experienced. 
In sum, the investigation revealed the existence of a disruptive innovation rejection strategy caused 
by cognitive dissonance, whereby management practitioners focus upon rewarding incrementalism 
to remove the experience of psychological discomfort. This finding was combined with the 
literature above to offer the following propositions: 
It was found that the holistic graphical approaches used in the interventions within cases A and B 
enabled the development of a common cross functional vocabulary. Perhaps the use of such 
holistic images could enable management practitioners to tackle the weak ties between 
technologists and business managers. If so, this could improve the transfer of knowledge a nd ideas 
regarding potentially disruptive innovations and increase leverage from previously non-reW2rded 
intellectual capital. 
To simultaneously pursue sustaining and disruptive innovations executive teams could intervene 
with reward systems to bring them into line with knowledge from social psychology in the 
following manner: 
Driver for disruptive innovation 
Top-down driven demand for pursuit 
of disruptive innovation 
Top-down supported grass-roots 
emergence of disruptive innovation 
Applicable 
Psychological 
Paradigm 
Induced- 
compliance 
Negative- 
incentive 
Management Action 
Large explicit and implicit rewards 
and incentives. 
Small/token incentives with explicit 
rewards based upon growth of the 
potentially disruptive innovation 
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Reappraising reward systems links with the growing belief that rewarding with stocks and shares 
may not be good enough in the future (Handy, 2001). Handy (2001) notes that the increasingly 
discontinuous nature of many industries makes stocks and shares a risky way of rewarding talent, 
for both employees with little direct control over share price or stock valuations and for people who 
make real cash investments into their business. 
7.2.2.2 Rejection Strategy 2: Ignoring the positive aspects of disruptive opportunities 
and/or removing the negative aspects of sustaining innovation 
When presented with a potentially disruptive opportunity, cognitive dissonance can force 
management practitioners to ignore the positive aspects of potentially disruptive opportunities 
and/or remove the negative aspects of sustaining alternatives. 
Participants of the DPM interventions, from both cases, admitted (in retrospect) to occasions where 
they rejected potentially disruptive opportunities, in favour of sustaining innovation, by removing 
the Positive aspects of the rejected prospect and/or removing the negative aspects of the chosen 
initiative. For example, in case A the management team had recently faced a decision between two 
dissonant projects: Should they (A) increase the allocation of resources to a project that was to 
deliver a new high-end product in their existing core range or (B) invest resources into a project 
with disruptive potential in a new and totally different emerging market? 
(A) The senior management were insistent that they could deliver new wealth generation by 
educating customers to move into the high performing end of their market (where they 
forecasted higher revenues and higher margins). In doing so they ignored the evidence 
which showed that most of their customer losses were to be found at the low-end of the 
market and that the high-end was small, shrinking and already saturated. Much of the 
customer base, it would seem, were now happy to purchase cheaper, lower quality, 
substitute products from China. 
(B) Alternatively, evidence showed that the emerging market within the unfamiliar industry 
(although currently small with only potential for large growth) could provide Case A with a 
new high margin revenue stream. Competitive intensity within the market for the new 
concept was low and the current players were ignoring non-consumers and low-end 
customers who were in a situation of massive technology oversupply. Furthermore, the 
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current players did not have as advanced technology and facilities as Case A to deliver the 
potentially disruptive proposition, which was based upon a cluster of simpler technologies. 
Despite the evidence, the potentially disruptive opportunity was labelled by the senior management 
team as 'too risky' for two reasons: (1) they felt the emerging market was "not yet large enough" 
and (2) they were "too unfamiliar with the emerging industry". The positive aspects of the 
opportunity with disruptive potential were removed and the lack of promise in manufacturing high- 
end products was ignored. 
The discovery of the existence of this disruptive innovation rejection strategy has important 
implications for executive management teams. As such, a proposition can be immediately drawn 
from this finding: executive teams who want their organisations to simultaneously pursue 
sustaining and disruptive innovations should create an environment where management 
practitioners do not feel compelled, either consciously or subconsciously, to ignore the positive 
aspects of potentially disruptive opportunities and/or remove the negative aspects of their 
sustaining alternatives. Employees should be able to see the true value and benefits of an 
innovation opportunity regardless of its 'type'. 
Discussing the validity of this finding: 
The strategy of ignoring the positive aspects and/or removing the negative aspects of innovation 
options was presented and discussed in a workshop setting with senior management practitioners 
from Cases C and D and five other organisations that were involved in the wider research 
programme. As with the first rejection strategy the participants 'admitted' (once they had 
overcome initial hesitancy) that when afflicted with cognitive dissonance they, or other members of 
their organisations, had resorted to ignoring the positive aspects of potentially disruptive 
innovations and/or the negative aspects of sustaining innovation. Thus the existence of this 
disruptive innovation rejection strategy has been ratified by a wider group of industrialists. 
Once again Reagans and McEvily's (2003) work, from the field of knowledge transfer, appears to 
provide a vocabulary to explain these observations within cases A and B. Managers seemed to find 
it easy to ignore the positive aspects of a potentially disruptive innovation as there were weak ties 
between the senders and the receivers of the tacit knowledge involved. Whereas, it did not matter 
whether the ties between the actors involved in the transfer of the codified knowledge for 
sustaining innovation were weak or strong as prevailing high levels of construct equivalence 
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(Wel ken huysen-Gybels, and Van de Vijver, 2001) facilitated the fast transfer and adoption of 
information and knowledge. Therefore, this perspective suggests that it may be natural to ignore 
the positive aspects of disruptive innovation because of the difficulties involved in tacit knowledge 
transfer. 
The concept of 'comprehensiveness', from the field of context based decision making, offers another 
perspective from which to consider this disruptive innovation rejection strategy. Fredrickson (1984) 
states that the degree to which an organisation's top management seek to be exhaustive or 
inclusive in formulating and integrating strategic decisions can be referred to as the level of 
comprehensiveness. Fredrickson and Mitchell (1984) have shown that the level of 
comprehensiveness has a positive relationship with organisational performance under stable 
environmental conditions. However, in unstable conditions there exists a negative relationship 
between comprehensiveness and performance. This has significant implications for managers 
pursuing potentially disruptive innovations. As was shown in chapter four, different strategic, 
managerial and information gathering approaches are required when pursuing sustaining and 
disruptive innovations - innovation contexts that can be described respectively to be inherently 
stable and unstable (Tushman and Anderson, 1986). Most senior executives will have historically 
found themselves facing the need for comprehensive management in relatively stable contexts 
(Liefer et al., 2000). However, such an approach appears to inhibit strategic, managerial and 
information receptivity approaches when pursuing potentially disruptive technologies and business 
models. An understanding of the comprehensiveness sought by management practitioners could, 
therefore, be used to explain why managers may ignore the positive aspects of disruptive 
innovations and the negative aspects of sustaining innovation. For example, sustaining innovations 
are more likely to satisfy the requirement of comprehensiveness; alternatively, potentially disruptive 
innovations are more likely to be based upon emergent, incomplete knowledge and insights into 
future trends for a given technology or demand. This is information that is neither exhaustive nor 
conducive to deliberate comprehensive strategy making, thus suiting a more emergent approach 
(Mintzberg et al., 1998). 
Therefore, the concept of comprehensiveness provides an insight as to why the positive aspects of a 
potentially disruptive innovation may be ignored - such an investment option is unlikely to meet 
high levels of comprehensiveness demanded by established organisations. Equally, the perceived 
value of a sustaining innovation may be exaggerated, if it is presented as a comprehensive 
investment option. This perspective highlights that cognitive dissonance is once again playing its 
part in the decision to fund potentially disruptive innovations. 
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Offering a deeper understanding of how people respond when attempting to reduce the experience 
of cognitive dissonance are Shultz and Lepper (1996), who have investigated an area of human 
behaviour they call 'spreading of alternatives'. In fact, their description of how people behave when 
making efforts to reduce cognitive dissonance almost provides a verbatim description of the 
disruptive innovation rejection strategy observed in this subsection. They state that a person who 
experiences cognitive dissonance, when forced to make a choice between two alternatives, will seek 
to reduce their perceived discomfort by removing the negative aspects of the chosen alternative, or 
the positive aspects of the rejected alternative. As described above, managers from each of the 
case study organisations admitted to disregarding negative aspects of selected incremental 
innovation opportunities, thus, making them more preferable to their potentially disruptive 
counterparts. They also ignored the positive aspects of the rejected potentially disruptive 
alternatives in order to justify their choices yet further. 
Thus, this investigation has contributed a practical business context to which the notion of 
'spreading of alternatives' is relevant. It would appear that this could be major cause of 
practitioners' habitual mismanagement of the resource allocation process and the restriction of 
potentially disruptive opportunities. The spreading of alternatives paradigm could, therefore, 
underpin problems with knowledge transfer and the seeking of comprehensiveness described above. 
This finding must be highlighted as a concern to industrialists and as area of further investigation 
for social scientists and psychologists; furthermore, it can be used to generate the following 
proposition: 
To simultaneously pursue sustaining and potentially disruptive innovations, employees must be able 
to garner true representations of the value and benefit of all investment options. This can be 
achieved by reducing the dissonance between these differing types of innovation objectives, which 
can be delivered with executive management support for both deliberate and emergent approaches 
to management and strategy. 
7.2.2.3 Rejection Strategy 3: Focusing upon historical perceptions of success 
When presented with a potentially disruptive opportunity that psychological inertia, caused by 
organisational memory, creates a focus upon historical perceptions of success and the rejection of 
alternative perspectives. 
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"We've always been the world leaders in ýroduct X'", said the director of R&D in case B, "we are 
the best in the world, no-one can make those like we do"[B-Director of R&D-O& 1998 15-200]. 
Almost the whole management team in Case B became comfortable with the idea that they could 
generate 'disruptions' in unfamiliar market places. However, past success, with world beating 
technologies, made many of them believe that they would not be disrupted in their current 
mainstream markets, despite preliminary evidence of technology over-supply in several core 
product categories. Similar evidence was present in Case A. It seemed that there existed an 
organisational memory, within both organisations, for the factors that have been responsible for 
past success and that this had become embedded in the cognitive processes of the organisation's 
management practitioners. Consequently, prevailing perceptions of success were preventing the 
practitioners from visualising or embracing the potential for disruptive change in their primary 
technologies and customer offerings. Ideas that went against the grain of history generated 
cognitive dissonance and consequently did not get funded. Thus, it was observed in both cases that 
the notion of taking current technologies and competencies to unfamiliar markets with disruptive 
strategies was a more appealing proposition, yet both organisations preferred what they deemed to 
be safer investment options. 
This disruptive innovation rejection strategy has significant implications for executive management 
teams and the stakeholders of organisations who see the longevity of the business as paramount. 
As such, a proposition can be immediately drawn from the discovery of this finding: Executive 
teams must ensure that their workforce is proud of its history but not tied to it. Core competencies 
soon become core rigidities (Leonard-Barton, 1992) in the face of disruptive innovations. They 
should be prepared to celebrate their organisation's competencies whilst also preparing to both 
learn and unlearn for the future. 
Discussing the validity of this finding: 
The strategy of focusing upon historical perceptions of success was presented and discussed in a 
workshop setting. The wider group of industrial participants (the senior management practitioners 
from Cases C and D and five other organisations that were involved in the wider research 
programme to which this investigation contributed), ratified the existence and use of this rejection 
strategy. Despite some initial hesitancy, the participants 'admitted' that they, or other members of 
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their organisations, had resorted to maintaining a focus upon historically valued perceptions of 
success when afflicted with cognitive dissonance. 
This finding appears to contribute to the body of knowledge from the domains of knowledge 
management and organisational learning - in particular the characteristics of organisational and 
managerial psychology in both. For example, information and knowledge is said to be embedded 
within individuals, relationships, culture, processes, structures, archives and artefacts (Stewart 
1998). When management practitioners recall this information and knowledge from their 
organ isations' history, they are in effect, drawing upon their organisational memory (Senge, 1990). 
Authors writing in the domains of knowledge management and organisational learning, who assert 
the notion of organisational memoryý such as Senge (1990), Lukas and Bell (2000), Olivera (2000), 
Walsh and Ungson (1991), show that an organisation's memory can influence organisation wide 
decision-making. As outlined in Chapter 2, DeBono (1968 and 1988) offers the construct of 
psychological inertia to explain how and why people get trapped into ways of thinking and being, 
thus finding it difficult to change. The effects of organisational memory can be paralleled to this 
inertia and how an individual's memory can affect their day-to-day decision-making. 
Berthon et al. (2001) applied the construct of organisational memory to decision making in the 
marketing arena. They found that small, young companies with low levels of content in their 
organisational memories' rely more upon external sources of information compared to their larger, 
established competitors. Authors in this field contend that that a deep and rich organisational 
memory can be both enabling and debilitating (DeBono, 1988; Walsh and Ungson, 1991). It can 
ensure that management practitioners have increased access to sources of learning and are less 
likely to repeat errors. However, it is also claimed that it can restrict people to familiar ways of 
thinking and making decisions. For example, Walsh and Ungerson (1991) note that decisions which 
are not framed within the context of an organisation's history are more likely to be met with 
resistance than those that are congruent with its history. 
It is believed that the results presented in this thesis would indicate that the concept of 
organisational memory has clear implications for disruptive innovation -a topic to which this 
construct has not been frequently paired. It would appear that the major challenge for 
management practitioners in an established organisation is to use their organisational memory to 
positive affect, whilst simultaneously preventing it from constraining decision making - thus 
alleviating the focus upon historical routes to success. 
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Authors in the broad fields of organisational behaviour and management studies will often refer to 
the influence that the senior executives assert over their organisations through processes called 
"sense-making" and "sense-giving" (e. g. Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991; Watson, 1995). Gioia and 
Chittipeddi (1991) have shown that a manager is sense-making when he or she attempts to assess 
their external organisational context and allow their observations to influence a change in their 
opinions and viewpoint regarding their business and its future. Alternatively, they contend that 
managers are sense-giving when they disseminate their response to sense-making activities - often 
via the communication of new plans, new programmes or new visions. 
Handy (2001) has claimed that the process of sense-making, for younger organisations, relies upon 
active and continuously evolving processes. These on-going activities, allow managers to identify 
emergent information regarding their performance and their organisations' wider domain, thus 
generating a responsive emergent approach to organisational development and strategy. Handy 
(2001) also demonstrated that older, established organisations will mostly engage in more 
formalised and even passive sense-making. He states the executives from these organisations often 
believe their understanding of their external organisational context is much greater than what it 
really is (he insists that many rely upon buying or appropriating from smaller, more nimble 
organisations for true innovation). Christensen and Raynor (2003) and Hamel (2000) have 
illustrated that problems can evolve when using industry specific, formalised sense-making 
approaches. The implication is that executive management teams of established organisations 
become obligated to deliberate strategy approaches, based upon a fixation upon historical 
perspectives of performance and success. Consequently, potentially disruptive opportunities are 
often assessed by the same criteria as their incumbent offerings - through the filter of past 
experiences. Kaplan (1999) proposed that organisational activities are more likely to produce both 
sustaining and disruptive innovations, if executive management and employees are in acceptance 
of the notion that all technologies, customer offerings and business models have limited life cycles. 
Such an acceptance would allow "sense-making" and "sense-giving" activities to be free of the bias 
of overbearing organisational memories and would allow leadership to challenge any prevailing 
psychological inertia. 
The results presented in this thesis suggest that the construct of organisational memory should be 
considered in more depth within the context of the pursuit of disruptive innovation. The 
practitioners involved in this research demonstrated that their organisational memories prejudiced 
their innovation activity. It could be concluded that investment options which are congruent with 
organisational memory are less likely to create cognitive dissonance than options that require the 
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treading of new ground - such as disruptive innovation. The senior management teams within 
these established businesses possessed a shared management psychology entrenched in 
organisational memories that appeared to create a limiting filter, which younger organisations do 
not possess. Instead younger or emerging organisations are more agile (Tushman and O'Reilly, 
1996) and appear more prepared to adopt notions that support disruptive innovation such as "win 
small, win early and win often" and "be patient for growth but impatient for profitability" (Hamel, 
2000; Christensen and Raynor, 2003), as presented in Chapter 4. 
The discovery of this disruptive innovation rejection strategy and the insights presented above were 
used to generate the following propositions: 
An executive management team who is committed to the pursuit of disruptive innovation must 
ensure that their top management team, and the key stakeholders in the innovation effort, are 
accepting of the notion that all technologies, customer offerings and business models have limited 
life cycles. In doing so, they must ensure the top management team's 'sense making' activities are 
open to both sustaining and disruptive innovation and are dominated by what the business could 
do, as opposed to what it has done in the past. 
The combination of this research with extant literature from the area of disruptive innovation 
shows that organisations must embrace the notion that history is to be celebrated but not allowed 
to dictate the future. Thus, if an organisation has committed to the pursuit of disruptive innovation 
and an employee allows their unwillingness to accept this notion to inhibit the pursuit of this 
strategy, then their departure from the business should considered. Company Chairman should pay 
particular credence to this proposition if such an employee happens to be the CEO or a director - as 
the 'upper echelons' exert significant influence across the business. Although it may seem a little 
draconian, this notion has received support since Pfeffer and Salancik (1979) made a very similar 
assertion in their work on the impact of resource dependencies. 
7.2.2.4 Rejection Strategy 4: Creating perception of success with high effort 
The more effort that is seen to be put into sustaining innovations the more management 
practitioners will try to perceive the outcome as desirable. This allows management to add 
consonant cognitions to such organisational behaviour and explains the maintenance of the 
preference for sustaining innovations in two ways: 
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(1) they contribute to the grand historic effort of the business, and 
(2) they are more likely to immediately require large amounts of resources and aim to deliver some 
measurable immediate benefit than a new potentially disruptive opportunity (which will be 
focused upon small market niche), thus increasing the perception of contribution and 
comprehensiveness 
Evidence in the data, linked to the amount of effort expended on current innovation initiatives, 
points to another cognitive strategy employed by practitioners to reduce the cognitive dissonance 
surrounding disruptive innovation (thus legitimising the allocation of resources to sustaining 
innovations). Participant from both cases A and B cited examples of "prestige innovation projects" 
where huge amounts of effort were being invested. The targets of the high-activity, prestige 
projects were nearly always the improvement of highly mature products and/or technologies for 
familiar markets. The data analysis revealed a correlation between the amounts of reported effort, 
which management teams had invested into their prestige projects, and the perception of 
attractiveness of the outcome of this resource allocation. 
In case A, for example, resources invested into prestige projects were targeted at improving core 
offerings, to retain market share and to remain competitive with insurgent Chinese rivals. It was 
observed that the practitioners, in the face of growing year on year competition, commit more and 
more effort, yet achieve less and less benefit. Despite this performance analysis, which illustrates 
that such project teams had reached the point of diminishing returns, senior management appeared 
keen to exaggerate the benefits of their high effort projects, both in their own minds and to the 
rest of the business. In both cases the more effort the management teams had invested into their 
prestige projects, the more they sought to exaggerate the attractiveness of the outcome of this 
resource allocation. Perceived attractiveness was, therefore, linked to effort and appearance and 
not always to measured benefits. The perception of exaggerated attractiveness provides insights 
into the cognition of practitioners faced with the choice of funding a project of a sustaining or 
potentially disruptive innovation. The investigation has found that the experience of cognitive 
dissonance, generated by the incongruence of potentially disruptive investment options, can be 
alleviated by deciding to fund the unjustly attractive, but perceptually desirable, high-effort 
sustaining innovation and rejecting the potentially disruptive alternative. 
Once again the discovery of this disruptive innovation rejection strategy has important implications 
for executive management teams. As such, a proposition can be immediately drawn: An executive 
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management team, which seeks to pursue both sustaining and disruptive innovations, may be 
blinded by the effort involved in an innovation initiative if they do not intervene with how success 
is measured in their organisation. Particular attention must be given to uncovering false 
perceptions of success attached to high-effort projects that are delivering diminishing returns on 
investment. 
Discussing the validity of this finding: 
The strategy of linking the perception of success with high effort was presented and discussed with 
the wider collaborative research group. Despite some initial hesitancy, the participants 'admitted' 
that they, or other members of their organisations, had allowed their perception of success to be 
governed by how much effort had been undertaken. This false perception of success was reported 
to increase the cognitive consonance surrounding the decision to reject or withdraw funds from 
potentially disruptive innovations in favour of their sustaining alternatives. Thus, the existence of 
this disruptive innovation rejection strategy has been ratified by a wider group of industrialists. 
The emergent understanding of this disruptive innovation rejection strategy further contributes to 
the body of knowledge surrounding the topic of 'managerial comprehensiveness' (Fredrickson, 1984; 
Fredrickson and Mitchell, 1984 - as described earlier in this chapter). For example, most managers 
are used to working in operational contexts that strive to maintain or enhance their current 
businesses with sustaining innovations. This situation necessitates the need for high levels of 
comprehensiveness; a factor that becomes engrained into working processes, culture and the 
perception of success (Fredrickson and Mitchel, 1984). Thus, when attempting to deliver 
competitive advantage with innovation, managers who are entrenched in the notion that high 
levels of comprehensiveness will deliver success, may be more likely to initiate and fund high effort, 
high involvement, low risk sustaining innovation projects. The evidence and literature presented 
through-out this thesis has shown that such an approach is unsupportive to the pursuit of 
disruptive innovation. Early stage success should not be measured in terms of high effort. Instead 
it should be considered in terms of linking a unique proposition to a small niche market with a 
compelling reason to buy that also has high potential for providing the basis of a disruptive 
foothold market. 
Moreover, and perhaps more pertinently, experiments from the field of social psychology, which 
have considered cognitive dissonance, can also be linked to this disruptive innovation rejection 
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strategy. For example, Aronson and Mills (1959) conducted an experiment whereby women had to 
undergo a severe or mild 'initiation' to become a member of a group. In the severe-initiation 
condition, the women were made to engage in an embarrassing activity to join the group, whereas 
the women in the mild-initiation condition joined the same group without engaging in the 
embarrassing activity. The group that the participants joined was engineered to be rather dull and 
boring. When the women had been group members for a short while, interviews were conducted 
and it was found that those which had undergone the severe-initiation evaluated the group more 
favou rably than those who had experienced the mild-initiation. Beauvois and Joule (1996) have 
noted t hat prior to this, social psychologists would have predicted that the greater the unpleasant 
effort required when obtaining an outcome, the greater the perception of cognitive dissonance. 
However, Aronson and Mills (1959) claim that this did not occur, with their participants from the 
severe-initiation condition, because their research shows that humans have a tendency to actively 
attempt to reduce their perception of dissonance by adding consonant cognitions to their 
behaviour, thus exaggerating the desirability of the outcome. Beauvois and Joule (1996) refer to 
this phenomenon as the effort-justification paradigm and it continues to be used fruitfully in social 
psychology research today (Harmon-Jones and Mills 1999). 
In sum, the effort-justification paradigm effectively asserts that the more effort people have to put 
into an activity the more they will seek means to exaggerate the desirability of the activity's 
outcomes. This has clear resonance with the disruptive innovation rejection strategy that was 
observed to occur within the case studies involved in this research. Therefore, it is believed that the 
current investigation has contributed to the body of knowledge on the effort-justification 
paradigm, via the provision of another context of incidence that has not hitherto been rigorously 
explored. 
Consideration of the findings and the literature presented above led to the generation of the 
following proposition: 
If executive management are committed to the pursuit of both sustaining and disruptive innovation 
they should ensure that they, and their management teams, are not blinded by high-effort 
innovation initiatives. 'They should introduce mechanisms to deliver a true picture of realised or 
realisable benefits. Such a picture would demonstrate the innovation options contribution to 
emerging, growing and maturing customer offerings and business models, as well as strategic goals 
- not just bottom I ine profits. 
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7.2.2.5 Rejection Strategy 5: Holding beliefs in the face of disconfirming information 
Cognitive dissonance will be stimulated by the presentation of a potentially disruptive opportunity 
if it is inconsistent with prevailing organisational trajectories and/or executive management's 
beliefs. The experience of such psychological discomfort can compel managers to hold onto their 
familiar beliefs, to misinterpret the potentially disruptive opportunity, and to reject it as a viable 
investment option. 
The management practitioners in both Cases A and B appeared to hold beliefs that were 
unchangeable in the presence of disconfirming information. Case B, for example, had identified a 
potentially disruptive business opportunity in an unfamiliar market. They had managed (on this 
occasion) not to succumb to the previously mentioned rejection strategies and a development 
project had been initiated. Members of their senior executive team kindly agreed to share their 
potentially disruptive concept with the author, for the benefit of the current research and in return 
for a workshop that introduced a summary of best practice guidance and advice on the 
implementation of disruptive strategies, from academic literature. Concordantly, a one-day 
interactive workshop was designed and implemented with the project management team and a 
cross functional support group from other areas of the business unit. There were 32 participants in 
total who took part in the 'state-of-the-art knowledge transfer activity'. On concluding the 
workshop, 80% of the group who were non-project members reported that the day had contributed 
"high benefits" to their professional development, and their understanding of disruptive innovation 
(20% medium-to-high benefits). All of these people reported that they believed the theories 
discussed would help the project succeed. Conversely, 80% of the project team's members reported 
their disappointment with the notion that disruptive innovations should be initially launched with 
comparatively small projects for specific niche markets. Moreover, the distinct majority of the 
senior members of the project team dismissed the information and sought to persuade other 
participants within the workshop to do the same. They reported that they believed in the potential 
of their concept so much, that they chose to ignore the disconfirming information and still wanted 
to launch a multi-million dollar, 5-10 year project. They hoped that the result of this project would 
be able to compete directly with industry incumbents in the mainstream market, effectively using a 
mass market sustaining innovation model - thus the project management team had also 
succumbed to rejection strategy 4. Therefore, another strategy employed in both cases A and B was 
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simply the dismissal, refutation and/or misinterpretation of information that was inconsistent with 
the beliefs of the practitioners. 
Of the participants involved in this research that struggled, failed or refused to accept the notion of 
disruptive innovation, all could be considered as intelligent and diligent industrialists who wanted 
the best for their organisation. So why would they hold on to their beliefs in the face of 
disconfirming information? Reporting upon cutting edge consumer research techniques, Spinney 
(2004) states that there is an "instinctual response to overvalue something when we see that other 
people want it... it makes sense for us to be swayed by others in this way because much of our 
success as a species depends on our ability to learn what is good and what is not from those 
around u s. " (p34). Thus, when the bulk of influential people within an organisation purely focus 
upon sustaining innovation, it is difficult to resist this majority. And in the absence of an active 
community of practice within both cases A and B, which could influence their management 
practitioners into using the disruptive innovation management approaches from the literature, it 
should come as no surprise that the theory was rejected by some. 
The existence of this disruptive innovation rejection strategy has important implications for 
executive management teams. As such, a proposition can be immediately drawn from this finding: 
executive management should attempt to uncover the deeply entrenched beliefs that undermine 
the pursuit of innovation that moves beyond the steady state. In doing so, they will be better 
prepared when propagating the notion of disruptive innovation. 
Discussing the validity of this finding: 
The strategy of holding beliefs in the face of disconfirming information was presented and 
discussed in a workshop setting with senior management practitioners from the wider collaborative 
research group. The participants reported that information, which is incongruent with their 
organisational beliefs, can generate psychological discomfort (associated with the experience of 
cognitive dissonance) leading to its rejection. Thus the existence of this disruptive innovation 
rejection strategy has been ratified by a wider group of industrialists. 
When considering the example, presented above, of members of Case B holding beliefs in the face 
of disconfirming information, perhaps Reagans and McEvily's (2003) insights into knowledge 
transfer could be useful once again. It could be argued that the author struggled to permeate the 
external and internal boundaries of the case study organisation because he only established weak 
ties between the sources of information and the recipients. However, feedback would suggest to 
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the contrary and, furthermore, investigations from the field of social psychology (in particular 
cognitive dissonance) can be extrapolated to provide insights into this disruptive innovation 
rejection strategy. 
Burris et al. (1997) investigated cognitive dissonance in the context of religion. They demonstrated 
that people are willing to act by faith alone and not change their behaviour when presented with 
information that is inconsistent with their beliefs. It was shown that people will hold on to their 
beliefs and misperceive or misinterpret disconfirming information, which consequently, leads to it 
being refuted or rejected. It was also reported that these people sought support from other 
"believers", in their endeavours to maintain a sense of self that is both consistent and positive. 
Harmon-Jones and Mills (1999) have stated that this phenomenon can be referred to as the belief- 
disconfirmation paradigm. 
Thus, it would appear that the current investigation contributes another context to which the 
belief-disconfirmation paradigm is applicable. Once again, the area of social psychology offers 
further understanding and support for the notion that managers may reject or refute innovations 
with disruptive potential. Thus, when pursuing resources for potentially disruptive opportunities, 
management practitioners need to be aware of the fact that people may be holding onto their 
beliefs in the face of disconfirming information. Industrialists will, therefore, benefit from 
developing strategies to overcome the effects of prevailing beliefs, especially when presenting data 
that suggests current competitive advantage, technological platforms, customer offerings or 
business models have limited life cycles. 
Another reason as to why members of the case studies involved in this research may have held on 
to their beliefs, in the face of disconfirming information, can be found by considering the 
organisations' origins. Tripsas and Gavetti (2000) state "Work on organizational imprinting has 
demonstrated that a broad range of environmental conditions at organizational founding (e g. the 
social, economic, and competitive environments) have a lasting influence on organizational 
structure and culture" (pl 159). It is their belief that the area of organisational imprinting should 
be a new avenue of investigation for those conducting research into discontinuous and disruptive 
innovation. For example, Tripsas and Gavetti (2000) believed the role of Polaroid's founder was 
significantly influential over both its success and its eventual demise. This notion is supported by 
Schein (1983), whose research also demonstrated that not all founders are as memorable, and 
therefore do not have such a significant effect. Stinchcombe, (1965) has discussed social structures 
at organisational founding and Zygildopoulos (1999) has investigated initial environmental 
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conditions. Both authors' work show how these settings can induce limiting factors on future 
trajectories of development. Furthermore, Burgleman (2002) demonstrates how difficult it is for 
management practitioners to overcome the organisational 'inertia of evolutionary lock-in'. 
Alternatively, Adams' (2002) work as a venture capitalist has led him to believe that organisations 
which start life with an entrepreneurial and adventurous culture, are more likely-to continue to be 
entrepreneurial and adventurous in the future. 
It is not in the remit of this research to investigate, at length, each case study's founding, yet it 
could be seen that the conditions at each organisation's beginning may have possibly locked them 
into a trajectory of development, limiting them to sustaining innovation. Although not 
demonstrable in the context of the current research, this discussion does lead to the conclusion 
that management practitioners wishing to pursue disruptive innovation may have to consider 
-organisational imprinting' before they commence. This may allow them to assess the extent to 
whic h organisational members will hold onto prevailing beliefs regarding their organisation and 
their innovation activity. Such a consideration could allow managers to calculate how to 'pitch' the 
pursuit of a potentially disruptive innovation when building a community of interest, making 
requests for resources or attempting to modify the strategic intent of the organisation. 
Consideration of the findings and the literature presented above led to the generation of the 
following propositions: 
Executive management, who want to initiate a focus upon the pursuit of disruptive innovation, 
should assess the extent to which their organisation's founding contributes to the organisational 
wide view of its future. In doing so, executive management will identify the stakeholders who will 
be resistant to the re-focusing of selected resources to potentially disruptive innovations. 
Furthermore, this will enable them to work on the delivery of tailor made education packages to 
garner the support of pockets of resistance (NB. a holistic understanding of the innovation playing 
field, such as that delivered by the DPM intervention, could be useful in this context). 
A management practitioner, who attempts to attract fundi ng for a potentially disruptive 
innovation, which is counter to traditional organisational focus, should be prepared to face the 
belief-disconfirmation paradigm. Thus, the management practitioner should pre-emptively prepare 
mitigating strategies such as creating a network of influence or pitching the idea in the language 
of the prevailing doctrine. 
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7.2.2.6 Discussing and positioning the contribution to knowledge made by the 
identification and exploration of the disruptive innovation rejection strategies 
*Locating the contribution of the findings to the understanding of theory and practice of 
resource allocation: 
Further consideration of the disruptive innovation rejection strategies, and their cognitive basis, 
appears to reveal that they not only underpin common inhibiting management actions (Section 
7.2.1), but they appear to be the primary reason for managers' failure to allocate resources to 
potentially disruptive innovations throughout all resource allocation activities (Figure 7-4). The 
collaborative partners involved in this research have concurred with this notion. It can be seen that 
prevailing mental models were affecting the structural context (the management systems, the 
allocation of physical resources) and the situational context (the cultural systems and individual 
and group values) within all the collaborating case studies. Consequently, cognitive dissonance was 
experienced at all points within the activities that can be described as within the remit of resource 
allocation. 
Chapter 5 (Section 5.6) presented an overview of the literature pertaining to the resource allocation 
agenda faced by today's management practitioners. An outline was provided regarding the decision 
making context, the requirements for a continuous process, a breakdown between resource 
approval and resource provision, and the identification of some of the primary supportive 
management tools and approaches. It is believed that the findings of the final wave of this 
research contribute to furthering the understanding of a breakdown between resource approval and 
resource provision and the decision making context within which this occurs. For example, 
Burgleman et al. (1996); and Leonard-Barton (1992) provide a description of the decision making 
context faced by management with responsibility for allocating resources. It is believed that this 
thesis adds further richness to their work by contributing increased academic clarity to the resource 
allocation issue, by offering a better understanding of the effects of conflicting management 
cognitions (Figure 7-3). Moreover, insights are garnered for management practitioners wishing to 
initiate the pursuit of disruptive innovation. 
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Figure 7-3: Cognitive dissonance and disruptive innovation rejection strategies- 
their impact upon resource allocation routines. 
Stacey (2000) and McMillan (2004) discuss how shadow systems, such as the 'underground' 
'conversations that organisational members partake in on a daily basis, affect the strategic action of 
an organisation. By considering the rejection strategies as a negative shadow system the above 
conclusion has further implications for the depth and breadth of the impact of cognitive 
dissonance. If it is accepted that the resultant disruptive innovation rejection strategies play a 
significant part in limiting the output from both the structural and situational contexts of resource 
allocation, then they may not only underpin inappropriate resource allocation routines. Their 
impact could be mapped across the entirety of the processual and systemic elements of the 
innovation effort. Figure 7-4 extends the 'scope of resource allocation diagram' to include the 
processual elements of innovation, and shows that the impact of cognitive dissonance could quite 
easily be a major contributor to all barriers in the pursuit of disruptive innovation. 
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The conclusion from this assertion is that the impact of cognitive dissonance is likely to be common 
in all average performing businesses but will have to be dealt with in a bespoke manner to deal 
with the intricacies of individualised approaches to the innovation effort. Strategies for reducing 
risk (e. g. probe and learn tactics, staged funding, partnering etc) may be difficult to deliver until the 
prevailing restrictive mental model(s) are acknowledged and understood. 
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Figure 7-4., Cognitive dissonance and disruptive innovation rejection strategies- 
their impact upon the entire innovation effort. 
It may be possible to extend this finding yet further by considering the five rejection strategies as a 
root cause for the rejection of all ideas and concepts that are incongruent with prevailing mental 
models, not just disruptive innovations. If this was so, we would expect to see the emergence of 
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these rejection strategies in the contexts of most large change programmes, the forcing of 
compliance to governmental policy, and in the introduction of agendas that do not immediately 
add to an organisation's bottom line i. e. 'green' issues and social corporate responsibility. 
Interestingly, Reger et al. (1994) report that many total quality management (TQM) programmes 
often require the managers to reframe their image of their organisations and even their roles 
within. Consequently, "... implementing total quality is easier said than done" (Ibid p566); TQM was 
often reported as being contradictory to established patterns of work, met with resentment and 
even, in some cases, aborted. The researcher hopes that the effect of prevailing mental models and 
cognitive dissonance can be extend to broader fields of organisational change. 
eConsidering the pursuit of disruptive innovation at the micro-level -a contribution to 
understanding from the perspective of management cognition: 
Kaplan et al., (2003) note that the body of literature in the arena of innovation management and in 
particular the field of discontinuous innovation "... in general, has not focused attention on 
management's cognitive processes" (p230). And as stated previously in this thesis, Tripsas and 
Gavetti (2000) call for more research into managerial cognitions. They state that a better 
understanding of the cognitions that drive management behaviour must be uncovered, when 
considering a management team's willingness and ability to adopt the pursuit of strategies that 
could be thought of as disruptive. However, Christensen and Raynor (2003) note that it is difficult 
to understand the cognitions (or thoughts and believes) that underpin a management team's ability 
to succeed or fail with disruptive innovation. Yet, the work of Salvato (2003) and Johnson, Melin 
and Wittington (2003) could suggest that such difficulties may be overcome by understanding an 
organisation from the perspective of micro-strategy; where micro-strategy is said to be the 
established system of interconnected routines and micro-activities. 
The data underpinning the discovery of the five disruptive innovation rejection strategies (as 
presented above), is based upon the researcher's observations, and statements from participants in 
relation to the micro activities and cognitive routines that underpin management decision making 
in the practice of innovation. The discussion of each disruptive innovation rejection strategy, in 
relation to innovation literature and findings from social psychology, knowledge management and 
organisational learning, has provided further richness to the emergent importance of managerial 
cognition and the effect of experiencing cognitive dissonance. Thus, it is believed that this research 
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has contributed, via the identification and description of the five disruptive innovation rejection 
strategies, to a better understanding of the managerial cognitions that result in an organisation's 
failure to foster disruptive innovation. 
As well as linking the topic of disruptive innovation to the previously overlooked constructs of 
cognitive dissonance and mental models, this research provides a new context of application for 
these terms from social psychology. Much of the past research into cognitive dissonance has been 
of the experimental type, in laboratory or staged settings (Harmon-Jones and Mills, 1999), which 
restricts the real-life element of the investigations (Robson, 1993). And mental models are often 
referred to in difficult-to-apply abstractions or in an over-simplified manner (Hodgkinson, 2000). 
Thus, the context of application - the pursuit of disruptive innovation - explored by this research, 
offers social psychologists and social scientists a real life setting and a new window through which 
they can consider the effect of cognitive dissonance and mental models. For this reason it is 
believed that this thesis, with its deeper probing of the effects of cognitive dissonance and mental 
models, contributes a new angle to the growing field of micro strategy and strategising with an 
activity based view (Johnson, Melin and Wittington, 2003). And in doing so it begins to answer the 
calls of Tripsas and Gavetti (2000) and Kaplan et al., (2003) for a better understanding of 
management cognitions. 
*Considering the pursuit of different types of disruptive innovation: 
As noted in Chapter 2 (the literature review), there are different approaches to the pursuit of 
disruptive innovation and the level of disruptiveness is not experienced to the same degree by all 
stakeholders. When considering the data set that underpins the disruptive innovation rejection 
strategies, with this appreciation in mind, a clear observation was noted: cognitive dissonance was 
reported to be experienced by managers from all four established cases when a potentially 
disruptive innovation conflicted with an established mental model. However, the speed at which 
the disruptive innovation rejection strategies were engaged was observed to vary. Potentially 
disruptive innovations that require the development of new, simple technological capabilities, 
appear to be met with less resistance than those that require the adoption of different strategic 
beliefs. The latter appeared to immediately generate significant levels of cognitive dissonance and 
were almost immediately confronted with the disruptive innovation rejections strategies; whereas 
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the former appeared to be influenced by the rejection strategies to an increasing degree as they 
progressed through the innovation processes. 
This observation can be presented by considering the different intensities with which the Cases A 
and B employed the rejection strategies and why. For example, Case A, the medium sized 
manufacturer, appeared to be more susceptible to the dissonance caused by disruptive 
opportunities that could potentially effect their core business operation. It appeared that this 
increased susceptibility was mainly due to their experience with and reliance upon a narrow group 
of technologies and narrow range of product offerings. Alternatively, once the management team 
of Case B, the large manufacturer, accepted the notion and importance of disruptive innovation 
they appeared to be more open to the suggestion that they could, and perhaps should, disrupt 
aspects of their core operations. This acceptance primarily appeared to be due to their large 
experience with a significantly diverse technology base, where experimenting with technologies 
was a key business activity. More research is needed to consider the relationship between the 
susceptibility of dissonance and the breadth of technological activity, yet it seems clear that the 
rejection strategies will be pursued with more vigour when cognitive dissonance is immediate and 
intense. 
This observation has also been paralleled by reports of management action in the literature. For 
example, Chandy and Tellis (1998), note that taking the first steps to disruption, via self- 
cannibalisation, often requires significant shift in strategic action and this is why many executive 
management teams resist or reject innovation of this sort. Likewise, Tripsas and Gavetti (2000) 
show that radical technological discontinuities, in the photography industry, had failed to cause a 
transformation in the basis of competition for Polaroid's core markets, until the emergence of 
digital imaging. This technological discontinuity represented a change that required a 
fundamentally different strategic belief. Polaroid's own digital imaging group pushed for a change 
of strategic focus, yet their ideas for new business models were resisted and rejected by top 
management. It could be argued that unperceivable disruptive innovation rejection strategies were 
at play within this one time world leader. In fact, Tripsas and Gavetti (2000) call for more research 
into management's understanding of, and reactions to, discontinuities that require the development 
of new technological capabilities versus those that require the adoption of different strategic 
beliefs. Moreover, 6 of the 11 expert interviewees made reference, without being prompted, to the 
increased propensity for top management to reject potentially disruptive ideas, if they appeared to 
instantly conflict with prevailing beliefs/mental models. 
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The identification of five disruptive innovation rejection strategies has provided managers and 
academics with the ability to consider the failed pursuit of disruptive innovation at a micro level. 
In doing so, it has been found that the higher the perceived intensity of disruption (e. g. a need for 
a change in strategic belief), the faster and more intense the disruptive innovation rejection 
strategies emerge. 
7.2.2.7 Summarising the limitations of insights that can be drawn form this deeper 
understanding 
To effectively summarise the limitations of insights that can be drawn form this deeper 
understanding it is necessary to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the approach taken to 
this investigation (Table 7-2). 
STRENGTHS 
" The findings are grounded in a real world investigation with data from four organisations that 
are attempting to use innovation to pursue increased competitive advantage. 
" The findings in this thesis have been evaluated by the industrialists involved in this research as 
having a high degree of relevance. 
" All data analysis activities have been triangulated with data from 'expert' interviewees, from 
outside the research group, and extant literature, in order to prevent the temptations of 'going 
native' (Van Maanen, 1988). 
The research was designed as an exploratory study, aiming to garner data upon the often 
overlooked qualitative issues of innovation management with respect to disruptive innovation. 
Such research requires context-specific understanding and the methodology was designed 
accordingly. 
The research has generated findings of value to both academia and industry; Chapter 8 will 
summarise how these form the basis of new contributions to knowledge, which can and should 
be the subject of future investigation to more accurately deduce their reliability and validity. 
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POTENTIAL WEAKNESSES 
The qualitative nature of the research, with its limited numbers of case study organisations, 
means that. the findings cannot be assessed by traditional, statistical measures of reliability. 
Thus, the value of the findings, in terms of their generality, results from their degree of 
credibility to those with an interest in the research area (Wyatt, 2001) 
The nature of qualitative research generates outcomes that cannot be viewed as facts or 
obj ective truths; they are the result of an interaction between the research and the researched 
(Silverman, 2000). 
The findings in relation to the conceptual framework and resource allocation do not represent 
complete theories, but they do highlight aspects of great relevance to those involved. 
The extant theory on the subject of disruptive innovation has not been tested and validated; it 
has been explored, in order to develop new knowledge and understanding of the experience of 
the pursuit of disruptive innovation within today's organisations. 
Table 7-2. - the strengths and weaknesses of the approach taken to this investiqation 
The discussion thus far has presented several deeper insights, implications and contributions to 
theory on disruptive innovation and the practice of managers in today's organisations. Table 7-2 
summarises that the nature of this qualitative investigation has enabled in-depth context-specific 
understanding to be developed regarding the human issues of a research topic that quantitative 
research cannot deliver. Yet this approach restricts traditional measures of reliability and the push 
for general isations; therefore, the value of the findings, in terms of their generality and validity, 
results from the degree of credibility to those with an interest in the area. It is believed that the 
author has maximised his opportunities to ensure that rigorous data collection and analysis 
techniques were implemented and that he accounted for the potential temptations of researcher 
bias or unjustified participant influence. In this regard, the findings offered throughout this thesis 
can be asserted as valuable to both academia and industry; they can form the basis of new 
contributions to knowledge and should be the subject of future investigations to deduce 
genera I isabi lity, reliability and validity. 
290 
Chapter 7: Discussion 
7.3 Methodological contributions 
Authors from the field of qualitative, social science research design, such as Silverman (2000), 
Robson (1993) and Yin (11994), state that the validity of a research methodology can be assessed in 
two key ways: 
a) Has the methodological approach been designed with full systematic consideration of all 
the options available? 
b) Was the methodology implemented correctly and appropriately? 
By answering these questions a full evaluation of the methodology that was employed to satisfy 
the research objectives of this investigation was conducted. This enabled the final key research 
finding to emerge, with respect to the collaborative mode 2 approach to management 
investigations; it is this evaluation and finding that will be discussed in the remainder of this 
subsection: 
The mode 2 collaborative approach enables researchers to deliver academically robust research 
without sacrificing the industrial relevance. The collaborative academic-industrial approach can 
be further facilitated by the exploitation of three features, which are additional to those presented 
in the extant literature. 
i) The pursuit of an open and trusting work environment. 
ii) The use of large-scale graphical facilitation approaches to record and disseminate data, and to 
elicit public commitment to research actions. 
iii) The co-creation of a conceptual framework to describe the research area of interest, in order to 
develop a shared language and to enable a shared research agenda with two-way connections 
between academia and industry. 
7.3.1 Ajustified methodological approach? 
New and Payne (1995: 75) state that "It is possible to have academic research which scores high on 
rigour and cleverness but low on connection to real problems... " and they claim that in 
management, more than any other discipline, there is a fundamental need to make a "... 
commitment to an encounter with that which management and workers do... " (p75). The research 
was designed to account for this issue, ensuring immersion into the world of each case study and a 
qualitative connection with the issue at hand. A case study based, 'mode 2% academic-industrial, 
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collaborative research design was employed. Chapter 3 and Appendix 2 describe the systematic 
consideration of the strategic and practical options, which social scientists face, when conducting a 
qualitative exploration, from a phenomenological perspective, in an emergent research area. It is 
believed that this systematic consideration, adequately justified the chosen methodology as the 
most appropriate research design in relation to the research objectives and time and resource 
limitations. 
7.3.2 Was the methodology implemented correctly and appropriately? 
To assess whether or not the mode 2 collaborative research approach was implemented correctly, 
eight factors were assessed; these were taken from the four features that typify the Mode 2 
approach (Stewart et aL, 2000) and the four theoretical propositions of idealistic collaboration 
(Gray, 2004). The findings of this analysis can be seen in Appendix B. In sum, despite the 'fad-like' 
nature (Gray, 2004) of this collaborative research (due to the imposed time restrictions), it is 
believed that this investigation has delivered a high quality collaborative inquiry that has resulted 
in industrially relevant and academically robust findings. The fact that both the academic and 
industrial communities have benefited from their involvement, is a key measure that this Mode 2 
approach was a success. 
Furthermore, as the notion of the Mode 2 collaborative research approach is relatively novel in the 
area of management studies (Tranfield, 2002), there are gaps in knowledge regarding advice and 
good practice for researchers. Thus, the author asserts that researchers who have effectively 
implemented a mode 2 collaborative research design, should look to their experiences to offer a 
contribution to knowledge and practice, which have not been promoted else where, regarding 
collaborative academic-industrial methodological approaches. 
At the closure of the research activities the following four main contributions were drawn: 
1) Building an environment of trust with a no-competitive research group and team 
building activities: 
It is believed that a researcher driven collaborative approach can only be effective if the 
industrialists are trusting and open, both with the researcher and the whole team of 
industrial collaborators. This was especially important in data collection workshops 
involving the entire group, where participants were required to share personal thoughts 
and company practice on innovation. Thus, it is believed that the use of case study sites 
from disparate organisations (creating a non-competitive research group) combined with 
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the use of team and trust building activities (proposed and implemented by each of the 
different organisations within the group) proved essential in the rapid development of 
trust and openness. 
The use of large-scale graphic facilitation: 
At the end of each wave of the research, data were gathered in the form of participant 
feedback. Following analysis, it appears that the use of the graphical facilitation approach 
(as described in Chapter 3) was believed to assist with the collaborative approach to the 
investigation. As well as delivering a fresh new way of displaying, collecting and analysing 
information (Young, 2003), six main benefits were cited: 
9 They improve the efficiency of transferring and developing knowledge and 
understanding. 
* They improved communication within the heterogeneous group of both academics and 
practitioners - thus enabling a true trans-disciplinary investigative approach - by surfacing 
a common language within the research group and increasing the levels of construct 
equivalence surrounding terminology and shared experiences. 
e They provided another medium for the participants and the author to better 
communicate how the research problem ('How can organisations understand and foster 
disruptive innovation? ') was framed in the context of application within the case study 
sites. 
* They facilitated the surfacing of information and data that would have otherwise been 
significantly more difficult to extract; a finding also noted by Young (2003). 
e When used effectively, they appeared to mandate full participation from the group. 
41 They enabled the group to develop, agree and utilise a socially-distributed research 
capability. The graphical approach facilitated public commitment to, and improved the 
communication of, actions, knowledge and insights (e. g. tasks and actions were easily 
shared amongst all group participants using large scale graphical 'pert charts' or 
'responsibility maps'). 
3) The academic and industrial co-development of a conceptual framework that 
holistically describes the research area under consideration: 
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The co-development of the conceptual framework that emerged from the first wave of 
research activities has provided significant utility for both the academic and industrial 
audiences -a key indicator of successful 'mode 2' collaborative design (Tranfield, 2002). It 
contributed to the holistic academic understanding of disruptive innovation in the context 
of the larger agenda of innovation research (Thomond, Lettice and Herzberg, 2003). And it 
contributed to the management practitioner audience in two ways. Firstly, by explaining 
the multifaceted and interrelated features of disruptive innovation in a pragmatic and 
holistic manner. Secondly, it has been shown to be a value added tool to assess and 
compare organisational performance (e. g. Michel, Monville and Thomond, 2004). 
4) Conscious effort to build construct equivalence regarding research terms: 
The importance and benefits of the graphical nature of the conceptual framework were 
further extended by the mode 2 research design; they were also influential in the design of 
the DPM management intervention. For example, the graphical and conceptual synthesis 
of a holistic understanding of the topic surfaced a common language that underpinned the 
essential feedback and two-way connections between the academic and industrial 
communities. Thus the conceptual framework generated a protocol that authors such as 
Gibbons el al (1994) view as essential in collaborative research. They state that successful 
collaborative research is "... characterised by a constant flow back and forth between ... 
the theoretical and the practical... discovery occurs in contexts where knowledge is 
developed and put to use, while results, which would have been traditionally characterised 
as applied - fuel further theoretical advances" (Gibbons et al., p9,1994). Thus, the 
graphical nature of the conceptual framework helped to solidify 'construct equivalence' 
(Welkenhuysen-Gybels and Van de Vijver, 2001) this facilitated shared understanding and 
minimised difficulties with academic and organisational specific definitions of complex 
terminology. 
It is believed that the instruments and protocols developed throughout this investigation offered 
the author an opportunity to simultaneously seek relevance without sacrificing rigour through a 
collaborative research design. As a consequence these insights are offered as a contribution to 
knowledge and practice. 
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7.4 Summary 
it is believed that in light of the valid and robust design of the research methodology and 
management intervention, the findings presented in this chapter can be accepted as relevant and 
valuable to both academia and industry: 
Therefore, it may be possible to conclude that a top management team, of an average performing 
organisation, can begin to overcome its resource allocation barriers to disruptive innovation if the 
following four circumstances were present: 
a) They had an understanding of the importance of disruptive innovation. 
b) They could map their priority innovation activities onto a holistic view of the entire 
innovation playing field (a view that includes areas for both sustaining and disruptive 
innovation). 
c) They were facilitated to see how both mechanistic financing routines and a restrictive 
perception of innovation, constrain resources and generate a failure to support disruptive 
opportunities (thus providing a value based view of why innovation projects, with 
disruptive potential, have been killed in the past). 
d) They were facilitated to see how it is possible to challenge existing restrictive funding 
routines and to allocate resources to potentially disruptive innovations. 
Moreover, the identification of the restrictive management actions and disruptive innovation 
rejection strategies allows both academics and industrialists to better understand, and to more 
effectively appraise, problems with the allocation of resources to disruptive innovation. In sum, 
being capable of fostering and delivering a disruptive innovation is not simply a matter of adding 
procedures, teams, champions, and visionary leaders (although these factors are important). This 
thesis provides evidence to illustrate that the pursuit of disruptive innovation may require a -shift in 
the mental models of major innovation stakeholders within an organisation. The investigation 
found that an holistic appreciation of the entire 'innovation playing field' and an holistic 
understanding of how current innovation activity maps onto this space, appears to enable top 
management teams to understand, challenge, and even change prevailing mental models. However, 
these reconfiqu rations appear to induce emotive responses especially when they impact self 
perception, and the perception of prevailing power bases and relationships within an organisation. 
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These emotive responses induce the application of disruptive innovation rejection strategies which 
in turn stimulate restrictive management actions. 
Thus, if the top management of an average performing organisation commits to delivering and 
fostering disruptive innovations they must first conduct a review of their resource allocation 
activities. Such a review must consider both physical systems as well as an assessment of the 
strength and influence of the top management teams prevailing mental model(s). Indeed, the 
failure to acknowledge the influence of prevailing belief systems and the impact of cognitive 
dissonance, both in theory and in practice, may prove to be a key explanation as to why researchers 
and p ractitioners do not understand the barriers to the pursuit of disruptive innovation well enough 
in order to do anything proactively about them. 
7.4.1 Recommendations for innovation practitioners 
The following recommendations for innovation practitioners have been extrapolated from the 
findings of this study and the extant literature. 
1. An holistic understanding of innovation activity allows management to challenge prevailing 
mental models that restrict innovation, allowing organisations to disrupt strategically. 
2. One method of delivering an holistic understanding of innovation activity can be achieved 
using the "Disruptive Portfolio Management" approach designed during this study. 
3. An holistic view of innovation activity improves the quality of management meetings focused 
upon innovation. 
4. Senior executives must reduce the perceived risk of pursing disruptive innovation, first 
amongst their own team then across the business. Case study organisations involved in this 
research achieved in by using portfolio maps to complete three key actions: 
0 The adoption of knowledge on the theory of disruptive innovation and staged 
financing approaches. 
0 The recognition of prevailing mental models and an understanding of how they 
encourage the use of disruptive innovation rejection strategies. 
* An holistic view of innovation activity, which can be used to legitimise 'ring-fencing I 
resources for potentially disruptive initiatives. 
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5. Ring fencing resources within your portfolio for seed-funding strategies, will support and 
deliver a patient-for-growth yet impatient-for-profitability approach. 
6. The management team must select a team of 'movers and shapers' who understand the 
theory of disruptive innovation and who can help mould potentially disruptive ideas into disruptive 
business propositions. 
7. Management teams must diffuse knowledge on disruptive innovation throughout the 
organisation; they can use portfolio map output to communicate support, intent and availability of 
resources. 
8. The discipline of managing the mental models of employees - surfacing, testing and 
improving their internal picture of how the world works - will deliver day-to-day strategically 
aligned activity. 
9. Top management must regularly look at their firm's current customer offerings and ask 
themselves the following simple questions to ensure that disruptive innovation remains fresh in 
their mind: 
a Are we facing diminishing returns for investments into incremental improvements? 
0 Are any of these offerings at risk from being disrupted from below? 
0 Do we have projects in our portfolio to protect the low-end? 
10. Top management must regularly look at their firm's current competencies and ask themselves 
the following simple questions to ensure that disruptive innovation remains fresh in their mind: 
0 Have we become fixated on our product offerings or our historical success factors? 
Could our current and existing competencies be combined with knowledge on 
disruptive innovation to offer different markets different offerings? 
0 Do we have projects in our portfolio to exploit our competencies using new or low- 
end disruptive strategies? 
The following chapter will conclude this thesis by clarifying and asserting the contribution to 
knowledge made by the research. 
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Conclusions 
This chapter has three aims. ý (1) to briefly summanse the approach taken by the research to explore the 
nature and experience of management practitioners'pur5uit of potentially disruptive innovations in 
average performing (or non-be5t-practice) bu5inesse5, (2) to make clear the overall contribution to 
knowledqe made by this research, and (3) to provide recommendations for future research. 
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8.1 Introduction 
This research began with a review of key literature (Chapter 2). The review demonstrated that 
Clayton Christensen (e. g. Christensen, 1997 and Christensen and Raynor, 2003) was responsible for 
coining and popularising the terms disruptive technologies and disruptive innovation. 
Consequently, the literature review provided a critique of Christensen's work, and traced a history 
of academic publications that focused upon innovation of a discontinuous nature. It was found 
that authors and industrialists alike have expressed the urgent and growing need for an improved 
understanding of disruptive innovation and how it can be delivered. Yet, publications and industrial 
practice appear to fall short of delivering three important factors: 
0a clear definition of disruptive innovation, 
0 an holistic understanding of the topic in terms of the multifaceted and interrelated 
qualitative issues that surround innovation practitioners' capacity and capability to foster 
disruptive innovation, and 
0 an identification of primary issues that average performing businesses must first undertake 
to initiate their pursuit of disruptive innovations. 
This observation spurred the current investigation, which has generated a contribution to 
knowledge in the area of innovation management. Figure 8-1 illustrates this process. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusioný 
To conclude this thesis, this chapter will provide a summary of the preceding diagram. A summary 
of the research approach is offered and the findings of each wave of the research are addressed in 
turn, illustrating how the research objectives were met. During this process, the evidence is 
assessed, illustrating that this thesis offers both new, confirmatory support for existing knowledge 
and novel extensions of existing theory that address gaps in prevailing understanding. In doing so, 
this chapter asserts a lucid and realistic contribution to knowledge. To close the thesis, this chapter 
offers recommendations for future research and a final comment from the author. 
8.2 Research approach 
The literature review enabled the formation of a definition of disruptive innovation along with the 
identification of a primary research question. The research question led to the development of the 
primary research objective for this investigation: 
To explore the nature and experience of management practitioners' pursuit of potentially 
disruptive innovations in average performing (or non -best- practice) businesses. 
In an attempt to satisfy this research objective, a review was made of the methodologies used in 
the extant literature. It was found that past research was mostly quantitative, with a positivistic 
perspective and had followed two main approaches: 
0 building historical accounts, in retrospect, of either disruptive innovations or failed 
attempts to disrupt, or 
conducting longitudinal investigations following the progression of an organisation's 
attempts to exploit a potentially disruptive technology. 
It is the opinion of the author that these dominant research approaches have done much to 
illustrate and describe the prevalence, importance and process of disruptive innovation. However, 
their appears to exist somewhat of a disconnect from the management actions and cognitions to 
which the phenomenon is dependent - it is in these areas where there is a lack of an holistic 
understanding. New and Payne (1995: 75) state that "it is possible to have academic research 
which scores high on rigour and cleverness but low on connection to real problems... " and they 
claim that in management, more than any other discipline, there is a fundamental need to make a 
1.... commitment to an encounter with that which management and workers do... " (p75). This 
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opinion combined with the growth of action research (Reason and Bradbury, 2001; Coughlan and 
Coghl2n, 2002) and the growing demand for management research that is both rigorous and 
relevant (Tranfield, 2002) led to the adoption of a collaborative, Mode 2 research design, that was 
both exploratory and qualitative in nature. 
The use of a qualitative research design and data collection analysis inspired by _grounded 
(Strauss 
and Corbin, 1990), collaborative approaches, is a highly unusual method to investigate disruptive 
innovation. It is believed that the ability of the researcher to digress from more traditional 
approaches is both reflective of the prevailing gaps in knowledge and current debates within the 
academic community regarding the concept of rigour and relevance within management and 
organisational research. For this reason a secondary research question was generated, which led to 
the development of a secondary research objective: 
To use this investigation as a tool to extend knowledge and practice of collaborative academic- 
practitioner methodological approaches in the field of innovation research. 
It would seem that innovation researchers, in particular those within the context of a Phl), are 
required at some point in their studies to make a choice between breadth and depth of study - as 
straddling the two presents significant challenges (Adams, 2004). This research was no different, it 
consisted of three empirical waves implemented in series to provide increasing focus to the 
research. The next section will highlight the research objective and the research method employed 
for each wave of the investigation, it will then outline the key findings in terms of their novelty and 
contribution to knowledge. 
8.3 Contribution to knowledge 
The primary objective of the thesis was to explore the nature and experience of management 
practitioners'pursuit of potentially disruptive innovations in average performing (or non-best- 
practice) businesses. As shown in Chapter 3 (the research methodology) this investigation was 
broken down into three waves, each of which had its own sub-objective. The findings from each 
wave of the research contribute, with varying degrees of novelty, to the existing body of academic 
theory, and combined, they contribute in two further areas: the methodology of innovation 
research, and the theory of practice. 
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The qualitative nature of the research means that the findings of this investigation cannot be 
assessed by traditional, statistical measures of reliability, nor can the outcomes be viewed as facts 
or objective truths, as they are the result of an interaction between the researcher and the 
researched (Silverman, 2000). Thus, the value of the findings, in terms of their generality and 
validity, results from their degree of credibility to those with an interest in the research area 
(Greenwood and Levin, 1998; Susman and Evered, 1978; Wyatt, 2001). The findings presented in 
this thesis are grounded in a real world investigation and have been evaluated by the industrialists 
involved in the research as having a high degree of relevance. It is therefore believed that this 
research has generated new knowledge that can contribute to an enhanced understanding for 
future theory development. These contributions are summarised in the remainder of this section. 
8.3.1 Contributions to knowledge made by the first wave of this research 
The first wave of this research was broad. Its aim was to introduce the concept of disruptive 
innovation to four non-best-in-class case organisation5 and to conduct a qualitative, collaborative, 
exploratory investigation into how managers adopt this new knowledge and begin their pursuit of 
disruptive innovation. Sub-objective 1 was: 
To deliver an holistic understanding of the key facilitators and inhibitors faced by management 
practitioners wanting to enable the capacity and capability to pursue potentially disruptive 
innovations within their non-best-in-class organisations. And to convert this knowledge into 
an holistic processual and systemic conceptual framework, grounded in both data and theory. 
In attempting to satisfy this sub-objective the author wanted to garner an holistic understanding of 
the complex web of conventions, rules, actions, behaviours and cognitions that contribute to 
enabling or inhibiting the pursuit of potentially disruptive innovations in today's organisations. This 
was completed by triangulating the observations within the four case organisations with data from 
expert interviews and state of the art literature. 
The final outcome of this first wave of research was the first key finding of this investigation: the 
pursuit of disruptive innovations can be represented by a novel conceptual framework of 8 
constructs and 48 themes (Figure 8-2). 
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Market and External Environment 
Organisational Ecology 
Innovation Strategy 
Opportunity Opportunity Solution Exploitation 
Potentially 
Recognition Development Development Disruptive 
Innovation 
Human Resources 
Figure 8-2., A conceptual framework of the pursuit of potentially disruptive innovation 
(see Chapter 4 for a more detailed illustration). 
Chapter 4 describes this conceptual framework, how it is both processual and systemic in nature 
and is grounded in real world data as well as extant literature, and, therefore, appears to satisfy the 
aforementioned research objective. It is also believed that the conceptual framework addresses the 
prevailing gap in knowledge which can be represented as a need for an holistic understanding of 
the issues faced by management practitioners wishing to pursue disruptive innovation. It does this 
by combining, in one model, many of the facets of disruptive innovation that have been described 
in isolation and in doing so it offers a novel extension of existing models and theory. It is similar in 
fashion to the model for developing breakthrough products offered by Deszca et al (1999), however, 
it extends their ideas beyond the focus of market assessment; it also offers more information and 
advice as it focuses upon both enabters and inhibitors within each dimension of the framework. 
Moreover, it has taken influence from the Pentathlon Model published by Goffin and Pfieffer 
(2000), yet is more focused and detailed than their description of the general pursuit of innovation. 
The emergent conceptual framework also both dissects and expands upon Christensen and Raynor's 
(2003) approach to describing disruptive innovation in which they discuss disruption in terms of 
technological trajectories, marketing processes, resources and values. Furthermore, the conceptual 
framework has been shown to have industrial utility. It was used to facilitate the management 
practitioners involved in this research to uncover what they perceived to be critical managerial 
focus areas. And Michel, Monville and Thomond (2004) show how it was used to assess the 
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capacity and capability to pursue disruptive innovation within a small-medium sized French 
manufacturing organisation. Thus, it offers both academics and practitioners alike, an holistic, 
graphical understanding that was missing at the onset of this research. 
By combining, in one model, many of the facets of disruptive innovation that have been described 
in isolation, the conceptual framework developed in the fitst wave of this investigation 
contributes a novel extension to existing models and theory. This will aid both academics and 
practitioners to better understand the complexity of the pursuit of disruptive innovation. 
8.3.2 Contributions to knowledge made by the second wave of this research 
The second wave of this research was less broad and deeper in nature. The aim was to use the 
conceptual framework, which emerged in the first wave of this research, as a tool to help identify 
important managerial focus areas. Sub-objective 2 was: 
To explore the emergent conceptual framework in order to identify focus areas of management 
action and management cognition to which the delivery of potentially disruptive innovations 
are highly dependent. 
In attempting to satisfy this sub-objective, a collaborative and qualitative approach was utilised 
with constant feedback between the literature and practice. Four focus areas emerged as the 
second key finding of this research: 
1. Inappropriate resource allocation routines. 
2. A failure to address the strategic importance of disruptive innovation. 
3. An inability to identify or to generate disruptive foothold markets. 
4. Traditional new product/service development routines 
These focus areas have also been identified as highly important factors by Dougherty and Hardy 
(1996), Liefer et al. (2000), Christensen (1997) and Christensen and Raynor (2003). Therefore, this 
second key finding cannot be asserted a novel contribution to knowledge. However, it does provide 
new confirmatory evidence to support the conclusions offered by the aforementioned authors. This 
is in itself a useful academic contribution that should not be overlooked. Moreover, the 
descriptions of the focus areas, offered as an output of this investigation in Chapter 6, provide 
useful insights and a more qualitative perspective than is often offered by the extant literature. 
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The second wave of this research has contributed new conflrmatoly evidence to support the 
prevailing knowledge base with the identirIcation of four managerial focus areas. 
This second wave of the research also generated the third key finding: the identification and 
description of inappropriate resource allocation routines as a major priority focus area for 
management practitioners. Once again the description that was enabled by the qualitative 
investigation allowed the author to confirm past descriptions of the structural and situational 
context of resource allocation (Bower, 1970; Burgleman, 1983; Leonard-Barton, 1992; Ansoff, 
1965; Burgleman et al., 1996). However, it also facilitated a deeper understanding of the softer 
issues such as the importance of mental models and the resultant psychological inertia that can 
occur within resource allocation decision-making. Moreover, the analysis of the findings enabled 
the identification of circumstances and/or management actions that could be proposed as highly 
important in attempts to overcome the resource allocation barrier (see Chapter 5 table 5-6). This 
insight formed the beginnings of a novel contribution that was explored further in the third wave 
of the research. It is believed that this finding responds to Bessant's and Francis' (2004) implied 
appeal for the identification of "alternative routines for discontinuous innovation ('do different' 
routines) which can sit alongside those for steady state 'do better' innovation" (p135). 
The second wave of this research has contributed new evidence to confirm the importance of 
resource allocation routines. In doing so it also highfi, a . ghts 
the important qu litative nature that is 
mostly overlooked by the prevailing knowledge base and begins to identify resource allocation 
approaches that managers can 'do differently' 
8.3.3 Contributions to knowledge made by the third wave of this research 
The final wave of this research was an in-depth analysis of the critical managerial area of 
inappropriate resource allocation routines. Sub-objective 3 was: 
To specify, design and implement a management intervention to probe a priority focus area of 
management action and cognition. The intervention should be able to build new academic 
knowledge, whilst simultaneously improving the ability of the participating organisations to 
pursue potentially disruptive innovations. 
The final wave of this research drew upon the experience, relationships and knowledge built in the 
first two waves. A collaborative and qualitative approach was utilised with constant feedback 
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between the literature and practice, this enabled the design and implementation of a management 
intervention to probe the inappropriate resource allocation routines of cases A and B. 
The analysis of the data gathered during the design and implementation of the intervention 
enabled the fourth key finding: the identification of six primary management actions that constrain 
resources to sustaining innovation. And by cross-referencing this finding with the data from expert 
interviews and the literature, six 'idealised' management actions, to which managers should aspire, 
were also generated. Chapter 7 shows that these findings reiterate much of what has already been 
reported in the literature, therefore suggesting a lack of novelty; however, they make a useful 
academic contribution as they provide new confirmatory evidence to support the assertions made 
by Dougherty and Hardy (1996), Christensen and Raynor (2003), Burgleman et al. (1996) and Pfeffer 
Et Salancik (1978) regarding management actions and (in)appropriate resource allocation. 
The third wave of this research identified six primary management actions that constrain 
resources to sustaining innovation and six 'ideali5ed' management actions to which managers 
should aspire. This provides conflimatory support for extant literature and useful insights for 
managementp, -actitioners. 
With respect to this finding, it was shown in the preceding chapter that novelty, in terms of a 
contribution to knowledge that extends current thinking, could only be achieved if the deeper 
causes of these constraining actions could be identified. In cross examination of the data 
underpinning these constraining management actions the author uncovered five 'disruptive 
innovation rejection strategies': 
1. Rewarding incrementalism. 
2. Ignoring the positive aspects of disruptive opportunities and/or removing the negative 
aspects of sustaining innovation. 
3. Focusing upon historical perceptions of success 
4. Creating perception of success with high effort 
5. Holding beliefs in the face of disconfirming information 
The strategies were found to be common across all four case study organisations and could be 
considered as the prime reasons for their failure and inability to pursue potentially disruptive ideas 
and/or innovation projects. It is believed that the emergence of the disruptive innovation rejection 
strategies from the data is, in itself, a contribution to further understanding. 
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Moreover, the data locates the support for the rejection strategies in the often difficult to perceive 
cognitive routines of the management practitioners. And when considering this data through the 
lens of cognitive dissonance or organisational learning an even richer picture can be presented and 
several propositions for management practitioners can be established (see Chapter 7). Therefore, it 
is the assertion of the author that this finding has contributed to a deeper understanding of the 
resource allocation routines that undermine the pursuit of disruptive innovation; specifically with 
respect to the breakdown between the stated and actual support of potentially disruptive 
innovations. Furthermore, the uncovering of the rejection strategies and the contention of their 
link to cognitive dissonance, mental models and organisational learning, makes steps towards 
answering the call for a better understanding of the impact of managerial cognitions upon the 
pursuit and delivery of innovations of a disruptive nature (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000; Kaplan et aL, 
2003). 
The third wave of this research identifled that management practitioners suffer with cognitive 
dissonance when presented with potentially disruptive innovation options that conflict with 
prevailing mental models. This leads them to employ one or a combination of more than one of 
Five disruptive innovation rejection strategies; the use of these strategies allows the practitioners 
to justify, in their minds and to their organisation, the rejection of disruptive opportunities in 
favour of sustaininglincremental alternatives. In extending the understanding of constraining 
management actions, this offers a novel contribution that addresses a gap in the literature 
regarding disruptive innovation and management cognitions. This new knowled e provd, g i, es a 
series of both academic and practical insights to explain why many organisations fail to deliver 
disruptive innovation. 
Another key finding of the third wave of this research was: the higher the perceived intensity of 
disruption (e. g. a need for a change of ingrained strategic belief is perceived as more intense than 
an acceptable market repositioning), the more significant the experience of cognitive dissonance 
and the faster and more intense the disruptive innovation rejection strategies would emerge. Once 
again, this finding was developed from an in-depth context specific understanding, yet it also 
emerged in discussion, without prompting, in over half of expert interviews, and this observation 
has been paralleled by reports of management action in the literature (e. g. Chandy and Tellis' 
(1998) descriptions of a reluctance to self-cannibalise, and Tripsas and Gavetti's (2000) accounts of 
Polaroid's failure to adopt a successful model for the disruptive digital imaging business, despite a 
technological advantage). 
The third wave of this research offers conrlrmatory evidence for the likes of Chandy and Te/115 
(19981 and Tripsas and 6avetti (2000) who content that the Speed at which an 117novRtion 
opportunity - that this research would consider to be disruptive - is pursued or rejected will 
depend upon its congruence with the perspectives of top management. 
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The seventh key finding of this research contributes to the theory of practice. It was found that it is 
possible to surface and challenge mental models that restrict innovation to the pursuit of 
incrementalism, by using a portfolio management approach that has been adjusted and tailored to 
introduce and include the importance of disruptive innovation. The development and successful 
implementation of the 'Disruptive Portfolio Management' intervention in the final wave of this 
research led to this finding. The author has found no other references to the extension and use of 
portfolio management tools in this manner, and despite a significant investigation into existing 
innovation facilitating tools, there appears to be no well documented equivalent process on the 
market place. For this reason, it is contended that this finding can be asserted as a novel and lucid 
contribution to both extant literature and industrial practice, providing academics with a tool to 
probe and understand the failure to fund disruptive innovation, and industrialists with a novel 
approach to tackle their inappropriate resource allocation routines. 
The third wave of this research offers a novel contribution in the finding that it is possible to 
surface and challenge mental models that restrict innovation to the pursuit of incrementali5m, by 
using a portfolio management approach that has been adjusted and tailored to introduce and 
include the importance of disruptive innovation. This new knowledge addresses a gap in the 
literature and in practice regarding the challenging of prevailing resource allocation routines, in 
order to facilitate the pursuit ofpotentially disruptive innovations. 
8.3.4 Contributions to knowledge made by the research approach 
As previously explained, this research employed a collaborative, Mode 2 (Tranfield 2002) research 
design. In the field of disruptive innovation this research design was novel. Therefore, it was 
decided that this investigation would also be used as a tool to extend knowledge and practice 
of collaborative academic-practitioner methodological approaches in the field of innovation 
research. 
It is believed that the instruments and protocols developed throughout this investigation offered 
the author an opportunity to simultaneously seek relevance without sacrificing rigour. For example, 
contributions to knowledge have been made (e. g. an holistic conceptual framework of disruptive 
innovation and the identification five common disruptive innovation rejection strategies), whilst 
simultaneously enabling the participating case organisations to enhance their capacity and 
capability to foster and deliver potentially disruptive innovations (e. g. Chapter 7, Table 7-2, 
illustrates Case A's and B's confirmation that they had improved their ability to allocate resources 
to potentially disruptive innovations). 
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Consequent reflection upon the experience of using this methodological approach garnered an 
assessment of the pros and cons the research design and led to the identification of the final key 
finding of this investigation. This finding can also be offered as a contribution to knowledge and as 
recommendations for the improved practice of Mode 2 collaborative research programmes in the 
future: 
The collaborative academic-industrial approach can be further facilitated by the exploitation of 
three features, which are additional to those presented in the extant literature. 
i) The activeputsuit ofan open and trusting work environment byall involved parties. 
ii) The co-creation of a conceptual framework to describe the research area of interest, in order to 
develop a shared language and to enable the emergence of a shared research agenda with two- 
way connections between academia and industry. 
N) The use of large-scale graphical facilitation approaches to record and disseminate data, and to 
elicit public commitment to research actions. 
8.4 Recommendations for future research 
This section provides recommendations for future research. It will not offer an exhaustive list of 
possible research avenues or extensions to the current investigation. Instead, the author has 
imagined that he has been asked to propose three new PhD research programmes. Each of the 
following programme proposal overviews aims to tackle or further probe remaining gaps in 
knowledge with respect to disruptive innovation or the wider innovation agenda. 
Research Programme 1: Linking disruptive innovation theory to the renewable energy market 
AIM: To investigate whether renewable energies could benefit from consciously positioning 
themselves as a disruptive innovation. 
BACKGROUND AND ANTICIPATED CONTRIBUTION: 
The depletion of the world's resources has resulted in a growth of organisations focused on 
the pursuit of offering renewable energies. Yet the proposition of using or benefiting from 
these energy sources, for much of the public, is either not practical or incomprehensible. 
Moreover, those seeking to promote alternative 'green' energy are left marginalised by the 
powerful energy incumbents. This research programme would attempt to investigate whether 
or not the integration of the theory 'disruptive innovation' into the strategies (and senior 
management mind-set) of renewable energy providers would affect competitive advantage 
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and share of energy markets? It is hoped that this research could be used as a contribution to 
both academic understanding and industry. Academia would benefit from rich data 
concerning the issues of understanding, adopting and implementing a disruptive strategy. 
And Governmental policy makers (as well as the organisations involved) could gain valuable 
insights into attempts at increasing public access to green energies. 
RESOURCES REQUIRED: 
Ix PhD student. 
1x cluster of non-competitive renewable energy organisations, linked to a Governmental 
'green energies commission'. 
METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW: 
1) Build cluster of non-competitive renewable energy organisations with link to a 
Governmental 'green energies commission'. 
2) Work with the senior management teams of each renewable energy case to understand 
current competitive position. 
3) Co-ordinate and implement case specific training and awareness raising workshops 
regarding disruptive innovation. 
4) Co-ordinate and implement cross case workshops to encourage cross fertilisation of ideas. 
5) Monitor and record all progress toward the goals of market share development. 
6) Repeat steps 4 and 5 with the involvement of Government policy makers and publish. 
Research Programme 2: Holistic thinking tools and the pursuit of disruptive innovation 
AIM: To empirically test the impact of holistic thinking tools in the context of facilitating the 
pursuit of disruptive innovation. 
BACKGROUND AND ANTICIPATED CONTRIBUTION: 
There exists prevailing gaps in knowledge regarding how or why holistic thinking tools seem 
to help the facilitation of organisational change (Young, 2003). Yet authors such as Cooper 
et al. (2001) and Phaal et al. (2004) use holistic portfolio management tools and technology 
roadmapping respectively, to facilitate improved management and more efficient resource 
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allocation in the new product development and technology management process. It is hoped 
that a comparative analysis of holistic thinking tools, within the specific context of trying to 
facilitate the pursuit of disruptive innovation, would begin to address this gap in knowledge. 
Moreover, it would compliment the findings of this thesis by bringing more grounded 
understanding to the issues faced by organisations attempting to pursue disruptive strategies. 
RESOURCES REQUIRED: 
.1x PhD student with experience of initiating or delivering organisational change 
programmes, who would be willing to learn how to use and adapt tools such as Learning 
Maps, Visual Metaphor Elicitation (Young, 2003), Technology Roadmapping (Phaal et al., 
2004) and Portfolio Management. 
METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW: 
1) Find case study for involvement in action research: 1x manufacturing organisation with a 
large and diverse product portfolio. 
2) Select 5 holistic thinking tools and working with senior members of the case study 
organisation (in order to take account of cultural issues) and state of the art literature, 
adapt them with the aim of facilitating the pursuit of disruptive innovation. 
3) Create 5 "innovation teams" within the case study site, of roughly equal size and ability. 
4) Implement a different tool within each innovation team. Recording each group member's 
knowledge, thoughts, behaviour and comments, regarding disruptive innovation and the 
pursuit of disruption, prior to, during and after the interventions. 
5) Codify the resultant data of each group individually, using state of the art qualitative 
data analysis techniques. 
6) Build cross group themes of the factors that emerge as important to the benefits and 
drawbacks derived by holistic thinking. 
RESOURCES REQUIRED: 
1x PhD student with experience of initiating or delivering organisational change 
programmes, who would be willing to learn how to use and adapt tools such as Learning 
Maps, Visual Metaphor Elicitation (Young, 2003), Technology Roadmapping (Phaal et al., 
2004) and Portfolio Management. 
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Research Programme 3: A change management programme that attempts to introduce and 
deliver benefits from the pursuit of disruptive innovation. 
AIM: To conduct a three year action research case study in complete context immersion, 
which follows an organisation's change management programme that attempts to introduce 
and deliver benefits from the pursuit of disruptive innovation. 
BACKGROUND AND ANTICIPATED CONTRIBUTION: 
This programme of research was inspired by the author's frustrations with the investigation 
that he undertook. It would make constant deeply involved access a prerequisite. Research 
with the above aim could document, in real time, vast amounts of context specific, rich, 
qualitative data, in a more exhaustive and less task focused manner (i. e. beyond a focus on 
senior management resource allocation). It would contribute an understanding of how the 
topic of disruptive innovation is viewed and understood by people from different divisions and 
at all levels of the business. And what impact the introduction of the topic has upon the 
systems and culture of the business. Although such research would not contribute 
generalisable theory, it would shed light on new areas of interest and focus. 
RESOURCES REQUIRED: 
1x PhD student permanently based within a large REW based organisation that wants to 
reinvigorate its innovation effort with a focus on both sustaining and disruptive innovation. 
The PhD student must have operational experience of change management. 
METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW: 
1) Find case study for involvement in action research: 1x manufacturing or service 
organisation with a large and diverse product portfolio that has fallen into a "more of the 
same" trap. 
2) Working with the senior management team, conceive of and initiate a change 
management programme focused on delivering more benefits from innovation (including 
a focus on disruptive innovation). 
3) Monitor and record the actions taken by the change management team and monitor and 
record the impact and response within the business; providing a consulting and feedback 
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role, but no direct operational responsibility that would detract from the data collection 
and analysis objective. 
4) Present two case study reports: one as a story and the second codified by the conceptual 
framework developed by this thesis. 
8.5 A final comment 
It is the author's view that the ever increasing rates of technological change will continue to Push 
the subject of disruptive innovation to the fore of academic and industrial attention. Moreover, the 
ever growing influence of the Chinese and Asian economies will make disruptive innovations more 
pertinent for increasingly vulnerable, average performing British and European organisations. 
Hence, the organisations involved in this study were not world leading innovators, but they were 
organisations led by industrialists who understand that innovation could bring new sources of 
competitive advantage. The extant literature and this investigation provides evidence to show that 
the delivery of disruptive innovation is not based upon luck; instead, it was found that it is 
important to identify and target appropriate niches of customers who are, in effect, the gateway to 
a path of disruption. Whilst much of the prevailing literature concentrates upon finding the 
gateway or describing the nature of this path (in terms of technological trajectories, marketing 
approaches, project teams, leadership styles etc. ), there appears to be little understanding of the 
factors that enable or inhibit managers in average businesses to allocate and protect the necessary 
resources to target and open the gateway in the first place. It is hoped that this research has 
contributed understanding to explain the difficulties faced in embracing the notion of disruption 
and that this understanding will inspire more academic research into these important qualitative 
factors. Moreover, it is hoped that the avenue of research initiated by this thesis, and the findings 
presented within, will one day empower managers to reject tradition and authority as infallible 
sources of 'truth', facilitating them to embrace free innovative inquiry, and the desire to be 
proactively disruptive. 
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Appendix 1: Supporting notes for the literature review 
Appendix 1 a: Examples of disruptive innovation 
Example A: LED Candles to light-bulbs and light-bulbs to LEDs? 
Future predictions of disruption include the potentially disruptive impact that Light Emitting Diode 
(L. E. D. ) technology could have on the traditional light bulb sector (figure AI). Single LEDs are not 
as effective as standard light-bulbs, however, clustered and improved, the author has observed 
that they are already being used in place of three single light-bulbs in many traffic light system 
across Spain - saving energy, lasting longer and much more durable in the face of the outdoor 
elements. Furthermore, the author recently purchased a simple hand held torch utilising LED 
technology, although marginally more expensive than and not as effective as a traditional device it 
offers other advantages - it is more durable, it is only the size of a credit card and has a life time 
guarantee. The days of the traditional light-bulb may be numbered - perhaps this is why Philips 
recently purchased the organisation with the patents to the LED technology that produces white 
light? ). 
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Example B: Open heart surgery Vs Angioplasty 
8 
92- 
Time 
Figure Al: Using disruptive innovation to improve access to health provision 
- Open heart surgery Vs Angioplasty 
Access to life saving procedures has been increased with the aid of disruptive innovation. For 
example, hospitals around the world needed highly expert people in specialised environments to 
conduct operations on patients in desperate need to have their arteries unlocked. Few people were 
eligible to the specialised services of the heart surgeons, however, the invention and 
commercial isation of the balloon angioplasty process has disrupted this paradigm of patient care 
by making the heart surgeon over qualified for the needs of the patients. (figure A2) Multitudes 
more people now have access to and receive the life saving procedures that were once offered by 
specialists which are now offered by less skilled people in a more convenient setting. The initial 
pessimism of the heart surgeon traditionalists and the patients' negative perception that less 
skilled people were being used for their critical procedures was eventually overcome by the 
benefits offered by the new trajectory of performance obtainable through angioplasty. The theory 
of disruptive innovation can be applied more broadly to health provision; for example, currently 
within the British National Health Service there is controversial debate about transferring a 
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number of patient care activities from doctors to nurses and pharmacists. This has been met by 
objections from the traditionalists but is clearly an example of how patients can be given increased 
access to basic and pre-emptive care and treatment without the need of highly qualified doctors 
who are mostly overqualified for such treatment. 
Example C: The Computing Industry 
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Figure AIDisruptive innovations have fiberalised computing technology 
Only four decades ago access to computer technology was the reserve of prestigious organisations 
(Foster and Kaplan 2001); gradually technology such as mainframe computing infiltrated more 
workers lives but still access to computing was not close to the level to which we see it today. 
Christensen (1997) shows how the pace of technological progress generated by traditional 
mainframe and mini-computer manufactures inevitably outstripped customers abilities to absorb 
it, and that this created an opportunity for a new offerings to displace the incumbents. With 
hindsight it is clear that the invention of a small disk drive that would operate a computer that 
could fit onto a desk was the major step to liberating the benefits of computing technology to the 
masses (figure A3). This technology was first invented by the computer industry giants 'IBM' but 
was ignored (Foster and Kaplan 2001) as it did not satisfy the performance trajectory of the high- 
end computer customers (Christensen, 1997) or their historic path dependence (Tidd, Bessant, and 
Pavitt, 1997). Since then Microsoft and Intel have captured the lions share of the computer 
industries profits (Christensen, Raynor and Verlinden, 2001) and the world of computing has 
changed forever. Still it is the premise of the author that the 'personal computer (PC)' in its 
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traditional form (the desk-top or the laptop) over-supplies the needs of many users around the 
world. A key indicator of this fact is that incremental sustaining improvements are valued less and 
less by the Market. Could the benefits of easy immediate access to personal digital computing 
disrupt the traditional PC market? Are the computer manufacturers ready. for such a disruption? 
Who will be the winners? 
Example D: The Music Industry 
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Figure A 4: Disruption changing the shape of music 
Compact disk (CD) technology revolutionised the music industry and caused major disruptions in 
the manufacturing of recorded music. Customers' lives changed to accommodate the new CD 
technology as increasingly more people found that it offered them a new value proposition that 
nullified the traditional vinyl records offering - almost eradicating the need for this form of music 
device. However, the music industry now faces an even larger disruption in the form of digital or 
'mp3' music (figure A4). The mp3 format, although lower in quality than the compact disk, offers 
customers a wide range of benefits that have not been fully considered by the music industry or 
traditional CD sales outlets. The value proposition offered by mp3s gave birth to the emergence 
websites such as "napster. com" which allowed its 'customers' to share mp3 files, eradicating the 
need for the CD format, the CD distribution channels and even more worryingly for the music 
industry, customers could now 'share' and not purchase music. Legal issues forced the closure of 
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napster, but the music industry has not been able to prevent that onslaught of disruption. The key 
record labels have to accept that they will no longer be able to maintain the revenue levels to 
which they have become accustomed. It can be argued that access to music as a life improving 
product has been increased and the new format has created a basis on which long term 
organisational survival could be ensured for the likes of Apple who have embraced the inevitable 
disruption and transformed the music player industry with their I-Pod offering. 
Appendix I b: The 18 features of the term disruptive innovation 
In order to generate an understanding of the features of the term disruptive innovation, the 
publications on the topic were reviewed along with literature from the broader fields of 
discontinuous and radical innovation. By using the definitions of disruptive innovation and 
potentially disruptive innovation, developed above, focus could be kept whilst considering the wider 
context; a critical appraisal generated the 18 themes or key features of the term disruptive 
innovation (see Appendix 1b Table B-1), below are the five most frequently mentioned: 
Table A- 1: Recurrent themes in the literature with respect to the 
definition of disruptive innovation and competence destroying discontinuities 
Theme Examples of Authors 
(DI = disruptive innovation) 
(1) Impact of DI is transformational and 
broad- e. g. effects multiple perspectives and 
multiple units of analysis 
(2) Trajectories: Dis create a significant shift 
in 'performance trajectories' whereby they 
initially offer lower performance as 
perceived by the existing markets 
incumbents 
(3) DI offers less functionality as perceived 
by customers and suppliers within the 
mainstream 
(4) DI offerings target real existing 
customer needs, in particular offering 
superior performance to those exogenous to 
mainstream existing markets 
(5) DIs are first established in non- 
Leiffer et al. 2000, Christensen (1997) 
Tushman and Anderson (1986) Tidd, Pavitt and 
Bessant (1997), Kassiecieh et al (2002) 
- e. g. Christensen (1967), Christensen, Raynor and 
Verlinden (2001), Bower and Christensen (1995), Raffj 
and Kampas (2002), Shumpeter (1975), McKee (1992) 
- e. g. Christensen (1997), Christensen, Raynor and 
Verlinden (2001), Bower and Christensen (1995), Raffi 
and Kampas (2002), Moore (1995), Charitou and 
Markides (2003) 
- e. g. Christensen (1997), Chr istensen, Raynor and 
Verlinden (2001), Bower and Christensen (1995), Raffi 
and Kampas (2002), Moore (1995), Charitou and 
Markides (2003), Kassiecieh et al (2002), Walsh Et 
Kirchhoff (2002), Linton and Walsh (2001) 
e. g. Christensen (1997), Christensen, Raynor and 
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demanding customer niches - where the Verlinden (2001), Bower and Christensen (1995), 
organisation can be patient for growth but Raffi and Kampas (2002), Moore (1995), Charitou 
impatient for profitability and Markides (2003), Kassiecieh et al (2002), Walsh 
EL Kirchhoff (2002), Linton and Walsh (2001) 
e. g. Christensen (1997), Christensen, Raynor and 
(6) DIs displace incumbents from existing Verlinden (2001), Bower and Christensen (1995), 
industries - usually by improving from Raffi and Kampas (2002), Moore (1995), Charitou 
'below them' and Markides (2003), Kassiecieh et a[ (2002), Walsh 
Et Kirchhoff (2002), Linton and Walsh (2001) 
(7) DIs require a significant change in e. g. 
Walsh Et Kirchhoff (2002), Moore (1995), 
customer behaviour 
DeTienne and Koberg (2002), Tushman and Anderson 
(1986), Martinich (2002), Zairi(1995) 
(8) Over-performance or over-supply from e. g. 
Christensen (1997), Christensen, Raynor and 
traditional/existing offerings creates a 
Verlinden (2001), Bower and Christensen (1995), 
space for disruptive innovation 
Raffi and Kampas (2002), Moore (1995), Charitou 
and Markides (2003) 
(9) DIs are not radically new to the world e. g. 
Walsh and Kirchhoff (2002) Christensen, 
Raynor and Verlinden (2001), Bower and Christensen from a technology perspective (1995), Moore (1995), Mascitelli (2000) 
e. g. Abernathy (1978), O'Connor and Veryzer (2001), 
(10) Dls create 'new competitive paradigms' 
Tushman and Anderson (1986), Kassiecieh et al 
(2002), Rice, Leifer and O'Connor (2000), DeTienne Et with new tech nology-product paradigms Koberg (2002), Christensen (1997), Dowd and Walsh 
(1998) 
(11) Dls'are mainly the domain of start-ups, e. g. 
Tushman and Anderson (11986), Kassiecieh et a[ 
but can be exploited by all organisations 
(2002), Christensen (1997), Christensen and Raynor 
(2003) 
(12) DIs re-write competitive rules - e. g. Kassiecieh et a[ (2002), Tushman and Anderson introducing new firm and market based JI 986), Abernathy and Clark (1985), Dowd and Walsh competencies, with introduction of new (1998), DeTienne Et Koberg (2002) 
produce/service attribute sets 
(13) DIs provide future competitive e. g. Kassiecieh et al (2002), Tushman and Anderson 
advantage - they are the "wellsprings" of (1986), Dosi (1982), Schumpeter (1976), Rice, Leifer 
future sustaining innovation and O'Oconner (2000), DeTienne Et Koberg (2002), 
(14) DIs do not offer. an order of magnitude 
improvement - discontinuities do so e. g. Christensen (1997), Kassiecieh et al (2002), 
through significantly new-to-world Veryzer (1998), Mascitelli (2000): 
technologies 
(15) Dis are discontinuous but e. g. Linton and Walsh (2001), Tushman and 
discontinuities are not necessarily Anderson (1986), Linton and Walsh (2001), 
disruptive Christensen (1997 EL 2002), Moore (1995) 
(116) DIs are less risky than extreme e. g. Tushman and Anderson (1986), Linton and 
discontinuities from a customer perspective Walsh (2001), Christensen (1997 Et 2002) McDermott 
- due to the strong customer focus Et Handfield (1996) - (17) DIs are killed by traditional approaches - e. g. McDermott Et Handfield (1996), Christensen 
to new product and service development (1997), Christensen, Raynor and Verlinden (2001), 
and resburce allocation practices. Bower and Christensen (1995), Raffi and Kampas 
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(18) Dis transform the relationships 
between customers and suppliers - 
enabling customers to do things that only 
specialists could do before in a more 
convenient setting 
(2002), Moore 199 1 5), Charito Iu and Markides (2003), 
Kassiecieh et al (2002), Walsh Et Kirchhoff (2002), 
Linton and Walsh (2001), Hamel (2000) 
e. g ' Rice, Leifer and O'Oconner (2000), 
. Christensen 
(1997), Hamel (2000), Christensen, Raynor and 
Verlinden (2001), Bower and Christensen (1995), 
Raffi and Kampas (2002), Moore (1995), Charitou 
and Markides (2003) 
Table A- 1: Recurrent themes in the literature with respect to the 
definition of disruptive innovation and competence destroying discontinuities 
Appendix 1c: Building an understanding of holistic approaches to innovation 
management. 
A common representation of innovation is that of a temporal innovation process, where activities or 
events are built serially into categories, stages or phases. Such processes have been popularised by 
Cooper (1979,1980,1983,1988,1990), Cooper and Kleinschmidt (1987,1990) and Cooper, et al. 
(1999,2000,2001). Although the number of stages varies across studies (Pelz (1983) identifies 8 
and Cooper et al. (2001) 12) Figure 2-1 illustrates what has come to be known as a reasonably 
generic processual perspective of product innovation. 
initial Second . Decision on Screen Business Ca Screen I* I se 
4b 
Preliminary Detailed 
Idea Investigation Investigation 
Postclevelopment Precommercialization 
Review Business Analysis 
+1010. MOO-10001. 
Devokpment Testing & Full Product 
4D 
Validation and - Succeissful Product Market Launch 
1. 
Figure 10-2. - Stage Gate approach to new product development (adapted from Cooper, et al., 2001) 
While the processual perspective has proved popular over the last 25 years, in both innovation 
practice and academia (Cooper, 1979,1980,1983,1988,1990; Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 1987, 
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1990; Pelz, 1993), it is not without its critics. Van de Ven and Drazin (1985) proclaim that 
innovation should be considered in a systemic manner, where multiple contextual and structural 
characteristics have to be examined simultaneously to identify their effect upon performance. 
Adding to this, in a general criticism of prevailing conceptual frameworks of innovation, Mohr 
(1982) notes "There is a tendency to present the stages in the process but to omit the forces that 
drive from one stage to another. The latter, however, are essential" (p14). He adds "... process- 
orientated ideas in organisational behaviour, and in social science more broadly, tend to be 
primarily of the stage naming variety. They are incomplete from the standpoint of theory in that 
they simply rehearse a series of steps; they lack the lines of action - either causal or probabilistic - 
that must be present to convey a sense of explanation" (Mohr, 1982: 53). Adams (2003) work adds 
weight to the criticism of the often over simplistically applied process models (Cooper, et aL 2000). 
His analysis of successful innovations in the UK National Health Service, plus extensive integration 
of the literature, resulted in the identification of a framework of activities and enabling conditions 
important to the innovation effort (Table 2-1). 
Perspective Category 
Triggers 
Idea 
Activity management 
Process formality 
Testing 
Implementation 
Managerial 
Commitment 
Enabling 
conditions Group factors 
Factor 
Serendipity. Critical moments. 
Conjunctions. Opportunism. 
Problem recognition 
Information gathering. Sifting. 
Selection, Proliferation 
Integration/combination 
Degree of planning Existing process 
Sequence of events 
Piloting 
, Launch 
Foisted implementation 
Top management support 
Resource availability 
Visions and guiding principles 
Champions and leadership 
Challenge the orthodoxy. Safety. 
Innovators tolerated/supported 
Making space Risk taking 
Empowerment/autonomy 
Tolerance of uncertainty 
Mutual support 
jeer group credibility 
Table 10-2., Factors important to innovation (Adams, 2003.207) 
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Consideration of Adams' (2003) framework reveals process factors juxtaposed with supporting 
conditions, which act, in effect, like forces upon an innovation effort that can still be 
conceptualised as essentially serial in nature. Similarly, Goffin and Pfeiffer (2000) propose that 
innovation can be managed through three serial phases supported by two systemic factors. Their 
Pentathlon Model (Figure 2-2) proposes a more holistic approach to innovation management than 
the traditional processual approach. 
-Normative -Goals 
-Exploratory -Communication 
-By Serendipity -Technology 
-Measures 
Innovation Strategy 
external Creativity and Portfolio 
Project 
markets and 
stimulus management marketing Idea Generation Management -. 7 '(Implementationy--* 
Hum an Resource Management 
-Implementation 
-Screening -Development 
-Selection process I time 
-Balance -Simultaneous 
-Culture 
engineering 
: Motivation 
Appraisal 
Table 10-3: The Innovation Pentathlon (adapted from 6offl'n and Pfeiffer, 1999,2000) 
The Pentathlon Model was developed following the analysis of nearly 200- high performing 
companies in the electronics and engineering sectors in Germany and the UK. The research was 
founded upon an earlier finding that many organisations misunderstand the role of innovation, 
have too many development projects and perceive innovation to be a single discipline - the rite of a 
research and development department. 
Their analysis revealed that organisations would benefit from considering innovation and the 
dynamic interplay between the five key factors presented in Figure 2-2. They proposed that three 
phases can be used to translate stimulus and ideas into the injection of innovations onto the 
marketplace. They found that stimulating good ideas, which address customer requirements, is 
crucial, thus creativity and ideas management is essential to the innovation effort. Furthermore, 
they found since innovation includes new products, services and processes, the scope for ideas is 
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wide and therefore all employees should be involved. Once ideas have been generated, 
organisations need an efficient process to choose those with the highest potential as resources are 
always limited. They found that leading companies ensure that their innovation portfolio contains 
a good balance of new products, processes, and business and service innovations. The final phase 
'project management' refers to the capability to quickly turn selected ideas into new products, 
services and processes. Claiming that good project management enables fast time-to-market, high 
product quality and acceptable development costs, they state that companies should look to 
introduce state of art practices, particularly including the use of cross-functional teams. 
Goffin and Pfeiffer (1999) note that this process is wrought with problems; this is why they state 
that innovation strategy should decide the technology focus, communicate the role of innovation 
within a company, and drive all performance improvements and innovation targets through 
appropriate performance management techniques. Moreover, they claim that the ole of human 
resource management should underlie all innovation effort, as it is needed to create and support a 
culture in which employees are motivated to contribute to innovation. 
Although the Pentathlon Model asserts that the five constructs should be viewed as 
interdependent, Goffin and Pfeiffer (1999 and 2000) fail to significantly elaborate on this point; 
with little regard for the interaction of these features with the external environment. Moreover, 
where they gain in the introduction of the systemic features to the issue of innovation, they lose in 
reducing the phases of innovation to three over simplified constructs. Furthermore, their approach 
to portfolio management is not comprehensive; Cooper et al. (2001) and Hamel (2000) propagate 
significantly more sophisticated approaches. Nonetheless, the Pentathlon Model maintains a 
qualitatively different perspective to innovation than that of its processual counterparts. It 
represents a more holistic approach to the issue of innovation and its management, -and offers a 
more dynamic picture than that provided by Adam' (2003) framework. 
It seems that an effective holistic approach to innovation management must include the high-level 
processual features of the innovation effort, dynamically combined with the structural and social 
factors within an organisation, which places importance upon the integration of the external 
environment. Such a conceptual framework should aim to adopt a stance similar to that proposed 
by Jelinek and Schoonhoven (1990). from which the constructs are viewed as interwoven, 
interdependent and mutually involved. 
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Appendix 2: Supporting notes for the research methodology chapter 
Research strategy 
The research will use a mixed research strategy across three phases 
Defining the perspective and purpose of a study helps in deciding which strategies to adopt when 
collecting and analysing empirical evidence (Robson, 1993). Robson (1993) identifies three 
traditional strategies: experiments, surveys and case studies (summarised in Table 3-3). 
Traditional research strategies Key Characteristics 
Experiments "Typical features: selection of samples of individuals from 
"Measuring the effect of 
known populations; allocation of samples to different 
manipulating one variable on experimental conditions; 
introduction of planned change on 
another variable. " one or more variables; measurement on small number of variables; control of other variables; usually involves 
hypothesis testing. " 
Survey "Typical features: selection of samples of individuals from 
known populations; collection of relatively small amount of "Collection of information in data in standardised form from each individual; usually standardised form from groups of employs questionnaire or structured interview. " people. " 
Case Study 
"Development of detailed, 
intensive knowledge about a 
single 'case', or of a small number 
of related 'cases'. " 
"Typical features: selection of a single case for a small 
number of related cases) of a situation, individual or group 
of interest or concern; study of the case in its context; 
collection of information via a range of data collection 
techniques including observation, interview and 
documentary analysis. " 
Table 10-4: A summary of the three traditional research strategies (Robson 1993: 40) 
This section of chapter 3 will consist of a four further parts. A consideration of the three research 
strategies will be presented. Methods for ensuring academic robustness and industrial relevance 
will be discussed. Consideration of qualitative vs. quantitative approaches will be given. Finally a 
summary of how this understanding can be bought together to form research strategy that will 
satisfy the objectives of the current investigation will be presented. 
Deciding upon the appropriateness of the different research strategies 
In deciding the appropriateness of the different research strategies, Robson (1993) states three 
issues must be considered: 
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" The type of research questions that are being asked. 
" The controlrequired overevenL 
" The focu5on contemporary events. 
Research questions: 
Yin (1994) considers that the most influential method for determining the correct strategy for an 
enquiry is the type of research questions asked in a study i. e. "how", "why", "who", "what", "where", 
and "when". In the first phase of the current study, the researcher will aim to discover what are 
the key enabling and inhibiting factors of disruptive innovation. "What" questions in an exploratory 
context lend themselves to any of the strategies describes in Table 3-4 (Yin, 1994; Robson, 1993). 
According to the Robson (1993) and Yin (1994) the "why" and "how" questions such as those that 
will be posed in the descriptive phase of the research are best suited to either the experiment or 
case study strategy. 
Con trol o ver e ven Is: 
For experimentation, the researcher is required to have a high degree of control over events 
(Robson, 1993; Yin, 1994). The phenomenological perspective eliminates experimentation as a 
research strategy for the current study as the inquiry is concerned with understanding disruptive 
innovation in its natural setting. Exercising control will disrupt the very reality that the research is 
trying to explain. The researcher is not required to have control over events in either the survey or 
the case study strategies, thus both are considered suitable. 
Contempo, rary focus: 
To develop and test an understanding of disruptive innovation the current study will use a varying 
focus on both contemporary and historical events. The literature (Robson, 1993; Yin, 1994) shows 
that this approach does not eliminate any of the research strategies outlined in Table 3-4, however, 
it does highlight surveys and case studies as an effective strategy. 
The analysis of the above three issues indicates that the case study and survey strategies are best 
suited to the current research. The use of these throughout the three waves of the investigation 
can be underpinned by a comprehensive knowledge of the literature to satisfy the research 
objectives (Figure 3-3). 
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PUFPOSQ Wave 1: Exploratory Wave II: Exploratory A Wave III: Descriptive 
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Figure 10-3: 7he use of research strategies in the current investigation 
Deciding upon a quantitative or qualitative focus 
Qualitative and quantitative data have been gathered 
using a multiple method data collection approach < 
There are two types of research data that can be collected: quantitative and qualitative. 
Quantitative data is based on meaning derived from numbers; its collection results in numerical and 
standardised data (Silverman, 1999). Once collected it is analysed through the use of diagrams and 
statistics (Robson, 1993; Silverman, 1999). The quantitative approach is often deemed as the 
'scientific approach' (Robson, 1993) as it is synonymous hypothesis testing, involving experiments 
or other forms of empirical enquiry. 
Qualitative data is based on meanings expressed through words; its collection results in non- 
standardised data requiring classification into categories (Silverman, 1999). Data collection and 
analysis, conducted through the use of conceptualisation, can happen concurrently (Robson, 1993; 
Silverman, 1999). The qualitative approach allows theory and concepts to arise from the inquiry, 
coming after and during data collection rather than before (Robson, 1993). The research often 
deals with human issues, for instance reflecting on the life of individuals, groups, societies and 
organisations, and is conducted through contact with 'field' or 'life' situations (Miles Et Huberman, 
1994). The researcher may often start with a tentative research question, concept or constructs 
and allow an initial period of research to assist in developing hypotheses (Robson, 1993). Thus the 
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quantitative and qualitative approaches impact the researcher and the research strategy in 
different ways (Table 3-4). 
Aspect of Research Quantitative Qualitative 
Relationship between researcher and subject Distant Close 
Research strategy Structured Unstructured 
Nature of data Hard Et Reliable Rich Et Deep 
Relationship between theory and research Confirmation Emergent 
Table 10-5., Comparison of quantitative and qualitative research methods (Bouma ft Atkinson, 1995) 
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Appendix 3: The Case Studies 
Case A: Overview 
The following details provide an overview of Case A's position in December 2001: 
CASE A: I Manufacture. 
LOCATION: I Fra n ce. 
SIZE Crurnover): IC7.0 million per annum. 
SIZE (empioyces): 
I 110 full time equivalents. 
BACKGROUND: In France in 1992, the world's leading bicycle helmet manufacturer 
opened Europe's first factory dedicated to the manufacture of bicycle 
helmets. In 1999, the French manufacturer gained its independence 
and Case A was born. The parent had decided to relinquish control of 
manufacturing - to focus purely on design and sales activities and to 
allow other plastics moulding firms to tender for its business. In 
December 2001, Case A's parent company remained a major 
customer. 
Independence generated new opportunities and threats for Case A 
and in an attempt to broaden their activities from bicycle helmets 
they began to consider the business differently. Firstly, they wanted 
to be recognised as a European authority in protective helmet design 
and manufacture. Secondly as they wanted to be European experts 
in thermo forming, expanded polystyrene moulding (Figure A-1), die 
cutting foams, fabricated foams injection moulding tool design and 
manufacturer and sub assembly contracting. This repositioned Case 
A into the worldwide domain of custom plastics manufacturing. 
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Figure A-1: Case A ý; expandedpolystyrene injection machines. 
Case A began to make headway into the custom mouldings arena, 
successfully capturing a small number of contracts for simple 
products such as wine pack boxes. However, limited commercial 
experience meant that diversification into new markets was not as 
easy as anticipated. Thus, the senior management team decided to 
refocus much of its efforts into familiar areas - the manufacture of 
protective helmets. Soon after, new customers in the protection 
helmet industry were found (not just in the bicycle sector), these 
almost completely offset contract losses from their former owner. 
In 2000, Chinese manufacturers made a rapid large scale entry into 
the already competitive worldwide market of protective helmets. 
This had an instant impact upon Case A's sales, significantly reducing 
their market share and generating a huge threat for the firm's 
existence. Just a few years earlier, Chinese helmet manufacturers 
had operated on the periphery of the market and were almost non- 
existent. However, by offering products of marginally less quality but 
at significantly less cost, they had effectively begun to disrupt the 
protective helmet industry using a low-end disruptive strategy. 
REASON FOR I Case A's executive management team conducted a review of product 
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INVOLVEMENT: offerings, past and present, within its core market - the protective 
helmet industry. They generated two conclusions: 
1) Although Case A's core market had moved forward, it had 
essentially remained the same for several years (Figure A-2) and now 
competitive advantage was firmly focused upon cost reduction. 
Figure A-2: The core products manufactured by Case A- 1997 to 2003. 
2) Case A was nearing the end of its capacity to compete on price 
within its core product range. It needed to generate new areas of 
competitive advantage and saw the rapid introduction of innovation 
to the top of the management agenda as crucial for the firm's 
permanence. 
Case A's Director General understood they will never again be able to 
compete in the lower-level and mid tiers of the protective helmet 
market. In addition, incremental innovation at the high-end was 
delivering diminishing returns on investment. He made the decision 
that the firm needed to develop competencies beyond incremental 
innovation. It had to now embrace radical forms of innovation and 
better understand the phenomenon of disruption, "... this perhaps 
will be our only way to survive. " (Director General Case A) 
CONTRIBUTORS: All five members of Case A's executive management team have been 
involved in the current study to varying degrees. Particularly high 
involvement has been seen from the Director General (who has a rich 
international executive management experience and has overseen 
numerous international product development projects) and the head 
of Quality and REtD (a plastic and composite materials engineer, who 
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Case B: Overview 
has project managed many of Case A's new product development 
initiatives within the protective helmet sector). 
The following details provide an overview of Case B's position in December 2001: 
CASE B: I Manufacture. 
LOCATION: Israel. 
SIZE (Turnover): C2.5 billion per annum. 
SIZE (ernpioyees): Approximately 14,400 full time equivalents across the whole 
enterprise. 
BACKGROUND: Case B is a government owned manufacturer with an intensive focus 
on research and development (REtD). In the last two decades, Case B 
has witnessed significant changes. It has expanded design and sales 
activities from its home nation markets to the global, worldwide 
level. It has enjoyed success and growth, and is now considered to 
be one of the world's leading firms in the conception and 
manufacture of aeronautics, aerospace and electronics equipment for 
the military sector (Figure B-1). 
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Figure 8- 1: Case 8, a global leader in military hardware. 
Case B has also developed a strong presence in the global military 
market for the conception and delivery of software engineering, 
embedded computer systems, advanced electronic navigation 
systems and optronics (Figure B-2). 
Fiqure B-2. Case 8, a global leader in military software. 
By the end of the 1990's, competition within Case B's core markets 
had intensified. Growth rates had slowed and in some divisions they 
had almost stopped. To combat reduced growth, Case B launched 
two major initiatives: the Systems and Software Process 
Improvement Programme (SPIP) and the Competitiveness 
Improvement Programme (CIP). 
SPIP was an initiative lead by the Director of Corporate REW and 
Business Development Embedded Computer Systems. To improve 
competitiveness, it focused on incrementally improving internal 
processes. The focus of CIP was different. It was an initiative led by 
the Chief Operations Officer and the divisional Vice Presidents of 
REW, to create a company wide improvement of general innovation 
capabilities. It focused upon improving the effectiveness of REW 
activities and the identification of new revenue streams. Particular 
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attention was given to radical new product development, the 
decisive success factor of arriving first to market, and tentative steps 
into investigating commercial, non-military domains. 
In 2001, both programmes were recognised to have delivered success 
but the future still looked uncertain and growth rates had not 
drastically improved. Accepting the need to lead an intensive 
company wide improvement in performance, Case B's executive 
management team initiated a corporate change initiative. A new 
mission statement was written and four core values were identified. 
Case B now had a 'Technology and Innovation Value': "We will 
encourage all the people in [Case B] to seek innovative ideas in 
everything that we do. Our technology edge is a foundation for 
satisfying customers and for our growth". 
REASON FOR 
INVOLVEMENT: 
Case B has primarily involved one of its key divisions in the current 
research; it is a typical division within the firm. In the 1980's, most 
of its people were engaged in designing new cutting edge 
technologies for its rapidly growing market base, which in the 
subsequent years have become the focus of sustaining innovation. 
The division has concentrated upon exploiting the knowledge that it 
created and is now a world leader in the field of operational 
upgrades of fighter and trainer aircraft. The problem the division 
now faces is one of diminishing returns on their prevailing 
knowledge and technology base. The need to identify new business 
and technology opportunities has emerged into a primary objective 
and search for innovation has begun. 
It was the opinion of two Divisional REtD Vice Presidents that this 
division of Case B was much like the rest - excellent at delivering 
incremental improvements to existing offerings and rapidly imitating 
market pioneers. However, it lacked the ability to identify and 
capitalise upon breakthrough or disruptive innovations. 
Therefore, the primary reason for Case B's involvement in this 
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research project was to address their gap in knowledge. Through 
being involved, they hoped to deliver a better understanding of 
disruptive innovation and how it can be enabled. They intended to 
diffuse this knowledge throughout the core business areas to 
enhance the firm's capability to quickly identify disruptive 
opportunities, from both external and internal sources, especially 
those in the increasingly attractive non-military fields. 
CONTRIBUTORS: 
Case C: Overview 
This research has benefited from two types of Case B contributor. 
The first group consists of six people, who have provided regular 
contact with rich involvement. Of these six members, three hold 
executive level positions and three are senior engineers. The second 
grouping of contributors - consisted of approximately 90 people, 
consisting of functional managers, senior engineers and senior 
commercial staff, who attended a series of four one-day workshops 
held on site at Case B in Israel. 
The following details provide an overview of Case C's position in December 2001: 
CASE C: I Service provider 
LOCATION: Head offices in Sweden, operating in 24 countries. 
SIZE (Turnover): SEK 134 billion for the year 
SIZE (empioyees): 
BACKGROUND: Case C is an international financial services and insurance group, 
established in Sweden in 1855. In December 2001, the company had 
SEK 833 billion in assets under management and was ranked within 
the world's top ten largest insurance companies in the Fortune 
Global 500. 
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Case C is an example of. a disruptive innovator. During the 1980's, it 
experienced rapid growth that transformed the financial services 
sector. A business model innovation revolutionised the company 
from a traditional national firm to a global leader. It accomplished 
this feat by pioneering the use of the 'extended enterprise' within the 
financial service market. Case C developed and implemented new 
organisational and technological structures to maximise the sharing 
of knowledge across local business units and partners. By using a 
new type of business model it became a specialist in inter- 
organisational co-operation. Its traditional integrated supply and 
value chain was replaced with a 'virtual organisation', consisting of 
independent money managers and distributors from across the world 
(Figure C-1). 
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Figure C- 1: Case C, a global virtual oýyanisation. 
Case C had undergone significant business model innovation. The 
virtual business model could was one of the first to realise the 
benefits of networked operations, making the network much more 
valuable than the individual parts. Consequently, Case C needed to 
invent new ways to report the value-creating potential of its virtual 
organisation and became the first company to describe and quantify 
the difference between its market value and its book value. It 
developed new tools and business management models to provide a 
more balanced, true picture of operations -a balance between the 
past, the present and the future. Many of these tools and 
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approaches have themselves become income generators and are sold 
in the form of con5ultancy and 5oftware to organisations around the 
world. 
Since its disruption of the financial services market, Case C claims to 
have been looking for the next big changes in the sector. It has 
utilised an 'incubator' approach to provide seed funding for new 
service innovations, sometimes in spin-out organisations, to develop 
them into the potential new business models of the future. 
These efforts have realised the creation of a number Of SM211 service 
offerings but to date, have not succeeded in delivering any 
significant breakthroughs. 
Despite its pioneering approach, by the 1990's, Case C had lost its 
unique position. On witnessing the success of the virtual 
organisation, the rest of the world's major financial service and 
insurance companies rapidly copied and replicated the new 'best 
practice' business model. In December 2001, Case C was regarded by 
its industry to be an effective innovator, with a lead-time of less 
than one year for developing and introducing new products (in the 
form of service offerings). However, this could be matched by many 
and even bettered by some of the competition. Worse still, their 
competitors had squeezed costs from the virtual organisation 
businesses model, where Case C had failed to do so, whilst at the 
same time making shrewder investment decisions, thus 
outperforming the one time disruptor. 
REASON FOR 
INVOLVEMENT: 
Case C recognises that their disruption of the financial services 
sector was not based upon premeditated action but upon a number 
of sequential acts of serendipity. It historically understands the 
benefits of delivering disruptive innovation but lacks the 
understanding and ability to become a second time disruptor. Their 
competitors are continually reducing costs and prices and Case C are 
aware that their performance improvements have reached the point 
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of diminishing returns. 
Despite its strategic intent to find and capitalise upon the next 
financial services breakthrough, Case C admits that it has lost its way 
with innovation. Formal channels for collecting and building radical 
ideas have all but closed and the organisation has issues with its 
ability to scale up its seed funded projects. Furthermore, it needs 
help to better identify the difference between new small niche 
opportunities and potentially disruptive innovations. 
They joined this research hoping to develop a better understanding of 
what disruptive innovation is and how it can be enabled. 
Furthermore, they wanted access to a network of non-competitive 
organisations who share in the same struggle to pursue wealth 
creating industry disruptions. 
CONTRIBUTORS: 
Case D: Overview 
Case C has primarily involved two groups of contributor to the 
research: 
1) Two corporate level strategy advisors who have a global view of 
the business and a direct input to the boardroom. 
2) A long serving group, consisting of a senior manager and her team 
of five staff, who have r ecently established an innovative new service 
venture seed-funded by corporate Case C. 
The following details provide an overview of Case D's position in December 2001: 
CASE D: I Service provider 
LOCATION: I Head offices in Spain with subsidiaries in France and Portugal. 
SIZE (Turnover): C 3.9 million for the year 
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SIZE (cmpioyees): 1 56 employees. 
BACKGROUND: Case D was founded in 1989 as a small industrial design studio with 
2 designers. By December 2001, the firm had evolved into a SME 
with 56 employees divided over its three divisions in France, Spain 
and Portugal and a turnover that had increased in size by more then 
100% per year in the preceding 5 years. 
Case D's business activities have evolved from its start point as a 
design studio. The firm now offers a range of services to industrial 
companies covering the whole cycle of product development. This 
includes: product briefing, concept development, concept and 
detailed design, engineering, prototyping, mould manufacturing co- 
ordination and innovation strategy and management. 
In December 2001, Case D boasted more than 70 different industrial 
clients from a high variety of sectors such as: furniture, toys, white 
goods, computer printers, home use tools, industrial tools, banking 
(pay dispensers and cash machines), ticketing devices, hospitals 
(information poles), industrial machinery, bathrooms Et WC 
manufacturers, and machine control devices (Figure D-1). 
-row 
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Hqure D-1: Case D, A consulting firm that provides competitive advantages to its 
clients through product innovation, development and optimisation. 
The success of Case D's integratable product development services is 
based upon highly responsive co-operation and communication 
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between the firm and its clients. This strong client-relationship focus 
has provided Case D with extensive experience and practical know- 
how of industrial product development cycles. Case D now leads the 
market in its home nation of Spain. 
The executive management of Case D have recognised that firms of 
comparable size and competency in the British, north American and 
German markets are unable to command such market shares in their 
home nations. This is because the industry is more mature and 
established within these countries. Hence Case D is not yet 
recognised to be a significant multi-national player in the arena of 
design and product development consultancy. The world's most 
recognised design firms dominate the high revenue European market 
and are seen as the benchmark to beat. Case D understands that it 
has a long way to go before it can attract the clientele and the 
revenues of these market leaders. However, Case D's management 
intends to maintain the vigorous growth of its knowledge and 
experience base and are determined to maintain the rapid growth of 
revenues - they want to become a major contender in the European 
market. 
REASON FOR 
INVOLVEMENT: 
Two years ago, to add ress Case D's desire to become a leading 
European design and product development consultancy, the 
organisation created a new division - the 'innovation group'. The 
team intended to provide its clients with new visions and something 
that no other consultancy was offering: disruptive future product 
plans. However, the two year experience unearthed four critical 
findings for the firm: 
1) Within Case D, there was significant misunderstanding 
surrounding the term disruptive innovation. 
2) Within the management teams of Case D's clients, there existed 
an almost total lack of knowledge on disruptive innovation. 
3) There was a lack of pragmatic and easy methods for generating, 
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scanning for and identifying new disruptive product opportunities. 
4) Conventional market research methodologies were not sufficient 
to detect new wealth-creating innovations - they disabled the ability 
to create a stronger position for the long term future of the a client 
company. 
Case D joined this research because it considered a deeper 
understanding of disruptive innovation to be essential for delivering 
competitive advantage and to fulfil its growth targets. 
CONTRIBUTORS: 
I 
The primary contributors, involved in the current research from Case 
D, are the members of the aforementioned innovation group. This 
team possess a wealth of experience in the areas of product design 
and new product development. The entire group has been involved 
to varying degrees. The most regular and rich involvement has been 
with the head of the division and one of his senior consultants. 
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Appendix 4: Data Analysis - How coding evolved through-out the 
investigation 
From the outset of the data collection, an open coding approach (Strauss and Corbin, 1997) 
enabled the author to categorise field notes, transcripts and other material into patterns, themes, 
concepts and categories. In accordance with Strauss and Corbin (1997) the coding system was 
refined as the data collection proceeded; the use of a database facilitated this process 
Examples of field notes taken using the split-page technique 
Inserted after this page is an example of a page of field notes take from an interview with the COE 
of Case A in August 2002. 
Examples of the data analysis - evolution of the database 
Inserted after this page is are examples of screen shots from the database established to help with 
data coding and analysis. Three pictures are presented to illustrate the evolution of the database in 
line with the progress of the research. 
369 
Exploring and Describing the Pursuit of Disruptive Innovation 
JI Ele ýdt Yý Insert F2rf,. t Recixds Joolk WI-d- tl* dF X 
Br9A: N !- [F Agfa Robs Sarts Sal 11 -5i 
N 'Al 1 x) " 
z ZVI a 
%f 1003, 
oil 
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Director - 
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I my opinion, w-ha-tm kes a true radical innovator is a person who can set aside 
tetal norm& At the very le ast, they have to be ready to not accept the status-quO as Individual and Managerial cognition - 
hey have to want to change it, if they are going to innovate. Ihis tenclencyý I think, 
is 
ten found in eccentric people these sort of people don*t feel bound bythe structures 
f haw things usually get done but sadly, many of these unconventional types don't 
.4 
Beginning -idea 
Gen and Capture - 
peak the same language as our executive management We need to provide them with * 
etter communication training because, Fight now, we end up ignoring therm' 
Beginning -Idea 
Gen and Capture 
0 Product Service Development 
Could form part of an enabler of disruptive innovation? 2 0 Exploitation 
Rýd: 14 141 F-962 M 1ý* of 35M 
Fý. V- 
Note the initial simple coding system 
This was used at the onset of the research. 
The first iteration of the data analysis and coding database 
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Opportunity Development 
Solution Development 
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Note the introduction of the processual and systemic coding system. 
It was from this coding that frequency counts were made regarding the 
enablers and inhibitors within each construct. The three more frequently 
mention enablers and inhibitors for each eventually formed the conceptual 
framework presented in Chapter 4. 
7he third iteration of the data analysis and coding database 
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Appendix 5: A description of the disruptive portfolio management intervention 
The Disruptive Portfolio Management (DPM) intervention: 
The primary aim is to tackle inappropriate funding routines by facilitating senior management to 
understand how their current mental models determine a fixed and narrow view of innovation as 
incrementalism. It aims to help managers to see how their current actions (which are driven by 
their cognitions) lead to the disregarding or mismanagement of potentially disruptive innovations. 
And aims to prov ide a context whereby new strategic intentions can be formulated and to offer 
the tools to turn these into strategic action 
The Objectives of the DPM: 
1. To help senior management to graphically see the whole innovation playing field -from 
incrementalism to disruption. 
2. To facilitating the identification of potentially disruptive opportunities. 
3. To facilitate senior management in legitimi5ing the allocation of resources to potentially 
disruptive opportunities. 
4. To provide senior management with best practice funding guidance 
S. To help prevent projects with a dominant history or dominant people from soaking resources 
away from disruptive opportunities. 
6 To show how the above objectives can be achieved whilst delivering best practice innovation 
management at all points in the new product, service, and process development cycle. (e. g. 
maximising benefits from investment into innovation, preventing project gridlock, delivery of 
strategic aims and a balanced focus between sustaining and potentially disruptive projects, long 
and short-term etc). 
An overview: 
The very latest understanding of 'disruptive innovation' and 'portfolio management' approaches 
have been uniquely combined to offer a solution to the crippling resource allocation problem. The 
"Disruptive Portfolio Management Intervention" consists of a workshop focused upon facilitating 
management practitioners to challenge their prevailing mental models of innovation and their 
373 
Exploring and Describing the Pursuit of Disruptive Innovation 
conventional funding routines. The output of the tool can also be used to communicate any 
priority changes throughout the business. 
The unique approach provides practitioners with a true 'big picture' of their organisations' 
innovation activity which will legitimise the simultaneous investment of resources into continued 
business success and the new fertile grounds of Disruptive Innovation. 
Unlike other portfolio approaches, it takes advantage of the goals of portfolio management whilst 
also enabling a more easily justifiable investment into potentially disruptive projects. The tool is 
deployed through an interactive workshop with the senior management team responsible for 
innovation strategy and is supported by a software tool. 
A focus upon financial methods within portfolio management are favoured by industry, however, 
these are shown to be the worst performing, in terms of delivering value, strategic alignment and 
balance (Cooper et al, 2001). Therefore, the DPM methodology uses a hybrid approach, or multiple 
portfolio method. A combination of strategic approaches (whereby business strategy determines 
"buckets" of money or resources and projects are selected because of their strategic importance), 
scoring models (whereby projects are rated on multiple criteria), and bubble diagrams (where 
projects are plotted on various X-Y axis on a variety of parameters) have been used 
Graphically representing an organisation's portfolio of projects in this manner avoids a narrow, 
project-by-project decision making approach and allows a broadening of investment options with 
fewer missed opportunities. Users of the tool are facilitated to disrupt strategically. The 
deployment of the DPM is described in the proceeding section: 
The DPM Process: 
To help management teams to disrupt strategically the DPM process in implemented in four stages 
(Figure 5-1) 
z 
M, I> Prepare: 
Dimensions 2> Complete 3> DPIVI 4> Future 
Ranking Checklist "Homework" Workshop Actions 
C): 
z 
Figure 5-1: The Disruptive Portfolio Management Process 
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9 Phase 1: Prepare Dimensions Ranking Checlikists: 
The DPM is essentially an assessment and analysis tool, founded upon series of questionnaires 
called the dimensions ranking checklists (DRCs) (Figure 5-2). The DRCs have two objectives: 
1) To assess the organisation's priority innovation initiatives using a series of standard PM 
measures (e. g. market feasibility, technological feasibility, benefit to the organisations, fit with 
strategy, etc), plus a cluster of qualitative and quantitative measures focused upon disruptive 
innovation. 
r 
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Figure 5-2: A small section of the Dimensions Ranking Checklists 
2) To gauge the impact of the initiatives under consideration (e. g. incremental, radical, 
discontinuous or potentially disruptive); whilst providing an analysis of each initiative's current 
situation, in consideration of its stage of maturity, from early stage idea to advanced innovation 
project. 
There are a series of DRCs to match the maturity of the initiative under consideration (Figure 5-3); 
the tool even provides a project management assessment for advanced developments. 
e Phase 2: Complete Homework 
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There are two types of homework: 
1) The DRC assessments can be 
completed as'homework' by the 
relevant project managers or REtD 
team. The assessors should select 
their organisations top ten high 
priority innovation initiatives, in 
any stage of development, and a 
small selection of recently killed 
initiatives for assessment with 
the DRCs. 
2) The facilitator of the DPM 
process gathers this data (either 
manually or using the DPM 
Software) and plots it onto seven 
The Development Funnel Which checklist needs to be completed? 
Now Do you ant to assess a NE 
Concept. CONCEPT to be added to V: PO"117 
ganisation's týýolio? A 
re-Complete: 
Preliminary. Do you want to assess an idea that is 
Investigation undergoing or has undergone a 
P RELIMENARY feasibilfly 
INVESTMATION? 
'-Yes-Co. plete: 
Detailed Do you want to assess a Business Plan 
Investigation & or. an idea that is undergoing or has lCkorm 
8u Slness Case. un ergons significant detailed invesligation7 
Complete: 
Developmental Do you want to assess the Progress Of 
PfO)ocls. a concept that you are developing into 
an executable product, service or 
p, oc it ss? "-IIS-Cornplete: 
Readyto Do you want to assess a pro-market 
Able- 
Laun h productiservice or re ady-to-exe cute 
Products process? * AEft, 
Servi, 
Cos '-, 
---Complete: 
Processes 
14W 
9 
Figure 5-3: Which DRC to select? 
large scale portfolio maps or 
"Bubble Diagrams" (where projects are plotted on a variety of 1M2 maps using different parameters 
on the X and Y axis) . Four of the maps are standard portfolio management views and three are 
designed to specifically account for disruptive innovation. The aim is to present to the senior 
management team a holistic graphical representation of their portfolio's of priority innovation 
projects (Figure 5-4). 
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Figure 54: Presenting Case A 's Portfolio Maps 
9 Phase 3: The DPM Workshop: 
The management team can choose a one or two day DPM workshop, which follows the agenda 
shown in Figure 5-5. The plotted portfolio maps are attached to the wall of the meeting room; the 
purpose of the workshop is three-fold: 
1) To allow the facilitator to introduce or re-emphasise the concept of disruptive innovation to 
the participants (using the knowledge safari tool); these should be the full senior 
management team responsible for innovation strategy and formal resource allocation 
(during this process lessons learnt from case studies and funding strategies from venture 
capitalists are also discussed). 
2) To allow the participants to be facilitated through an holistic analysis of the data from their 
portfolio maps. 
3) To facilitate the management team to see how their prevailing mental model of innovation 
has impacted resource allocation and therefore influenced the firms actual strategy. 
See Figure 5-6: A break-out group 
discusses the dangers of focusing its 
innovation effort in one quadrant of 
the portfolio map. 
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Two day One day Activity 
Version Version 
Time Time 
l 
08.00: 08.00: ing objectives, agenda, roles, and Stage ta: Introductions and establis 
rules. 
Stage I b: 'Disruptive Innovation KnoWledge Safari*. 
09.00: 09.00: Stage 2: Brief overview presentation7of the projects under assessment. 
09.45: 11.45: Break rLunch 
10.00: 13.00: Stage 3: Portfolio Maps. 
I 
- Understanding the process: How Disrupt-it builds the portfolio maps - 
15 mins. 
- Understanding the perspectives: Introducing your innovation 
landscape - 45 mins. 
- Group discussion on what the maps mean - 45 mins. 
1 
11.45: LUNCH 
1 
13.00: 08: 00 Stage 4: Developing Resourcing Strategies: 
An organisafional needs-driven activity; choices are for example: 
Understanding the DPM process (full groups). 
Understanding the implications of the maps for IAL (start full group 
then breakout). 
- Building innovation strategies (breakout groups). 
1145 Lunch 1 
15.00 15.00 Stage 5: The future of Innovation Strategy atyour organisation - 
Actions and next steps 1 
16.00 16.00 END 
Figure 5-5: The DPM Workshop Process 
* Phase 4: Future Actions -New Visions: 
The final phase is driven very much by the participants of the workshop, only when needed is 
guidance provided by the facilitator. The objective of this process is to use the richness of the 
preceding conversations in order to construct new visions 
and value that will guide future resource allocation. 
It is common in this phase for the management team to 
address the disruptive innovation rejection strategies 
that have been employed in the past (Figure 5-7). 
Furthermore, senior strategists will generate new 
intended futures by physically drawing them on the 
portfolio maps and gaining agreement from the group. 
This is a valuable group experience for the reasons 
presented in the proceeding section. 
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Figure 5-7: Edna Pasher, one of 
Case B's long-term collaborators 
discusses the impact of not 
pursuing disruptive Innovation 
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The knowledge safari tool: 
Objectives 
The objectives of the "DI Knowledge Safari" are: 
op To distil a large amount of theory and information on DI to the participants of a workshop 
in a rapid, highly digestible fashion by stimulating the visual, auditory, touch and 
movement senses (it has been shown that humans learn faster and more effectively when 
more of their senses are stimulated by the material presented). 
To provide the participants of a DI workshop with a journey through the topic of DI, which 
provides a holistic view of the content at all times to enable interrelations to be made 
between the subtopics. 
To ensure the participant's understanding of DI by invoking discussion and debate about 
the relevance of the content to the participants involved. 
Resources Required 
The resources required to complete the DI Knowledge Safari are: 
1) Two facilitators trained in theory of DI and the use of the DI Knowledge Safari technique. 
2) The seven large scale DI graphical templates, or "knowledge posters" described below (figure 
3-1 to 3-7). 
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3) Post-it notes and marker pens to capture the comments and insights of the participants - the 
participants should be encouraged to make notes of their thoughts and to place them onto 
the respective graphical template to be discussed at the end of the session. 
4) Physical artefacts that were, are or could be disruptive innovations. 
The DI Knowledge Safari is usually completed with 8-12 people, when presenting to larger groups it is 
difficult to ask everyone to move around the 'safari' with the facilitators, therefore, item three may be 
dropped for a discussion. Item 4 is optional as artefacts are a great way of bringing a subject to life, 
but they are also a great way to distract people from the content of the presentation and the 
discussion. 
The Process 
Facilitators using the DI Knowledge Safari technique attach large scale graphical illustrations, or 
knowledge posters, of the key findings, theories and insights of DI to the walls of their workshop 
meeting room. The workshop participants are then quite literally taken on a journey, or a safari, round 
the knowledge that drapes the walls. The process for the knowledge safari used to raise awareness of 
DI by the "Opportunity Recognition" and the "Disruptive Portfolio Management" workshops is as 
follows: 
a) The workshop room: 
Before the participants enter the workshop room, the graphical templates illustrating the key findings, 
theories and insights of disruptive innovation are attached to the walls (usually in one long horizontal 
line in the order that they will be presented). These are intentionally displayed during the opening of 
the workshop as a way to stimulate the participants from the onset. 
b) Introduction: 
On beginning the knowledge safari the lead facilitator introduces the "knowledge safari concept" to 
the participants. They make clear that two presenters will take responsibility to take the participants 
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on a "safari" through a state of the art understanding of disruptive innovation and that the use of 
technique will enable a rapid holistic understanding of the concepts that will be introduced. 
[N. B. more information on the each of the knowledge posters can be obtained in chapter 1 of this 
document] 
c) The innovation continuum: 
Figure 3-1: The Innovation Continuum (Thomond and Lettice. 2003) 
The lead facilitator asks the participants to look at the illustration presented above and during its 
explanation the following key points: are covered: 
9 Innovation can be categorised across a continuum from "evolutionary" to "revolutionary". 
Evolutionary innovations range from simple continuous improvements through to radical 
innovations. 
* All evolutionary innovations maintain the existence of existing and mainstream markets. 
Evolutionary innovations improve the performance of products, services and processes in directions 
that customers and consumers desire, consequently the market uncertainty of evolutionary 
innovations is low. 
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9 The more radical a leap forward that an evolutionary innovation Makes, the more likely that 
technical and 6usiness environment uncertainties will increase. 
e Evolutionary innovations cannot guarantee the delivery of long term survival. 
*Revolutionary innovations range from competence enhancing discontinuities through to 
competence destroying disruptive innovations. 
e All revolutionary innovations create or grow emerging niche markets (or value networks) that 
eventually re-frame existing and mainstream markets. 
Revolutionary innovations introduce commercial andlor technical performance dimensions that are 
in conflict with the performance directions desired by customers and consumers, consequently the 
market uncertainty of revolutionary innovations is high. 
Traditionally, technical and business environment uncertainties range from medium to very high 
when an organisation introduces a revolutionary innovation. 
* Revolutionary innovations offer the otherwise unachievable promise of new wealth creation, 
however, they are accompanied by high uncertainties and very little is know about how an 
organisation can foster these benefits as part of a major competitive strategy. 
e Disruptive innovations (the extreme of the revolutionary innovations) are the well-springs of new 
industries, they transform existing markets and thus offer the potential of long term survival. 
41 Time and again almost all the organisations that have 'died' or been displaced from their industries 
because of a new paradigm of customer offering could see the disruption coming but did nothing 
until it was too late. They assess potentially disruptive innovations and frame them as either 
deficient or as an unlikely threat - much to the managers' regret and the organisation's demise. 
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Despite the importance of disruptive innovation, it is an emerging research topic; consequently 
understanding is traditionally very low. Only a few people have published insights into the subject 
and no organisations have managed to repeatedly use disruptive strategies. 
Figure 3-2: Three types of discontinuity (Veryzer, 1998) 
Using the graphic above the second facilitator explains that the perceived value attributes of a 
product or service are critical to innovations with potential for di5ruption. A model developed by 
VMzer in 1998 makes the distinction between two dimensions: 
e "product capability" - the benefits of products as perceived by customers and users; and 
* "technological capability" - the degree to which the product involves expanding capabilities beyond 
existing organisational boundaries. 
4, This model uses the following examples to illustrate how organisations can deliver three types of 
discontinuous innovation and how each type requires a different management approach: 
"Flat Screen TVs" show that an organisation can introduce a radically different technology into a 
market, creating a discontinuity, yet not offering the consumers significantly more in the way of 
product capability. 
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* "Sony Walkman" utilised existing technologies to introduce a discontinuity that significantly 
improved the benefits of products as perceived by customers and users. 
9 "Compact disks and disk drives" were responsible for disrupting the traditional vinyl record and 
mini-computer markets respectively with the introduction of enhanced product and technological 
capabilities. 
Figure 3-3: Low-end Disruptive Strategies (Christensen, 1997) 
The second facilitator introduces the most famous model of disruptive innovation as proposed by 
Clayton Christensen in 1997. In essence this model introduces the following notion: 
* Organisations often over-supply their customers' needs with excess technological functionality Oust 
think about how Microsoft Word does things that you do not need) or services that they do not 
actually require. 
* "Oversupply" leaves a vacuum for other products/services to target the low-end market niches with 
a simpler offering that can be consumed in more convenient settings. 
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s By being patient for growth but impatient for profitability the new offering can be gradually 
improved and allowed to migrate upstream. 
* This migration can continue up to the point where it can satisfy the average customer needs of 
existing mainstream markets and take over as the dominant paradigm of customer offering. 
* The organisation following a low-end disruptive strategy must begin with a well defined niche of 
"over-supplied" low-end customers of an established market and adopt a stance of being "patient 
for growth but impatient for profitability". 
Examples of low-end disruptions include: 
9 The personal computer's impact upon mini-computers. 
a Intel's introduction of Celeron - disrupting its own market but ensuring longer term survival. 
o MPTs with their lower quality sound playback are disrupting CD's with high quality digital 
performance. 
In academic terms Christensen's model illustrates how established firms' decisions to ignore new 
customer offering that do not appear to address their customers' needs become fatal when two 
paradigmatic trajectories of progress interact - thus the term "disruptive innovation" is introduced to 
explain the impact of this interaction: 
* As the performance demanded by an organisations customer's increases over time so does the 
performance provided within a technological paradigm. 
* Quite often the performance improvement provided has a different trajectory to the trajectory of 
performance improvement demanded by customers. 
o When the trajectory slopes differ, and performance provided exceeds performance demanded, new 
technologies that were only perform an ce-com petitive in remote value networks may migrate into 
established markets. 
o This provides innovators with a vehicle to new customers, who would have previously viewed the 
innovation as substandard; 
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9 Enabling them to offer established mainstream markets a new set of performance attributes that 
are now more relevant than the current paradigm. 
Figure 3-4: New Market Disruptive Strategies (Gilbert, 1997) 
The lead facilitator explains that an author called Gilbert (2001 and 2003) refers 'new-market' 
disruptive strategies'; these occur when: 
* 'Non-consumers' are offered a simple, convenient product/service that allows them to do things 
that they would not have other wise been able to do. 
The growth of the new market is ignored by established companies as it is considered too small and 
"are not up to snuff on the performance criteria that existing companies talk about". 
4, Much like the 'low-end' disruptions described above, as the offerings improve 'new-market 
disruptors' begin to attract customers away from established markets 
e Finally by the time incumbents begin to notice the defection, its too late, the innovations 
permanently reshape and disrupt existing markets. 
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In summary, the organisation following a new-market disruptive strategy must begin with a well 
defined niche of "non-consumers" and adopt a stance of being "patient for growth but impatient 
for profitability". 
g) Why organisations often fail to capitalise on disruptive innovation - "crossing the chasm": 
Figure 3-5: Crossing the Chasm (Moore, 1995) 
The second facilitator explains that if an organisation manages to foster a potentially disruptive idea, 
there are problems to overcome to get it adopted by the mass market: 
eA model proposed by Moore (1995) addresses the huge difficulties faced by companies trying to 
'cross the chasm' from early market acceptance to gain the support of the 'early majority'. 
* The key message from the model is that the market for a potentially disruptive innovation can be 
segmented. 
e The 'early market' niche may be enthusiastic about the new offering; however this segment 
accounts for less than 13% of a market's population - thus an innovation with the potential for 
disruption must cross the chasm into the mainstream of an existing market. 
e True market disruption will not therefore be successfully exploited if the organisation does not find 
a niche market with a "compelling reason to buy" within the 'early majority' of the population. 
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It is from this customer base that other niches can be sought and conquered with the appropriate 
"Bowling Ally" (niche marketing) strategy and disruption can truly be realised. 
* The difference between the "visionaries" in the early market and the "pragmatists" in the early 
majority are introduced to illustrate why potentially disruptive innovations often fall into the chasm 
of failed disruption. 
h) Why organisations often fail to capitalise on disruptive innovation - "organisational 
structures": 
Figure 3-6: When to spin out? (Christensen and Overdorf, 2000) 
The lead facilitator explains that inappropriate organisational structures are often the reason why 
businesses fail to capitalise on disruptive innovation. The first illustration on the graphic above shows 
a two-by-two matrix which can be used to assess a new innovative concept and to provide advice on 
which organisational structures will best suit exploitation. The horizontal (Y) axis is used to assess a 
concepts degree of fit with an organisations values (its strategy, beliefs and culture) measured from 
good to poor, whereas the vertical ('y') axis assesses whether the concept will fit with an 
organisations' processes (its capabilities and internal structures). 
If a new concept has a good fit with organisational values and processes then a lightweight team 
within the existing organisation is best suited to for development and exploitation. 
If a new concept has a good fit with organisational values but internal processes, capabilities and 
structures are not well-matched, then a heavyweight team within the existing organisation is in the 
best position for development and exploitation. 
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If a new concept has a good fit with organisational processes but it clashes with its values, then the 
organisation should develop the concept in-house but create a separate spin-out organisation for 
exploitation. 
If however, a new concept has a poor fit with both organisational processes and values yet has the 
potential to generate new net wealth, the organisation should provide some seed funding for a 
separate heavyweight spin-out operation. 
i) The characteristics of disruptive innovation: 
Jill, 
4W 
Figure 3-7: Characteristics of DI (adapted from Thomond and Lettice 2003) 
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Finally the lead facilitator presents a summary of the typical characteristics of a disruptive innovation, 
as illustrated above. 
j) Closing the DI Knowledge Safari: 
When reaching the end of the DI Knowledge Safari, it has been found that a final tailored graphical 
template should be used to introduce the next element of the workshop. This could be introducing a 
method to conduct a structured brainstorm, or it could be to introduce a new topic. 
For example, the DPM methodology uses the DI Knowledge Safari to kick-start the workshop element 
of the offering. This allows the facilitators to bring the participants to up to the same level of 
understanding of the terminology used in the tool. At the end of the knowledge safari the the 
facilitators use a final template introducing the key objectives of Portfolio Management techniques. 
Figure 3-8: Goals of Portfolio Management (adapted from Cooper, Edgett and Klienschmidt, 2001) 
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Appendix 6: Aggregated results of the initial feedback questionnaires following 
the DPM interventions 
Aggregated results at Case A: 
The overafl workshqp was considered: 
How beneficial has the DPM process been 
to your organisation? 123456 
I= no benefit to 6= highly beneficial 
To what extent has the DPM process 
contributed to you professionally? 123456 
1= no benefit to 6- highly beneficial 
0 
How useful were the large scale graphic 
templates to the DPM workshop process? 123456 
1= not effective to 6= highly effective 
A knowledge safari was used to explain disruptive innovation: 
Objectives of Knowledge Safari E EEEE 
E T0 
CL 
z E 0 Q 
To explain the concept of disruptive innovation. 
To make the concept of disruptive innovation (D 
applicable to Case A 
To explain the use of portfolio management 
techniques. 
To explain how portfolio management techniques 
can be used to foster disruptive innovation. 
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The following questions relate to the Dimensions Ranking Checklist process: 
Objectives of assessing the innovation initiatives -V 
-U zz 
EEEE 
and showing how the DPM tool builds the portfolio 
maps. E ýi .20 tf 
E 
To demonstrate that a comprehensive methodology 
has been developed to assess the projects and to 
produce the portfolio maps 
To show that the DRC methodology can be 
implemented easily as homework 
To show that the methodology can be manipulated 
to suit any organisation's needs. 
The following questions relate to the workshop process: 
Objectives of introducing and discussing the E EE innovation landscape of Case A 
-6 
Z. 2: 1 M 
E 
V M 
z 
To introduce and explain the portfolio maps used in the 
workshop. 
To introduce and familiarize the group with Case A 's 
"innovation landscape". 
To explain the general implications of the maps 
generated from Case A's project data. 
To allow the participants to understand the 
implications of their narrow project selection and the 
team's current resource allocation strategy 
Objectives of initiating discussion on the zz EEEEE 0 
development of new resource allocation approaches 0 ýt= 2- a- 
and Case A's future 'Innovation Strategy". -V -E! V E0Z 
E z0 Cd 
To probe the portfolio views for the 
implications of individual project positioning 
and individual project funding decisions. 
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Objectives of initiating discussion on the E 
-15 
EE 
-V 
E development of new resource allocation approaches Z- 
and Case A 's future "Innovation Strategy". E ig 
0 Cý z 
To probe each of the important portfolio views 
for the deeper implications of Case A's current 
innovation strategy and resourcing approach. 
To develop an understanding of how the senior 
management team's actions influence the 
innovation efforts of Case A. 
To develop new visions and to understand how 
the DPM Toot can be used to protect resources 
for radical and potentially disruptive projects 
in the future 
To consider the feasibility of current priority 
projects whilst considering the entire portfolio 
view. 
To suggest improvements to Case A's 
innovation strategy. 
To understand how the DPM tool can be used 
to support a broader selection of projects and 
to enable more informed strategically aligned 
resource allocation decisions 
Aggregated results at Case B: 
the fflecific objectives of the workshqp were con5idered. - 
A knowledge safari was used to explain disruptive innovation: 
Objectives of Knowledge Safari -V z -V -V EEEEE 
E ;a0 
0 z E 
To explain the concept of disruptive innovation. 
To make the concept of disruptive innovation 
applicable to CASE B 
To explain the use of portfolio management 
techniques. 
To explain how portfolio management techniques 
can be used to foster disruptive innovation. 
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The following questions relate to the Dimensions Ranking Checklist process: 
Objectives of assessing the innovation initiatives EE 
and showing how the DPM tool builds the portfolio I; 
maps. 15 E tf 
To demonstrate that a comprehensive methodology 
has been developed to assess the projects and to 
produce the portfolio maps 
To show that the DRC methodology can be 
implemented easily as homework 
To show that the methodology can be manipulated 
to suit any organisation's needs. 
The following questions relate to the workshop process: 
Objectives of introducing and discussing the EEEE E innovation landscape of Case B. >ý >- 76 >- 
E 
CL 
Z E 0 U 
To introduce and explain the portfolio maps used in the 
workshop. 
To introduce and familiarize the group with Case B 's 
*innovation landscape". 
To explain the general implications of the maps 
generated from CASE B 's project data. 
To allow the participants to understand the 
implications of their narrow project selection and the 
team's current resource allocation strategy 
Objectives of initiating discussion on the EEE development of new resource allocation approaches 
and Case B 's future 'Innovation Strategy". E 
18 Cý z 
To probe the portfolio views for the 
implications of individual project positioning 
and individual project funding decisions, 
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Objectives of initiating discussion on the z E E 
development of new resource allocation approaches -a = 'P _U z and Case B 's future "Innovation Strategy". E 0 . 
23 
tf 
-0 M 
Cý E 
0 
To probe each of the important portfolio views 
for the deeper implications of Case B 's current 
resource allocation approach. 
To develop an understanding of how the senior 
management team's actions influence the 
innovation efforts of Case B. 
To deve lop a new strategic innovation vision 
for the future. 
to understand how the DPM Tool can be used 
to protect resources for radical and potentially 
disruptive projects in the future 
To consider the feasibility of current priority 
projects whilst considering the entire portfolio 
view. r 
To suggest improvements to Case B 's 
innovation strategy. 
To understand how the DPM tool can be used 
to support a broader selection of projects and 
to enable more informed strategically aligned 
resource allocation decisions 
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Appendix 7: Assessing the shortfalls of the DPM intervention 
Weaknesses of the individual elements of the DPM process: 
In order to assess the shortfall of the DPM intervention process an evaluation was conducted 
regarding some of the specific elements of the methodology 
0 The dimensions ranking check#A5 (DRCs) - complexity of questions: 
The DRC questions were reported to be too complex in terminology because of high academic 
content. For example, Case B sent several emails requesting clarification of question objectives and 
of terminology. Although all the participants stated that the DRC process was well designed and 
thorough, the complexity reduced their confidence that the process was easy to adopt. 
0 The DRCs - length ofprocess. - 
It was reported that the DRCs took too long to complete. Although eventually it was agreed that 
the benefits of the lengthy analysis and discussion outweighed the early cost of time consumption, 
it was clear that industrial collaborators with less commitment to the research may not have been 
as willing to initially undertake such an extensive process. In particular, it was suggested that a 
simpler DRC process should be specifically designed for SMEs. 
0 The DRCs - understanding the Inaturity ofprevailing project asse5sment method5., 
Following analysis of the feedback data, regarding the completion of the DRCs, it was apparent that 
more attention should have been given to both cases prevailing project management and 
assessment mechanisms. In particular, the pre-intervention meetings and teleconferences would 
have benefited from more discussion regarding the maturity of the collaborators' project 
assessment methods and project information levels. This would have helped to govern how much 
time should be allocated to the "homework project assessment phase" - the completion of the 
DRCs. For example, it is believed that Case B's process maturity could be considered to be of an 
average or medium level. For this reason, they reported that they would have benefited from a 
one-day facilitated DRC exercise. Alternatively, an organisation with mature well rehearsed 
processes could complete the DRC assessments as a one-day, participant-driven, 'homework' 
exercise. Companies such as Case A with low process maturity would benefit from a DRC exercise 
spread over an agreed period of time, whereby the client (and if need be the facilitator) can collect 
and disseminate additional information to help complete the process. 
D The DRC5 - The benefits of externally facilitated individualproject a5sessment, 
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," Case A participants reported that the DRCs were too complex to be completed as 'homework'; this 
increased Case A's dependence upon the author, as an external facilitator, to help the DPM 
participants to complete the project assessments. Rather than causing a problem, this proved to be 
a fortuitous situation. It emerged that Case A benefited from the facilitated individual project 
analysis as much as it did the facilitated holistic portfolio analysis. The DRCs raised many useful 
questions that the team had not previously asked of itself, having a facilitator present assisted in 
the capture of a deeper organisational understanding of each initiative and avoided rushed, 
unconsidered answers. This generated well considered project data, which increased confidence 
later in the process when the portfolio maps revealed invaluable insights that were previously 
unachievable. More benefit could have been delivered if more time was allocated to this exercise. 
0 The DRCs - complications: 
The main complications that arose from the DRC process did so because the practitioners from both 
cases were asked questions about individual projects that had never previously been considered in 
depth. This meant that some information could not be as forthcoming as desired; therefore, raising 
issues regarding the reliability of some of the answers. Consequently, the participants reported it 
would have proved useful to spend more time on project assessment, especially when mining for 
data on size, growth, variances and expected penetrations of markets. 
13 Opening the DPM Work5hop with the 'knowledge safari'kno wledqe tran5ter exerci5e: 
The participants of Case A struggled to relate to specific elements of the disruptive innovation 
knowledge safari as the content did not have a strong focus upon SMEs. It was reported that more 
stories, experiences and case studies from the SME arena would have proved useful. Likewise, 
participants from Case B stated that the knowledge safari helped them to understand some of the 
theory of disruptive innovation; but it was not until they began to discuss the implications of their 
constrained portfolio of innovation activity that the theory came to life. This suggests that specific 
examples of disruptive innovation must be presented during the knowledge safari; these should 
relate to the participating organisation and its industry. The feedback suggests that this would 
bring the theory to life in a context better understood by the participants - although it would 
require prior investigative work. 
Furthermore some of the terminology used was reported to be 'too academic'. 
0 The number Oportfolio maps and the complexity of the intervention: 
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It became clear when building the portfolio maps that the team at Case A would not be able to 
absorb or utilise all the information from all 7 possible maps. A decision was made to not burden 
the team with an over supply of information. Instead, Case A's Director General helped select 4 
maps to facilitate the discussion and analysis - two of the key traditional maps and two maps that 
incorporate knowledge on disruptive innovation (Figure 5-13). Interestingly, a similar situation 
arose at Case B and these same four maps emerged as the most useful in the one-day intervention 
- although it was noted that with more time the other maps may have played a larger role in the 
discussions. The concentration upon these four maps also nullified the use of the section within 
the DRCs on project management assessment. Therefore, it was concluded that the design of the 
intervention was perhaps too complex. The pre-intervention discussions could have been used to 
limit the number of maps, and to cut out the project management section of the DRCs. This would 
have reduced the data collection burden in the project assessment phase, thus making the DRCs 
easier to complete. 
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Map 1 
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(fit with processes) 
Figure 7-1: The four most useful and popular portfolio maps. 
11 Preparing for emotional reactions: 
French and Bell (1990) note that during organisational interventions emotional reactions may 
occasionally emerge from participants. Amis, Slack and Hinnings (2004) found that whilst it is 
witax ms cmng*ar 
The mlerencesAIA112 and BJ-BJ2 refer to the taxonomy of kiricivation identified and ýd by the DPM tool 
Map 3 
10 
Dystrr .... t... Act 
market 
)0/0 
-hnical 
wness 
Key: 
Map 1= The 'innovation playing field' - 
the global impact of innovation activity. 
Map 2= Market Newness vs. Technical 
Newness. 
Map 3= Reward vs. Probability of 
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important to tackle decision making routines to create a transformation of organisational 
behaviour, these areas are "also likely to be the most contentious parts of an organization to alter 
and thus changes to them precipitate most resistance" (p35). Despite these warnings this 
investigation did pay not enough credence to the potential for emotional reactions. The author 
should have sought more advice upon how workshop participants react, both rationally and 
emotionally, when their traditional perspectives are challenged. One of the participants from Case 
A stated "... if you could have warned us at the beginning of the workshop that today might get 
uncomfortable, things might not have got so heated... " [A-Head of Sales-IS-DPM-3245]. Further 
attempts to implement this intervention would follow this advice at the onset of the DPM 
workshop. It is believed that overt acknowledgement of the likeliness for emotional reactions 
would allow the participants and the facilitator to diffuse emotional situations if they later 
emerged. 
0 Implementing the DPM intervention during organisational decline: 
The DPM process provided noted benefits to Case A even whilst it was suffering organisational 
decline. However, comparisons of the benefits delivered between Cases A and B reveal that a 
return on an investment of management time into such an intervention is more difficult to prove 
for a struggling firm. This experience suggests that the DPM approach may be more suited to 
organisations in less turbulent environments or in periods of growth, as these businesses are in a 
stronger position to provide the nurturing ecologies for disruptive innovation. Extant literature 
shows that disruptive innovations require "longer r un-ways before a steep accent is possible" 
(Christensen and Raynor 2004: 291. Thus, it would appear that organisations which are not 
undergoing periods of decline will be better positioned to offer these longer, sheltered run-ways. 
0 The effect of facing "unusual orqanisational objective5 "., 
It was concluded that unusual organisational objectives, such as Case B's desire to create more jobs 
for Israeli citizens, should have been surfaced earlier, preferably in the pre-intervention process. 
This would have provided the author, as the facilitator, with more time to assess whether the 
pursuit of disruptive innovation can be linked to these unforeseen intentions. 
11 Maintaining flexibility: 
When critical issues emerged, during both interventions, it became clear that the participants were 
not keen to complete all of the prearranged tasks. Yor example, during the intervention in Case B, 
the objective of discussing the implications of how the individual projects were positioned was 
dropped in favour of an emergent dominant objective: 'to create a new focus for the future'. The 
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flexibility of the workshop allowed the DPM process to respond to emergent priorities; this was 
rated by all participants as an important factor in the DPM's perceived success. Bell and French 
(1990) note that social scientists must ensure that influential participants do not dominate or 
commandeer an intervention process. Therefore, decisions regarding responsiveness and flexibility 
were not taken lightly, as researchers must attempt to they stay faithful to the intervention in 
hand, for the results to be accurately assessed. 
0 The sacrifice of industrial requirements for the benerlt of the research: 
In the final design phases of the DPM intervention, the collaborating practitioners stated that they 
wanted to the DPM workshop to deliver two additional objectives: 
- an understanding of how the DPM approach could be used to protect resources for 
disruptive innovations, and 
- an understanding of how the DPM approach could be used on an on-going basis to 
deliver new strategic action. 
However, these objectives were only partially met, as the flexibility of the intervention allowed the 
author, as facilitator, to focus each group's attention on the emergent 'burning issue' of better 
understanding the behaviour that constrains innovation activity. This decision supported the aims 
of this thesis, but not the stated requirements of the collaborating businesses. Despite this concern 
the most senior participants later stated that the focus upon behaviours (and not just financial 
mechanisms) that prevent the allocation of resources to potentially disruptive innovations was 
insightful and highly useful to their aims. 
0 More time was needed. - 
The flexibility of the workshop allowed the groups in both interventions to focus their attention on 
the 'burning issues', as such it was concluded that more time was needed to pursue the deeper 
benefits of the DPM approach. Both case study sites announced their interest in future 
implementations of the DPM methodology, both also stating that it should co-incide with their 
planning cycle and that it should be allocated more time that was available in the research. 
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Issues that the DPM intervention neglected 
The key issues that were overlooked or neglected by the DPM intervention process are discussed in 
detail in section 6.5 (recommendations for future research), however, these can be summarised as: 
a) The need for more focus on the relationship between the susceptibility of cognitive dissonance 
and the breadth of technological activity. 
b) The top management teams of cases A and B were, by there very nature, diverse cross function 
groups of people. The issue of the diversity of these 'resource allocation committees' should have 
been considered in more depth. 
c) Both intervention sites were stakeholders in a number of collaborative innovation efforts. A 
rn u Iti-stakeh older perspective on the portfolio maps may have generated insights to better 
understand the role and purpose of each organisations within these value networks. 
d) A longitudinal approach to the DPM intervention may have shed light on how mental models 
evolve and how they can be challenged and changed. This may have provided more insights into 
how organisations adopt new concepts to survive in an increasingly discontinuous world. 
e) The DPM intervention used a portfolio management approach to deliver holistic thinking. An 
empirical consideration of other tools that that facilitate holistic thinking (e. g. 'Learning Maps', 
Visual Metaphor Elicitation' (Young, 2003) and Technology Roadmapping (Phaal et al., 2004) etc. ) 
could deliver a better understand of the advantages and disadvantages of such tools. This would 
allow future management interventions to enhance the benefits of holistic thinking to better 
overcome the dilemmas faced in the pursuit of disruptive innovation. 
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Appendix 8: A method to evaluate the mode 2 approach 
An evaluation of the four features that typify the Mode 2: 
According to Stewart et al. (2000) there are four features that typifV the Mode 2 approach to 
research. These, or similar features, are commonly reference by other authors in the field of 
research design when discussing 'mode 2' or academic-industrial collaborative approaches to 
management inquiries. Therefore, if the current research was implemented correctly and 
appropriately we would expect to see that these features have played an integral part in the 
research. 
Feature 1: The research problem must be framed in the context of application. 
One of the critical gaps in knowledge, identified in Chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis, is the lack of 
pragmatic industrial advice for management practitioners wanting to pursue disruptive innovation 
as part of a major competitive strategy. This notion was held at the heart of the current inquiry. 
The research problem was: 9)ow can senior practitibner5 under5tand and foster 
disruptive innovation as part of a m3jor competitive strategy? 
The 17 core membets of the multi-case, multi-level research group were asked the following 
question: 
Was this research problem firamed with an academic or indu5trial focus? 
Result. - 
10 answered industrial. 
7 answered both. 
Throughout the research programme, academic theory and findings from data analysis were 
constantly discussed in the context of how they apply in the real-world industrial settings of the 
four industrial collaborators. This was mostly conducted in workshop settings. The commitment of 
the research participants and their open and honest temperament, allowed the researcher to probe 
these areas in much more depth than could have been achieved without the collaborative nature of 
the research (e. g. within the limited confines of a short interview setting). 
group of both academics and practition r hou d be ngaged in the Feature 2., A hdcrogeneous es 5e 
in vestigation, using a trans-dikiolinary approach. 
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In total 127 industrialists took part in this investigation. Four different case study sites from four 
different countries provided a total 17 core members of the collaborative research group. In 
addition a further 103 employees from the four case study organisations participated in one-off or 
infrequent data collection workshops and questionnaires, there were also 7 expert industrial 
interviewees. The organisational functions that were performed by the participants could be 
divided into 9 clusters and the organisational roles could be divided into 8 clusters (Table 10-7). 
Furthermore, 8 expert academics (4 from Britain and 4 from Germany) were consulted either once 
or intermittently throughout the inquiry. 
Organisational Function 
Finance 
Marketing 
Purchasing 
REW/Design 
Manufacturing/Operations 
Sales 
Human resources 
Legal 
Cross Functional 
Organisational Role 
CEO 
Director Divisional Head 
Senior Manager 
Manager 
Senior Consultant 
Consultant 
General Employee 
Mixed Role 
Table 10-6.1he oryanisational functions and roles of the participants involved in this research. 
Therefore, it was concluded that a truly heterogeneous group of both academics and practitioners 
were engaged in this investigation, using a trans-disciplinary approach 
Feature 3. - The group 5hould have a 5ocially-distributed research capability. 
The collaborative nature of this investigation was very much driven by the author. Despite the 
author taking responsibility for driving the research programme, he also ensured that it was 
responding to the industrialists needs. Furthermore, one of the key reasons for the success of the 
investigation was the fact that the industrial members of the research group would commit to 
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taking actions from the meetings. These may have been to arrange workshops or interviews, but 
they also included conducting data collection and group discussion sessions within their own 
organisations. Therefore, the research capability and the responsibility for the research programme 
became social ly-distributed. 
The research problem was: ýýow can senior practitioners understand and foster 
disruptive innovation as part of a major competitive strategy? 
The 17 core members of the multi-ca5e, multi-level research group were asked the following 
question: 
Did you feel personal responsibility for the outcome of this investigation? 
flesulL 
17 answered YE 
oanswel-edNO. 
Feature 4. Theoty-building and application should be combined in the co-production of new 
knowledge. 
The conceptual framework delivered in the first wave of this research was grounded in data from 
the case studies, thus, theory building was conducted in the context of application. In the second 
wave of this research the conceptual framework was applied to reassess the case study sites. This 
resulted in the co-production of new knowledge; the top four barriers to the pursuit of potentially 
disruptive innovations had been identified. However, nowhere else could this final feature of mode 
2 collaborative research be more clearly seen than in the third and final wave of this research. 
Theory building led to the development of the DPM intervention, this was applied in the industrial 
settings of cases A and B, and the resultant effect was the co-production of new knowledge on the 
deep set root causes of inappropriate resource allocation routines and how they prevent 
organisations from pursuing potentially disruptive innovations. 
In sum, it is believed that this research has been based upon the correct delivery of the mode 2 
collaborative approach. 
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An evaluation of the quality of the inter-organisational 
collaboration: 
A special interest group on 'inter-organisational relations' was established by the British Academy 
of Management, in order to assist in shaping the research agenda of the coming years. Gray (2004) 
recently attended this forum and presented a significant review of extant literature regarding inter- 
organisational collaboration. In summarising the complementarities and tensions in the context of 
collaboration, she offered four theoretical propositions, of what could be thought of as idealistic 
collaboration measures. Many of the members of this group have displayed support for these 
propositions and her work continues. In the absence of any other such comprehensive yardstick the 
current investigation will use Gray's propositions to assess the quality of the collaborative approach 
that was adopted. 
Idealistic Collaboration Proposition 1: An increase in social capital among stakeholders leads to a 
greater likelihood of improved future collaboration. 
Putman (1993) defines social capital as features of social organi5ations, such as trust, norms, and 
networks, which facilitate co-operative action for mutual benefit. At the onset of this research 
significant attention was given to team and trust building. Furthermore a focus was kept upon 
social activities at all group meetings - in fact social time proved to be as fruitful for gaining 
insights into the case study organisations as formal work time. Norms emerged that were 
supportive to open, frank and honest discussion. And each of the core group members used their 
extensive intra and inter organisational networks to bring extra richness to the data collection. 
In July 2004, at the fl'nal meeting of the research group, 10 of the 17 core members reported that 
this investiqation had been the most fun and the most fruitful research programme that they had 
been involved in for many a year. 
It was observed that as trust and openness increased so did the quality of the collaboration and the 
quality and depth of the data collection and data analysis exercises. 
Also at the final meeting of the research -group, 
11 of the 17 core members expressed their 
interest in pursuing the initiation of another working group to extend the research programme. 
Idealistic Collaboration Proposition 2: Successful collaborations need to address the tensions 
between need for shared meaning and diversity. 
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The research group, as expressed earlier, was highly diverse. This led to many circumstances where 
tensions arose. However, these were minimised by two factors: 
- The rapid pursuit of construct equivalence (Welkenhuysen-Gybels and Van de Vijver, 2001), 
which generated a common language and reduced frustrations surrounding translation or 
misunderstanding of terminology. 
- The embracing of diversity ensuring a "no ideas are bad philosophy" and by allowing 
individuals to develop and present their own thoughts. Furthermore, people were encouraged 
to conduct rapid experiments with new ideas and to report back to the group. 
Moreover, the high levels of social capital drove the group to find consensus regarding difficult 
issues. 
ldcafi5tic Collaboration Proposition 3: Resilient domains have the greatest potential for being 
responsive to the domain level problem they were created to resolve. 
This research was conducted as part a 33 month research programme. The nature of such a fixed 
duration prevented the research group from becoming a 'resilient domain'. Instead, the group took 
the form of a 'fad domain' (Gray, 2004), however, to avoid the impact of the research being short 
lived and unable to create lasting systems, two issues have emerged: 
Firstly, a commercial focus was encouraged. This meant that the management practitioners were 
creating resilient domains internal to their own organisations. This has helped to maintain the 
momentum of energy into the topic of disruptive innovation within the participating organisations 
and has underpinned Case B's and Case D's decisions to internalise the DPM methodology and Case 
C's experimentation with further company assessments using the conceptual framework. 
Secondly, a number of the participants, along with the author, were at the time of writing this 
thesis considering channels for further collaborative work. 
Idealistic Collaboration Proposition 4: Achieving integrative, learningrequires an a5sumption that an 
inteqrative outcome may be pos5ible and acceptance of at lea5t a 5m.? fl degree of ri5k to find out 
The management practitioners who entered into this programme of research activities did so under 
the agreement that they did not know what would materialise - the bonding factor was an interest 
in the topic of new product/service development and the desire to better understand the 
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phenomenon of disruptive innovation. As the group consisted of non-competitive organisations the 
participants were keen to share their perspectives. This situation, combined with the fast 
emergence of high levels of social capital, ensured that there was no one member of the group who 
thought that they had an answer to the research problem that would be better than what we could 
achieved jointly as a team. 
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